Government alternation is a fundamental compound of any efficient democracy and it could be seen both as an empirical evidence (in democracy there is government alternation) or as an ideal pattern of competition (in democracy there should be government alternation). However, to what extent do democracies work according to such an ideal pattern? A «Government Turnover Index» (GTI) is provided to answer this question with respect to 524 governments in 22 European contemporary democracies since World War II. As suggested by the data and by the GTI, there is no necessary link between democratic competition and government alternation, although some democracies are more likely to experience it. It is therefore necessary to direct the analysis towards some systemic factors which may favour or hinder government alternation (such as the party system structure and the institutional framework).

Government alternation and Patterns of Competition in Europe. Comparative data in search of some explanations

IERACI, GIUSEPPE
2012-01-01

Abstract

Government alternation is a fundamental compound of any efficient democracy and it could be seen both as an empirical evidence (in democracy there is government alternation) or as an ideal pattern of competition (in democracy there should be government alternation). However, to what extent do democracies work according to such an ideal pattern? A «Government Turnover Index» (GTI) is provided to answer this question with respect to 524 governments in 22 European contemporary democracies since World War II. As suggested by the data and by the GTI, there is no necessary link between democratic competition and government alternation, although some democracies are more likely to experience it. It is therefore necessary to direct the analysis towards some systemic factors which may favour or hinder government alternation (such as the party system structure and the institutional framework).
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11368/2498550
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