Epistemic probabilities in argumentation frameworks are meant to represent subjective degrees of belief in the acceptance of arguments. As such, they are subject to some rationality conditions, taking into account the attack relation between arguments. This paper provides an advancement with respect to the previous literature on this matter by casting epistemic probabilities in the context of de Finetti’s theory of subjective probability and by analyzing and revising the relevant rationality properties in relation with de Finetti’s notion of coherence. Further, we consider the extension to Walley’s theory of imprecise probabilities and carry out a preliminary analysis about rationality conditions in this more general context.

On rationality conditions for epistemic probabilities in abstract argumentation

VICIG, PAOLO
2014-01-01

Abstract

Epistemic probabilities in argumentation frameworks are meant to represent subjective degrees of belief in the acceptance of arguments. As such, they are subject to some rationality conditions, taking into account the attack relation between arguments. This paper provides an advancement with respect to the previous literature on this matter by casting epistemic probabilities in the context of de Finetti’s theory of subjective probability and by analyzing and revising the relevant rationality properties in relation with de Finetti’s notion of coherence. Further, we consider the extension to Walley’s theory of imprecise probabilities and carry out a preliminary analysis about rationality conditions in this more general context.
2014
9781614994350
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11368/2808926
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