Natural aptitude (Naturell) in Kant’s doctrine of character

In his first two Critiques, Kant makes a distinction between the empirical and the intelligible character. Yet, in his Pragmatic anthropology Kant adds the human beings’ “natural aptitude” (Naturell) to the customary dichotomy of “way of sensing” and “way of thinking”. In this paper, I investigate Kant’s concept of natural aptitude in his Pragmatic anthropology and in his Lectures on anthropology. Most probably, Kant’s sources lie in the Scholastic doctrine of the “character of scholars” (Meier). The “good mind” that Kant associates with the human beings’ natural aptitude – in sharp contrast with the autonomy implied by moral character – nevertheless reveals its significance in compensating for the human species’ “pragmatic predisposition”. To some extent, then, natural aptitude contributes to the pursuit of nature’s providential goals.