

Asymmetric alliances and high polarity: evaluating regional security complexes in the Middle East and Horn of Africa

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ABSTRACT

The Middle East and the Horn of Africa exist in two distinct regional security complexes (RSCs), groupings of states exhibiting intense security interdependence within a distinct region, but rarely between regions. Recent geopolitical changes and related analyses, however, point to either a subsuming or a joining of the two RSCs, potentially leading to a high degree of uncertainty in two conflict-prone regions. Given the importance of such developments, we question this theory of RSC expansion by offering a concise review of recent security interactions between the two RSCs as well as quantitatively and qualitatively measuring the material power capabilities of relevant states. Borrowing from and contributing to RSC theory, we also identify and analyse concepts and indicators such as threat perception and sub-regional alliances. Our findings demonstrate the Middle East RSC is not expanding to include that of the Horn of Africa. The two remain distinct and under internal consolidation, despite the current discourse. Rather, high polarity in the Middle East coupled with often-congruent interests in Horn of Africa states best explains the current pattern of their interaction, particularly as Middle East states pursue strategies that further their own security interests at the expense of rival states within their own RSC.

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Introduction

The interactions between states of the Middle East and those of the Horn of Africa have recently garnered much attention. Ten years ago, literature on the topic was limited.¹ A rash of economic and political deals, however, characterises what appears to be an increasingly close relationship between states that geographically inhabit two distinct regional security complexes (RSCs): the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Briefly, but discussed in greater detail below, RSCs are characterised by an intense degree of security interdependence. In other words, an RSC is ‘a group of states whose primary security concerns link together

sufficiently closely so that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.²

Regional systems can change and be reconfigured, unlike the global system which is by nature closed. Any change in the international system, however, may have profound implications through the introduction of uncertainty and instability.³ Thus, should the Middle East regional security complex (MERSC) integrate with or subsume the Horn of Africa regional security complex (HOARSC), it would be important for three reasons. First, it would be one of the few instances where one RSC has joined another. Indeed, RSCs are more often characterised by their respective consolidation as separate and distinct complexes.⁴ Second, there are serious security and political implications for the two RSCs. Both are characterised by a high degree of instability, omnibalancing⁵ and incongruence between regime security and state security.⁶ Third, the joining of the unstable MERSC with the volatile HOARSC would likely see a rise in uncertainty with resulting opportunity spaces for conflict as well as rebalancing when security interdependence among Middle East states is transferred to or taken on by Horn of Africa states. Some have described the actions of MERSC states in the HOARSC as having 'facilitated geopolitical tensions and regional rivalries that risk militarizing the region and impacting human security by reinforcing more state-centric conceptions of security concentrated on territorial and border disputes.'⁷ According to another publication, 'the idea that regional security complexes [of the Horn of Africa and the Middle East] are mutually exclusive is becoming less credible [...] Military and economic priorities are intimately related, creating new and complex regional boundaries.'⁸ Verhoeven baldly noted that the geographic extent of ideological and religio-political standoffs and visions previously confined to the MERSC are 'no longer limited to the Gulf itself or even the Middle East; the imagined security complex has been expanded to include the Horn of Africa.'⁹ This trajectory is unidirectional and unstoppable, according to the current narrative about the MERSC and its relationship with the HOARSC.¹⁰ Accordingly, and given the security and political implications of such a development for the region and the world, we pose and attempt to answer the following question: Is the MERSC joining with and possibly subsuming the HOARSC?

Following the Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier analytical framework, we assume that security orders within RSCs are driven by three explanatory variables: (1) regional structure (material capabilities and polarity); (2) regional power roles (leadership, custodianship, protection); and (3) regional power orientations (status quo, cooperation, long-term design).¹¹ In addition, and borrowing from regional security complex theory (RSCT), we identify and analyse concepts and indicators such as threat perception and sub-regional arrangements. Importantly, this article uses the existing analytical frameworks developed for the conceptualisation and classification of an RSC and order. It provides neither a new definition nor a different regional order classification. Rather, it aims to test empirically whether or not the security dynamics of the MERSC have been gradually absorbed by those of the HOARSC. In doing so, the article contributes to RSCT by demonstrating key variables within each complex that engender increased interaction.

The article is organised into four main sections. The first section introduces the main tenets of the RSC, the theoretical framework within which the research is developed. Subsequently, the article provides a concise primer of, and analyses the growing security interaction between, the MERSC and the HOARSC. The third section identifies, contextualises and compares key RSC concepts and indicators. The fourth section forms the conclusion.

Dynamics of RSCs

Buzan and Wæver formulated a 'regional security complex' theory that claims to evaluate the relative power and mutual relationship between regionalising trends on the one hand and globalising trends on the other.¹² The RSC theory has been formulated as an inter-operational theory that includes both realist and liberal approaches to the study of international relations. However, the theory has constructivist roots, and the term 'region' does not identify a purely geographical area, but is defined by the security relationships between existing units, as the action of any one of them inevitably has effects on the other units of the complex. The relations within RSCs are determined not only by the geographic proximity of the states involved, but also by the anarchic nature of the international political system, interests, interdependent behaviours and interconnected perceptions. An RSC is 'a geographically limited as well as materially and perceptually specific example of international anarchy with the corresponding internal amity/enmity relationships.'¹³ In other words, RSCs do not refer to any group of countries but are, in part, socially constructed because they are contingent on the security practice of the actors. They are also reliant on the 'tyranny of geography'¹⁴ and must possess a degree of security interdependence sufficient both to establish them as a linked set and to differentiate them from surrounding RSCs.¹⁵

This framework is relevant because it offers the possibility of systematically linking the study of internal conditions, relations among units in the region, relations between regions, and the interplay of regional dynamics with global powers. The main tenet of the regional system is that the system can change and reconfigure, unlike the global system which is by nature closed.¹⁶ Some scholars have argued that even regions in which material and ideal boundaries seem innate and unalterable are, in fact, the product of political constructions and, as such, continue to be subject to attempts at reconstruction and modification.¹⁷ To determine the transformation as well as the consolidation of the essential structure of the RSC, one or more changes must occur (excluding the geographical variable): the composition of units and differentiation between them, the patterns of amity/enmity and the distribution of power between units. Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde divided the effects of such changes into four distinct categories: maintenance of the status quo, internal transformation, external transformation and overlay.¹⁸ For the aims of this article it is important to highlight the last two so as to gauge to what degree, if any, the dynamics of overlap transformation and overlay are occurring between the two RSCs. First, *external transformation* occurs either through modification of the external boundary – contraction or expansion – or the inclusion or exclusion of a state whose relative power determines a change in the internal power balance of the region. Second, *overlay* occurs when one or more powers outside the RSC intervene directly with the effect of stifling the dynamics of internal security.¹⁹ Specifically, the process of overlay differs from normal interventions by external powers since the latter 'transcends mere penetration', resulting in the definition of 'the dynamics of security within the regional complex'.²⁰ Moreover, overlay usually results in the long-term stationing of external powers' armed forces in the region, and in 'the alignment of the local states according to the patterns of powers rivalry'.²¹

Constructivists argue RSCs are shaped by the relationships between units along an amity/enmity continuum. The realist approach, while maintaining the centrality attributed to the systemic level, considers regions as expressions of material interests regardless of the presence of transnational and ideational factors.²² The realist interpretation is

particularly useful because it lists conditions that may lead extra-regional actors to intervene beyond their RSC: (1) the relative power of external actors must be greater than that of local actors; and (2) the former must find a specific interest to justify their engagement in a different RSC.²³

Increased interaction

As a starting point, we posit that the HOARSC²⁴ should not be considered part of the MERSC,²⁵ despite some countries like Somalia and Sudan being members of the Arab League and having significant interactions with Arabian Peninsula states.²⁶ Furthermore, not all MERSC states are involved in the HOARSC. Indeed, our findings and analysis indicate patterns of uneven engagement over the past decade. However, what links the MERSC states of Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Qatar, Iran and Egypt is that they have demonstrated both the intent and the capacity to engage significantly with the majority of states in the HOARSC over the past 10–20 years. Some, such as KSA and Egypt, have been involved quite substantially since the 1960s and the era of decolonisation. Engagement by Turkey, the UAE and Qatar, on the other hand, dates back approximately one decade.²⁷

The cumulative effect of these interactions has led some to see an increased interdependence, indeed a subsuming of one RSC by the other.²⁸ The geopolitical reshuffling following the 2011 Arab Spring upheavals and the pursuit of new alliances have certainly strengthened or reinvigorated the interdependence and interconnections between the two RSCs. The proactive policies of the MERSC states, coupled with complementary efforts by HOARSC states – particularly Ethiopia and Somaliland – have arguably moved far beyond traditional trade and familial links to issues of politics and security.²⁹ We therefore posit that high polarity in the MERSC – as explained below – has stimulated overlapping rivalries and created the conditions for increased engagement of certain MERSC states with those of the HOARSC. Furthermore, the change in patterns of security interaction has been accompanied by what some scholars see as the militarisation of the HOARSC by MERSC states,³⁰ though this analysis has been pointedly critiqued.³¹ Markers of such developments were the 2014 steep drop in oil prices that further encouraged Arab Gulf States to diversify their economies, and the launch of military operations in Yemen in 2015 by a Saudi-led coalition that was partially supported by Eritrea and Sudan.³²

The war in Yemen

Buzan and Wæver considered the Bab-el Mandeb Strait to be one of the two fault lines between the MERSC and the HOARSC. Yet it is the historical, geopolitical role of Yemen along with the flow of Iranian weaponry across this ‘fault line’ that has increased security interactions between the two RSCs more than anything else.³³ Furthermore, it is precisely events such as the Iranian supply of weaponry to the Houthis via the lengthy and sparsely inhabited HOARSC shores and the related jockeying for influence in the HOARSC that have been characterised as an effective expansion of the boundaries of the MERSC to the Horn. Indeed, it was perceptions of Iranian influence in internationally isolated states such as Sudan and weapons shipments from Eritrea that the Saudi-led coalition, spearheaded by

the UAE, attempted to stem. They did so through a combination of personal diplomacy and oil as well as significant aid packages. So effective was the UAE's engagement with Asmara, for example, that by 2015, Eritrea had agreed to lease its Hanish Islands and facilities at the port city of Assab to the UAE for 30 years. This was one piece of a much wider UAE–Eritrea security agreement. Other MERSC states had already followed suit or would soon do so.

Turkey and the Arab Gulf States in the Horn

In 2013, a Turkish company took over the refurbishment and running of Mogadishu Airport in Somalia.³⁴ In 2014, another Turkish company assumed operations at Mogadishu's port.³⁵ In 2015, in the *de facto* independent but internationally unrecognised Republic of Somaliland, the UAE's DP World signed a tripartite agreement with Somaliland and Ethiopia to develop and manage the Port of Berbera for 30 years.³⁶ Two years later, another UAE port company, P&O Ports, won a 30-year concession for the management and development of a port project at Bosaso in Somalia's Puntland.³⁷ KSA has reportedly been building a military base in Djibouti since 2016,³⁸ and Qatar is credited for providing the resources leading to the election of Somalia's sitting and previous presidents.³⁹

In 2017, Turkey established a military training facility for the Somali National Army (SNA), further entrenching Turkish interests in Somalia and ringing alarm bells in capitals across the HOARSC and MERSC states.⁴⁰ The same year, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and then-Sudanese President Omar al Bashir signed a US\$650 million agreement to restore the old Ottoman port of Suakin and construct a dock for civilian and military vessels.⁴¹ Press reports on both sides of the Red Sea immediately raised concerns about a possible escalation of tensions in the region, hinting that the Turkish presence was meant to destabilise the Egyptian government.⁴² Related analyses argued the deal gave 'Turkey a military presence in the Red Sea via Sudanese territorial waters, though masked as counter-terrorism and protection for military ships.'⁴³ Raising further alarm, Qatar announced a US\$4 billion plan to develop and manage the port. Then, in June 2017, the split in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) led to a situation whereby internal GCC political dynamics increasingly affected relations with, and regional dynamics in, various HOARSC states. The following February, Djibouti forcibly removed Dubai's DP World from the Doraleh container port. In April 2018, Somalia seized nearly US\$10 million from a UAE airplane carrying diplomats and diplomatic cargo in Mogadishu, thereby curtailing the UAE's presence in Mogadishu and ending its support and training mission to the Somali military. Despite these potentially conflict-inducing scenarios, the HOARSC also witnessed opportunities for the opposite.⁴⁴

Peace deals and poles of power

Stunning scholars and policymakers alike, in July 2018, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki reached an agreement to re-establish official relations between the two countries.⁴⁵ They were hosted in Abu Dhabi and then Jeddah, where they signed a seven-point peace agreement. The two Gulf monarchies encouraged the rapprochement with promises of considerable financial and hydrocarbon aid to both countries.⁴⁶ While

it seems that the general Eritrean and Ethiopian alignment with the Saudi-led bloc and related inducements resulted in the easing of tensions, recent changes internally in both countries, but particularly Ethiopia, likely played a larger role and should be scrupulously highlighted.⁴⁷

These steps are closely intertwined with changes in the distribution of power within the regional system. According to some, the current Middle Eastern regional system is characterised by two competing poles: on the one hand, the politicisation of sectarianism pitting a Saudi-led Sunni bloc against an Iran-led Shia bloc and, on the other, an intra-Sunni cleavage around the mobilisation of political Islam.⁴⁸ However, after the Arab Spring, the regional system is now arguably home to three poles and configured in terms of material and ideological distributions of power. Specifically, the split within the GCC is related to a regional system dynamic that has led some to describe a consolidation of interests, even an alliance, between Qatar and Turkey.⁴⁹ Despite the paucity of hard evidence for something even loosely resembling an alliance,⁵⁰ a strategic partnership between Turkey and Qatar would form a third pole in addition to the Arab Sunni and Iranian Shia poles.

This tri-polarity in the MERSC has given new impetus to the search for allies and spheres of influence beyond the traditional boundaries of the MERSC (*external transformation*), particularly in the HOARSC.⁵¹ In the tri-polar logic, the HOARSC represents an appendix of the strategic projection of the three poles. As such, we argue that the high polarity inherently present in the MERSC – a polarity that is engendered as much by the lack of a clear hegemon as by the presence of shifting would-be hegemons – is instructive in explaining the current pattern of MERSC states' interaction with the HOARSC. In essence, this tri-polarity constitutes a greater impetus for certain MERSC states to engage with HOARSC states to pursue strategies that further their own security interests at the expense of rival states within their own RSC.

Seizing the initiative: the actions and reactions of Horn of Africa states

We posit that the growing interdependence between the two RSCs has induced shifts in the regional distribution of power and created new threats and opportunities for HOARSC states as they have attempted to exploit this dynamic of security interactions. Indeed, various states, acting on their own perceived interests, have endeavoured to capitalise on the reshuffling of the MERSC power balance in order to consolidate their domestic structures and regimes, as well as to pursue their own strategic interests in maximising their share of finite power. Ethiopia, for example, has capitalised on MERSC state rivalries to reinforce its position as would-be hegemon of the HOARSC.⁵² Although its deal with Eritrea perhaps highlights an affinity for the Saudi-led bloc, Addis Ababa has managed to present itself as equidistant from all three Middle Eastern poles. Especially since 2015, Ethiopia has been able to enhance its geostrategic relevance, its absolute power and the potential of its economy to attract investment and political support from different MERSC partners. This is demonstrated by the fact that the growing Saudi role in Ethiopia – while certainly not a zero-sum game – is being offset by its significant trade relations with Turkey.⁵³ Similarly, the existence of Qatari investment in Ethiopia has not prevented Addis Ababa from currying favour with the UAE to support Ethiopia's strategic need for ports. Indeed, UAE investments in regional ports coupled with peace with Eritrea are opening new routes for Ethiopian goods, thereby reducing its dependence on Djibouti.⁵⁴ Even these economic evaluations have weighed in the

normalisation of relations with Eritrea, which seems to have gained much from these contingencies. Considered for years the rogue state of the region and a destabilising influence, Eritrea has recently embarked on a process of international re-legitimisation, beginning with its abrupt severing of military and diplomatic relations with Iran in 2015.⁵⁵ That same year, it received support from certain GCC states for its participation in anti-Houthi operations in Yemen.

Events in Eritrea mirror those in Sudan. Khartoum has consistently demonstrated hedging behaviour, making deals and winning support from MERSC states in all three poles. It has curried favour, albeit unevenly, with GCC states despite its stalwart support (almost alone among Arab states) of Iran.⁵⁶ However, the loss of oil revenues after South Sudan independence in 2011⁵⁷ prompted Khartoum to seek new friends and funds. From 2014 to 2015, Sudan seized on a Saudi offer of financial support, breaking its ties with Tehran and supporting Saudi-led operations in Yemen. Internal political change in Sudan, relatedly, eased friction with Egypt. Following the advent of the GCC crisis, Sudan again shifted its stance. The choice to consolidate the regime's defense links with Turkey and Qatar cooled Khartoum's relations with the Saudi-led bloc and reinvigorated tensions with Egypt, with events surrounding the removal of Omar al Bashir's from power in April 2019 leading to even greater uncertainty.

Perhaps the state most affected by the recent uptick in MERSC interest in the HOARSC is Somalia. When the GCC crisis erupted, the Saudi-led bloc reportedly pressured Somalia to choose sides and sever ties with Qatar. Mogadishu demurred and attempted to chart a publicly neutral course.⁵⁸ This stance, coupled with the UAE's development of ports in the breakaway region of Somaliland and the autonomous region of Puntland, has raised tensions between the two states. This led to Mogadishu's decision to ban DP World from operating in Somalia.⁵⁹

Actors, indicators and context

Actors and resource arrays

We again highlight the two conditions mentioned in the first section that must be in place to push extra-regional powers to intervene beyond their regional borders and generate increased interaction between different RSCs. One of these was met when external actors from the MERSC justified their engagement in the HOARSC on account of the Yemen crisis with the consequent decision of the Saudi-led coalition to launch a military offensive. The other condition – that the relative power of external actors must be greater than that of local actors – is highlighted by our analysis of MERSC and HOARSC states' material power capabilities. As shown in [Tables 1](#) and [2](#), the MERSC states possess a relative power far superior to that of HOARSC states. While these measures are arguably snapshots that lack nuance and fail to convey true power arrays, few would argue that the Gulf States, Turkey, Egypt and Iran possess higher gross domestic products (GDPs) and human development indices, for example. It is precisely the glaring disparities in terms of material resources – military as well as economic – that have informed so many recent analyses characterising HOARSC states as passive, lacking agency and initiative, and therefore offering fertile ground for MERSC states to extend their influence.⁶⁰ The section cataloging the actions and reactions of Horn

Table 1. Middle East regional security complex material power capabilities: (I) military power (SIPRI) and personnel (Cow Index); (II) economic power (GDP, GINI Index); (III) demographic power; (IV) Human Development Index.

| Country | Population ^a | GDP ^b | IISS ^c | SIPRI ^d | PwrIndx ^e | Military personnel ^f | Gini Index ^g | CINC ^h | HDI ⁱ |
|---------|-------------------------|------------------|-------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Egypt | 97,041,072 | 235,369,129.34 | 5,330 | 2,774 | 0.2751 (12) | 1,329,250 | 31.8 ^j | 0.225 (21) | 0.696 (115) |
| Iran | 82,021,564 | 439,513,511.62 | 15,882 | 14,548 | 0.3131 (13) | 934,000 | 38.8 ^k | 0.418 (15) | 0.798 (60) |
| KSA | 28,571,770 | 683,827,144.29 | 56,898 | 69,413 | 0.4636 (26) | 256,000 | // ^l | 0.286 (19) | 0.853 (39) |
| Qatar | 2,314,307 | 167,605,219.78 | 4,404 | 2,171 ^m | 2.1132 (100) | 12,000 | // | -0.231 (89) | 0.856 (37) |
| Turkey | 80,845,215 | 851,102,411.12 | 8,764 | 18,190 | 0.2216 (9) | 710,000 | 41.90 | 0.463 (12) | 0.791 (64) |
| UAE | 6,072,475 | 382,575,085.09 | // | 24,400 ⁿ | 1.0157 (65) | 64,000 | // | -0.123 (51) | 0.863 (34) |

^a Source: World Bank database 2016.

^b GDP 2016 current prices. Source: World Bank database: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>

^c Defence spending by country, 2016. Source: International Institute for Military Studies, Annual.

^d Military expenditure by country, 2017. Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2017: <https://www.sipri.org/databases>

^e The Global Firepower ranking utilises over 55 individual factors to determine a given nation's PowerIndex (PwrIndx) score. A perfect PwrIndx score is 0.0000, which is realistically unattainable in the scope of the GFP formula. The global rank is given in parentheses. Source: Global Firepower list: <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>

^f Source: Global Firepower list.

^g The Gini Index is a statistical measure of distribution. It measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus, a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. Data are estimates provided by the World Bank, and those for some countries (Qatar, UAE and KSA) are not available.

^h The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) is a statistical measure of national power created by J. David Singer for the Correlates of War project in 1963. It uses an average of percentages of world totals in six different components. The components represent demographic, economic and military strength. Data refers to the CINC as of 2007. The global rank is shown in parentheses. Source: National Material Capabilities, Correlates of War Dataset v. 5.0: <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities>

ⁱ The Human Development Index (HDI) is a tool developed by the United Nations to measure and rank countries' levels of social and economic development. The global rank is shown in parentheses. Source: United Nations Development Programs, 2016: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>

^j Data refers to the year 2015.

^k Data refers to the year 2014.

^l No data is available.

^m Data refers to the year 2010.

ⁿ Data refers to the year 2014. The latest data are not available.

Table 2. Horn of Africa material power capabilities: (I) military power (SIPRI) and personnel (Cow Index); (II) economic power (GDP, GINI Index); (III) demographic power; (IV) Human Development Index.

| Country | Population ^a | GDP ^b | IIS ^c | SIPRI ^d | PwrIndx ^e | Military personnel ^f | Gini Index ^g | CINC ^h | HDI ⁱ |
|-------------|---------------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Djibouti | 956,985,000 | 1,764,268.47 | // | // ^k | // | 10,000 | // | 0.00015 (146) | 0.476 (172) |
| Eritrea | 4,474,690.00 ^l | 2,607,739.84 | // | // | // | 202,000 | // | 0.00226 (57) | 0.440 (179) |
| Ethiopia | 102,403,196.00 | 73,000,980.43 | 451 | 497 ^m | 0.8771 (51) | 138,000 | 39.1 ⁿ | 0.00386 (42) | 0.463 (173) |
| Somalia | 14,317,996.00 | 6,752,653.10 | // | // | // | 20,000 | // | // | // |
| South Sudan | 12,230,730.00 | 2,904,114.90 | 76 | 60 | 2.0989 (99) | 185,000 | // | // | 0.388 (187) |
| Sudan | 39,578,828.00 | 95,584,380.03 | // | 3721 | 1.1592 (70) | 244,000 | // | 0.00308 (49) | 0.502 (167) |

^a Source: World Bank database 2016.

^b Source: World Bank database: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>

^c Source: International Institute for Military Studies, Annual.

^d Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2017: <https://www.sipri.org/databases>

^e Source: Global Firepower list: <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>

^f Source: International Institute for Military Studies.

^g Data are estimates provided by the World Bank.

^h Source: National Material Capabilities, Correlates of War Dataset v. 5.0: <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities>

ⁱ Source: United Nations Development Programs, 2016: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>

^j No data is available.

^k No data is available.

^l Data refers to the year 2011.

^m Highly uncertain data.

ⁿ Data refers to the year 2015.

of Africa states certainly disputes this claim by demonstrating robust, complex and multi-directional sets of security and other engagements between the two RSCs.

Variables

Interdependent rivalries and perceptions of threat

The assessment or national perception of threats by relevant MERSC and HOARSC states is the first indicator analysed to answer the research question. We use a multi-level approach to understand national threat assessments in the current multipolar system, as based on neoclassical theory.⁶¹ This is because threats can emanate from great powers and extra-regional actors (systemic level), or regional powers in the locale (sub-systemic level), or domestic opponents (domestic level). This variable is also considered a major indicator within RSCs because it defines the level of complementarity of value among the actors.⁶² In other words, threat perceptions are important determinants of security interdependence. Within an RSC, each member is faced with all three levels: systemic, sub-systemic and domestic. The sub-systemic level is of primary concern, as it encompasses the threats mutually perceived by the actors that constitute the RSC. Indeed, these usually define the lines of rivalry within the complex.

In [Table 3](#), we analyse first- and second-tier national security threats, emanating generally from external states. We define first-tier external threats as threats coming from states possessing both the ability and the intent to cause catastrophic harm to the national security of the country. We define second-tier external threats as threats emanating from states possessing the possible ability and intent to cause serious harm to the national security of a country.

Admittedly, the list of states in [Table 3](#) will be the subject of some dispute given its qualitative nature. To be clear, we emphasise that [Table 3](#) is instructive *vis-à-vis* the aims of this paper and was completed by reviewing the relevant literature associated with threat perceptions of states *vis-à-vis* external states in both RSCs over the *longue durée*.⁶³ Additionally, these are perceptions of external threats rather than perceived threats coming from within the states, as discussed in the next section.

Table 3. First- and second-tier threat assessments for relevant states in Middle East and Horn of Africa regional security complexes (RSCs).

| Country | RSC | First-tier national security threats (external) | Second-tier national security threats (external) |
|----------|----------------|---|--|
| Turkey | Insulator | Russia | Iran |
| UAE | Middle East | Iran | States supportive of Muslim Brotherhood (Turkey, Qatar) |
| KSA | Middle East | Iran | Yemen (Iranian influence) |
| Qatar | Middle East | Iran | Quartet of states involved in GCC crisis (KSA, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain) |
| Iran | Middle East | Israel and its ally, the USA | Sunni bloc led by KSA |
| Egypt | Middle East | Iran and 'Shia Crescent' and/or States supportive of Muslim Brotherhood (Turkey, Qatar) | Riparian Nile states (particularly Ethiopia, but also Sudan etc.) |
| Ethiopia | Horn of Africa | Somalia (Somali irredentism) | Sudan, Egypt |
| Sudan | Horn of Africa | South Sudan | Ethiopia, Egypt |
| Somalia | Horn of Africa | Ethiopia | Kenya |
| Eritrea | Horn of Africa | Ethiopia | Djibouti |
| Djibouti | Horn of Africa | Ethiopia | Eritrea |

Table 3 is important because it clearly demonstrates that the boundaries of the two RSCs in question remain the same. Indeed, none of the HOARSC states assesses any of the MERSC states as a first-tier or second-tier threat to its own national security. Likewise, the states of the MERSC do not identify any first-tier or second-tier threat coming from states of the HOARSC. To wit, states in the MERSC each perceive their primary and secondary external threats as other states within the same RSC. The same holds true for states in the HOARSC. Such evidence partially answers our question as to whether or not the two RSCs remain separate and distinct. The only aberrations we observe are Turkey and Egypt. According to Buzan and Wæver's theory, Turkey is an insulator or buffer state which, for reasons of geography and history amongst others, straddles the boundaries between the European and Middle Eastern RSCs.⁶⁴ In 2003, Turkey's interest in the MERSC, moribund for much of its post-Ottoman history, was revived, and Turkey is now fully engaged in this RSC.⁶⁵ Egypt, on the other hand, is part of the Levantine sub-complex of the MERSC but maintains a significant security interaction with states in the HOARSC because of the importance of the Nile River to Egypt's political and economic security.⁶⁶

Internal threats and external support

In Table 4, we analyse perceptions of internal threats. Because no clear hegemon exists in either RSC, both regions are characterised by a high degree of uncertainty that leads to constant balancing strategies. Furthermore, a distinction must be made between regime security and national security in any analysis of internal threats. As demonstrated below, many of the internal threats listed constitute a threat to the regime rather than to a state

Table 4. Internal threat perceptions for relevant states in Middle East and Horn of Africa regional security complexes (RSCs).

| Country | RSC | Internal threats | Contiguity (states) | External support (states) |
|----------|------------------------|--|--|---|
| Turkey | Insulator ^a | Violent Kurdish separatist movements (PKK); Gülen movement (FETÖ) | Yes (Syria, Iran, Iraq) | Varies (Syria, Iraq) |
| UAE | Middle East | Muslim Brotherhood | No | Unclear |
| KSA | Middle East | Violent jihadi groups (AQ, IS); Shia minority | No | Yes (Iran) |
| Qatar | Middle East | Unclear, possibly rival branch of the ruling Al-Thani family with support from abroad | No | Unclear |
| Iran | Middle East | Kurds, Azeris, Baloch, Sunni Arabs; Mojahedin-e Khalq (MeK) | Yes (Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan) | Varies (Iraq in concert with other Sunni Arab states) |
| Egypt | Middle East | Muslim Brotherhood; violent jihadi groups (AQ, IS) | Yes (Israel/Palestine, Libya) | Varies |
| Ethiopia | Horn of Africa | Somali minority, other ethnic groups (dependent on which group holds leadership position in Addis Ababa) | Somalia, Sudan | Varies (Somalia, Sudan) |
| Sudan | Horn of Africa | Darfur separatist movement (JEM, SLM) | Yes (Chad, Libya) | Varies (Chad, Libya) |
| Somalia | Horn of Africa | Separatist regions (Somaliland, Puntland, Jubbaland); violent jihadi groups (al-Shabaab) | Yes | Yes (Ethiopia, Eritrea) |
| Eritrea | Horn of Africa | Anti-Afwerki regime individuals and groups | No | Yes (Ethiopia) |
| Djibouti | Horn of Africa | Unclear | No | Unclear |

^aDiez, "Turkey, the European Union and security."

and its people. Therefore, we define primary and secondary internal threats as politicised and motivated groups – whether ethnic, ideological, religious or a combination thereof – which are perceived by the state as having the ability and intent to cause serious harm to the regime, the state, or both.

Table 4 will be the subject of some dispute, for the same reasons as Table 3. However, we highlight that it is instructive for the same reasons: it assists in answering our research question. In doing so, it further demonstrates that perceptions of internal threats by the various states of both RSCs are relational and, at times, affected by states within the same complex. In other words, while Turkey and the UAE – often described in analyses as external state rivals in the Horn of Africa – may perceive each other as nascent threats, they come from the same RSC. Importantly, while the UAE and Turkey may quibble in the HOARSC, neither perceives a state from that RSC as constituting either an external threat or one which may influence a perceived internal threat.

Sub-regional alliances or cooperative arrangements

The third variable considered is alliances or cooperative arrangements such as trade or security blocs. As Ayooob noted, 'quite a few of these arrangements are subregional alliances that define the line of regional rivalry and polarization.'⁶⁷ But these groupings also reportedly help to stabilise the RSC by promoting a balance of power *vis-à-vis* the rival actors and reducing the conflict within their own membership.

In the MERSC, the GCC is a prime example of this despite the recent crisis. However, in the HOARSC, few robust sub-regional cooperative arrangements exist that are not financed and heavily influenced by external actors. Furthermore, the only arrangements that all HOARSC states belong to are the African Union (continent-wide membership) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Eritrea's absence is notable, for example, in the East African Standby Force (EASF), and Somalia is not a member of the Common Market for Southern and Eastern Africa (COMESA).⁶⁸ Similarly, while KSA recently expressed an interest in creating and supporting, economically and politically, a new entity involving Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Yemen, Somalia and Jordan that spans the two RSCs with the aim of achieving stability, this initiative is vague and lacks definite goals.⁶⁹ As such, it may fare little better than other trade and security arrangements proposed between states or regional arrangements in two differing RSCs, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) or France's project of a Mediterranean Union, established in 2008.⁷⁰

Despite a significant number of bilateral initiatives between states in the MERSC and HOARSC, none of these demonstrate a conclusive overlap between the two RSCs. Indeed, the relative paucity of alliances and cooperative arrangements that characterises both complexes may engender rather than calm rivalry. Additionally, some have argued that agreements between states in the two complexes involving infrastructure, security and human capital development, such as Turkey's agreement with Somalia to train the SNA or the development of the ports of Bosaso and Berbera by UAE companies, may actually increase the likelihood of both proxy conflict and inter-state conflict in the Horn.⁷¹ This is a critical point and one that not only bolsters the answer to our research question but contributes to RSCT. In essence, the heightened polarity currently present in the MERSC – a situation of tri-polarity, according to some⁷² – is useful in explaining the increased security interaction of certain MERSC states in the HOARSC. The high degree of polarity exacerbated by the absence

of a clear regional hegemon leads certain MERSC states to engage in balancing and/or revisionist behaviour with states in the HOARSC. These actions are pursued to enhance their own security interests at the expense of rival states within their own RSC. In other words, states in the MERSC would initiate or become involved in either conflict or rebalancing actions in the HOARSC (such as the Eritrea–Ethiopia rapprochement) precisely because these security interactions would potentially have the result of limiting or curbing the influence and position of other, rival states in the MERSC. In the corollary, HOARSC states would initiate or become involved in conflict or rebalancing behaviour, such as peace talks, within their own RSC because of issues of distribution of power within the HOARSC, rather than attempting to influence events through security interactions in the neighbouring MERSC. Ethiopia’s diplomatic push with Somaliland to curry the interest of the UAE in Berbera, in other words, was driven by regional and domestic interests. However, it dovetailed with the UAE’s own strategic interest in curtailing the influence and power of other MERSC states, particularly Iran.

Conclusion

The reported shift of the MERSC’s western border towards the HOARSC is due not only to the geographical and cultural proximities but also to the high disparities in wealth and weaponry between states of the HOARSC and MERSC that allow the formation of asymmetric alliances. Consequently, some would see the greater involvement of MERSC states (*external powers*) as generating progressive and rapid change in the dynamics of both internal conflict and amity/enmity patterns that increasingly assume the characteristics of MERSC rivalries (*overlay*). However, despite the ever-growing interaction between the countries on both sides of the Red Sea, there is a lack of evidence of overlay. Instead, our measures and analysis of three critical variables demonstrate that the two RSCs remain separate and distinct even though high polarity in the MERSC, exacerbated by the lack of a clear regional hegemon, means that interregional rivalry spills into the HOARSC, thereby influencing the security interactions of the two RSCs. Yet rather than internalising and sharing MERSC rivalry dynamics and interests, HOARSC states have attempted to capitalise on the MERSC rivalry. They can do so precisely because they are not part of the same RSC and therefore their costs of doing so are lower. What is true for the HOARSC also holds true for the relevant MERSC states, albeit to a lesser degree. That is, Turkey, Qatar, KSA, Iran and other states have neither begun to internalise nor begun to share HOARSC rivalries beyond exploiting or using them to grow their own power and influence in the region at the expense of their MERSC rivals.

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Notes

1. Ulrichsen, "Geopolitics of Insecurity"; Lefebvre, "Iran in the Horn of Africa."
2. Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 190.
3. Gaddis, "The Long Peace"; Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change"; Koslowski and Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics."
4. Troitskiy, "Central Asian Regional Security Complex."
5. The concept of omnibalancing was developed by David in "Explaining Third World Alignment," and refers, particularly in this article, to the difference between threats posed to the state leadership of, say, Egypt, rather than to threats to the state. As explicated by Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, the leaders of Egypt, in particular, have attempted to maintain power by balancing between perceived domestic threats to the regime and perceived external threats to the state as a whole. Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, "Foreign Policymaking in the Middle East," 246–50.
6. Mayall, "Battle for the Horn"; Legrenzi and Calculli, "Middle East Security," 221; Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, "Foreign Policymaking in the Middle East," 246–50; Woldemariam, "'No War, No Peace' in a Region."
7. Kabandula and Shaw, "Rising Powers and the Horn of Africa," 13.
8. Huliaras and Kalantzakos, "Gulf States and the Horn of Africa," 72. Verhoeven, "The Gulf and the Horn," 335, also cites the potential for changes in the currently separate HOARSC and MERSC: 'The geographically evermore expansive designs for regional order of the leading actors in the Gulf and the Horn are not solely contested by other aspiring hegemon within their respective subregions, but are clashing with those on the other side of the Red Sea'. Additionally, the International Crisis Group highlighted the perception that 'The extension of the Middle East's fault lines into the region have unsettled already fraught relations among Horn states and led their leaders to recalibrate their policies toward neighbours and outside powers alike'. ICG, "United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa."
9. Verhoeven, "The Gulf and the Horn," 349. Another notable Horn of Africa scholar recently noted a 'new regional order' emanating from the MERSC into the HOARSC: 'the [Saudi-led] coalition [in Yemen] would likely remain politically committed to the Horn in a way that has no real historical parallel, even if the war in Yemen came to a conclusion and the purported Iranian threat in the Red Sea basin were to be fully neutralized. Put differently, this is no temporary excursion'. Woldemariam, "Old Game, New Stakes."
10. The analyses of think tanks as well as media reports and journal articles maintain an intent focus on the perceived projections of power by new state actors in the Horn. Indeed, the word 'scramble' – a throwback to the nineteenth-century European colonial scramble for Africa – appears to be the nomenclature of choice. For example, in July 2018, *The Economist* proclaimed: 'The UAE is scrambling to control ports in Africa'. In October 2018, a headline in *The East African*, published in Nairobi, read 'Scramble for Eritrea likely to change Horn, Nile geopolitics'. Even the *London Review of Books* featured a blog post entitled the 'Scramble for the Horn' in mid-2017.

11. Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier, "Regional Powers and Security"; Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier, *Regional Powers and Security Orders*.
12. Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*.
13. McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 63; Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 40.
14. Funston, *Government & Politics in Southeast Asia*, 295–6.
15. Geographical variables are central to regional security complex theory. Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 70.
16. Lake and Morgan, *Regional Orders*; Kelly, "Security Theory in the 'New Regionalism,'" 203.
17. Katzenstein, *A World of Regions*.
18. Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework*, 13–4.
19. *Ibid.*, 14. See also Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 61–4.
20. Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 61.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Merom, "Realist Hypotheses on Regional Peace."
23. Taliaferro, "Neoclassical Realism and the Study of Regional Order," 81–2.
24. See Map 7 in Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 231.
25. See Map 5 in Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 189.
26. Buzan and Wæver based their analysis on the 'firm consensus among the experts' on the subject, such as Clapham and Tibi. Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 188.
27. Verhoeven, "The Gulf and the Horn," 340–2; Cannon, "Foreign State Influence."
28. Huliaras and Kalantzakos, "Gulf States and the Horn of Africa," 64. Verhoeven, "The Gulf and the Horn," 349. Woldemariam, "Old Game, New Stakes"; Kabandula and Shaw, "Rising Powers and the Horn of Africa," 13; Telci and Horoz, "Military Bases in the Foreign Policy," 161.
29. Ethiopia's and Somaliland's efforts to engage Arab Gulf States in development projects and rivalries, particularly at the Berbera Port, are detailed by Rossiter and Cannon, "Re-Examining the 'Base.'" Verhoeven, "The Gulf and the Horn," provides an excellent primer of the age-old links across the Red Sea. However, he also aptly demonstrates Saudi Arabia's long-term interest in the Horn, particularly Sudan. Donelli, "Ankara Consensus," highlights how Turkey has nurtured long-standing geopolitical interests throughout the Horn.
30. Telci and Horoz, "Military Bases in the Foreign Policy."
31. Rossiter and Cannon, "Re-examining the 'Base.'"
 32. The Houthis are Zaydi Shiites, or Zaydiyyah. Their grievances against Yemen's ruling elite date back years, resulting in an insurgency that took control of the capital, Sana, in 2015. Iran is a source of support to the movement in the form of weapons and training. The Houthis and Iranians share a common enemy in Saudi Arabia. Bruce Riedel, "Who Are the Houthis and Why Are We at War with Them?," *Brookings*, December 18, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/>
33. Telci and Horoz, "Military Bases in the Foreign Policy," 147–9.
34. For an overview of Turkish involvement in Somalia, see Donelli, "Hybrid Actor in the Horn of Africa."
35. Cannon, "Deconstructing Turkey's Efforts in Somalia," 113–4.
36. Verhoeven, "The Gulf and the Horn," 350–1; Cannon and Rossiter, "Ethiopia, Berbera Port," 16.
37. Meester, Van den Berg, and Verhoeven, *The Political Economy of Gulf Investments*, 47. P&O Ports is a sister company of DP World, and though they share the same chairman, DP World is owned by the Dubai investment company Dubai World while P&O Ports is owned by the state entity Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation (PCFC).
38. Joseph Braude and Tyler Jiang, "Why China and Saudi Arabia Are Building Bases in Djibouti," *Huffington Post*, December 6, 2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-braude/why-china-and-saudi-arabi_b_12194702.html (accessed November 26, 2018).
39. Qatar built its relations with individuals and groups in Mogadishu beginning in 2006, and began using its resultant political clout along with large financial incentives to reportedly swing the presidential elections in favour of its desired candidates in both 2010 and 2017. Despite its inability to project hard power to the region on account of its small population, in the political realm Qatar has been the kingmaker in Mogadishu for nearly a decade. See Cannon, "Foreign State Influence."

40. Rossiter and Cannon, "Re-examining the 'Base.'"
41. Ali Kucukgocmen and Khalid Abdelaziz, "Turkey to Restore Sudanese Red Sea Port and Build Naval Dock," *Reuters*, December 26, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-sudan-port/turkey-to-restore-sudanese-red-sea-port-and-build-naval-dock-idUSKBN1EK0ZC> (accessed December 14, 2018).
42. "Sudan, Turkey Deny Military Naval Base Deal," *Sudan Tribune*, December 29, 2017, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article64364> (accessed September 23, 2018).
43. Kbandula and Shaw, "Rising Powers and the Horn of Africa," 10–1.
44. Weber, *Red Sea: Connector and Divider*; Woldemariam and Young, "After the Split."
45. AFP, "Ethiopia, Eritrea Sign Statement That War 'Has Come to an End,'" *The East African*, July 9, 2018, <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/africa/Ethiopia-Eritrea-sign-statement-that-war-has-come-to-an-end/4552902-4654052-50srfd/index.html> (accessed November 28, 2018).
46. Aaron Maasho, "UAE to Give Ethiopia \$3 Billion in Aid and Investments," *Reuters*, June 16, 2018, <https://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFKBN1JC07G-OZABS> (accessed November 28, 2018); Nizar Manek, "Saudi Arabia Brokers a New Ethiopia–Eritrea Peace Deal," *Bloomberg*, September 17, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-17/ethiopia-eritrea-leaders-sign-peace-accord-in-saudi-arabia> (accessed December 2, 2018).
47. Fisher and Gebrewahd, "Game Over?."
48. Santini, "New Regional Cold War."
49. Aras and Akpınar, *Turkish Foreign Policy and the Qatar Crisis*; Oktav, "Quo Vadis Turkey–GCC."
50. Cannon, "Foreign State Influence."
51. On the concept of 'tripolarity,' see Schweller, "Tripolarity and the Second World War"; Wohlforth, "Stability of a Unipolar World."
52. Rossiter and Cannon, "Re-examining the 'Base,'" 15–7.
53. Ethiopia remains the biggest recipient of Turkish direct investment in Africa and its fourth largest trading partner on the continent. Sano Akino, "Turkey Jockeys with China for Influence in Africa," *Asian Review*, May 12, 2018, <https://www.asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-Relations/Turkey-jockeys-with-China-for-influence-in-Africa> (accessed November 18, 2018).
54. Ethiopia reportedly imports and exports 95% of its goods through the Port of Djibouti. Anudalem Sisay Gessesse, "Ethiopia to Trade Using Regional Ports," *The East African*, April 11, 2015, <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Ethiopia-to-trade-using-regional-ports/2558-2682324-11idtdp/index.html> (accessed December 14, 2018).
55. Salih Noor, "Eritrea: Why Change Abroad Doesn't Mean Change at Home," *African Arguments*, September 12, 2018, <https://africanarguments.org/2018/09/12/eritrea-why-change-abroad-change-home/> (accessed January 10, 2018).
56. Lefebvre, "Iran in the Horn of Africa"; Lob, "Islamic Republic of Iran's Foreign Policy."
57. Sudan lost 75% of its oil reserves after the southern part of the country became independent in July 2011. Oil revenue constituted more than half of Sudan's revenue and 90% of its exports. See Sharfi, "Dynamics of the Loss of Oil Revenues."
58. This publicly neutral stance was understandably questioned by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi when Somalia President Mohamed Farmajo reportedly signed a US\$200 million financing deal with Doha to refurbish government buildings, construct city roads and build schools. Aggrey Mutambo, "Somalia, US and UAE Relations Telltale of Suspicions," *Daily Nation*, April 28, 2018, <https://www.nation.co.ke/news/africa/Somalia-US-and-UAE-relations-telltale-of-suspicions/1066-4535116-14riujsz/index.html> (accessed December 12, 2018).
59. Somalia has not been a unitary, sovereign state since the outbreak of its civil war in 1991. Officials in Mogadishu remain unable to extend their writ of government across a number of federal districts or states, including two *de facto* or largely autonomous regions: Somaliland and Puntland. Additionally, the governments in each state often assume differing positions from Mogadishu, and may establish their own relations with different MERC states and poles.
60. Braden Fuller and Valentin D'Hauthuille, "Exporting (In)Stability: The UAE's Role in Yemen and the Horn of Africa," *ACLEDDATA*, October 10, 2018, <https://www.acleddata.com/2018/10/10/>

exporting-instability-the-uaes-role-in-yemen-and-the-horn-of-africa/ (accessed December 10, 2018). See also “Ethiopia: The Thorny New Port Deal on the Horn of Africa,” STRATFOR Snapshot, <https://www.stratfor.com/article/ethiopia-port-deal-presents-thorny-issue-horn-africa-berbera-somaliland-farmajo>; *Somalia and the Gulf Crisis*. International Crisis Group: Crisis Group Africa Report 260; Martina Stevis-Gridneff, “Middle East Power Struggle Plays Out on New Stage,” *Wall Street Journal*, June 1, 2018, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/global-powers-race-for-position-in-horn-of-africa-1527861768> (accessed December 10, 2018).

61. Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell. *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*.
62. Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*.
63. For example, and regardless of Turkey’s currently uncomfortable alliance-of-convenience with Russia in Syria, Turkey’s mistrust of Russia dates back centuries and has resulted in multiple wars. Since the demise of the USSR, Turkey still considers Russia’s build-up of the Black Sea fleet, its presence in Syria (and what it means for Turkey) and its omnipresent interest in controlling the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits to be existential threats. See Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy,” 167–9; Toucas, “Turkey Has No Allies.”
64. Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 344.
65. Ayata, “Turkish Foreign Policy”; Ehteshami, “Middle East Middle Powers”; Hazbun, *Regional Powers and the Production of Insecurity*.
66. Egypt’s position had been consistently anti-Ethiopian for at least the previous 50 years, supporting Somalia in 1977 against Ethiopia, and Sudan in 1976 against Ethiopia. Egypt worries about control of the Nile waters, and thus opposed the secession of South Sudan from Sudan, and Ethiopia’s building of the Grand Renaissance Dam on the headwaters of the Blue Nile. Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 243.
67. Ayoob, “Regional Security and the Third World,” 6.
68. Bruce Byier, *Regional Organisations in Africa – Mapping Multiple Memberships*. ECDPM, 2017, <https://ecdpm.org/talking-points/regional-organisations-africa-mapping-multiple-memberships/> (accessed November 12, 2018).
69. “Saudi Arabia Announces Creation of Entity for Red Sea, Gulf of Aden Countries,” *Al Arabiya English*, December 12, 2018, <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2018/12/12/Saudi-Arabia-announces-creation-of-entity-for-Red-Sea-Gulf-of-Aden-countries.html> (accessed December 23, 2018).
70. Hollis, “Europe in the Middle East,” 390–2.
71. Rossiter and Cannon, “Re-Examining the ‘Base,’” 177–80; Telci and Horoz, “Military Bases in the Foreign Policy,” 157–8; Khan, *Gulf Strategic Interests*.
72. Khairuldeen Al Makhzoom and Adel Albdeewy, “Race to the Sea: Qatar and the Balance of Power in the Middle East,” *Open Democracy*, July 30, 2017, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-africa-west-asia/khairuldeen-al-makhzoomi-adel-albdeewy/qatar-MiddleEast-power-US-SaudiArabia-Iran-Turkey-Egypt-GCC-gulf> (accessed July 12, 2018).

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