

Ronny Boogaart, Bart Garssen, Henrike Jansen, Maarten van Leeuwen, Roosmaryn Pilgram, Alex Reuneker (Eds.)

Proceedings of the *Tenth Conference of the
International Society for the Study of
Argumentation*



Ronny Boogaart, Bart Garssen, Henrike Jansen, Maarten van Leeuwen, Roosmaryn Pilgram, Alex Reunecker
(Eds.)

Proceedings of the Tenth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation

Published by:
Sic Sat
P.O. Box 3267
1001 AB Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Preface

The *Tenth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation* (ISSA), held at Leiden University, the Netherlands, from 4-7 July 2023, drew together around 250 argumentation scholars from a wide variety of disciplines, including AI, (speech) communication, critical discourse analysis, education, informal logic, law, linguistics, media studies, philosophy, political science, pragmatics, religious studies, rhetoric, and more. The Proceedings of the conference reflect the richness and evolution of our discipline.

The keynote speakers of the Tenth ISSA edition were Isabela Fairclough, Robert Rowland and Christopher Tindale. Their papers can be found in these Proceedings, together with the regular papers of 91 other conference participants who submitted their contributions. The Proceedings start with the keynote papers, and are followed by the regular papers, arranged in alphabetical order. It should be noted that the contents of the papers remain the responsibility of the respective authors. Authors are free to submit their contribution elsewhere.

We are very grateful for the financial and/or material support that we received for organizing this conference from the Leiden University Centre for Linguistics (LUCL), John Benjamins Publishers, the Sciential International Centre for Scholarship in Argumentation Theory (Sic Sat), and Springer Academic Publishers, and from everyone else who supported us, in particular Margot Starckenburg as LUCL's conference manager, and our student assistants Koen Cornelissen and Mila van Nieuwenhuizen for helping out with these Proceedings. We would also like to thank Frans van Eemeren and Ton van Haften for their invaluable contributions as members of the conference's Planning Committee.

1 September 2024

The editors: Ronny Boogaart, Bart Garssen, Henrike Jansen, Maarten van Leeuwen, Roosmaryn Pilgram and Alex Reuneker

Table of Contents

Keynote speakers

ISABELA FAIRCLOUGH – Impossible Conversations Across Radically Different “Frameworks”. A Critical Rationalist approach to deep disagreements	1
ROBERT C. ROWLAND – In Defense of Pragmatic Reason. Responding to the Postmodern Challenge	25
CHRISTOPHER W. TINDALE – The Secret Lives of Arguments	37

Regular papers

PARICHEHR AFZALI – Argumentative Style Across Cultures. A Corpus-Based Comparative Study of Standpoint Presentation by Iranian and Norwegian Learners of English	58
SCOTT AIKIN & JOHN CASEY – The Ambitious and the Modest Meta-Argumentation Theses	75
LAURA ALBERTI, L. PAUL STRAIT & G. THOMAS GOODNIGHT – The Rule of Law, Stases, and the Polarizing Style Public Argument and Paradiastole	82
JOSÉ ALHAMBRA – Argumentation by Analogy as a Comparison of Argumentative Relationships	92
SATORU AONUMA – Between IS and AS: Legal Fiction as Rhetorical Argument	104
SHARON BAILIN, MARK BATTERSBY & DANIEL COHEN – The Virtues of Virtue for Inquiry, Argumentation and Education – Pace Paglieri	115
LUKAS BECK & REBECCA KIDERLEN – Rhetorical Topos Analysis Considerations for a systematic method of argumentation analysis	125
SARAH BIGI, CHIARA MIDEA, VALENTINA NOSEDA & SIBILLA PARLATO – Caregivers’ Reasoning about Oncological Treatment in Online Discussions. A comparative analysis	138

PETAR BODLOVIĆ, MARCIN LEWIŃSKI, ELENA CABRIO & SERENA VILLATA – Explanatory Dialogues and Digital Medicine	150
EMANUELE BRAMBILLA – On Alcide de Gasperi’s Argumentative Defence of Trieste at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference	163
ANN E. BURNETTE & WAYNE L. KRAEMER – The 2022 US National Security Strategy Responding to new threats in an evolving world	178
JOHN CASEY & SCOTT AIKIN – What About Whataboutism?	187
LEAH CECCARELLI & COLLIN SYFERT – Climate Scientists as Rhetorical Citizens. Public Argumentation in Persuasive Op-Eds	196
CLAUDIA COPPOLA & SARA GRECO – Argumentation and Agency for Building Ethos in an Italian Bank’s Institutional Website	205
SILVIA CORRADI – The Role of Ethos in Legal Rhetoric	218
DANIEL DE OLIVEIRA FERNANDES & STEVE OSWALD Insinuated vs Asserted Ad Hominem. An Experimental Approach to their Rhetorical Effectiveness on Ethos	227
ANTONIO DUARTE – Fallacies as Cultural Representations	236
MICHEL DUFOUR – Did Aristotle Write on Fallacies?	244
DOROTTYA EGRES – Scare Tactics, Media Capture and the Pandemic. Argumentative Style in the Online News Media	254
LISA EICHHORN – Rhetorical Questions as Argumentative Devices in U.S. Supreme Court Dissenting Opinions	265
G.C. GODDU – Arguments as Propositions that are a Kind of Act?	276
VADIM GOLUBEV – Propaganda in Russian Media Coverage of the War in Ukraine. Emotion vs. reason	286
JEAN-CLAUDE GUERRINI – The Use of Diagrams in Argumentation. Logical, Argumentative and Rhetorical Approach	297
HANS V. HANSEN – Argumentation: What It Is & How to Do It	313
HANS V. HANSEN & HAREIM HASSAN – Perspectives on Political Arguments	323

HANZE LIANG & SHIER JU – Argumentations in the Qur’an. A Perspective of Generalized Argumentation Theory	333
AMALIA HARO MARCHAL – Joint Meaning of Speech Acts of Arguing	340
HAREIM HASSAN – Argumentative Use of Slogans. The Case of the Egypt Uprising	346
DALE A. HERBECK & SARA A. MEHLTRETTER DRURY – Argument Ad Feminam. The Use of Gendered Attacks to Discredit the Women Participating in the 2020 Hearings of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6 th Attack on the United States Capitol	355
DARRIN HICKS – Argumentation and Discretionary Power	365
RYO HISAJIMA – How & Why Toulmin Model Became Triangular: (Over)Simplification in Japan	376
THOMAS A. HOLLIHAN & PATRICIA RILEY – Strategic Ambiguity vs. Strategic Clarity. The Defense of Taiwan	383
SALLY JACKSON – Arguing on Unlevelled Playing Fields: Local Management of Reasonableness in a Special Place for Managing Disagreement About Health	395
SALLY JACKSON & JODI SCHNEIDER – What Can Be Learned about Argument Schemes from Other Fields’ Inventions?	409
SCOTT JACOBS – Arguments and Speech Acts Reconsidered	420
MICHAEL JANAS – Motivated Reasoning and Contradictory Internet Memes. Bottomless irony and the affective conditions of assent	436
CHIARA JERMINI-MARTINEZ SORIA – What Place for Parties’ Emotions in Dispute Mediation’s Discourse?	447
YUTONG JI & YUN XIE – Deciphering the Discourse of Livestreaming E-commerce in China. From the perspective of classical rhetorical persuasion	455
ANDRÉ JUTHE & HUBERT MARRAUD – Inferentism vs Reasonism in the Analysis of Arguments	468
TOMOHIRO KANKE & JUNYA MOROOKA – A Historical Survey of Speech and Education at Mission Schools’ in Modern Japan	480

ZORNITSA D. KEREMIDCHIEVA – Irredentist Claim-Making. Legitimation Warrants for Possessive Statism in Vladimir Putin’s War Rhetoric	491
SEBASTIAN KILSBACH & NADINE MICHEL – Computer-Based Generation of Learner-Sensitive Feedback to Argumentative Learner Texts	502
MANFRED KRAUS – One-Premise Arguments. Jean Wagemans’ Periodic Table of Arguments, a Revival of Aristotle’s Topics?	510
ALEXANDRA KUZMINA – Dead-end of Argumentation: The Holocaust Analogy	519
RANDALL A. LAKE & COLLEEN M. KEOUGH – Stasis on the Greasy Grass	533
ALAIN LÉTOURNEAU – Remarks on the Challenge Raised to Argumentation Practice by Conspiracy Discourses	540
JIAXING LI – A Construction Based on Audience. A Rhetorical Interpretation of the Toulmin Model	550
XI LI – The Application of Contemporary Western Argumentation Theories in English Speech and Debate in China	562
YANLIN LIAO & ZIHAN NIU – In What Sense Do Visual Arguments Exist?	571
CARMEN LIPPHARDT & JUTTA KRAUTTER – What Constitutes an Intelligible Argument in the STEM Fields?	580
COSTANZA LUCCHINI, ANDREA ROCCI & ELENA BATTAGLIA – Epistemic and Evidential Expressions as Context-Specific Argumentative Indicators in Institutional Dialogues. A Corpus Study of Interactions in the Financial Domain	591
CHRISTOPH LUMER – Rules for Epistemically Oriented Argumentative Dialogues	605
ROSEANN M. MANDZIUK – Performing Fragility and Masking Hate. Women’s White Supremacist Rhetoric	616
HUBERT MARRAUD – Classifying Argument Models	627

MARCIA MARTÍNEZ GARCÍA – Toulmin’s ‘argument fields’: an Operational or a Critical Notion?	636
DAVIDE MAZZI – “...like their comrades who fell in 1916”: Argumentative Discours in Propaganda Sheets from the Irish Civil War	646
MATTHEW MCKEON – A Case for Different Standards of Argumentative Rationality	656
DANIEL MEJÍA S. – From An Extremist to Status Quo: Changing Consciousness on Climate Change	666
ELENA MUSI, MARIAVITTORIA MASOTINA & SIMEON YATES An Argumentative Approach to Map the Issue of Impartiality in Newsmaking and Factchecking	677
ZIHAN NIU & MINGHUI XIONG – Non-Western Legal Argumentation Study	689
MARKO NOVAK – Legal Arguments in Interdisciplinary Argumentation	701
HIROKO OKUDA – An Argumentative Approach to Representations of Fukushima. A Case Study of the Legacy Media Coverage over the Russian Invasion in Ukraine	714
PAULA OLMOS – Toulmin’s Warrants and Wittgenstein’s Hinges	723
WENQI OUYANG – Pragma-Dialectics Meets Virtue	733
OXANA PIMENOVA – Motivated Criticism in Indigenous Consultations. Why Indigenous Arguments Do Not Convince the Crown	742
CHRISTIAN PLANTIN – Arguments from Translated Chinese Classics	755
GILBERT PLUMER – Argumentative Painting	768
FEDERICO PUPPO – Sophocles’ Antigone and Its Argumentative Value. A Legal-Philosophical Reading	779
MAGNE REITAN – Relevance in Arguments	787
ELLA SCHAD, ANNETTE HAUTLI-JANISZ & CHRIS REED – The 10.000-Argument Rule. Adequacy in Theories of Argument Structure	797

ELLA SCHAD, JACKY VISSER & CHRIS REED – The Adventure of Argument: Hypothesis-Making in Fictionalised Crime	814
JODI SCHNEIDER – How Do Empirical Biomedical Research Articles Argue? Examining the Layers of Rhetorical, Domain-Specific, and Citation-Based Argumentation	824
MENASHE SCHWED – On the Question of Epistemic Norms in Argumentation	830
MASAKO SUZUKI – Sidetracking: Is It Really a Cultural Norm?	838
TAKESHI SUZUKI & STEPHEN LLANO – Republicacy: a New Compass in the Age of Trans-Science	846
SERENA TOMASI – Justice for Ageing: Rhetoric as a Tool for Legal Guidelines	860
HRISTO VALCHEV, DALE HAMPLE & JESSICA HAMPLE – How Do Bulgarians Understand the Experience of Interpersonal Arguing?	869
CHARLOTTE VAN DER VOORT – Speaking to a Divided Audience. The ambiguous strategic design of figured discourse	883
JAN ALBERT VAN LAAR – A Dialogue-Theoretical Approach to Multimodal Arguments	894
JAVIER VILANOVA ARIAS – Conductivism	905
JACKY VISSER, DIMITRA ZOGRAFISTOU, JOHN LAWRENCE & CHRIS REED – Argumentation in the Intelligence Domain	916
JIANFENG WANG – Election Denialism as Extremism in Argumentation	925
YIRAN WANG & YUN XIE – Confucius and Virtue Argumentation Theory	929
MARK WEINSTEIN & DANIEL FISHERMAN – Towards a New Paradigm for Argumentation Theory	945
FEI WEN & JINCHENG ZHAI – Classification of Information-Seeking Dialogue	958

MAGDALENA WOLSKA, BERND FRÖHLICH, KATRIN GIRGENSOHN, SASSAN GHOLIAGHA, DORA KIESEL, JÜRGEN NEYER, PATRICK RIEHMANN, MITJA SIENKNECHT & BENNO STEIN – Argumentation in Waltz’s “Emerging Structure of International Politics”	970
YINGXIU YE & XIAOMEI WANG – Argumentative Strategies Adopted by Parents and Children in Shopping Discussions	981
MARILYN J. YOUNG, DAVID CRATIS WILLIAMS & MICHAEL K. LAUNER – The Conspiracy Theory of History as Argument. Vladimir Putin's September 30, 2022, and February 21, 2023, addresses or The Paranoid Style in (Putin’s) Russian Politics (with apologies to Richard Hofstadter)	993
SHIYANG YU & FRANK ZENKER – There is More to an Argumentum Ad Ignorantiam than Epistemic Considerations	1004
IGOR Ž. ŽAGAR – Neuro-Cognitive Argumentation and (the Problem of) Other Minds	1014
DAVID ZAREFSKY – Surrogate Arguments in the Controversy Over the Annexation of Texas to the United States	1024

On Alcide de Gasperi's Argumentative Defence of Trieste at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference

EMANUELE BRAMBILLA

Department of Legal, Language, Interpreting and Translation Studies (IUSLIT)
University of Trieste
Italy
emanuele.brambilla@units.it

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the speech that Alcide De Gasperi delivered at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference, focusing on the portion in which he dealt with “the problem of Trieste”. The analysis reveals that arguments from authority, pragmatic arguments and numerical arguments were selected to discredit the peace treaty provisions objectively. However, metaphors also stand out, suggesting that De Gasperi strategically merged elements of detached and engaged argumentative styles to foster the amendment of the treaty.

KEYWORDS: argumentative style, De Gasperi, metaphors, numerical arguments, Trieste

1. INTRODUCTION

Located in the far northeastern corner of Italy, on the border with Eastern Europe, on a narrow strip of territory lying between the Adriatic Sea and Slovenia, the city of Trieste was often a bone contention between nations and powers. Notably, its port was the main outlet to the sea for the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Cattaruzza, 2017, p. 40), giving the city a significant strategic and commercial importance.

The “problematic” nature of Trieste revealed itself at the end of the two World Wars in particular. At the conclusion of the second, in early May 1945, the Allied forces led by the 2nd New Zealand Division and the Yugoslav Partisans both occupied Trieste and defeated the Nazis; this episode is known as “the race for Trieste” (Cattaruzza, 2017, p. 216).

Events assumed a frenzied pace. The surviving Germans surrendered to the Allies. Despite the National Liberation Committee's desperate attempts to deliver the city to the New Zealand General Bernard Freyberg, the Yugoslavs were the ones who took ownership of the symbols of power, namely the prefecture and city hall, where they took down the Italian flag and raised the Yugoslav flag. The officers from New Zealand were escorted to the Hôtel de la Ville as “guests.” The forty days of Yugoslav occupation of the city thus began—the event that marks the origin of the issue of Trieste. (Cattaruzza, 2017, p. 216)

The “issue” or “problem” of Trieste, thus, marked the first diplomatic crisis of post-war Europe. While waiting for the decisions of the 1946 Paris Peace Conference, the region named Venezia Giulia and comprising Italian, Slovenian and Croatian territories was divided into two areas: the A zone controlled by the Allies and the B zone controlled by the Yugoslavs.



Figure 1. The “race for Trieste”, drawn from Cattaruzza (2017, p. 222)

Despite Italy’s co-belligerence with the Allies after the Armistice of Cassibile in 1943 (Cattaruzza, 2017, p. 180), the country was “considered an ally of Germany” (Cattaruzza, 2017, p. 225) and “treated as a defeated state” (Cattaruzza, 2017, p. 289) at the 1946 Peace Conference, where “representatives of twenty-one Allied nations met with representatives of Germany’s former allies – Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Finland, and Italy – over a period of ten weeks” (Blumenthal, 2021, p. 22).

At the Paris Peace Conference of 1946, both the Italian and Yugoslav delegations presented several arguments in favor of their territorial demands. As a defeated nation, Italy gave up the principle of “strategic” border, falling back onto the idea of “ethnic” border, similar to the one proposed by the American President Woodrow Wilson at the end of World War I. (Cattaruzza, 2017, p. 2)

The option of an “ethnic border” was the most realistic, as “this line was also the most equitable from a national point of view” (Cattaruzza, 2017, p. 225).

Nonetheless, the ethnic criterion was also crucial for Yugoslavia. As a victor state, it could assert a broad interpretation of that principle, by pushing its application as far as the extreme limits of the western Slovenian settlements. (Cattaruzza, 2017, p. 3)

As a result, the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty “forced Italy to give up almost all the territories on the Adriatic Sea that had been conquered in World War I” (Cattaruzza, 2017, p. 3). As Figure 2 shows, “the Italian border was set at Duino, whereas the area of Trieste and a strip of the Italian northern coast were supposed to form the Free Territory of Trieste” (Cattaruzza, 2017, p. 289), “ruled by a governor appointed by the United Nations Security Council” (Cattaruzza, 2017, p.226).



Figure 2. Paris Peace Treaty, 1947, drawn from Cattaruzza (2017, p. 230)

Before the actual signing of the treaty, at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference Alcide De Gasperi had delivered a speech before the representatives of the victorious Allied powers to explain his country's views on this decision and, in general, on "the peace treaty's harsh terms" (White, 2020, p.129). It was 10th August 1946. Within his address, the Prime Minister of the Italian Republic devoted considerable time and effort to arguing about the territorial clauses and "the problem of Trieste".

On August 10, 1946, in his speech to the Paris Peace Conference, De Gasperi expressed his bitterness over the fact that the French line no longer set the border between Italy and Yugoslavia, but rather between Yugoslavia and the Free Territory. He declared that the new border damaged the integrity of the nation, and foresaw a future when the TLT [Free Territory of Trieste] might become the theater of grave international conflicts that would engulf the neighboring states. (Cattaruzza, 2017, p. 228)

De Gasperi had already spoken in favour of Italy and Trieste in his meetings with the Council of Foreign Ministers, which had been created at the 1945 Potsdam Conference and was charged to prepare the draft peace treaties (Cattaruzza, 2017, p. 224).

De Gasperi had travelled to Paris in May to plead the cause of Trieste again. There seemed to be grounds for some hope, but in early June came news of plans to create the Free Territory of Trieste and to cede the whole of Istria, including the city of Pola, to Yugoslavia. (Canavero, 2019, p. 102)

One of the founding fathers of the Italian Republic (White, 2020, p. 2) and the European Union (Canavero, 2019, p. 19), De Gasperi was famous for his "pragmatic and

down-to-earth oratory” (Canavero, 2019, p. 61), as he was resolved “to convince rather than entrance, to persuade rather than receive applause” (White, 2020, p. 28). This is what he also tried to do at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference. Figure 3 shows the multiple argumentation structure (van Eemeren & Snoeck Henkemans 2017, p. 58) that underpinned De Gasperi’s defence of his standpoint in favour of the amendment of the peace treaty. This structure has been reconstructed thanks to a previous study of De Gasperi’s address that is described in Brambilla (2023).




Figure 3. Multiple argumentation in De Gasperi’s 1946 speech to the Paris Peace Conference

As Figure 3 illustrates, De Gasperi implicitly defended one main standpoint throughout his address (1. “The Peace Treaty should be amended”), and he did so by advancing multiple arguments. Argument 1.1 (“because the Peace Treaty is extremely harsh to Italy”) was used to defend standpoint 1, while the claim that the treaty was extremely harsh to Italy was further defended and explained by means of four additional arguments. Thus, the severity of the treaty was motivated by saying that the fact that Italy had fought with the Allies since 1943 had not been acknowledged in the treaty (1.1.1), the territorial clauses were harsh (1.1.2), some economic clauses were harsh (1.1.3) and the military clauses were harsh.

The analysis of De Gasperi's speech was initiated in 2022, and the results have been and will be outlined in a series of publications. Brambilla (2023) focused exclusively on the examination of the verbalisation of argument 1.1.1, concerning the defence of Italy's antifascist identity. The present paper, instead, presents the findings of the analysis of another portion of De Gasperi's memorable piece of political rhetoric, namely that corresponding to the verbalisation of his second argument (1.1.2), the one concerning "the problem of Trieste".

2. METHODOLOGY

The portion of De Gasperi's speech concerning the territorial clauses makes up 1476 words. As specified in Brambilla (2023), in Paris De Gasperi uttered approximately 3500 words, 1500 of which have already been analysed (Brambilla, 2023). In this respect, the present paper will virtually complete the examination of argumentation in the speech in question; notably, arguments 1.1.3 and 1.1.4 "occupied" a relatively small portion of the address, probably because of De Gasperi's topical choices, who selected the themes related to arguments 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 as most significant to lead the audience to consider amending the draft peace treaty.

Drawing on Pragma-dialectics, the investigation will focus on the description of how De Gasperi argued in favour of a solution to "the problem of Trieste", that's to say how he illustrated the socio-political implications of the decisions made by the Allies to render the city a "free territory" under UN administration and to force Italy to cede Istria and part of Venezia Giulia to Yugoslavia.

At the Paris Peace Conference, "Italy was subjected to decisions taken by others [...] shaped by power relations at the international level, and it was condemned to what has been defined 'the politics of impotence'" (Cattaruzza, 2017, p. 4); hence, De Gasperi's speech can be considered an instance of "a mixed difference of opinion, where two parties have advanced contradictory standpoints [and] each party has an obligation to defend his own standpoint" (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 218).

In describing the argumentative features of the speech, the analysis will be centred on the notion of *strategic manoeuvring* (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 93), to try and investigate how the speaker simultaneously pursued rhetorical effectiveness and dialectical reasonableness in order to convince the audience that the peace treaty had to be amended (partly) because the territorial clauses were too harsh. Emphasis will also be laid on the pragma-dialectical notion of *argumentative style* (van Eemeren, 2021), which will favour the description of De Gasperi's speech, characterised by elements of detached (van Eemeren, 2021, pp. 19-20) and engaged (van Eemeren, 2021, p. 21) argumentative styles alike.

As Alcide De Gasperi delivered his address in Italian, selected excerpts of the speech will be displayed in their original form, but they will be regularly accompanied by a translation into English. An official translation of the speech was published by *The New York Times* (NYT) on 11th August 1946, the day after De Gasperi delivered his address; this translation was retrieved through the Library System of the University of Trieste, which provides free access to the archives of the newspaper in question.

The aim of the present paper is not to assess the quality of the translation of the speech from Italian into English but rather to examine argumentation in favour of a solution to “the problem of Trieste”. Yet, in the excerpts shown, disputable translation choices will stick out; therefore, reference will occasionally be made to the notion of *argumentative equivalence* (Brambilla, 2020), which will foster the description of how the aspects of strategic manoeuvring characterising De Gasperi’s speech were conveyed cross-culturally and cross-linguistically.

3. FINDINGS

The section of De Gasperi’s speech that is the object of analysis in the present paper starts with the speaker expressing argument 1.1.2 explicitly, as he claimed that “The punitive character of the treaty is likewise evident in its territorial clauses”.

- (1) *Il carattere punitivo del trattato risulta anche dalle clausole territoriali. E qui non posso negare che la soluzione del problema di Trieste implicava difficoltà oggettive che non era facile superare. Tuttavia anche questo problema è stato inficiato fin dall’inizio da una psicologia di guerra, da un richiamo tenace ad un presunto diritto del primo occupante e dalla mancata tregua fra le due parti più direttamente interessate.*

The original translation of Excerpt (1) as appeared in *The New York Times* is displayed in Figure 4.

The punitive character of the treaty is likewise evident in its territorial clauses.
I will not deny, of course, that the solution of the problem of Trieste entails difficulties not easy to overcome.
However, even this problem was vitiated from the start by the persistence of war psychology, by a continuous reference to an assumed right of the first occupant and by the lack of a spirit of truce between the two parties more directly concerned.


Figure 4. Translation of Excerpt (1) in the NYT

Specifying that the territorial clauses were harsh, argument 1.1.2 was advanced in defence of argument 1.1, i.e. to support the claim that the treaty was harsh in general. The speaker, then, admitted that the problem of Trieste was objectively difficult to sort out but he maintained that the management of this problem had been “vitiating from the start by a

war psychology” and “by the lack of a spirit of truce between the two parties more directly concerned”.

As shown in Excerpt (2) and Figure 5, De Gasperi later retraced the phases that had led to the draft of the peace treaty and by doing so he advanced additional arguments.

(2) *Mi avete chiamato a Londra il 18 settembre 1945. Abbandonando la frontiera naturale delle Alpi e per soddisfare alle aspirazioni etniche Jugoslave, proposi allora la linea che Wilson aveva fatto propria quando, il 28 aprile 1919, nella Conferenza della Pace a Parigi invocava “una decisione giusta ed equa, non già una decisione che eternasse la distinzione tra vincitori e vinti”.*



On Sept. 18, 1945, you called me to London. At that time, in order to satisfy Yugoslav ethnical claims, I proposed to you to relinquish the natural frontier of the Alps and fall back on the line which Wilson had traced when, on April 23, 1919, at the peace conference in Paris he bid for “a just and equitable decision which would not draw an everlasting distinction between victors and vanquished.”

Figure 5. Translation of Excerpt (2) in the NYT

As shown in Figure 5, De Gasperi reminded his audience that he had proposed an ethnic border, similar to “the line first proposed by Woodrow Wilson at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, and adopted by the President of the Council of Ministers” (Cattaruzza, 2017, p. 225). As anticipated in Section 1, this line was named and known as “ethnic” because it was the most sensible, fair and egalitarian for the nations involved (Cattaruzza, 2017, p. 225).

From an argumentative point of view, the excerpt displayed in Figure 5 provides textual evidence of the fact that De Gasperi advanced two different arguments. First, an argument from authority (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958, p. 410), as he quoted Wilson’s words at the 1919 Peace Conference labelling the ethnic border “a just and equitable decision which would not draw an everlasting distinction between victors and vanquished”. Second, in quoting Wilson, De Gasperi also drew a straightforward analogy (Garssen & Kienpointner, 2011, p. 40) between the line set in 1919 and the one that had to be set in 1946. This analogy was used argumentatively, giving rise to an instance of descriptive analogy argumentation (Garssen, 2017, p. 41) that can be represented as follows:

1. Standpoint: The ethnic line is the best solution.
 - 1.1 Because: The ethnic line is the one proposed by Woodrow Wilson in 1919.
 - 1.1.1 And: The line proposed by Woodrow Wilson was the best solution.

After simultaneously advancing an argument from authority and an argument by analogy, De Gasperi reminded his audience that he had “suggested that the economic problem of Venezia Giulia should be solved by internationalizing the port of Trieste and by setting up a form of collaboration with the port of Fiume and with the Danube-Sava- Adriatic railway system” (*Proponevamo inoltre che il problema economico della Venezia Giulia venisse risolto internazionalizzando il porto di Trieste e creando una collaborazione col porto di Fiume e col sistema ferroviario Danubio-Sava-Adriatico*). In line with his constant search for sensible policies and tangible results (Canavero, 2019, p. 62), he specified that “the treatment of minorities should be based on parity¹ and reciprocity” (*era naturalmente inteso che si dovesse introdurre parità e reciprocità nel trattamento delle minoranze*) and reminded that it was precisely the Council of Foreign Ministers that on 19th September 1945 had opted for “an ethnic line which should leave a minimum of inhabitants under alien rule” (*la linea etnica in modo che essa lasciasse il minimo di abitanti sotto dominio straniero*).

He went on stating that, despite the appointment and fruitful work of a committee of experts, “the Yugoslavs delegates insisted, with arguments still based on the idea of punishment, for total possession of Venezia Giulia, and particularly of Trieste” (*Ma i rappresentanti iugoslavi insistettero, con argomenti di sapore punitivo, sul possesso totale della Venezia Giulia e specie di Trieste*). Then, he reminded that “there then began a strenuous search for compromise” (*Cominciò allora l’affannosa ricerca del compromesso*), which was frustrated by the decision by the English and the Americans to fall back on the French line. De Gasperi called the French line “a line of political expediency” (*una linea politica di comodo*), which left 180,000 Italians in Yugoslavia, 59,000 Slavs in Italy and excluded from Italy Pola and other minor towns along the western coast of Istria and implied therefore for us an unbearable loss” (*perché rimanevano nel territorio slavo 180.000 italiani e in quello italiano 59.000 slavi; soprattutto essa escludeva dall’Italia Pola e le città minori della costa istriana occidentale ed implicava quindi per noi una perdita insopportabile*). The speaker, however, also highlighted a positive implication of adopting the French line and introduced the theme of the Free Territory of Trieste, as shown in Excerpt (3) and Figure 6.

- (3) *Ma per quanto inaccettabile, essa era almeno una frontiera italo-jugoslava che aggiudicava Trieste all’Italia. Ebbene, che cosa è accaduto sul tavolo del compromesso durante il giugno, perché il 3 luglio il Consiglio dei Quattro rovesciasse le decisioni di Londra e facesse della linea francese non più la frontiera fra Italia e Jugoslavia, ma quella di un cosiddetto “Territorio libero di Trieste” con particolare statuto internazionale? Questo rovesciamento fu per noi una amarissima sorpresa e provocò in Italia la più profonda reazione.*

¹ In the NYT article, the Italian term *parità* was translated as *party* rather than *parity*, suggesting a certain inaccuracy in the drafting of the translated text. Notably, accuracy is, besides equivalence, appropriateness and usability, one of the four parameters of translation quality (Viezzi, 1999, pp. 146-150).

But, however unacceptable, it was still a frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia and assigned Trieste to Italy. How did it happen that on July 3 somewhere on the road of compromise, the Council of Four reversed the London decision and made the French line no longer a frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia, but the frontier of a so-called "Free Territory of Trieste."
This reversal came to us as a bitter surprise and gave rise in Italy to the strongest reaction.

Figure 6. Translation of Excerpt (3) in the NYT

After claiming that the French line was at least a solution that assigned Trieste to Italy, De Gasperi stated that the decision made by the Council of Four – namely the USA, the USSR, the UK and France – to change their minds and create a free territory of Trieste governed by the UN “came [...] as a bitter surprise” for Italy. Notably, the arguer expressed his solid position by asking a rhetorical question; yet his position was not reproduced in the form of a rhetorical question in the translated text, which thus appears less riveting and engaging than its Italian counterpart. In other words, even though the content of the speaker’s message is preserved, its form is not, jeopardising the attainment of argumentative equivalence between the Italian speech and its translation into English.

At this point, De Gasperi reiterated that the peace treaty was extremely harsh to Italy (argument 1.1), also in the light of the harsh territorial clauses (1.1.2). From this excerpt, though, he also started expressing his argument creatively and evocatively, resorting to metaphors.

- (4) *Nessun sintomo, nessun cenno poteva autorizzare gli autori del compromesso a ritenere che avremmo assunto la benché minima corresponsabilità di una simile soluzione che incide nelle nostre carni e mutila la nostra integrità nazionale. [...] La soluzione internazionale, dicevo, com'è progettata, non è accettabile e specialmente l'esclusione dell'Istria occidentale fino a Pola causerà una ferita insopportabile alla coscienza nazionale italiana. La mia preghiera non ebbe risposta e venne messa agli atti. Oggi non posso che rinnovarla, aggiungendo degli argomenti che non interessano solo la nostra nazione, ma voi tutti che siete ansiosi della pace del mondo.*

No indication, no gesture on our part could have authorized the sponsor of this solution, which maims our national unity and bites into our very flesh, to believe that we could accept responsibility for it. On June 30, as

The international solution for Trieste as planned, I stated in that message, could not be accepted, especially because the exclusion of western Istria down to Pola would inflict an unbearable wound on the Italian national conscience.

My plea found no answer. It was filed away.

Today I can do nothing more but renew it, adding certain considerations, which are of interest not only to my country but to you all who are anxious for world peace.

Figure 7. Translation of Excerpt (4) in the NYT

As shown in Figure 7, the speaker said that the solution proposed by the Allies “maims our national unity and bites into our very flesh” (*incide nelle nostre carni e mutila la nostra integrità nazionale*) and “would inflict an unbearable wound on the Italian national conscience” (*causerà una una ferita insopportabile alla coscienza nazionale italiana*). By selecting lexical items that pertain to the semantic field of war (*maims, bites into our very flesh, unbearable wound*), De Gasperi contributed to keeping public discourse in the war context in spite of the end of the conflict. After verbalising his argument creatively, the arguer clarified that he would “add certain considerations” (*aggiungendo degli argomenti*); these considerations were uttered in the form of *numerical arguments* (Andone, 2022).

According to Andone (2022, p. 688), “numbers constitute scientific evidence”. When used argumentatively, they “can offer essential insights into the benefits or undesirable consequences of a policy proposal” (Andone, 2022, p. 686).

From an argumentative perspective, we can understand numerical arguments in policymaking as premises supporting prescriptive positions in favour of a particular course of action. (Andone, 2022, p. 689)

Notably, numbers often constitute “the premises of a pragmatic argument scheme” (Andone, 2022, pp. 689-690), as pragmatic arguments are those arguments enabling audiences to judge an event or action by its favourable or unfavourable consequences (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 358).

In De Gasperi's address, numbers were generally used to quantify the extension of the given territories assigned to each nation by the treaty and to specify the number and nationality of their inhabitants, in order to corroborate the assessment of the acceptability of the treaty provisions.

(5) *Il Territorio libero, come descritto dal progetto, avrebbe una estensione di 783 kmq. Con 334.000 abitanti concentrati per 3/4 nella città capitale. La popolazione si comporrebbe, secondo il censimento del 1921, di 266.000 italiani, 49.501 slavi, 18.000 altri. [...] L'effetto di codesta vostra soluzione è che, fatta astrazione dal Territorio libero, 180.000 italiani rimangono in Jugoslavia e 10.000 slavi in Italia (secondo il censimento del 1921) e che il totale degli italiani esclusi dall'Italia calcolando quelli di Trieste, è di 446.000.*

The Free Territory of Trieste as described in the draft, would cover 783 square kilometers with 334,000 inhabitants, three-fourths of whom are concentrated in the city. The population would comprise, according to the 1921 census, 226,000 Italians, 49,501 Slavs and 18,000 of other origin.

The net result of the solution you propose is that apart from the Free Territory, 180,000 Italians are left in Yugoslavia and 10,000 Slavs in Italy (1921 census), while if you consider also Trieste you find fully 646,000 Italians are severed from their country.

Figure 8. Translation of Excerpt (5) in the NYT

As suggested in Figure 8, De Gasperi emphasised numbers concerning the Free Territory of Trieste. He first clarified that “The population of the Free Territory would comprise 226,000 Italians, 49,501 Slavs and 18,000 of other origin”; he added that “apart from the Free Territory, 180,000 Italians are left in Yugoslavia and 10,000 Slavs in Italy”; and concluded by specifying that “if you consider also Trieste, you find fully 646,000 Italians are severed from their country”. Notably, this last number (646,000) was reported incorrectly in the NYT article, as De Gasperi had specified that the number of Italians that would have been severed from their country was 446,000. This additional typo points, again, to a certain inaccuracy in the translated text.

As Andone (2022, p. 692) maintains, numbers are “employed to problematize and prioritize issues”, and so were in this passage. As numbers in policymaking are often used as premises of argumentation to support prescriptive positions in favour of a particular course of action and, therefore, function as the premises of pragmatic arguments (Andone, 2022, pp. 689-690), De Gasperi's argumentation in favour of a solution to the problem of Trieste can be reconstructed in the form of an argumentative pattern of complex problem-

solving argumentation (Garssen, 2017, pp. 36-37), as in this portion of the speech we have “a combination of a prescriptive standpoint [...] and an argument in which numbers elucidate a problem and/or a priority” (Andone, 2022, p. 689).

- (1.) (The Peace Treaty should be amended) and the Free Territory should not be created.
 - 1.1 The Peace Treaty is extremely harsh to Italy.
 - 1.1.1 The territorial clauses are harsh.
 - 1.1.1.1 226,000 Italians living in the Free Territory and, in general, 446,000 Italians would be severed from their country.
 - 1.1.1.2 Apart from the Free Territory, 180,000 Italians would be left in Yugoslavia and 10,000 Slavs in Italy.

This argumentative pattern was functional to leading the audience to understand the nature of “the problem of Trieste”, which was an ethnic and national one, boiling down to preventing internal political struggles that would escalate internationally.

- (6) *Come farà l'ONU ad arbitrare e ad evitare che le lotte politiche interne assumano carattere internazionale?*

trial centers. How will the United Nations arbitrate and prevent the internal political struggle from becoming an international one?

Figure 9. Translation of Excerpt (6) in the NYT

Figure 9 further shows that De Gasperi did not refrain from resorting to rhetorical questions to challenge the opinions of his audience; incidentally, this rhetorical question – as several others – was translated accurately in the NYT article. Immediately after asking this question, the speaker further described “the problem of Trieste”, yet without the aid of numbers but by making recourse to metaphors again.

- (7) *Voi rinserrate nella fragile gabbia d'uno statuto i due contendenti con ragioni scarse e copiosi diritti politici e voi pretendete che non vengano alle mani e non chiamino in aiuto gli slavi, schierati tutto all'intorno a 8 chilometri di distanza, e gl'italiani che tendono il braccio attraverso un varco di due chilometri?*

Do you really intend to enclose
in the fragile cage of an inter-
national statute these two adver-
saries, and still hope that they
will not come to blows? Will both
the Slavs call for the help of
their brethren deployed five miles
away around the city and the
Italians reach out, through the
narrow one-mile gap, to their
own people?

Figure 10. Translation of Excerpt (7) in the NYT

As displayed in Figure 10, too, De Gasperi did not refrain from selecting rhetorical questions as presentational devices in his speech at the Paris Peace Conference. With the rhetorical question shown in Figure 10, he compared the territorial solution proposed by the Allies to “a fragile cage” where the two parties are enclosed “with scarce rations and significant political rights”. Incidentally, this clause cannot be read in the official translation of De Gasperi’s speech, as shown in Figure 10. The omission of the translation of this pragmatically significant clause is just one example of the questionable translation choices made by *The New York Times* to inform a wider English-speaking audience of the appeals launched in Paris by the Italian Prime Minister. Reference is made in Brambilla (2023) to the numerous disputable translation choices that characterised the NYT article, which, in light of its international scope, might also have “discursively contribute[d] to justifying the sanctions and harsh provisions [against Italy] in the Peace Treaty” (Brambilla, 2023, p. 490). In that context, though, emphasis was laid on the quasi- systematic omission of – among other lexical items – the adjective *antifascist*, which seemed to intentionally conceal references to Italy’s non-fascist identity in the translation. In the portion of speech analysed in this paper, though, typos and less significant omissions stand out, suggesting a certain inaccuracy rather than a deliberate purge of De Gasperi’s themes and presentational devices. In this respect, these aspects could also have been determined by editorial choices or a hasty translation (which was published the day after De Gasperi delivered his address).

Regarding argumentation, the speaker iterated rhetorical questions and selected metaphors as presentational devices throughout this whole section of the speech and, actually, throughout the whole address. The treaty was said to “*cast its shadow* on Trieste and on its industrial activities” and, as shown in Excerpt (8) and in Figure 11, the audience was rhetorically asked the reason why they were *shutting their ears* “to the cry for help of the Italians in Istria”.

- (8) *A qual prò dunque ostinarsi in una soluzione che rischia di creare nuovi guai, a qual prò voi vi chiuderete gli orecchi alle grida di dolore degli italiani dell’Istria – ho presente una sottoscrizione di Pola – che sono pronti a partire, ad abbandonare terre e focolari pur di non sottoporsi al nuovo regime?*

What good will come of clinging to a solution which only bids for new trouble? Why shut your ears to the cry for help of the Italians in Istria—remember the appeal from Pola—who at this very moment are preparing to abandon hearth and home rather than submit to the new regime?

Figure 11. Translation of Excerpt (8) in the NYT

Notably, the noun phrase “cry for help” does not do justice to the careful choice of words whereby De Gasperi depicted the heartbreaking situation of the Italians in Istria; whereas he spoke of their “cry of pain” (*grida di dolore*), the *New York Times* gave back the picture of supplicant rather than grieved citizens.

At the same time, despite his iterated recourse to metaphors and rhetorical questions, De Gasperi never forgot, until the end of his speech, to insert his emotional appeals into a pragmatic argumentation pattern, as he highlighted again the fact that the peace treaty as it was would create new trouble (“What good will come of clinging to a solution which only bids for new trouble?”).

4. CONCLUSION

The pragma-dialectical analysis of argumentation in the portion of speech in which De Gasperi dealt with the harsh territorial clauses in the draft peace treaty and “the problem of Trieste” at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference suggests that, owing to the presence of arguments from authority, pragmatic arguments and numerical arguments, the speaker’s argumentative style can be labelled “detached” (van Eemeren, 2021, pp. 19-20). Numerical arguments were selected to provide evidence of the ethnic and national nature of the problem of Trieste, with a view to preventing political struggles at the regional and international levels. Primarily used to highlight the nationalities of given groups residing in given cities and countries, numbers functioned as premises of pragmatic argument schemes; they were used to elucidate prospective ethnic problems and, therefore, played a crucial argumentative role in the pattern of complex problem-solving argumentation that De Gasperi harnessed to discredit the treaty provisions objectively and propose a solution to the issue of Trieste.

In addition, quoting the words of American President Woodrow Wilson at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference was functional to strengthening De Gasperi’s proposal to opt for the ethnic border, which was objectively presented as the best solution to the problem of Trieste. All these argumentative choices were instrumental for the speaker to radiate objectivity, as far as the topical dimension of his speech was concerned, and to convey reliability, as far as the audience demand dimension was concerned (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2023, p. 513).

However, quoting Wilson also enabled De Gasperi to draw a straightforward analogy between the border set in 1919 and the one that had to be set in 1946. Notably, the recourse to analogy argumentation is an element that, according to van Eemeren (2021, p.

21), characterises an “engaged” argumentative style. The same holds true for metaphors and rhetorical questions, which were iterated by the arguer to reach an appealing conclusion. By challenging his audience with rhetorical questions and comparing the territorial solution proposed in the peace treaty to a “fragile cage” that “maims our national unity [...] bites into our very flesh” and “would inflict an unbearable wound on the Italian national conscience”, the speaker radiated commitment to the cause at issue (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2023, p. 513), enriching his objective arguments in favour of a solution to the issue of Trieste with unmistakable elements of an engaged argumentative style.

These analytical findings are in line with those outlined in Brambilla (2023), where De Gasperi’s strenuous defence of Italy’s antifascist identity was demonstrated to be shaped by elements of detached and engaged argumentative styles alike. As a result, this hybrid argumentative style, which shapes the whole (or at least most of the) speech that De Gasperi delivered at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference, can be said to have been selected in light of its potential to enhance the acceptability of standpoint 1 promoting the amendment of the draft peace treaty.

REFERENCES

- Andone, C. (2022). On numerical arguments in policymaking. *Informal Logic*, 42(4), 685-704.
- Blumenthal, R. (2021). *Right to Reparations. The Claims Conference and Holocaust Survivors, 1951-1964*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Brambilla, E. (2020). *The Quest for Argumentative Equivalence: Argumentative Patterns in Political Interpreting Contexts*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Brambilla, E. (2023). On the defence of antifascist Italy in Alcide De Gasperi’s 1946 speech to the Paris Peace Conference. *Discourse Studies* 25(4), 473-492.
- Canavero, A. (2019). *Alcide De Gasperi. Christian, Democrat, European*. Rome: Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) in the European Parliament, Directorate for Press and Communications.
- Cattaruzza, M. (2017). *Italy and Its Eastern Border, 1866-2016*. New York/Abingdon: Routledge.
- Eemeren, F. H. van (2010). *Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse. Extending the Pragma-dialectical Theory of Argumentation*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Eemeren, F. H. van (2021). Examining argumentative style: a new theoretical perspective. *Journal of Argumentation in Context*, 10(1), 8-25.
- Eemeren, F. H. van, & Snoeck Henkemans, F. (2017). *Argumentation. Analysis and Evaluation*. London/New York: Routledge (2nd edition).
- Eemeren, F. H. van, & Garssen, B. (2023). A functional diversity of argumentative styles. *Discourse Studies*, 25(4), 510-529.
- Garssen, B., & Kienpointner, M. (2011). Figurative analogy in political argumentation. In E. T. Feteris, B. Garssen & F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), *Keeping in Touch with Pragma-dialectics* (pp. 39-58). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Garssen, B. (2017). The role of pragmatic problem-solving argumentation in plenary debate in the European Parliament. In F. H. van Eemeren (Ed.), *Prototypical Argumentative Patterns* (pp. 31-51). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1958). *Traité de l’Argumentation. La Nouvelle Rhétorique* (6th edition, 2008). Bruxelles: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles.
- Viezzi, M. (1999). Aspetti della qualità in interpretazione. In C. Falbo, M. Russo & F. Straniero Sergio (Eds.), *Interpretazione simultanea e consecutiva. Problemi teorici e metodologie didattiche* (pp. 140-151). Milano: Hoepli.
- White, S. F. (2020). *Modern Italy’s Founding Fathers: The Making of a Postwar Republic*. London/New York, NY: Bloomsbury.