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## **WAGING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THE UNITED STATES AND THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT (1950-1972)**

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*To my late grandma, the strongest woman I have ever met.*

*To my beloved mom: for infinite hours of babysitting, assistance, prayers, and encouragement. She knows I would never have done it without her, and I have no way of rewarding her.*



## ABSTRACT

Dopo la rottura tra Stalin e Tito del 1948, la partnership jugoslavo-statunitense, che venne a crearsi negli anni cinquanta, rinforzò la svolta della Jugoslavia verso l'Occidente. L'amministrazione Eisenhower formulò in seguito la "strategia del cuneo", atta a "mantenere Tito a galla" istigando instabilità nel blocco sovietico e legando il regime jugoslavo e le sue istituzioni politiche, economiche e militari agli Stati Uniti. Concepita quale effetto collaterale delle sue politiche neutraliste e quale presupposto per la modernizzazione industriale del paese, la rinnovata collaborazione jugoslava con i partner americani è stata in prevalenza studiata nei suoi risvolti economici e politici. Cercando di colmare lacune storiografiche precedenti, questa ricerca esplora come l'amministrazione statunitense adoperò l'apertura jugoslava verso l'estero per installarvi un'estesa rete di strumenti *soft power*, attuati tramite agenzie e agenti della diplomazia pubblica come la United States Information Agency (USIA), le postazioni locali della United States Information Service (USIS) e il Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU). Nel contesto della Guerra Fredda culturale degli anni cinquanta e sessanta, i centri culturali USIS, i padiglioni americani alle fiere di Zagabria e Belgrado, le trasmissioni della *Voice of America*, i tour di musicisti classici, jazz e rock e di gruppi teatrali finanziati dal CU e dal Dipartimento di Stato americano, e il travolgente programma di una cinquantina di scambi culturali, funsero da polo di attrazione per la leadership accademica, intellettuale, artistica e politica jugoslava, veicolando lezioni sulla democrazia, libertà, sapere tecnologico, e prosperità economica americane. Basandosi su un confronto tra le fonti americane e jugoslave, la ricerca ha rivelato gli ambiti di negoziazione, accettazione e rifiuto di questi contenuti e prassi culturali, offrendo pertanto nuove conoscenze sulla porosità del confine tra libertà e coercizione, tra ciò che era permesso e ciò che era sottointeso nel regime comunista di Tito. Al termine dell'analisi si asserisce che la *soft power* statunitense abbia avuto, nel contesto delle evoluzioni di liberalizzazione del regime negli anni sessanta nonché nei risvolti di dissidenza interna, il ruolo di *input* esterno a movimenti di riforma ispirati alla decentralizzazione federalista, alle pratiche di democrazia partecipativa e alla maggiore liberalizzazione del mercato interno. Inoltre, la penetrazione nella dirigenza jugoslava di medio e basso livello e la creazione di reti, contatti e cooperazioni con numerosi intellettuali, accademici e artisti, permisero di rafforzare tendenze pro-americane e occidentali sia a livelli politici esecutivi che nell'opinione pubblica. Infine, la

fluttuazione della dirigenza comunista – a livello federale, repubblicano e locale – tra le ricezioni positive e gli atti di coercizione nei confronti degli agenti della diplomazia pubblica americana rivelò l'arbitrarietà dei confini tra libertà e coercizione del regime titoista e l'insostenibilità della “poliarchia” jugoslava, il cui “esperimento” si sarebbe rivelato, a lungo andare, fallimentare.

In the aftermath of the Yugoslav rupture with the Soviets in 1948, the Eisenhower administration conceived the “wedge strategy” to “keep Tito afloat.” While supporting Yugoslav independence, its primary goal was to instigate instability in the Soviet bloc by tying the Yugoslav regime and its political, economic and military institutions to the United States. Since the early 1950s, the Yugoslav-U.S. partnership reinforced the Yugoslav turn to the West. Regarded as a side effect of its neutralist policies and a prerequisite for the industrial modernization of the country, the renewed Yugoslav cooperation with the American partners has been mainly studied in its economic and political implications. By filling previous historiographical gaps, this research explores how the U.S. administration used Yugoslav openness to foreign countries in order to establish an extensive network of soft power channels implemented by public diplomacy agencies and agents such as the United States Information Agency (USIA), the posts of the United States Information Service (USIS) and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU). Here it is shown that, in the context of the cultural Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the USIS cultural centers, the American pavilions at fairs in Zagreb and Belgrade, the broadcasts of the Voice of America, the tours of classical, jazz and rock musicians and theater groups funded by the State Department's CU, and the overwhelming program of fifty cultural exchanges, acted as a magnet for Yugoslav academic, intellectual, artistic and political leadership, by conveying lessons on democracy, freedom, modern technical knowledge and economic prosperity. Based on a comparison between American and Yugoslav archival sources, this research has revealed the negotiations, acceptance and rejection processes of these cultural practices, thus providing new insights into the porosity of the border between freedom and coercion, between what was permitted and what was implicitly forbidden by Tito's communist regime. According to the analyzed data, the research shows that the U.S. soft power has had, in the context of the regime's liberalization trends in the 1960s as well as for internal dissident movements, the role of an external input for reforms inspired by federalist decentralization, participatory democracy and market economy. Moreover, the penetration into the Yugoslav middle

and lower-level leadership and the creation of networks, contacts, and cooperation with numerous intellectuals, academics, and artists, strengthened pro-American and Western tendencies both at the executive level and in the public opinion. Finally, the fluctuation of the communist leadership – at the federal, republican and local level – between positive receptions and acts of coercion of the American public diplomacy agents and agencies revealed the arbitrariness of the margins of freedom and oppression in the Titoist regime, and the unsustainability of Yugoslav “polyarchy,” whose “experiment” would result, in the long run, in failure.

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## NOTES ON TRANSLATION, PRONUNCIATION AND ARCHIVAL REFERENCES

The translations from Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, French and Italian are mine. The title of documents originally in Cyrillic are always provided in the Latin alphabet. In the text I use original acronyms in Serbo-Croatian, with the English translations, as well as the diacritic signs of the Serbian (Latin) and Croatian alphabet. For the translation of Serbo-Croatian acronyms, see homonym section. Serbo-Croatian is completely regular in pronunciation, and there are no silent letters. Eight Serbo-Croatian consonants do not feature in English, and four consonants appear identical but are pronounced differently. They are:

*č* is *ch* in ‘church’; *ć* is *t* in ‘mixture’; *dž* is *j* in ‘jam’; *dj* is *d* in ‘duke’; *š* is *sh* in ‘shoe’; *ž* is *s* in ‘treasure’; *lj* is *ll* in ‘million’; *nj* is *n* in ‘new’; *c* is *ts* in ‘Tsar’; *j* is *y* in ‘yet’; and *h* and *r* are always pronounced. Of the remaining consonants, *g* is always hard (as in ‘gag’), and so is *s* (as in ‘sack’). The vowels in Serbo-Croatian sound as follows: *a* in ‘father’; *e* in ‘pet’; *i* in ‘machine’; *o* in ‘hot’; *u* in ‘rule’.<sup>1</sup>

In order of uniformity of archival references, I opted for the U.S. National Archives criteria, which follows the exactly opposite sequence of the Archives of Yugoslavia, the City of Belgrade and the Croatian State Archives criteria. This means I gave the references in the following sequence: the type and title of the item, originating office, addressee, date, file number, box and/or files by name and number, series or entry title/name of the collection, record group, and name of the repository. This rule has been respected in all cases, except for the records of the SKJ’s Central Committee, which have a special identification number (a sequence of Roman and Arabic numbers) that has been inserted between the box number and the entry title. At the time that I accessed the series of the Republican Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries of SRH, located in the Croatian State Archives, the record group was still unregulated. Therefore, I refer to it by the Archives’ temporary references. For any further update, consult the archival reference room.

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<sup>1</sup> L. Benson, *Yugoslavia: A Concise History*, 2nd edition (Hound mills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), x–xi.

# CONTENTS

<b>1 INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: FROM THE OWI TO THE USIA .....	10
1.2 SOFT POWER AND PUBLIC/CULTURAL DIPLOMACY.....	16
1.3 ON SOURCES, METHODOLOGY AND THE CASE STUDIES.....	20
<b>2 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE USIA-USIS NETWORK.....</b>	<b>24</b>
2.1 INFORMATION, PERSUASION AND COOPTATION.....	32
2.1.1 <i>Policy-Making between Washington and the Field</i> .....	35
2.1.2 <i>The Country Plan for Yugoslavia</i> .....	38
2.2 THE USIS POSTS IN BELGRADE AND ZAGREB AND THE SOFT POWER REVENUE....	42
2.2.1 1950-1953: “ <i>Business is booming at USIE... </i> ” .....	47
2.2.2 1954-1959: <i>The Inspection Practices in the Field</i> .....	52
2.2.3 <i>The Cultural Approach and the Personal Contacts Policy</i> .....	54
2.3 COMMUNICATING <i>IN</i> AND <i>WITHIN</i> THE FIELD .....	60
2.3.1 <i>Reading, Listening, and Watching</i> .....	61
2.3.2 <i>American Crazy Sounds</i> .....	68
2.3.3 <i>Book Translations, IMG and the P.L. 480 Programs</i> .....	69
2.4 THE “MENACE” OF AMERICAN PROPAGANDA.....	72
2.4.1 <i>The USIS Margins of Liberty</i> .....	74
2.4.2 <i>Yugoslav Patterns of Resistance and its Cold War Positioning</i> .....	80
2.4.3 <i>Just Student “Mensa” Protests or Signs of Change?</i> .....	87
<b>3 AND THE WINNER IS ...: THE EVOLUTION OF THE USIA-USIS NETWORK AND THE 1960S REVENUE.....</b>	<b>90</b>
3.1 <i>DEMOCRACY, CAPITALISM, AND FREEDOM ON BOOKSHELVES IN YUGOSLAVIA</i> .....	91
3.1.1 <i>American Modernism and USIA Selection Policy</i> .....	93
3.1.2 <i>USIS Periodical Collection and the ‘Invaluable’ Pregled</i> .....	97
3.1.3 <i>Battles for Hearts and Minds in Books, Pamphlets and Monthly Themes</i> ...	100
3.2 USIS MOVIES WITHIN YUGOSLAV TERRITORY: FROM CENTERS TO PERIPHERIES	110
3.2.1 <i>Showing, Lending, and Educating</i> .....	112
3.3 A COLD WAR ‘CASE’: THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE IN THE AMERICAN CULTURAL MISSION IN YUGOSLAVIA.....	118

3.3.1	<i>The Voice of America Reports</i> .....	120
3.3.2	<i>Pregled Reports...: Lessons on Democracy, Freedom, and Emancipation.</i>	122
3.4	A NEW PLAN FOR THE 1960S: THE YUGOSLAV PRESS LAW AND THE USIA LEADERS ‘SHIFT’ .....	124
3.4.1	<i>Applying and Resisting the Yugoslav Press Law</i> .....	127
3.4.2	<i>A New USIA Plan for Yugoslavia: Crafting the New Yugoslav Leadership</i>	134
3.4.3	<i>The Yugoslav 1960s: Public Opinion, Leadership and the Experiment</i> .....	138
<b>4</b>	<b><i>EXHIBITED! AMERICAN MODERNITY, ABUNDANCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL VANGUARD AT THE YUGOSLAV TRADE FAIRS</i></b> .....	<b>145</b>
4.1	WASHINGTON’S EXHIBITION PROGRAM .....	149
4.2	PLEASING THE “WHETTED APPETITES” AT THE YUGOSLAV TRADE FAIRS (1955-1964) .....	152
4.2.1	<i>The “Atoms-For-Peace” Debut at the 1955 Zagreb Trade Fair</i> .....	154
4.2.2	<i>The “American Supermarket” and the Yugoslav “Kitchen Debate”</i> .....	159
4.2.3	<i>Selling the American Market Economy</i> .....	163
4.3	DISPLAYS GET SOPHISTICATED (1967-1970) .....	172
4.4	SOFT POWER COMMODITIES AND COLD WAR BATTLEFIELDS .....	175
<b>5</b>	<b><i>BETWEEN ART AND SOUND DIPLOMACY: THE CULTURAL PRESENTATION PROGRAM AND THE YUGOSLAV VOICE OF AMERICA</i></b> .....	<b>181</b>
5.1	CLASSIC STYLE, CLASSY PERFORMANCES .....	185
5.1.1	<i>The Dubrovnik Summer Festival and the Zagreb Musical Biennale</i> .....	188
5.1.2	<i>The Negro Theatre and the Vanguard Ballet</i> .....	195
5.2	JAZZ DIPLOMACY OR SIMPLY “JAZZ”? .....	202
5.2.1	<i>Big Masters, Private Arrangements</i> .....	205
5.2.2	<i>Some Final Points</i> .....	210
5.3	THE VOICE OF AMERICA SPEAKS... ..	213
5.3.1	<i>Listening in the 1950s</i> .....	219
5.3.2	<i>Listening in the 1960s Between Political Disapproval and American Jazz</i>	222
5.3.3	<i>Communist Political Anxieties</i> .....	226
5.3.4	<i>And the RAI, BBC, and Radio Moscow?</i> .....	229
<b>6</b>	<b><i>THE U.S. CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NEW/OLD LEADERSHIP</i></b> .....	<b>232</b>
6.1	THE LEADER’S EXCHANGE PROGRAM AND THE YUGOSLAV MIDDLE RANKED LEADERSHIP .....	235

6.1.1 <i>The Ideological and Policy Background</i> .....	236
6.2 THE LEP INCEPTIONS IN YUGOSLAVIA: FROM 1958 TO 1965 .....	239
6.3 THE LEP/IVP AFTER THE FULBRIGHT IN YUGOSLAVIA.....	247
6.4 THE FULBRIGHT PROGRAM COMES TO YUGOSLAVIA (1964-1970) .....	249
6.4.1 <i>The “Case” of Senator Fulbright in Yugoslavia</i> .....	252
6.4.2 <i>The Fulbright Program Changed My Life...: The First Five Years (1965-1970)</i> .....	258
6.4.3 <i>Yugoslav versus U.S. Soft Power</i> .....	262
6.5 THE ROLE OF THE STATE-PRIVATE NETWORKS IN THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AGENDA .....	267
6.5.1 <i>The GLCA Exchange and Danica Purg’s Account: Some Grey Sides of an Exchange Story</i> .....	278
6.6 A WIN-WIN POSITION OR A COLD WAR EXPERIMENT? .....	282
<b>7 MEASURING THE IMPACT: THE U.S. SOFT POWER AND THE YUGOSLAV COLD WAR ADJUSTMENT .....</b>	<b>288</b>
7.1.1 <i>The Party Measures Impact</i> .....	290
7.1.2 <i>The USIA Measures Impact</i> .....	295
7.2 THE ‘YUGOSLAV 1960S’ AND THE U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY NETWORKS .....	301
7.2.1 <i>Mihajlo Mihajlov, Perspektive, Praxis and the U.S. Public Diplomacy Network</i> .....	305
7.2.2 <i>‘Network is Power’ or the Power of Networks</i> .....	312
7.2.3 <i>Instead of a Conclusion</i> .....	314
<b>8 CONCLUSIONS .....</b>	<b>317</b>
<b>9 REFERENCES .....</b>	<b>323</b>

## LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 6-1: YUGOSLAV LEP GRANTEES IN 1959 .....	241
TABLE 6-2: YUGOSLAV LEP GRANTEES IN 1960 .....	242
TABLE 6-3: YUGOSLAV LEP GRANTEES IN 1961 .....	242
TABLE 6-4: YUGOSLAV LEP GRANTEES IN 1962 .....	243
TABLE 6-5: YUGOSLAV LEP GRANTEES IN 1963 .....	243
TABLE 6-6: YUGOSLAV LEP GRANTEES IN 1964 .....	244
TABLE 6-7: YUGOSLAV LEP GRANTEES IN 1965. SOURCE: THE DATA OF TABLE 6-1 TO 6-7 WAS COLLECTED FROM BOX 1074, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP; BOX 610 AND 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ; BOX 142 AND BOX 320, BUREAU OF EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS, MC 468, SPECIAL COLLECTION, UAL; AND THE PERIODICAL <i>PREGLED</i> FROM 1959-1969.....	245

## LIST OF FIGURES

- FIGURE 2-1: VISITORS AT READING ROOM OF THE AMERICAN LIBRARY IN ZAGREB IN 1953 (COURTESY OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, COLLEGE PARK, MD). SOURCE: ENCLOSURE 3 IN DESPATCH 4 FROM THE AMERICAN CONSULATE ZAGREB TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, JULY 3, 1953, 511.68/7-353, BOX 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 63
- FIGURE 2-2: CROWDS WAITING FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DAILY BULLETIN/BILTEN IN 1953 IN FRONT OF THE AMERICAN LIBRARY IN ZAGREB (COURTESY OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, COLLEGE PARK, MD). SOURCE: ENCLOSURE 3 IN DESPATCH 4 FROM THE AMERICAN CONSULATE ZAGREB TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, JULY 3, 1953, 511.68/7-353, BOX 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 64
- FIGURE 4-1: JOHN GLENN CAPSULE ARRIVES AT BELGRADE AIRPORT (COURTESY OF MARK TAPLIN). SOURCE: TAPLIN, MARK. "GLOBAL PUBLICKS: WALTER ROBERTS: USIS MAGAZINES AND EXHIBITS IN YUGOSLAVIA - 'I'M RED-FACED. I APOLOGIZE.'" ACCESSED FEBRUARY 22, 2016. [HTTP://GLOBALPUBLICKS.BLOGSPOT.HR/2015/02/WALTER-ROBERTS-USIS-MAGAZINES-AND.HTML](http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-roberts-usis-magazines-and.html). 166
- FIGURE 4-2: A FARM AIRPLANE DESIGNED FOR CROP SPRAYING BY PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION (COURTESY OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, COLLEGE PARK, MD). SOURCE: PHOTOGRAPHS OF AMERICAN PAVILION AT ZAGREB TRADE FAIR 1964, BOX 20, RECORDS RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE FAIRS 1951-1966, USIA ICS/EXHIBITS DIVISION, RG 306, NACP. 170
- FIGURE 4-3: FARMHAND FEEDMASTER BY DAFFIN CORPORATION ALLOWS A FARMER TO GRIND AND MIX LIVESTOCK FEED TO SUIT INDIVIDUAL NEEDS (COURTESY OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, COLLEGE PARK, MD). SOURCE: PHOTOGRAPHS OF AMERICAN PAVILION AT ZAGREB TRADE FAIR 1964, BOX 20, RECORDS RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE FAIRS 1951-1966, USIA ICS/EXHIBITS DIVISION, RG 306, NACP. 171
- FIGURE 4-4: MACHINE FOR FILM PACKAGING OF FOOD PRODUCTS BY W. R. GRACE & CO. (COURTESY OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, COLLEGE PARK, MD). SOURCE: PHOTOGRAPHS OF AMERICAN PAVILION AT ZAGREB TRADE FAIR 1964, BOX 20,

RECORDS RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE FAIRS 1951-1966, USIA  
ICS/EXHIBITS DIVISION, RG 306, NACP. 171

FIGURE 5-1: ALWIN NIKOLAIS DANCE COMPANY IN BELGRADE YUGOSLAVIA,  
SEPTEMBER 1968; NIKOLAIS DISCUSSION AT BITEF ATTENDED BY LEADING  
THEATER, BALLET AS WELL AS BY DANCERS AND OTHER THEATER PERSONALITIES  
(COURTESY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS LIBRARIES). SOURCE: PHOTOGRAPHS  
OF THE ALWIN NIKOLAIS BALLET GROUP IN YUGOSLAVIA, FOLDER 34, BOX 346,  
MC 468, SPECIAL COLLECTION, UAL. 201

FIGURE 5-2: BELGRADE, JULY 14, 1970. DUKE ELLINGTON GIVING HIS AUTOGRAPH TO  
IVANKA PAVLOVIĆ, SINGER, AFTER THE CONCERT AT THE TRADE UNION HALL (DOM  
SINDIKATA). BEHIND HIM STANDING FROM THE LEFT: MIROSLAVA JANKOVIĆ,  
CULTURAL ADVISOR USIS BELGRADE, VOJISLAV SIMIĆ, CONDUCTOR OF BELGRADE  
RTV JAZZ ORCHESTRA, AND PETAR VUJIĆ, SECRETARY OF THE ASSOIATION OF JAZZ  
MUSICIANS OF SERBIA (COURTESY OF NATIONAL ARCHIVES). 210

FIGURE 5-3: BELGRADE, JULY 14, 1970. DUKE ELLINGTON GIVING HIS AUTOGRAPH TO  
IVANKA PAVLOVIĆ, SINGER, AFTER THE CONCERT AT THE TRADE UNION HALL (DOM  
SINDIKATA). BEHIND HIM STANDING FROM THE LEFT: MIROSLAVA JANKOVIĆ,  
CULTURAL ADVISOR USIS BELGRADE, VOJISLAV SIMIĆ, CONDUCTOR OF BELGRADE  
RTV JAZZ ORCHESTRA, AND PETAR VUJIĆ, SECRETARY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF  
JAZZ MUSICIANS OF SERBIA (COURTESY OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, COLLEGE  
PARK, MD). SOURCE: PHOTOGRAPH OF DUKE ELLINGTON CONCERT IN  
YUGOSLAVIA, JULY 14, 1970, BOX 6, RECORDS RELATING TO SELECTED USIA  
PROGRAMS 1953-1999, USIA BUREAU OF PROGRAMS, RG 306, NACP. 210

# LIST OF ACRONYMS

## Source Materials

AJ, Arhiv Jugoslavije / Archives of Yugoslavia  
AJBT, Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita / Josip Broz Tito Archives  
CDF, Central Decimal Files  
CFPF, Central Foreign Policy Files  
HDA, Hrvatski Državni Arhiv / Croatian State Archives  
IAB, Istorijски Arhiv Beograda / Historical Archives of Belgrade  
KPR, Kabinet Predsednika Republike / Cabinet of the President of the Republic  
MC, Manuscript Collection  
NACP, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD  
RG, Record Group  
RSC, Roosevelt Study Center Microfilm Collection  
SNF, Subject Numeric Files  
UAL, University of Arkansas Library

## Acronyms

AEC, Atomic Energy Commission<sup>2</sup>  
AGITPROP, Agitacija i propagandu / Agitation and Propaganda  
AID, Agency for International Development  
ANTA, American National Theatre and Academy  
AVNOJ, Antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije / Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia  
BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation  
BPAO, Branch Public Affairs Officer  
BFS, Board of Foreign Scholarships  
CAO, Cultural Affairs Officer  
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency  
COMINFORM, Communist Information Bureau  
CPP, Cultural Presentation Program  
CU, Bureau of Cultural and Educational Exchange/Affairs  
CU/CP, Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs/Cultural Presentations  
DFJ, Demokratska Federativna Jugoslavija / Democratic Federal Yugoslavia  
DSUP, Državni Sekretarijat unutarnjih poslova / State Secretariat for Internal Affairs  
EE, Bureau of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State  
EE/P, Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State  
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
FNRJ, Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija / Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia  
FOA, Foreign Operations Administration  
FY, Fiscal Year  
GLCA, Great Lakes College Association

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<sup>2</sup> In the body of the text, I use the original Yugoslav acronyms.

GO, Gradski odbor / City Council  
 GOY, Government of Yugoslavia  
 HEW, Department of Health, Education and Welfare  
 IBS, International Broadcasting Service/Division  
 ICA, International Cooperation Administration  
 ICS, Information Center Service  
 IES, International Educational Exchange Service  
 IIA, United States International Information Administration  
 IIE, Institute of International Education  
 IK CK SKJ, Izvršni komitet Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije /  
 Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of  
 Yugoslavia  
 IMG, Information Media Guaranty Program  
 IMP/IMS, International Motion Pictures Division/Service  
 INR, Intelligence and Research, Department of State  
 IO, Izvršni odbor / Executive Council  
 IOA, Office of Administration  
 IOP, Office of Plans  
 IPS, International Press Service/Press and Publication Service  
 IVS, Izvršno Vijeće Sabora / Executive Council of the Parliament  
 KPJ, Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije / Communist Party of Yugoslavia  
 LEP, Leader's Exchange Program  
 MAP, Military Assistance Pact  
 MDAP, Mutual Defense Aid Program  
 MSA, Mutual Security Agency  
 NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
 NCFE, National Committee for a Free Europe  
 NF, Narodna fronta / National Front  
 NOB/NOV, Narodnooslobodilačka Borba/Vojska / National Liberation Struggle/Army  
 NSC, National Security Council  
 OCB, Operations Coordinating Board  
 OII, Office of International Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State  
 OIR, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State  
 ORI, Office of Research and Intelligence, USIA  
 OZNA, Odeljenje zaštite naroda / Department for the Protection of the People  
 OWI, Office of War Information  
 PAO, Public Affairs Officer  
 PPS, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State  
 PRS, Program Planning and Evaluation Staff, Department of State  
 PSB, Psychological Strategy Board  
 RFE, Radio Free Europe  
 RL, Radio Liberty  
 RKKV, Republička komisija za kulturne veze s inostranstvom / Republican  
 Commission for the Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries  
 RTV, Radio Televizija / Radio-Television  
 SANU, Srpska Akademija Znanosti i Umetnosti / Serbian Academy of Science and Art  
 SIV, Savezno Izvršno Veće / Federal Executive Council  
 SSIP/SSVP, Savezni sekretarijat za inostrane/vanjske poslove / Federal Secretariat for  
 Foreign Affairs  
 SFRJ, Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija / Socialist Federal Republic of  
 Yugoslavia  
 SKJ, Savez Komunista Jugoslavije / League of Communists of Yugoslavia

SKKV, Savezna Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom / Federal Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries  
SKOJ, Savez Komunističke Omladine Jugoslavije / League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia  
SSJ, Savez sindikata Jugoslavije / League of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia  
SSRNJ, Socijalistički savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije / Socialist League of Working People of Yugoslavia  
TCA, Technical Cooperation Administration, Department of State  
UDB-a, Uprava Državne Bezbednosti / State Security Administration  
UK, United Kingdom  
UNRRA, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration  
USSR, Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics  
USA, United States of America  
USIE, United States Information and Education (Program)  
USIA, United States Information Agency  
USIIA, United States International Information Administration  
USIS, United States Information Service  
VOA, Voice of America



# 1 INTRODUCTION

“No event could be more momentous for the attainment of our [U.S.] foreign policy objectives than the permanent alienation from the Soviet Union of this key regime.”<sup>3</sup> These words, pronounced by American counselor Reams in Belgrade only a few days after the Tito-Stalin split of June 1948, seemed to capture perfectly the profound significance of that moment. The news about the expulsion of the Yugoslav Communist Party (KPJ) from the Cominform erupted on the front-page of worldwide newspapers.<sup>4</sup> *Borba*, *Vjesnik* and *Politika* – as the main Yugoslav Party’s “spokespersons” – expressed consternation and disbelief.<sup>5</sup> Very soon, it became clear that the breakup was

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<sup>3</sup> Reams, Chargé in Yugoslavia, to the Secretary of State, June 30, 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter FRUS), 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union, 1078. The Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties, more commonly Cominform (Communist Information Bureau), was founded in September 1947, as a political response to the Marshall Plan, in order to unify the European communist parties under Soviet auspices. Apart from the Soviet representatives, the delegates from Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, as well as the envoys of the Italian and French Communist Parties, participated at the founding meeting in Szklarska Poręba, Poland. After the expulsion of Yugoslavia (June 28), the Cominform headquarters moved to Bucharest. The organization was dissolved in 1956 following the improved relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviets in the post-Stalin era (Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli and Russian Center of Conservation and Study of Records for Modern History, eds., *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences, 1947/1948/1949*, vol. 24, Annali 30 (Milano: Feltrinelli Editore, 1994).

<sup>4</sup> “Main Part of Text of Cominform’s Declaration on the Yugoslav Party Chieftains,” *The New York Times*, June 29, 1948; Harold Callender, “Yugoslav ‘Revolt’ Held Peril to the Reds,” *The New York Times*, June 30, 1948; “La svolta della Jugoslavia; Tito sconfessato dal Cominform,” *Corriere della Sera*, June 29, 1948.

<sup>5</sup> “Projekt programa Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije,” *Borba*, June 30, 1948; “Izjava Centralnog komiteta KP Jugoslavije povodom Rezolucije Informacionog biroa Komunističkih partija o stanju u

a point of no return and with long-term consequences. The Soviet-Yugoslav rupture would lay ground for the Yugoslav “way to socialism,” the ideology and policy of Yugoslav exceptionalism.

More decisively, searching for new geostrategic partnerships, alliances and military backing, Yugoslavia would turn towards the United States, and the United States towards Yugoslavia. The early 1950s would sanction the Yugoslav-American new economic and political partnership, transforming Tito’s regime into the “American Communist ally,” as in the words of Tvrtko Jakovina.<sup>6</sup>

Walter Bedell Smith, U.S. ambassador in Moscow during those ‘stormy’ days of 1948, rightly observed that the “Cominform resolution, which the Yugoslav Communist Party has now rejected, indicates [the] first really serious crisis in the new ‘family’ of Soviet states erected since the war’s end, and will be a *God-send to our propagandists*.”<sup>7</sup>

In a way, this study starts from Smith’s “God-send propaganda issue.” Indeed, Yugoslavia became the first Communist-ruled State that defied Soviet domination and deviated from the Soviet model. As Rusinow remarkably explained, Yugoslav experimented with the market mechanism and gradually replaced a command economy with decentralized decision-making, wider personal freedom, new forms of political participation, an open frontiers policy and a wide-ranging integration into the Cold War international arena.<sup>8</sup> By the early 1950s, Yugoslavia had embraced the doctrine of “active peaceful cooperation”<sup>9</sup> with foreign countries, including the Western countries’, foremost the United States; its foreign policy strategy turned towards neutralism and, then, by the end of the decade, towards non-alignment.<sup>10</sup> However, the Yugoslav

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KPJ,” *Vjesnik*, June 30, 1948; “Izjava o stanju u CK KPJ povodom Rezolucije biroa Komunističkih partija o stanju u KPJ,” *Politika*, June 30, 1948.

<sup>6</sup> Tvrtko Jakovina, *Američki komunistički saveznik. Hrvati, Titova Jugoslavija i Sjedinjene Američke Države 1945.-1955.* (Zagreb: Profil, 2003).

<sup>7</sup> Smith, Ambassador in the Soviet Union, to the Secretary of State, Moscow, July 1, 1948, FRUS, 1948, IV, 1082. The emphasis is of the author.

<sup>8</sup> Dennison I. Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Dennison I. Rusinow, *Yugoslavia: Oblique Insights and Observations*, ed. Gale Stokes (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008).

<sup>9</sup> Edvard Kardelj, “Nova Jugoslavija u savremenom svijetu,” *Komunist*, no. 1 (January 1951): 1–32.

<sup>10</sup> Rinna Kullaa has questioned the presumption that the non-alignment strategy arose in the aftermath of the 1955 Bandung Conference, which, contrary to what is usually implied, had no Yugoslav participation, and of Tito’s Brioni meeting with Nasser and Nehru (1956). Instead, Kullaa argues that during Koča

inclination towards “bold and imaginative” experimentation, opened a series of dilemmas on how economic modernization could coexist without the institutional or social breakdown of the communist regime, and how would, consequently, individual and national freedom relate to these modernization processes.<sup>11</sup> Internally, the regime pioneered a decentralized self-management socialism that, together with the neutralist/non-alignment stance, would embody the “Yugoslav way to socialism.”<sup>12</sup> During the Cold War era, Yugoslav leadership internally, and Tito’s personal diplomacy towards international actors, would foster the ideology of Yugoslav exceptionalism, about which more shall be said in relation to the U.S. public diplomacy towards Yugoslavia.

The Truman and Eisenhower administrations adopted a policy of “keeping Tito afloat,” conceptually related to the “wedge strategy” that, while developed for foreign policy use in Europe and Asia as well, was a combination of nationalism and U.S.

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Popović’s serving as the State Secretary (1953-1965), Yugoslavia’s foreign policy strategy first adopted a neutralist stance as an alternative international position that would balance its partnership with the Soviet Union. When, after the Hungarian crisis, the 1955-1956 appeasement with the Soviet Union disappeared, Tito turned to its non-aligned partners by the late 1950s (Egypt, India, Indonesia) with whom he founded the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 (Rinna Kullaa, *Non-Alignment and Its Origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge* (London; New York: I.B.Tauris, 2012). This revisionist position has also been contemplated in Vladimir Unkovski-Korica, *The Economic Struggle for Power in Tito’s Yugoslavia: From World War II to Non-Alignment* (London: I.B.Tauris, forthcoming). The Yugoslav positioning between the two Blocs is described in John C. Campbell, *Tito’s Separate Road* (Joanna Cotler Books, 1967); Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, 2nd ed. (Princeton University Press, 2015); and Tvrtko Jakovina, *Treća strana Hladnog rata* (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2011). Lately, new scholarly interest has arisen over European neutralism during the Cold War. For this, see Sandra Bott et al., eds., *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?* (Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2016).

<sup>11</sup> Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, vii.

<sup>12</sup> According to Dejan Jović, besides self-management and non-alignment, the third pillar of the new Yugoslav official identity was the “confederalized federalism.” The three pillars were inspired by the desire to be different from interwar Yugoslavia and the USSR (Dejan Jović, “Communist Yugoslavia and Its ‘Others,’” in *Ideologies and National Identities : The Case of Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe*, by John Lampe and Mark Mazower, Hors Collection (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2013), 277–302, <http://books.openedition.org/ceup/2438>). For an overview on these issues, see Dejan Jović, *Yugoslavia: A State That Withered Away* (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2008). While the Yugoslav disintegration and political legitimacy will not be addressed in this study and literature review, it is worth mentioning some excellent scholarly works, particularly Sabrina P. Ramet and Ljubiša S. Adamović, *Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1995); Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration Of Yugoslavia From The Death Of Tito To The Fall Of Milosevic*, 4th ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2002); Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005*, Annotated ed. (Washington, D.C. : Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006); Dejan Djokić, *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992* (London: Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2003); and Lenard J. Cohen and Jasna Dragović-Soso, *State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia’s Disintegration* (West Lafayette, Indian: Purdue University Press, 2007).

pressure and support to create divisions between the Soviet Union and other communist countries. The “wedge strategy,” argues Lorraine Lees, consisted in supporting Yugoslav nationalism as an example for other, Soviet dominated, communist states, but was jeopardized by, what she defines as, futile attempts to change Tito’s regime.<sup>13</sup> Nonetheless, Tito’s regime changed. Whilst a liberalization shift seemed more obvious with the abandonment of Stalinism by the mid-1950s, it continued to change institutionally with the 1953, 1963, and 1974 Constitutions, and socially and culturally through the import of Western-like models, such as in jazz, rock music and films, household appliances, culinary arts, urban architecture, American-style advertising and supermarkets, and so forth. Scholars have usually distinguished between these two pattern-type changes, hence recognizing their different inspirational sources. Yet, in the Cold War “battle for hearts and minds,” these changes show themselves as being profoundly interrelated.

Yugoslavia became a top priority for Washington’s public diplomacy creators after 1950. This research explores an undiscovered, and, until today, untold story, about the U.S. “battle for the hearts and minds” of the “*jugoslaveni/jugosloveni*,” the Yugoslav citizens. It aims to identify, examine and comprehend the U.S. public diplomacy channels, agencies, and agents in Yugoslavia from 1950 to 1972, their capacity to penetrate Yugoslav Party leadership, intelligentsia, students, and public opinion, to change attraction patterns, and influence policy outcomes. Using the communication channels opened by the U.S. military, technological and economic aid,<sup>14</sup> from the early 1950s onwards, the Department of State, and the United States Information Agency (USIA) from 1953, envisioned a long-term policy aimed at exerting cultural but, most of all, political influence in Yugoslavia by means of *soft power*.

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<sup>13</sup> Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005). For a general overview of the wedge strategy, look into John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 152–94. Gaddis was the first to identify the wedge strategy as an innovative and essential aspect of Truman’s and Eisenhower’s administration.

<sup>14</sup> Tvrtko Jakovina, *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici* (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 2002) and *Američki komunistički saveznik. Hrvati, Titova Jugoslavija i Sjedinjene Američke Države 1945.-1955.* (Zagreb: Profil, 2003); John R. Lampe, Russell O. Prickett, and Ljubiša S. Adamović, *Yugoslav-American Economic Relations Since World War II* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); Dragan Bogetić, “Jugoslavija i svetsko tržište kapitala. Američka finansijska podrška jugoslovenskim razvojnim programima krajem 50-tih godina,” *Tokovi Istorije* 3, no. 3 (2010): 89–102.

According to the State Department's *Dictionary of International Relations Terms*, public diplomacy "entails government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television."<sup>15</sup> Apart from this quite traditional definition, more recently, public diplomacy was defined as

the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications.<sup>16</sup>

The analyzed U.S. and Yugoslav archival sources and periodicals, as well as the written and oral testimonies collected for this study, reveal a wide network of lobbies and operations conceived by the USIA from its headquarters in Washington D.C. and implemented by the United States Information Services (USIS) in Belgrade and Zagreb and, from there, in Yugoslav territory. Beginning with Joseph Nye's definition of soft power as a country's "ability to obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics" and "to shape the preferences of others" through the attractiveness of its values, prosperity and openness,<sup>17</sup> this research aims at reconstructing the role of American 'visible' and 'invisible' networks among Yugoslav citizens and leaders. In 1945 the U.S. government opened its USIS post in Belgrade, in 1948 in Novi Sad, and in 1951 in Zagreb (the American centers in Ljubljana, Skopje and Sarajevo were opened in the 1970s). These American information centers housed a public library and reading-room that provided American journals and specialized periodicals, lectures, exhibits, concerts and English lessons. Together with the State Department and its Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs, the USIS arranged the Cultural Presentation Program that provided the arrival in Yugoslavia of American artists, choirs, jazz, blues and classical music performers, vanguard theater groups, and painters, sportsmen, and academic lecturers. By broadcasting the *Voice of America* (VOA), the U.S. government reached thousands of

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<sup>15</sup> "Public Diplomacy," *Dictionary of International Relations Terms* (Department of State Library, 1987).

<sup>16</sup> Nicholas J. Cull, "Public Diplomacy before Gullion. The Evolution of a Phrase," in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (New York; London: Routledge Taylor&Francis, 2009), 19.

<sup>17</sup> Joseph S. Jr. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics*, 2nd ed. (Public Affairs, 2009), 21–22.

Yugoslav citizens. Likewise, the U.S. pavilions at the Zagreb and Belgrade International Trade Fairs further enhanced the idea of American wealth, knowledge and technological expertise. What is more, the Cultural Exchange Program, by including an extraordinary variety of more than fifty exchange platforms, such as the Leader's Exchange, the Fulbright and the Ford, provided by public, private or state-private funds, generated intense interest and impact on the part of Yugoslav politicians, academics and university students, by introducing an alternative and, for them, insidious *forma mentis*.

We shall look at public diplomacy in Yugoslavia as a balancing policy factor in shaping the Yugoslav-U.S. foreign relations, as well as a framework for bilateral downturns and crises. We shall examine how the U.S. interests in Yugoslavia, as well as the response strategy to Yugoslav internal policy restrictions, shaped Washington's public diplomacy. How did U.S. protagonists challenge the rather indisposed Yugoslav government officials, at micro and macro level, and hit the targeted population? By which methods of induction, cooptation and influence did they fulfill their operational goals and by which political and symbolical key words? What were the Yugoslav attitude patterns towards the American propaganda in Yugoslavia? How did the communist hierarchy and the USIS field officers embody Yugoslav-U.S. cooperation and dissimilarities? The basic assumptions of this study are:

1. the U.S. soft power resources are never monolithic, unidirectional, and uncritically received;
2. the U.S. public diplomacy uses both official, state-directed channels of communication, attraction and influence, and private actors speaking for governmental goals;
3. the U.S. public diplomacy efforts were not perceived, in most cases, as mere propaganda by the end-receivers (the Yugoslav Party leaders, intelligentsia, students and uncategorized public), but were despised by its observers (the Party analysts);
4. the U.S. cultural missions in Yugoslavia represented, in the collective imaginaries of Yugoslavs, an iconic United States and its *American way of life*;
5. 'center' and 'periphery' indicate relations between the USIS operational centers and the circulation of the U.S. programs within the Yugoslav territory (the Socialist Republics); they point to the reactions of Yugoslav officials from the executive centers of communist power to the local councils of culture,

education and science; they elucidate the relations between the USIA and the Department of State with field operations;

6. the USIS centers, geographically immobile and stationary, relied on the *Voice*, the exchange programs, the cultural exhibitions and lectures, the bookmobiles and the mobile movie theaters for rural propagation;

7. the relations of “intercultural communication” between the United States and Yugoslavia cannot be reduced to a simplistic transmission-reception criteria; the story of the USIA-USIS networks in Yugoslavia is, as in the Polish case as well, “a history of decoding and encoding messages, of interpreting, and eventually, appropriating various American voices for people’s own purposes in order to oppose, undermine, and maybe even shake off the shackles of the system.”<sup>18</sup>

While the Chapters 2 to 6 discuss the chief USIA and State Department channels in Yugoslavia, Chapter 7 interrogates whether the large span of U.S. public diplomacy activities had reached their end policy goals, and if so, how they might be measurable from the short, middle and long term perspective. In spring 1980, Ivan Pongračić entered the American Library in Zagreb and found on its desk Russell Kirk’s *The Conservative Mind*. Fascinated by the author, he returned looking for more books. Soon after, he applied to an international conference organized by Kirk in Pennsylvania, which he found out about in another American Library’s magazine. In the United States, Pongračić became first Kirk’s friend, then his assistant, and, ultimately, ended his career as Professor Emeritus of Indiana University.<sup>19</sup> This example, among many others, suggests that the impact of public diplomacy often transcends the main reason for which it was established. We shall look at the attractiveness of a resource and the outcome of behavior in the public diplomacy efforts in Yugoslavia, through the perspective of the sender (the U.S. government and its private partners), the receivers (Yugoslav citizens,

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<sup>18</sup> Andrzej Antonszek and Kate Delaney, “Poland: Transmissions and Translations,” in *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism After 1945* (Berghahn Books, 2007): 232–233.

<sup>19</sup> Ivan Pongračić and Russell Kirk, “Prolog,” in *Politika razboritosti* (Zagreb: Večernji list, 2015), 11–16. In the “Prologue” of Russell Kirk’s Croatian translation *The Politics of Prudence*, Pongračić reveals that he was a member of the American Library since his Law Studies in 1961, and usually borrowed music magazines and disks.

especially the cultural exchange grantees), and the observers and receivers (Yugoslav officials and Party leaders). Finally, what do the USIA messages abroad tell us? Whilst revelatory of the U.S. Cold War instances such as the containment, the New Look, and the Johnson's and Nixon's détente strategy, the State Department, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) from 1961, and the USIA, searched for solutions of soft power that would include a proper strategy and a wanted outcome. Their position presumed knowing the final recipient of power and communicating in his terms, while not trespassing the established framework of the political diplomacy strategy.

Yugoslav diplomats, like Leo Mates, interpreted Yugoslav openness as the 'starting grid' of Yugoslav exceptionalism.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, as Miroslav Perišić suggests, after 1950 the Yugoslav policymakers used the country's cultural avant-garde as a soft power instrument to affirm the Yugoslav image, prestige and value, in other words its distinctive "way to socialism" or "socialism with a human face," at the international exhibitions, festivals, and contests in the Western European cultural capitals.<sup>21</sup> In many notable studies on different subjects pertaining to Yugoslav history, scholars have used the Yugoslav "exceptionalist model" to comprehend the Yugoslav boundary position between East and West, capitalism and communism, the "Coca-Cola" socialism, and the "socialism on the American grain." By unifying two opposite qualities of the Yugoslav regime, which at least symbolically appertained to two opposite ideologies, they enhanced the idea of a Yugoslav oxymoron. So, for instance, Patrick H. Patterson and Igor Duda examined the socialist consumer and well-being of society;<sup>22</sup> Hannes

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<sup>20</sup> Leo Mates, *Međunarodni odnosi Socijalističke Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Nolit, 1976); on the Yugoslav Non-Aligned "exceptionalism," see Ranko Petković, *Nesvrstana Jugoslavija i savremeni svijet. Spoljna politika Jugoslavije 1945-1985* (Zagreb: Školska Knjiga, 1985). In another context, yet speaking in terms of exceptionalism, Slavenka Drakulić, the most world-known Yugoslav feminist, affirmed: "the system of 'self-management' Yugoslavia was so proud of was a ruse, invented to make you believe that [...] it was the most perfect system among the one-party states, set up to internalize guilt, blame, failure or fear, to teach you how you yourself should censor your thoughts and deeds and, at the same time, to make you feel that you had more freedom than anyone in Eastern Europe" (Slavenka Drakulić, *How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed* (New York; London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991), 6).

<sup>21</sup> Miroslav Perišić, *Diplomatija i kultura. Jugoslavija: prelomna 1950.* (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2013) and *Od Staljina ka Sartru. Formiranje jugoslovenske inteligencije na evropskim univerzitetima 1945-1958.* (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2012).

<sup>22</sup> Patrick H. Patterson, *Bought and Sold: Living and Losing the Good Life in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); Igor Duda, "Konzumerizmom do konzumizma? Potrošačka kultura u Hrvatskoj od 1950-tih do 1980-tih," in *Potrošačka kultura i konzumerizam*, ed. Snježana Čolić (Zagreb: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2013), 83–105; Igor Duda, *Pronađeno blagostanje: svakodnevni život i potrošačka kultura u Hrvatskoj 1970 - ih i 1980 - ih*, 2nd ed. (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2014); Igor

Grandits and Karin Taylor studied the ideological role of mass, Western-like, tourism in shaping the Yugoslav worker;<sup>23</sup> Tvrtko Jakovina emphasized the Yugoslav nation-building process on the “American grain”<sup>24</sup> while Radina Vučetić wrote about the “American dream in the Yugoslav way.”<sup>25</sup>

Seen as “exceptional” by its authors and as an “exception” by its scholars, the Yugoslav exceptionalist model does not work for this study. The insights into the U.S. public diplomacy networks within the Yugoslav experiment suggest that a *pragmatic, realpolitik*, and *identity* policy was involved. Dejan Jović’s assessment is very helpful in this scenario. He argues that there were two main “Others” against which Yugoslav socialism tried to construct itself, the liberal representative democracy and the Soviet-style socialism, both antipodes and “mirror images.” These potential threats had their domestic representatives in, on the one hand, the “liberals” and “techno-managerial forces,” and, on the other, “dogmatists,” “unitarists,” “bureaucrats” and “Stalinists.” Several circumstances, which Jović extensively analyzes, led the Yugoslavs to declare the Soviet-type statist socialism as their main threat and danger. Consequently, the Yugoslav political elite opposed with much less vigilance the liberal democrats and the pro-Western groups and, when the Soviet Union collapsed, they were left without the existence of the Soviet Other on which they constructed their own identity. Ultimately, liberalism, together with nationalism, “entered the Yugoslav identity-making arena and emerged victorious.”<sup>26</sup> This research aims to analyze how this liberal democracy “Other” evolved in Yugoslavia through the U.S. public diplomacy agents and agencies, how it appealed to its target groups, how its messages were explored, negotiated, and

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Duda, *U potrazi za blagostanjem: o povijesti dokolice i potrošačkog društva u Hrvatskoj 1950 - ih i 1960 - ih*, 2nd ed. (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2014).

<sup>23</sup> Hannes Grandits and Karin Taylor, eds., *Yugoslavia’s Sunny Side: A History of Tourism in Socialism* (Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2010).

<sup>24</sup> Jakovina, *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici*; Jakovina, *Američki komunistički saveznik*.

<sup>25</sup> Radina Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam. Amerikanizacija jugoslavenske popularne kulture šezdesetih godina XX veka* (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2012).

<sup>26</sup> Moreover, Jović claims that the Yugoslav elites’ “commitment to Marxism prompted them to underestimate the chance for liberal democracy or nationalism to compete with socialism as a vision of the future society. By declaring alternative models of socialism, especially the Soviet model, as the only real threat (since socialism was “the only game in town”), they ended up exactly where they did not want to be, more dependent than ever on the existence of the Soviet Other.” (Dejan Jović, “Communist Yugoslavia and Its ‘Others,’” 277–302).

rejected, and finally, to what extent it crafted the Yugoslav experiment between 1950 and 1972.

## 1.1 The Historical Background of Public Diplomacy: From the OWI to the USIA

*Our task is to present the truth to the millions of people who are uninformed, or misinformed, or unconvinced. Our task is to reach them in their daily lives, as they work and learn. [...] Our task is to show them that freedom is the way to economic and social advancement, the way to political independence, the way to strength, happiness, and peace. The task is not separate and distinct from other elements of our foreign policy.*

President Truman, April 20, 1950<sup>27</sup>

The experience of World War I changed the attitudes towards propaganda within the United States. With the Committee on Public Information (the Creel Committee), Woodrow Wilson's administration entered into information activities abroad. After the conflict, the post-Wilsonian isolationist policy dismantled the governmental backing of "propaganda" that instead continued to rely on private initiatives such as the Rockefellers' and Ford Foundations.<sup>28</sup> The arena of cultural diplomacy was already imbued with the Bolsheviks radio propaganda of the 1919 Comintern. In 1926, Fascist Italy opened its first Italian Cultural Institutes overseas, while Great Britain, by establishing in 1934 the British Council, planned "to save democracy by teaching English and organizing lectures on Shakespeare."<sup>29</sup> The point of caesura in the history of the U.S. domestic and foreign propaganda was the Franklin D. Roosevelt presidency.<sup>30</sup> Whatever its economic merits, Roosevelt's New Deal engaged in successful publicity initiatives such as the presidential radio "fireside chats," logos and

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<sup>27</sup> Howland H. Sargeant, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, The Overt International Information and Educational Exchange Program of the United States, March 31, 1952, Box 2245, Central Decimal Files (hereafter CDF) 1950-1954, Record Group 59 (hereafter RG), National Archives at College Park, Maryland (hereafter NACP).

<sup>28</sup> Sarah Ellen Graham, *Culture and Propaganda: The Progressive Origins of American Public Diplomacy, 1936-1953* (London; New York: Routledge, 2016), 17-48.

<sup>29</sup> Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 9-11. On Italian Fascist propaganda in the United States, see Matteo Pretelli, *La via fascista alla democrazia americana. Cultura e propaganda nelle comunità italo-americane* (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2012).

<sup>30</sup> Justin Hart, *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U. S. Foreign Policy* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

posters, rallies and parades. In 1934, his administration created an office within the National Executive Council called the United States Information Service (USIS) for the purpose of publicizing the New Deal, whilst in July 1939, FDR created the Office of Government Reports (OGR), which included the USIS and a new press survey function. After the war broke out in Europe, President Roosevelt engaged in an overall effort to pawn the effects of Axis propaganda. To counteract German and Italian propaganda in Latin America, he entrusted Nelson Rockefeller to the newly established Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.<sup>31</sup> Soon after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Germany's declaration of war against the United States, the State Department inaugurated the *Voice of America* (February 1942). Within a few months, broadcasts extended from German to French, Italian, and English. In June, Roosevelt founded the Office of War Information (OWI) with its overseas component becoming the United States Information Service (USIS) in many countries.<sup>32</sup> For the first time in U.S. history, ideas and images of the United States not only "mattered to foreign policy," they *were* the U.S. foreign policy, as Justin Hart suggests.<sup>33</sup>

On the flow of an expanding foreign propaganda, the years between 1943 and 1945 saw a tremendous increase of American libraries abroad: Sydney, Melbourne, Johannesburg, Wellington; then Madrid, Cairo, Stockholm, Paris, Baghdad, New Delhi, Bombay, Beirut, Damascus, Moscow, Calcutta, Istanbul, Ankara, Rome, Brussels, Florence, Oslo, The Hague, Copenhagen, Athens, Bern, Manila, Naples, Milan, Belgrade, Sofia, Bangkok, and even Leopoldville had one.<sup>34</sup> Established for the "reorientation of people in occupied areas," from 1945 onwards the U.S. Military Government in Germany, the U.S. Armed Forces in Austria and Korea, and the U.S. Allied Powers in Japan, started Information Center Libraries in those countries.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Howland H. Sargeant, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, The Overt International Information and Educational Exchange Program of the United States, March 31, 1952, Box 2245, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>32</sup> Study of USIS libraries, Aug. 1967, E-4-67, Box 1, Estimates and Evaluations 1966-1978, USIA Office of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP: 3-6 (hereafter Study of USIS libraries, Aug. 1967); Jack K. McFall to Edwin C. Johnson, Senator, Aug. 22, 1950, 511.00/8-950, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>33</sup> Hart, *Empire of Ideas*.

<sup>34</sup> Study of USIS libraries, Aug. 1967, 3-6.

<sup>35</sup> Kathleen R. Hooper, *Designing Democracy: Re-Education and the America Houses (1945-1961)* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2014).

In the immediate post-war context, the OWI propagandists, demonstrates Hart, played “a seminal role in theorizing the place of propaganda in a democratic society,” and in the relationships between foreign relations and domestic affairs, propaganda and psychological warfare, and public and private actors.<sup>36</sup> The increased Cold War tensions and the conviction over Soviet superiority in the war of ideas, convinced Congress that the VOA was necessary and legitimate even in peacetime.<sup>37</sup> The controversial U.S. Information and Education Exchange Act of January 1948 (Public Law 402), popularly referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act, legalized peacetime propaganda, but restricted the State Department, (and later the USIA) officials involved with public diplomacy from engaging in strategic communications or information operations within the United States or its territories.<sup>38</sup> In 1950, President Truman launched the Campaign of Truth to combat Communist propaganda. In June 1952, he reorganized the information and exchange program under the new U.S. International Information Administration (IIA), in order to multiply and intensify psychological deterrents to Soviet Communist aggression; to stimulate confidence in the U.S. Government, especially in Western Europe; to combat neutralism, particularly in Asia and the Middle East; and to maintain the hope of an “ultimate liberation” of the Iron Curtain countries.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Hart, *Empire of Ideas*, 72. Apart from Hart’s study, for valuable scholarly accounts on the origins of public diplomacy in the pre-Cold War period, see Sarah Ellen Graham, *Culture and Propaganda*; Wilson P. Dizard Jr., *Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 1–62; Allan M. Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945* (Yale University Press, 1978); David F. Krugler, *The Voice of America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles, 1945-1953* (University of Missouri Press, 2000).

<sup>37</sup> Krugler, *The Voice of America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles*. Indeed, explains Gregory Tomlin, “Many American policymakers doubted that a democratic country should continue to maintain a robust propaganda effort after World War II. Some liberals feared that, like Nazis and Japanese fascists, U.S. government officials might begin to direct propaganda toward American citizens. [...] Others, on both the political right and left, believed that the post-war stature of the United States alone would entice the rest of the world to reject communism, without the government spending a single taxpayer’s dollar to explain its policies. Many influential policymakers believed that everyone would want to emulate the United States based on the freedom, social mobility, and superior quality of life enjoyed by those pursuing the American dream” (Gregory M. Tomlin, *Murrow’s Cold War: Public Diplomacy for the Kennedy Administration*, (Potomac Books - University of Nebraska Press, 2016), Kindle edition, Introduction.

<sup>38</sup> Proposed by Senator Alexander Smith and Congressman Karl Mundt, its purpose was “to promote the better understanding of the United States among the people of the world and to strengthen cooperative international relations” (Psychological Board Briefings, Nov. 6, 1950, 511.00/11-650, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP). See also, Tomlin, *Murrow’s Cold War*, Introduction.

<sup>39</sup> Department of State Departmental Announcement No. 4, Jan. 16, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, II, 2, doc. 292; Howland H. Sargeant, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, The Overt International Information and Educational Exchange Program of the United States, March 31, 1952, Box 2245, CDF 1950-1954,

In May 1953, the Subcommittee on Overseas Information proposed the creation of “a new, independent information and propaganda agency at the sub-cabinet level.” The Reorganizational Plan no. 8 launched the United States Information Agency (USIA) on August 1, 1953. Under the USIA umbrella, President Eisenhower merged the IIA, the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), and the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), but left the exchange programs within the State Department.<sup>40</sup> In its tormented history, during which it struggled for a “deserved place” in the executive level, the USIA would become the spokesperson and interpreter of the American foreign policy, and the promotor of anti-communist stances and positive themes about the United States.<sup>41</sup> It would become the first global agency with the capacity to disseminate information before any private company was able to do so.<sup>42</sup> It pursued “media control projects” that consisted of planting news in newspapers, placing programs on local television channels, and using personal contacts to influence the perspective of foreign journalists and influential opinion leaders. Such obscured operations prove the USIA partial engagement in covert propaganda, claim Nelson and Izadi.<sup>43</sup>

In addition, Senator McCarthy’s investigations hardly hit the inceptions of the USIA. On February 18, 1953, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations called author Howard Fast, a reputed

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RG 59, NACP; Department of State Publication 3927, Aug. 1950, 511.00/9-2250, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP; 1954-1955 USIS Mission Prospectus, Dec. 3, 1953, 511.00/3-1253, Box 2246, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>40</sup> Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Senator, to John F. Dulles, Secretary of State, May 9, 1953, 511.00/5-953, Box 2248, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. These changes brought into the USIA the previous IIA divisions: International Broadcasting, Overseas Information Centers/Information Center Service, Private Enterprise Coordination Staff, Information Media Guaranty Program, and International Motion Pictures (Ninth Semiannual Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, Feb. 2, 1954, 511.00/3-2554, Box 2249, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP).

<sup>41</sup> Among the anti-communist themes, there were communist ideological contradictions, forced labor camps, absence of freedom, and the lack of consumer goods. Among the American virtues, the USIA publicized the U.S. economic and technical assistance programs, scientific and technological advances, and the free trade unions. The USIA “sold” the American dream abroad through cultural propaganda, celebrated the democratic values and practices, and advocated consumer capitalism. In this, the *Voice* was one of the prime weapons of influence. See as examples, Laura A. Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010) and Greg Barnhisel and Catherine Turner, eds., *Pressing the Fight: Print, Propaganda, and the Cold War* (University of Massachusetts Press, 2012).

<sup>42</sup> Nicholas J. Cull, *The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency: American Public Diplomacy, 1989-2001* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

<sup>43</sup> Richard Nelson and Foad Izadi, “Ethics and Social Issues in Public Diplomacy,” in *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (Routledge, 2008), 336.

communist, for questioning. But the real target was the IIA directive on the use of books by “controversial authors” in the overseas libraries, which stated that “the content of the book, regardless of authorship, should be the criterion which determines its availability for inclusion in USIS libraries.”<sup>44</sup> The IIA tried to placate McCarthy by replacing the directive with the one that banned any material by “controversial persons, Communists, [and] fellow travelers.” This latter created confusion for the ICS personnel and librarians abroad. On April 4 1953, McCarthy’s assistants Roy Cohn and David Schine flew to Paris for a ten-day tour of the European U.S. information centers. They inspected Bonn, Frankfurt, Munich, Vienna, Belgrade, Athens, Rome, and London.<sup>45</sup> Between February 19 and July 8, the State Department issued as many as ten separate confidential directives concerning materials in overseas libraries.<sup>46</sup> By June 23, 319 titles (38 anthologies and 281 individual titles by 144 authors) were removed from one or more of the U.S. Information Centers overseas.<sup>47</sup> The charges of book burning inevitably resulted in a loss of prestige and credibility that surrounded the USIA’s inception.<sup>48</sup> Indeed, the McCarthy era has been righteously considered one of the most inflammatory and controversial periods in 20th Century American history that had a large worldwide echo.<sup>49</sup> Interestingly, the Yugoslav authorities and newspaper editorials, were rather uninterested in McCarthyism, hence maintaining a “strategic

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<sup>44</sup> Airgram 218 from Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Feb. 3, 1953, 511.00/2-353, Box 2246, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>45</sup> For an in-depth view on the IIA McCarthy investigations, see Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 82–94; Belmonte, *Selling the American Way*, 56–57; Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York: The New Press, 2001), 190–196; Hart, *Empire of Ideas*, 178–197; and Craig Campbell and Fredrik Logevall, *America’s Cold War*, Reprint ed. (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2012), 122–138, 363–365.

<sup>46</sup> Louise S. Robbins, “The Overseas Libraries Controversy and the Freedom to Read: U.S. Librarians and Publishers Confront Joseph McCarthy,” *Libraries & Culture* 36, no. 1 (2001): 28–29.

<sup>47</sup> Memorandum Prepared in the United States International Information Agency, June 30, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, II, 2, doc. 336.

<sup>48</sup> Study of USIS libraries, Aug. 1967, 3–6.

<sup>49</sup> The scholarly debate over the McCarthyism era is extensive. For some noteworthy analyses are recommended: David Caute, *The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978); Albert Fried, *McCarthyism, The Great American Red Scare: A Documentary History*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991); David K. Johnson, *The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal Government*, (Chicago, Illinois: University Of Chicago Press, 2006); David M. Oshinsky, *A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Ellen Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1998). For a provocative perspective, see Robert Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).

silence,” and gave “impressively brief, lacking in detail” accounts on it, at least until May 1952. The American officers in Belgrade were convinced that the Yugoslav press received instructions “that nothing openly derogatory shall be published.”<sup>50</sup> Certainly, because of the intense Yugoslav-American negotiations over economic aid to Yugoslavia between 1949 and 1952, the anti-American narratives about the McCarthy “witch hunt” did not last long, from mid-1952 to the end of 1953, thus proving the very pragmatic stance of Yugoslav leaders.<sup>51</sup>

The USIA history, as the history of the CIA’s psychological covert warfare, relied on private cooperation that involved the use of American nongovernmental organizations, businesses, and ordinary citizens in the publicity campaign to cultivate a positive image of the United States. Many private American citizens wrote to the State Department asking to be voluntarily involved in anti-communist campaigns,<sup>52</sup> or proposed covert operations like flying kites and balloons to be launched beyond the Iron Curtain.<sup>53</sup> In addition to the USIA’s mostly overt public diplomacy programs, the CIA attempted to target the public of the USSR and its satellites through the Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. As Frances Saunders showed, a number of foundations were claimed to be the source of these broadcastings to cover the CIA involvement. Moreover, the Intelligence Agency sponsored numerous covert public diplomacy initiatives, including subsidizing non-communist labor unions, journalists, political parties, politicians, and student groups.<sup>54</sup> However, since the psychological warfare

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<sup>50</sup> USIE Report 610 for April and May 1950, June 20, 1950, 511.68/6-2050, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>51</sup> More crucially, the Yugoslav press’ accusations defined McCarthyism as “anti-liberalism,” hence implicitly assuming liberalism as a positive value, contradictorily to what was a common communist narrative, which associated liberalism with “bourgeois” capitalism (Carla Konta, “Antiamericanismo e titoismo. Gli anni Cinquanta e la «zona grigia jugoslava»,” *Contemporanea* XVI, no. 1 (2013): 76–78).

<sup>52</sup> Millard E. Tydings, Chairman of U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Service, to Jack K. McFall, Assistant Secretary of State, Nov. 1, 1950, 511.00/11-150, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>53</sup> Ferdinand Kaufman, New Orleans, to Senator Allen J. Ellender, Nov. 13, 1950, 511.00/11-1650, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>54</sup> In Western Europe, for instance, it was the Congress for Cultural Freedom. The scholarship on the CIA involvement in the cultural Cold War in Europe through private, sometimes a-political actors is in expansion. Amongst others, see Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*; Luc van Dongen, Stéphanie Roulin, and Giles Scott-Smith, eds., *Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities, and Networks* (Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Political Economy of American Hegemony 1945-1955* (London; New York: Routledge, 2001); Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford, eds., *The US Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War: The State-Private Network* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006); Giles Scott-Smith, *Western Anti-Communism and the Interdoc*

activities were substantially destined to the Soviet Union and its satellites, not to Yugoslavia, they shall not be addressed in this study.

## 1.2 Soft Power and Public/Cultural Diplomacy

*One of the reasons reciprocation can be used so effectively as a device for gaining another's compliance is its power. The rule possesses awesome strength, often producing a "yes" response to a request that, except for an existing feeling of indebtedness, would have surely been refused.*

Robert B. Cialdini<sup>55</sup>

From the early 1990s, historians Akira Iriye and Frank Ninkovich pioneered the rise of a cultural analysis within the fields of diplomatic history. Iriye defined culture in the study of international relations "as the sharing and transmitting of consciousness within and across national boundaries, and the cultural approach as a perspective that pays particular attention to this phenomenon."<sup>56</sup> In over 25 years, historians have investigated various aspects of culture in the Cold War, and its transatlantic relations,<sup>57</sup> networks,<sup>58</sup> intercultural exchanges,<sup>59</sup> intellectuals,<sup>60</sup> its entrenchment in international

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*Network: Cold War Internationale* (Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); and Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union* (New York: New York University Press, 1999).

<sup>55</sup> Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence. The Psychology of Persuasion* (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 34–35.

<sup>56</sup> Akira Iriye, "Culture and International History," in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Frank Costigliola and Michael Hogan (1: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 215; see also Akira Iriye, "Culture," *Journal of American History* 77, no. 1 (June 1990): 99–107; Frank A. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950* (Cambridge Eng. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981) and Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, "Shame on U.S.? Academics, Cultural Transfer, and the Cold War: A Critical Review," *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 3 (July 1, 2000): 465–94, doi:10.1111/0145-2096.00227. For recent discussion, look into Frank Costigliola and Michael Hogan, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (2: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, eds., *Culture and International History* (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2004).

<sup>57</sup> Hans Krabbendam and Giles Scott-Smith, eds., *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-60* (London: Routledge, 2004); Peter Romijn, Giles Scott-Smith, and Joes Segal, eds., *Divided Dreamworlds?: The Cultural Cold War in East and West* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012).

<sup>58</sup> Walter L. Hixon, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997).

<sup>59</sup> Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, And Transformed American Culture Since World War II*, Reprint ed. (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1998).

<sup>60</sup> Hilton Kramer, *The Twilight of the Intellectuals: Culture and Politics in the Era of the Cold War* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000); Volker R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone Between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002).

relations, economy and culture,<sup>61</sup> and between music and art,<sup>62</sup> while many studies have approached it as a national framework.<sup>63</sup>

Crucially, the USIA utilized culture for gaining public abroad in three main ways: people's way of life (customs, values, ideals), elite artistic expression (literature, fine arts, performing arts), and popular culture (the products of the commercial entertainment industry).<sup>64</sup> In this study, we endorse Nicholas J. Cull's definition of public diplomacy as "an international actor's attempt to conduct its foreign policy by engaging with foreign public" through five core components: listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and international broadcasting."<sup>65</sup> While scholars have usually interchanged the terms public and cultural diplomacy as synonyms, especially in the case of private or state-private actors, here we shall use cultural diplomacy as a sub-category of the U.S. public diplomacy efforts.<sup>66</sup> When, on the other hand, cultural diplomacy becomes a broad term that includes its "public" function, three "schools of thought" emerge, as Jessica Gienow-Hecht synthesizes. The first contemplates "the use of culture as 'an instrument of state policy' with limited

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<sup>61</sup> Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982) and Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2006).

<sup>62</sup> Penny Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006); Clare H. Croft, *Dancers as Diplomats: American Choreography in Cultural Exchange*, (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), Kindle edition.

<sup>63</sup> Richard F. Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 1993); Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War* (University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Charles A. Hobbie, *The Time of the Monkey, Rooster, and Dog: A Peace Corps Volunteer's Years in Korea* (Bloomington: iUniverse, 2011); Francisco Javier Rodriguez Jimenez, Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, and Nicholas J. Cull, eds., *US Public Diplomacy and Democratization in Spain: Selling Democracy?* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Simona Tobia, *Advertising America. The United States Information Service in Italy (1945-1956)* (Milano: LED Edizioni Universitarie, 2009).

<sup>64</sup> Martha Bayles, *Through a Screen Darkly: Popular Culture, Public Diplomacy, and America's Image Abroad* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2014), 5.

<sup>65</sup> Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, xv. More traditionally, Hans Tuch defines public diplomacy as "a government's process of communication with foreign public in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and its culture, as well as its national goal and current policies" (Hans Tuch, *Communicating with the World: U. S. Public Diplomacy Overseas* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 3.

<sup>66</sup> Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 489–492. For example, Patricia M. Goff defines cultural diplomacy as the action of "bridging differences and facilitating mutual understanding" in a way "that differs from what official policy would imply" (Patricia M. Goff, "Cultural Diplomacy," in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, ed. Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 421).

private participation.” The second comprehends “the use of cultural diplomacy as an instrument to work at the exclusion of politics.” Finally, a third school defines cultural diplomacy as being beyond the realm of the state, where non-state actors attempt to accomplish a change in foreign relations in the name of a nation or people they claim to represent.”<sup>67</sup> Interested in the state actors with minor private participation, this research follows the first definition of cultural diplomacy.

Finally, the research covers historiographical lacunas in two ways: primarily as a case study of the political role of culture, neglected today in the U.S.-Yugoslav foreign and bilateral relations;<sup>68</sup> secondly, as a statement on fluid relations between information and propaganda and unintended effects propaganda can produce beyond the control of both producers and receivers.<sup>69</sup> This study rejects the presumption that the U.S. propaganda in Yugoslavia was an avowal of cultural imperialism, as Tomlinson and others have argued,<sup>70</sup> somehow underestimating the capacity of negotiation and refusal as well as of reciprocal cultural ‘creolization’.<sup>71</sup> Neither is the question of ‘Americanization’ as a concept addressed, which prevents us from grasping the multipolarity of cultural and political relations between the United States and Yugoslavia.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, “What Are We Searching for? Culture, Diplomacy, Agents, and the State,” in *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*, ed. Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010), Kindle edition.

<sup>68</sup> Besides the already discussed Jakovina works, other authors have inquired the Yugoslav-U.S. relations under the frame either of economic relations (Lampe, Prickett, and Adamović, *Yugoslav-American Economic Relations Since World War II*; Bogetić, “Jugoslavensko-američki odnosi 1961.-1971”); of Cold War strategy (Lees’s, *Keeping Tito Afloat*) or traditional diplomatic relations (Nick Ceh, *U.S. Diplomatic Records on Relations with Yugoslavia during the Early Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), Dragan Bogetić in *Jugoslavensko-američki odnosi 1961.-1971*. (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2012), Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi u vreme bipolarnog detanta 1972-1975* (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike - Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2015) and Darko Bekić, *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu. Odnosi s velikim silama 1949-1955* (Zagreb: Globus, 1988)).

<sup>69</sup> Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 5–11.

<sup>70</sup> John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction* (A&C Black, 2001). See also, Christian G. Appy, *Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000).

<sup>71</sup> Mel van Elteren, “Rethinking Americanization Abroad: Toward a Critical Alternative to Prevailing Paradigms,” *The Journal of American Culture* 29, no. 3 (September 2006): 345–67.

<sup>72</sup> Volker R. Berghahn, “The Debate on ‘Americanization’ among Economic and Cultural Historians,” *Cold War History* 10, no. 1 (February 2010): 107–30.

Here, we agree with Nye's argumentation that soft power is cultural power,<sup>73</sup> however, by throwing in Hayden's assertion that soft power is "a translation of Gramsci's hegemony thesis [as] a relatively value-neutral concept for policymakers."<sup>74</sup> Indeed, while Neil Ferguson declined soft power as not being really a 'power' as it was "too soft",<sup>75</sup> Janice Bially Mattern explained that attraction, as a socio-linguistically constructed "representational force," makes soft power a continuation of hard power, only by different means.<sup>76</sup> In fact, as Samuel Huntington has emphasized,

Soft power is power only when it rests on a foundation of hard power. Increases in hard economic and military power produce enhanced self-confidence, arrogance, and belief in the superiority of one's own culture or soft power compared to those of other peoples and greatly increase its attractiveness to other peoples. Decreases in economic and military power lead to self-doubt, crises of identity, and efforts to find in other cultures the keys to economic, military, and political success. As non-Western societies enhance their economic, military, and political capacity, they increasingly trumpet the virtues of their own values, institutions, and culture.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, 29–30. In this sense, Changhe explains, "Soft power is a useful component of foreign policy. It can be used in all areas and different levels in diplomacy. The state can achieve its goals by resorting to coercive or co-optive means; however, the coercive use of power by government has not been encouraged and has even been restrained greatly, whether at the level of domestic political culture or at the level of international norms and rules. This prompts governments to use soft power to achieve what they want" (Su Changhe, "Soft Power," in *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies*, ed. Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 553.

<sup>74</sup> Craig Hayden, *The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2011), 27–76. For more discussions, look into Philip Seib, *Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) and Jan Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations* (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2005).

<sup>75</sup> Niall Ferguson, "Think Again Power," *Foreign Policy*, February 2003.

<sup>76</sup> Janice Bially Mattern, "Why 'Soft Power' Isn't So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33, no. 3 (June 2005): 583–612, doi:10.1177/03058298050330031601. Nye partially solved critics by introducing the concept of *smart power*, the combination of hard power and soft power strategies (Nye, *The Future of Soft Power*, 16–17).

<sup>77</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 3rd ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 141. And continues, "Communist ideology appealed to people throughout the world in the 1950s and 1960s when it was associated with the economic success and military force of the Soviet Union. That appeal evaporated when the Soviet economy stagnated and was unable to maintain Soviet military strength. Western values and institutions have appealed to people from other cultures because they were seen as the source of Western power and wealth. [...] Similarly, when non-Western societies felt weak in relation to the West, they invoked Western values of self-determination, liberalism, democracy, and independence to justify their opposition to Western domination. Now that they are no longer weak but increasingly powerful, they do not hesitate to attack those same values which they previously used to promote their interests. The revolt against the West was originally legitimated by asserting the universality of Western values; it is now legitimated by asserting the superiority of non-Western values" (141–142).

### 1.3 On Sources, Methodology and the Case Studies

This study is based on the comparison of several international archival sources: the records of the State Department and the USIA (National Archives of the United States, College Park, MD); of the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board and the Bureau of Cultural and Education Affairs (University of Arkansas Libraries and Roosevelt Study Center Microfilm Collection, The Netherlands); of the Central Committee and the Presidency of the Yugoslav League of Communists, the Federal Executive Council, the Socialist League of Working People of Yugoslavia, the Commission for Educational Exchange between the SFRJ and the United States,<sup>78</sup> the Federal Secretariat for Education and Culture, the Yugoslav Council of Academies for Science and Art, the Council for Science and Culture of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Federal Council for Education and Culture 1960-1971 (Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade); of the Cabinet of the President (Archives of Josip Broz Tito, Belgrade); of the Belgrade City Assembly Secretariat for Culture and the City Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (Historical Archives of Belgrade); of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, the Presidency of the Government of the People's Republic of Croatia, the Croatian Parliament Republican Council and Executive Council, the Socialist League of Working People of Croatia, the Secretariat for Science, Education and Culture,<sup>79</sup> the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and the Council for Foreign Relations of the Executive Council of the Parliament (Croatian State Archives, Zagreb).<sup>80</sup> Interviews, collected both orally and by e-mail, testimonies from former officials placed in Belgrade, and newspapers and periodicals, are used to evince the wider possible perspective on the U.S. public diplomacy encounters with Yugoslav public and elites.

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<sup>78</sup> Otherwise known as the Bi-national Fulbright Commission for Yugoslavia.

<sup>79</sup> This government department had several different names in the period covered by this study. It was the Ministry for Science and Culture (1950-1951), the Council for Education, Science and Culture (1951-1956), the Council for Culture and Science (1956-1961), the Council for Education (1961-1963), the Republican Secretariat for Culture (1963-1965), and, finally, the Republican Secretariat for Education, Culture and Physical Culture (1965-1979).

<sup>80</sup> The archival documentation relating to the Socialist Republic of Serbia was not taken into account mainly for two empirical reasons: firstly because the American public and cultural diplomacy in Yugoslavia was an issue of federal interference; and, secondly, because in the case of Belgrade the competence over these policies relied on city secretariats and party organizations.

Yugoslavia comprised of six socialist republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro) and two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo) with Belgrade as the Federation's capital. The USIS post in Belgrade and Zagreb are symptomatic case studies that help comprehend how decision-making power circulated through the Yugoslav governmental institutions, in top-to-bottom directions. With its executive well-built apparatus, its economic attractiveness on the South-East European region, Belgrade and Zagreb held, with Ljubljana, the best universities and research centers. Between 1950 and 1972 (the chronological range of this study), the cities grew into the USIA's major operational centers covering, respectively, the north-west and the southeast of the country. As 'epicenters' of public and cultural diplomacy, they irradiated and permeated, as a sort of territorial-based network, other republics and their main cities.

While being rather traditional, the timeline borders of this research prove functional to the context we are trying to understand. In 1950, the United States and Yugoslavia established a new foreign relation 'conduit' and 'bilateral orbit.' Here, the 1950s are seen as the 'long decade,' spanning from the end of World War II to the affirmation of Johnson's détente policy.<sup>81</sup> 1972, the closing year, symbolically points to the USIA conservative shift with Nixon at the White House, the opening of three new American Libraries in Ljubljana (1970), Skopje (1972) and Sarajevo (1973), and the Yugoslav increase of dissidence movements as the Croatian Spring (1971) and the Serbian Liberals (1972).

In this study, the USIS syntax referred to as the American library, reading room, information center, and/or cultural center, lexis that are used as synonyms, either by the USIA, the Yugoslav policymakers, and the interviewees. Because they contemplated the U.S. economic and technological assistance to Yugoslavia, the following exchange programs are excluded from this research: the UN exchange programs (such as the UNESCO scholarships), the Yugoslav government-funded industrial and technical grants, and the Mutual Security Agency, the Foreign Operations Administration, the

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<sup>81</sup> For the application of the "long 1950s," see Andrea Carosso, *Cold War Narratives: American Culture in the 1950s* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2013), 11-12; Robert H. Bremner and Gary Reichard, *Reshaping America: Society and Institutions, 1945-1960* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1982), and Stephan Kieninger, *Dynamic Détente: The United States and Europe, 1964-1975* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).

Agency for International Development, the International Cooperation Agency, and the Public Law programs.<sup>82</sup>

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On 31 January 1946, a Constitution proclaimed the Federative Peoples' Republic of Yugoslavia, embodying six constituent republics and five constituent peoples (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians). The Five Year Plan, adopted on 28 April 1947 (the Marshall Aid was rejected in June), set grandiose targets for growth. A wholesale nationalization of the economy occurred by the end of 1946, including the seizing of all foreign assets. Industrial production was scheduled for five and agriculture for a 150 percent increase, while 200 major investment projects were planned.<sup>83</sup>

The Cominform blockade of credits and help changed the cards on the table. The Yugoslav famine crisis turned out to be very serious, and on November 10 1950, the State Department announced the U.S. food relief to Yugoslavia. Before asking Congress for an official grant-aid program, the Department decided to employ the EXIM Bank, the Marshall Plan and the Mutual Defense Aid funds to send an initial \$30 million for food purchase. The U.S. policymakers accentuated the humanitarian aspects and covered up the self-evident strategic importance of an independent Yugoslavia.<sup>84</sup> On May 23 1951, the Policy Advisory Staff of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs underlined how crucial it was to publicly dismantle every suspect of U.S. support for Tito's regime or pressure on Tito for military alliances.<sup>85</sup>

In mid-1950, the State Department commissioned the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to create a special project on how American information could get through the Iron Curtain and reach Russian people. The Project TROY, named after the legendary wooden horse operation to the Greek city of Troy, brought together 21

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<sup>82</sup> Even if having a confident and positive impact for bilateral relations, their impact on Yugoslav public opinion and leaders was limited because they mostly involved industrial specialists, construction or chemical engineers, physicians, managers of manufacturing plants, planners, inventors, and agricultural technicians.

<sup>83</sup> L. Benson, *Yugoslavia: A Concise History*, 2nd ed. (Hound mills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 89–91.

<sup>84</sup> Telegram 2896 from the Department of State to certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Nov. 9, 1950, 511.00/11-950, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>85</sup> Special Guidance 91 for the Mutual Security Program, May 23, 1951, enclosed in memorandum from Block to several Department of State offices, Oct. 24, 1951, Box 2243, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP: 7.

scholars from MIT and Harvard, who gathered for the first time in October 1950.<sup>86</sup> Submitted on February 1 1951, the final report “urged for unification of political warfare” at “our national power, political, economic,” and military level.<sup>87</sup> The section dedicated to Tito’s Yugoslavia is of foremost interest. The report appreciated Tito’s regime because it had the most success, economically, politically and socially, of all the Soviet-dominated satellites. The value of Tito’s Yugoslavia was multifold. Firstly, Tito could not become an “American puppet,” but the Americans welcoming him in the Western camp of international affairs without obligation to change his ideology, was of foremost relevance for the U.S. general strategy. Secondly, there were “some indications that the Tito regime may slowly be growing less doctrinaire,” as for the decentralization of industry, the abolition of special privileges for Party members, and admission of foreigners into the country, “all point to a general liberalization.”<sup>88</sup> While partly inaccurate, and partly overestimating the chance for the regime’s prompt liberalization, the Project TROY stated a core point of the U.S. strategy towards Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s, namely that Yugoslavia should be given “every possible support in developing an economic and political life independent of Russia.”<sup>89</sup> On these premises, the U.S. public diplomacy entered the Cultural Cold War *in* Yugoslavia and *for* Yugoslavia.

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<sup>86</sup> Hixon, *Parting the Curtain*, 16–17.

<sup>87</sup> Project TROY Report to the Secretary of State, vol. I, Feb. 1, 1951, 511.00/2-151, CDF 1950-1954, NACP: 1.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid*, 58.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid*, 61.

## 2 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE USIA-USIS NETWORK

*The primary purpose of the United States Information Agency [...] shall be to persuade foreign peoples that it lies in their own interest to take actions which are also consistent with the national objectives of the United States. The goal should be to harmonize wherever possible the personal and national self-interest of foreigners with the national objectives of the United States. This will require that the United States find out what other peoples want, relate their wants to those of this country, and explain these common goals in ways that will cause others to join with the United States in their achievement.*

Proposed National Security Council Directive to the USIA,  
Washington, July 15, 1953<sup>90</sup>

*The Yugoslavs need the technical knowledge which the West has. Moreover, they could not entirely prohibit our activities in this country without forfeiting their claim to independence of both East and West. Consequently, there has been certain relenting in their resistance to the spread of information about the United States in Yugoslavia. Their own need for us, however grudgingly admitted, opens a narrow but indispensable door in the wall of ideological hostility – and through this door ideas can pass.*

Letter from Inspector Lawrence S. Morris to USIA Director George V. Allen,  
Belgrade, November 20, 1959<sup>91</sup>

The history of U.S. public diplomacy in Yugoslavia is a Cold War history. The history of the USIA-USIS network in Yugoslavia is framed between the Yugoslav post-

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<sup>90</sup> Walter A. Radius and Howland H. Sargeant to Robert R. Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, July 15, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, II, 2, doc. 343.

<sup>91</sup> Morris to Allen, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP.

1948 Cold War positioning, its neutralist policy towards the Soviet Union and its non-alignment developed from the late 1950s on. The USIA mission in Yugoslavia echoes Yugoslav reluctance in their resistance to the United States and foreign cultural influence. Finally, USIS missions in Belgrade and Zagreb reflect Washington's policymaking on what Cull defined as the "listening," the "advocacy," the "international broadcasting," the "cultural diplomacy" and the "exchange diplomacy" factor of the USIA.<sup>92</sup>

It is impossible to understand USIA's Cold War mission without understanding its ideological boundaries. As historian David C. Engerman argues,

With no hopes of transforming the antagonists themselves, the American– Soviet conflict became a bipolar one in which the poles themselves were off limits. [...] Thus the story of the Cold War was the story of boundaries, establishing the outer limits of each sphere of influence and competing for those who had not yet pitched their tents in one camp or the other. [...] The conflict was ideological precisely because the two sides measured their own positions in terms of their ability to replicate their social systems around the world. Yet, at the same time, the superpowers pursued ideological aims in the broadest possible terms [...] and thus to give a great deal of leeway to allies who did not fit their ideological precepts. Soviet leaders worked with "bourgeois" or military regimes in the name of furthering Communism and world peace, while American leaders supported dictators and cartels in the name of democracy and free trade. [...] The Cold War was fought on neutral ground or, more precisely, to make neutral ground less so.<sup>93</sup>

The effort of making neutral ground less so and supporting dictators in the name of anti-communism coincided with the U.S. early Cold War policy in Latin America (by the support of Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, Paraguay, Cuba and the Dominican Republic dictatorships), in Franco's Spain and in the Titoist/communist dictatorship of Yugoslavia.

President Truman is mostly recalled by Cold War historians as the initiator of the containment strategy towards the Soviet Union. This doctrine, conceived by U.S. master diplomat George Kennan, alleged that "the main element of any United States policy

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<sup>92</sup> Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), xiv–xv.

<sup>93</sup> David C. Engerman, "Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, Reprint edition, vol. 1, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 33. For an excellent overview on the ideological struggle between the two superpowers and its meaning for geopolitical, technological, national reconstruction and decolonization in Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, look into Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter, eds., *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, 2 edition (New York: Routledge, 2005).

toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term patient, but firm and vigilant, containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”<sup>94</sup> After Kennan’s “long telegram” from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in February 1946 and Winston Churchill’s “iron curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri, in March, Truman and his advisers embraced the containment doctrine to suppress Soviet expansionist policies in Germany, Italy, Turkey, the Eastern Mediterranean and Asia.<sup>95</sup>

The continuation of the American warfare propaganda by the Truman administration, as during World War II, was closely linked to the embracing of containment.<sup>96</sup> On 31 August 1945, President Truman signed the Executive Order 9608, wrapping up the Office of War Information (OWI) and transforming it first into the Interim International Information Service (IIIS), and then into the Office of International Cultural Affairs (OIC) with a separate International Press and Publication Division. In late August 1945, the Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, persuaded his friend William B. Benton, an expert from the world of advertising, to accept the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Public and Cultural Relations.<sup>97</sup> Truman retained the wartime information apparatus as a resource for postwar U.S. foreign policy and decided to use American power to forge an international environment conducive to the

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<sup>94</sup> Diane P. Kunz, ed., *The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade. American Foreign Relations During the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 1.

<sup>95</sup> Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945–1952,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, Reprint edition, vol. 1, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 72. There is huge scholarly production on the containment strategy, on its successful and less efficacious outcomes. Hixson, for example, claims that when Kennan left the Foreign Service in 1950, he had already abandoned his strategy whose formulation “rested in too great a degree of fear of communism and an exaggerated perception of the potential for the spread of Soviet power.” In his view, it was a flawed strategy that produced unfortunate consequences such as “the division of Europe, the nuclear arms race, the focus on Soviet capabilities rather than intentions, and virtual abandonment of negotiations” (Walter L. Hixson, *George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast* (Columbia University Press, 1989), 308, xi). Contrariwise, Gaddis’s updated version of *Strategies of Containment* elucidates how Reagan used an asymmetrical containment strategy (that meant avoiding the costs, risks and frustrations of competing on terms set by the Soviet Union) to enlist Soviet leader Gorbachov in the task of altering his own regime (John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), Kindle edition, Chapter Eleven. For lucid accounts of Kennan’s containment strategy, see also Craig Campbell and Fredrik Logevall, *America’s Cold War*, Reprint edition (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2012), 59-101 and Martin Walker, *The Cold War: A History* (New York: Henry Holt & Co, 1995), 29–58.

<sup>96</sup> For an operational account of the containment strategy in the early Cold War, see for example Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993).

<sup>97</sup> Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 23.

American way of life. “The new president believed that the United States was God’s country, the city on a hill, the exemplar of a superior civilization based on personal freedom, private property, entrepreneurial opportunity, and limited government.”<sup>98</sup>

In early 1947, the Truman administration began preparations for a prolonged confrontation with the Soviet Union, and the White House soon introduced a National Security Bill to establish a Central Intelligence Agency, a National Security Resources Board, a Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a single Defense Department. Above all, the newly created National Security Council (NSC) would become the key senior figure in foreign and defense policy to coordinate the U.S. foreign relations approach.<sup>99</sup>

Under the Assistant Secretary George V. Allen, the work of the OIC developed into the Office of International Information and Educational Exchange (OIE). Then, from 1950 to 1951, Truman led the way to a major overseas propaganda drive that he called “the Campaign of Truth.” The Campaign was launched on April 20, 1950 (within just two to three weeks of reading NSC 68), in a speech in front of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in which he asked for an unprecedented expansion of the Voice of America. As he explained to the Society, the Cold War “is a struggle, above all else, for the minds of men,” and went on arguing that the propaganda used by the “forces of imperialistic communism” could be overcome by the “plain, simple, unvarnished truth.” On the home front, he urged the press to enlist in the campaign by informing the American people “well and completely.”<sup>100</sup> For Edward W. Barret, the author of the

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<sup>98</sup> Leffler, “The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945–1952,” 68.

<sup>99</sup> Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 24–34. On the role of the NSC and the CIA covert propaganda operations during the Truman’s and Eisenhower’s years much has been written. Notable overviews can be found in Lori Lyn Bogle, *The Pentagon’s Battle for the American Mind: The Early Cold War* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004); Sarah-Jane Corke, *US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare and the CIA, 1945-53* (New York: Routledge, 2007); Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006). On how Western anti-communism moved on a complex array of forces, factions and frictions to oppose Soviet power, see Luc van Dongen, Stéphanie Roulin, and Giles Scott-Smith, eds., *Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities, and Networks* (Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). For an in-depth account of the fight over Truman’s plan for unification of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the transformation of the CIA, and the institutionalization of the NSC through a progressive marginalization of the State Department, look into Douglas T. Stuart, *Creating the National Security State*, Reprint edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).

<sup>100</sup> “Address on Foreign Policy at a Luncheon of the American Society of Newspaper Editors,” April 20, 1950, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1945-53, 1950* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961-1966), 260–64; David F. Krugler, *The Voice of America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles, 1945-1953* (University of Missouri Press, 2000), 96.

campaign, the Campaign of Truth would be a “worldwide war of ideas” fought as a “dirty street-corner battle” countering the “Big Lie with the truth.”<sup>101</sup>

William Benton, in 1950 already the former Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, sponsored a Senate resolution for “a Marshall Plan in the field of ideas,” in recognition “that the central issue of our time is intellectual and spiritual, and that the heart of the present conflict is a struggle for the minds and loyalties of mankind.” After the Korean War began, Truman submitted an appropriation request in July for \$89 million to implement the campaign; after the House of Representatives reduced the amount by over \$20 million, he pressed in August for his original allocation.<sup>102</sup>

Edward W. Barrett was appointed after Benton as the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, directing what was then called the United States International Information and Educational Exchange Program (USIE). The final year of the Truman administration saw a belated effort to respond to the mounting pressure to remove U.S. information from the Department of State, therefore the President tried the semi-autonomous U.S. International Information Administration (IIA or USIIA).<sup>103</sup> The move toward the creation of an independent agency to handle U.S. information programs was supported by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, created to recommend changes in information and educational exchange programs. The new agency was patterned along lines recommended by President Eisenhower’s Committee on International Information Activities (the Jackson Committee) and the U.S. Senate’s Special Subcommittee on Overseas Information Programs (the Hickenlooper Committee), which investigated whether the IIA program should remain within the Department of State.<sup>104</sup> John Foster Dulles, President Eisenhower’s Secretary of State from 1953 to 1959, strongly advocated an independent information agency and

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The Public Papers of the U.S. Presidents are available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/> and for President Truman at Available online at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php>.

<sup>101</sup> Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary, to Ralph E. Flanders, Senator, June 16, 1951, 511.00/6-951, Box 2242, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. The official goals of the Truman’s Campaign were the protection and “maintenance of peace, freedom, stability, promotion of spiritual and social well-being, and respect for the rights of individuals in a free society” (Department of State Publication 3927, Aug. 1950, 511.00/9-2250, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP).

<sup>102</sup> Walter L. Hixon, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 14–15, and 241, note 49.

<sup>103</sup> Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 22–23.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid*, 81–82.

“engaged in ceaseless talk about the American duty to protect the “free world” from communism.”<sup>105</sup>

The Jackson Committee provided important recommendations for the new agency: to adapt all broadcasting and information activities to the needs of each target country; to avoid self-praise and emphasis on material achievements by the United States; and to use non-attribution tactics.<sup>106</sup> The United States Information Agency came into being on August 1 1953, with Ted Streibert as its first director, a former assistant dean of Harvard Business School and a successful broadcasting executive who kept the USIA linked to the White House and the NSC.<sup>107</sup>

On July 10 1953, the Operation Coordinating Board of the National Security Council,<sup>108</sup> approved the Doctrinal Program of the USIA. It proclaimed the intention to break down the worldwide intellectual basis of international communism represented in Marxists, socialists, academics, students and scientists. The main operational aim of the document was to find a way to translate American moral, spiritual and philosophical beliefs on liberty into terms “which are both attractive and acceptable to intellectuals.” What means of political, economic and social knowledge could “foster worldwide understanding and acceptance of traditions and viewpoints of the United States?” The

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<sup>105</sup> Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton University Press, 2001), 188–189.

<sup>106</sup> “Coordination of unattributed propaganda is vital, and as a general rule [...] a much greater percentage of the information program should be unattributed” stated the NSC proposal directive on the USIA in 1953 (Walter A. RADIUS and Howland H. Sargeant to Robert R. Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, July 15, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. II, part 2, doc. 343). In October 1953, Executive Secretary Lay authorized the USIA to communicate with audiences abroad without attribution to the U.S. Government “on matters for which attribution could be assumed by the Government if necessary.” (Statement of Policy by the National Security Council enclosed in Report to the NSC by the Executive Secretary (Lay), Oct. 23, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. II, part 2, doc. 355).

<sup>107</sup> Report to the President by the President's Committee on International Information Activities, June 30, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. II, part 2, doc. 368; Wilson P. Dizard Jr., *Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 63–82; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 94 – 96.

<sup>108</sup> Since the Jackson Committee felt that “psychological warfare” and “Cold War” were both unfortunate terms to explain U.S. effort to “build peace and freedom,” the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) was created to replace Truman's Psychological Strategy Board. Fully integrated within in the structure of the National Security Council, the OCB integrated the psychological aspects of U.S. foreign and defense policy, although with a strong membership with the Under Secretary of State as chair, the director of the CIA, deputy directors from Defense and agencies, and a representative of the President (C. D. Jackson in the first years). Eisenhower officially created the new board on September 2, 1953. (Report to the President by the President's Committee on International Information Activities, June 30, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. II, part 2, doc. 368, 1796, 1855–1857; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 94).

OCB policymakers proposed books and periodicals as “the most effective means of influencing the attitudes of persons who are themselves critically occupied in an exposition of social, political, philosophic and economic ideas.”<sup>109</sup> In February 1955, the Board again stressed that the USIA ideological program was “directed toward the present and potential leaders of the intellectual and official life abroad and through them to the wider public who look to them for guidance.” The OCB’s report highlighted how the U.S. mission was to convince those uncommitted and communist-dominated people that their aspirations could be best achieved in a free society.<sup>110</sup> In Yugoslavia, this meant to emphasize the ideological aspect of the East-West struggle, the defense against Soviet aggression and the maintenance of independence from the Soviets. So that “every effort be made to present a sober and true picture of the U.S., to the end that the Yugoslavs shall respect and understand us, rather than with the objective of selling freedom to them, since the latter objective connotes the subversion of their system, with the likely risks to U.S. security interests.”<sup>111</sup>

On September 11 1956, Eisenhower launched People-to-People at a large White House reception which coveted that “every U.S. citizen – man, woman and child – can do [something] to help make the truth of our peaceful goals.”<sup>112</sup> Prominent leaders in the field of private endeavor gathered to discuss how individuals and private institutions – backed by USIA experience and guidance – could participate in the exchange programs with countries beyond the Iron Curtain.<sup>113</sup> The private network would

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<sup>109</sup> Doctrinal Program of the USIA enclosed in Andrew Berding to FOA, Jan. 25, 1954, Box 9, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>110</sup> Operations Coordinating Board: Outline Plan of Operations for the U.S. Ideological Program, Feb. 16, 1955, 511.00/4-155, Box 2070, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>111</sup> Despatch 680 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, June 7, 1955, 511.68/6-755, Box 2204, CDF 1954-1959, NACP.

<sup>112</sup> Carl W. McCardle to Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary, Sept. 12, 1956, 511.00/9-1256, Box 2072, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>113</sup> The conference was attended by many representatives of American private entrepreneurship and NGOs: the American Council on Education, the World Medical Association, the Public Relations Council, the representatives of Presbyterian and other churches, the Institute of International Education, the Experiment of International Living, the AFL-CIO, the American Express Company, the General Electric Company, the MacMillan Company, the Freedoms Foundation Inc., the Radio Corporation of America, the Bortman Plastics Company, just to mention the most relevant.

become, as Conger Reynolds, chief of Office of Private Cooperation, proposed, an extension of the successful USIA program of personal contacts.<sup>114</sup>

In fact, psychological warfare, propaganda and public diplomacy efforts during the Cold War were not of the exclusive province of USIA or the CIA. As Kenneth Osgood demonstrated, dozens of agencies including the National Security Council, the White House, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, the Army, and the foreign economic assistance agencies (such as the Mutual Security Agency, the Foreign Operations Administration, and the Agency for International Development) participated in Cold War propaganda campaigns. In other cases, agencies mainly concerned with domestic policy like the Departments of Labor and Agriculture as well as private organizations, foundations, business, non-profit educational societies, and many ordinary Americans contributed to U.S. propaganda campaigns.<sup>115</sup> By working with both prominent and ordinary citizens, “civic organizations, women’s groups, labor organizations,” the psychological warfare planners hence blurred any distinction between domestic and international propaganda and highlighted still unexplored areas of American life in the 1950s.<sup>116</sup>

This chapter will, however, deal with a narrower perspective of USIA’s program in Yugoslavia, outlined by the first years of the person-to-person contact policy of the USIS posts in Belgrade and Zagreb and by the post-1948 Yugoslav turnover. This framework will, notwithstanding, expand, politically and operationally, through the 1950s and, moreover, the 1960s. Bolstered by the Press and Publication and the Motion Picture Services, the Office of Private Cooperation and the Office of Plans and Programs, all divisions inherited from the IIA, the USIE/USIA would conceive a long-

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<sup>114</sup> Summary Report on White House Conference on a Program for People-to-People Partnership, Washington D.C., Sept. 11-12, 1956, 511.00/9-1256, Box 2072, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>115</sup> Among them the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship, the Interlochen Michigan Music Camp, the National Association of Broadcasters, the World Journal Tribune, Samuel Rubin and Ford Foundation, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Social Science Research Council, the American College of Cardiology, the Council of International Programs for Youth Leaders and Social Workers, the Council on Student Travel, the Experiment in International Living, the Harvard International Seminar, the International Marketing Institute, the U.S. National Student Association and Youth for International Understanding.

<sup>116</sup> Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 5–6, 214–52.

range program attempted for the first time at the American Library in a post-bellum shattered city of Belgrade in March 1945. This is exactly where our story begins.

## 2.1 Information, Persuasion and Cooptation

“Information is power,” pointed out Joseph Nye, and the power of information relies on “getting others to want the outcomes you want”; it represents soft power because it “rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.”<sup>117</sup> For the USIA policymakers, such soft power was to be carried out

by explaining and interpreting [...] to foreign peoples the objectives and policies of the United States Government; by depicting imaginatively the correlation between U.S. policies and the legitimate aspirations of other peoples of the world; by unmasking and countering hostile attempts to distort or to frustrate the objectives and policies of the United States; by delineating [...] life and culture of the people of the United States [to] facilitate understanding of the policies and objectives of the Government of the United States.<sup>118</sup>

For the U.S. Advisory Commission, these missions to foreign countries involved “a great deal of patriotic self-sacrifice for men and women who [were] highly-skilled and highly-paid professionals to leave their long-range posts and to come into governmental service under condition of uncertainty.”<sup>119</sup> As if they were religious missionaries, the American officials abroad were called on total commitment and national self-identification. “You are the United States to hundreds, perhaps millions of people,” solicited “to line up enthusiastically with the United States in the perpetuation of freedom and peace,” and “to nullify and overcome Russian propaganda.”<sup>120</sup>

The U.S. libraries abroad were the direct product of Washington’s public diplomacy. The first infant steps of the library program took place in 1942. The American Library Association (ALA) and OWI quietly placed open-access libraries in all the world’s major cities. “Undertaken without an expression of national will, with fragile support from a divided Congress, with little thought to long-term costs, and

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<sup>117</sup> Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004): 1 – 5.

<sup>118</sup> Telegram 144 from the Department of State to all USIS Posts, Oct. 28, 1953, 511.00/10-2853, Box 2249, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>119</sup> U.S. Advisory Commission on Information – Semiannual Report to the Congress, April 1951, 511.00/4-1051, Box 2241, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>120</sup> Guides in Forming Mass Opinion enclosed in Office Memorandum from N.S. Grantham to Constanzo, June 28, 1951, 511.00/6-2851, Box 2242, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

again with a strong push from Rockefeller, the libraries were a unique American achievement.”<sup>121</sup> In Yugoslavia and other developing world countries, USIS centers were “demonstration models and training-centers.” “Like the fresh new US embassies,” argued life-long USIA officer Richard Arndt, “libraries themselves showcased an aspect of U.S. democracy. Their content, access, user-friendly classification systems, furnishings, ample lighting, knowledgeable and cheerful staff, open shelves, alternative or critical viewpoints, and free lending, showed how a free citizenry gets its information.” Indeed, the USIS libraries made a strong political statement about America. Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka, haunting USIS libraries in Nigeria as a youth, learned that books are “objects of terror to those who seek to suppress the truth.” On the other hand, Umberto Eco, like other young intellectuals all around the world, devoured every book in his USIS library in Milan, tasting free access to a wealth of books, including those critical of U.S. government.<sup>122</sup>

From 1950 to 1951, the activities related to the USIS libraries, such as the users and registered borrowers, reference questions, and the circulation of materials, doubled, and, in case of the Near East region, even trebled. Europe accounted for about half of the total activities with the number of European users augmenting from 435 970 in July 1950 to 1.4 million in December 1951.<sup>123</sup> Despite the Streibert cuts of 1953, when, with a budget of only \$86 million, he dismissed 2849 members of staff, of whom 763 were Americans, and cut the USIS posts from 255 in 85 countries to 217 in 76 countries, the worldwide numbers of USIS posts still surged.<sup>124</sup> In 1951 there were 109, increasing to 201 posts in 1954.<sup>125</sup> Among the 86 countries where USIS operated in 1954, there were 26 European countries with 57 running posts (Germany and Austria excluded).<sup>126</sup> After 1954, the numbers continued to rise: in 1957 there were 162 USIS posts in 63 countries

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<sup>121</sup> Richard Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (Washington, DC, Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2007), 150.

<sup>122</sup> Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings*, 156.

<sup>123</sup> Report on the Activities of USIS Libraries: July 1950-December 1951, Sept. 1952, Box 36, Research Memoranda 1963-1999, USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>124</sup> Immediately when appointed as director of the USIA and with a, Streibert dismissed around (Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 100).

<sup>125</sup> Edward W. Barrett to unspecified addresses, Nov. 15, 1951, 511.00/11-1551, Box 2243, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP; 1954-1955 USIS Mission Prospectus, Dec. 3, 1953, 511.00/3-1253, Box 2246, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>126</sup> 1954-1955 USIS Mission Prospectus, Dec. 3, 1953, 511.00/3-1253, Box 2246, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

and 75 Binational centers in 25 countries (mainly in the Near and Far East, South Asia, Africa and Latin America), for a total of 237 posts in 88 countries.<sup>127</sup>

Contrariwise to global trends, the USIA's "investments" in Western Europe declined after the mid-1950s, especially after the 1956 Hungarian crises, when there were 47 centers left in 16 countries (6 percent of total), although library visitors represented some 39 percent of 28 million of worldwide visitors.<sup>128</sup> This downturn was mainly due to the reinforcement of Eisenhower's New Look defense strategy towards Third World actors, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO), and new security alliances with Pakistan and Taiwan. As a defense strategy, the New Look consisted in a series of assumptions about the indispensability of nuclear weapons as mostly reliable deterrents to Soviet expansion. It relied on the role of the Central Agency and its espionage, sabotage and covert operations. Eisenhower, Foster Dulles, and other top decision makers wanted gradually to substitute allied for U.S. manpower in such key areas as Western Europe. For the propaganda strategy, psychological warfare, and public diplomacy, it meant more investments in Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, and in worldwide tours and trade expositions in Asia, Africa and Latin America.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> The total number of American posts abroad is a reliable approximation not an exact number since some sources implicitly assembled Information centers, Binational centers, Amerika Hauser and minor size reading rooms, while others made partial distinction. The numbers quoted above were obtained by intersecting different sources and can be, therefore, taken as fairly exact although with some margins of error.

<sup>128</sup> Message 120 from USIA CA to all principal USIS posts, July 15, 1957, Box 7, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP; ICS of the USIA, Dec. 4, 1957, Box 9, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>129</sup> Robert J. McMahon, "US National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, Reprint edition, vol. 1, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 293–302. Recent historiography's shift towards the Cold War peripheries and North-South relations within the bipolar confrontation has been witnessed in J. P. D. Dunbabin, *The Cold War: The Great Powers and Their Allies* (Routledge, 2014); Allen Hunter, *Rethinking the Cold War* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), 93–156; Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Geir Lundestad, *East, West, North, South: International Relations since 1945* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2014); and Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). For a Yugoslav perspective on the non-aligned nations and the global South during the Cold War, look into Tvrтко Jakovina, *Treća strana Hladnog rata* (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2011).

### 2.1.1 Policy-Making between Washington and the Field

The history of the USIA is a history between Washington's headquarters and the field. Moreover, it is a history of the USIA interrelating with other U.S. government agencies, such as the CIA, the NSC, the Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty headquarters, and numerous private encounters. By now, there is no scholarly account backing the argument of USIA's covert support of CIA's operations, although there are some indicators of some kind of "operative" interaction between the two agencies. For example, Henry Loomis, one of Streibert's closest cooperators, founder of the USIA's Office of Research and Intelligence, was formerly staffed at the PSB and the CIA representative of the Jackson committee. Streibert's line was, notwithstanding, that "under no circumstances was the agency to be used as cover for any CIA personnel, as exposure would destroy the USIA's credibility." Regardless, rumors that the USIS staff were actually CIA agents recurred, and according to Cull, such rumors were true in the case of Vietnam. Additionally, some "CIA agents were apparently integrated into the Joint United States Public Affairs Office apparatus with a USIA affiliation."<sup>130</sup> In 1956, Streibert asked and obtained that USIA deputy director, Abbott Washburn, "have cleared access to the special intelligence materials available through the [CIA] Office of Current Intelligence."<sup>131</sup> In the words of agency veteran Walter Roberts, the connections between USIA and the CIA were distant ("the CIA people were not always very open with us"), and later, in 1954/1955, Streibert found out about the "USIS payroll, who were basically employees of the Central Intelligence Agency," he agreed with Allen Dulles, head of the Central Agency, that the "USIA would not, in the future, house CIA operatives."<sup>132</sup> Edward Murrow, USIA director from 1961 to 1963, took further steps to define the relationship between the USIA and the CIA. He required that USIA needed to

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<sup>130</sup> Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 97–98, and 98, note 79.

<sup>131</sup> USIA Special Intelligence Clearances, March 5, 1956, CREST: 25-Year Program Archive, CIA Library (available online at [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document\\_conversions/5829/CIARDP80B01676R001000200052-4.pdf](http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/5829/CIARDP80B01676R001000200052-4.pdf)).

<sup>132</sup> Taplin, Mark. "Walter Roberts: Relations With State, CIA - 'Most of the People in the Department...Were Happy to Get Rid of the Information Program.'" *Global Publicks*, February 1, 2015. <http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-roberts-relations-with-state-cia.html>.

know what the CIA was doing, and “felt very strongly that if any USIA men were caught helping the CIA in any country, it would ruin the program.”<sup>133</sup>

The debate on USIA-USIS relations as between headquarters and the field persisted during all of its history between the position arguing for decentralized authority to the field (and therefore field supremacy) and a more balanced view.<sup>134</sup> For Richard A. Humphrey, acting ICS Chief in 1952, Washington had to expect “strong program initiatives, comprehensive recommendations, [...] and decisive local action” from the field, while the field had to expect Washington decisions regarding the worldwide program, the determination of psychological objectives, the operating budget and the program priorities.<sup>135</sup> Two arguments persisted for the selection of the target groups ranging between the *mass audience approach* (“a democratic information program must reach everyone”) and the *leaders’ selective approach*.<sup>136</sup>

In the “war of ideas against [communist] totalitarianism,” claimed an USIA early report, the USIS overseas libraries were essentially “instruments of persuasion,” appealing to leadership and opinion-molding groups. The American library was simultaneously a *place* and an *idea* for an accustomed community that could attract those persons in position to influence others. In Yugoslavia, the occupational target categories “included editors seeking background information for articles, translators, public officials, teachers and officers of the uniformed services.”<sup>137</sup>

From the 1960s on, the USIA established six area directors, “acting for the Director of the Agency” with the assistance of their small number of staff to “administer and direct the Agency’s worldwide overseas operations” that were responsible for the information programs in their respective areas, deciding on their content and method, and their effectiveness. Furthermore, the Media directors and services, with the

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<sup>133</sup> Ann M. Sperber, *Murrow, His Life and Times* (Fordham University Press, 1986), 636.

<sup>134</sup> A Study of USIA Operating Assumptions, Institute of Communications Research, Inc., Dec. 1954, S-27-54, vol. 2, Box 6, Special Reports 1953-1997, USIA Office of Research, RG 306, NACP (hereafter Study of USIA Operating Assumptions, Dec. 1954).

<sup>135</sup> Richard A. Humphrey, ICS, to Sims, IFI, Dec. 3, 1952, 511.00/12-352, Box 2246, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>136</sup> Besides, there was considerable disagreement on whether the USIA should prefer friendly, neutral or hostile audiences, and if it should take communist, neutralists or pro-Americans as target groups (Study of USIA Operating Assumptions, Dec. 1954).

<sup>137</sup> Report on Operations of the Overseas Book and Library Program, July 15, 1953, Box 1, Interagency/Congressional Reports, USIA Office of Administration, RG 306, NACP.

concurrence of the area directors, the Office of Policy and the Office of Administration, developed and supervised the broadcasting, press and publications, motion picture and television programs in support of Agency and country objectives.<sup>138</sup> The USIA Country Plan (or Paper) was the operative document containing fundamental policy guidelines, shaped between the Agency, the State Department and field recommendations. It established the priority objectives, tasks, targets groups, favorable and unfavorable factors involved in country's operations, and media communication channels.<sup>139</sup> The Plan was supported by the Country Program, a "schedule of information and educational exchange activities, projects and products adopted as means of implementing the Country Plan."<sup>140</sup>

Finally, highly engaged in the USIA policy programs, was the Loomis's Office of Research and Intelligence that, as "the jewel of the new agency," was founded in late 1954. By providing detailed analysis of particular trends in world opinion and responses to major events, and "synthesizing the wisdom of agency staff in the field for further dissemination within the wider apparatus of U.S. foreign policy making," the USIA research reports found their way to the White House desk.<sup>141</sup>

The first use of the expression "United States Information Centers" ascends to 1950, and from then it was used both for the American libraries and reading rooms, Amerika Hauser in Germany and Austria, the Bi-National Centers in Latin America (like Lincoln Library in Buenos Aires or Benjamin Franklin Library in Mexico City), in Africa and the Near East.<sup>142</sup> The usage of both *center* and *service* to define the USIS nature, utilized as synonyms, indicates how USIA policy planners had a varied perception of what were the Agency's tasks: a combination of service and center, a

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<sup>138</sup> Robert R. Elder, *The Information Machine. The United States Information Agency and American Foreign Policy* (Syracuse University Press, 1968), 178, note 1.

<sup>139</sup> Official USIE Country Papers, Jan. 19, 1951, 511.00/1-1951, Box 2239, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>140</sup> Airgram 1188 from the Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Feb. 12, 1953, 511.00/2-1253, Box 2246, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>141</sup> Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 97; A Study of USIA Operating Assumptions, Institute of Communication Research, Inc., Dec. 1954.

<sup>142</sup> Foreign Service Serial 1100, Nov. 3, 1950, 511.00/11-350, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. In May 1952, the IIA Field Division (IFI) established that all foreign posts would be denoted as the *United States Information Services* that, in terms of office space and plant, would provide "library rooms, lecture hall, film theater, music rooms, exhibit space, conference room, storage space [...] [and] working room" (William C. Johnstone to IFI officers, May 12, 1952, 511.00/5-1252, Box 2245, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP).

syncretic union of library program, amusement, education, information, and finally a weapon of Cold War persuasion.<sup>143</sup>

### 2.1.2 The Country Plan for Yugoslavia

*Such economic assistance as we have given Yugoslavia [...] in support [of] its resistance to Soviet Union and satellite pressure is [a] small price [to] pay for benefits already enjoyed and expected from Yugoslav independence of Kremlin dictation [...]. This independence from west as well as east is, in my opinion, essential to our immediate purpose of promoting disharmony in ranks of world Communism and thus weakening [the] Kremlin's aggressive power. We therefore should, I believe, guard against temptation, try to push [the] regime into [a] position which world Communists [...] could interpret as compromising dependence on [the] west.*

George Allen, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, to the Secretary of State, Acheson, April 20, 1950<sup>144</sup>

For Yugoslavia, that after the Tito-Stalin rupture proclaimed a neutralist stance, however ideologically tied with the Soviet Union, the U.S. efforts were directed towards “official circles in order to increase [Yugoslav] orientation toward the foreign policy objectives of the United States.”<sup>145</sup> According to Assistant Secretary Barrett, Yugoslavia, along with Japan, Germany, and Spain, was of special interest for the U.S. foreign agenda. In his words, USIS cultural mission in Belgrade was to develop awareness over a common ground of understanding with Yugoslavia, the advantages of participation in the “common defense of the free world,” and in the American-modeled economic welfare.<sup>146</sup>

Issued for the triennium 1950-1952, the first USIE Country Plan for Yugoslavia stated that since the United States and its “democratic way of life” had many admirers among the Yugoslav people, the “VOA broadcasts, printed matter, films and pictorial material [of USIE] should reflect the fundamental long-range objective of U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia,” that was

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<sup>143</sup> Frederic O. Bundy, IFI/F, to John T. Reid, IFI/A, May 12, 1952, 511.00/5-1252, Box 2245, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>144</sup> The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State, April 20, 1950, *FRUS*, Vol. IV, 1950, doc. 799, 1404–1405.

<sup>145</sup> Foreign Service Circular 32, April 10, 1952, 511.00/4-1052, Box 2244, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>146</sup> Edward W. Barrett to unspecified addresses, Nov. 15, 1951, 511.00/11-1551, Box 2243, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

the real emergence of that country as a democratic, independent member of the world community, cooperating with and adhering to the United Nations, and willing to contribute fully to the establishment of international peace and wellbeing. On the other hand, our immediate tactical objective, in the light of Tito's defiance of Stalin and our view that Titoism should continue to exist as an erosive and disintegrating force within the Soviet power sphere, is to extract the maximum political and propaganda advantage from this quarrel within the Communist family. Thus we should strive to foster Tito's independence of the USSR, strengthen his resistance to Soviet pressure, and provide an example to those dissatisfied elements in the Communist parties of the Cominform countries of what they too might enjoy if they embark on Tito's course.<sup>147</sup>

Still, discussions over the Country Plan's guidelines aroused several idiosyncrasies. Supporting Titoism in short term range would not achieve democracy in the long term. In the view of Embassy's representatives in Belgrade, "the present Yugoslav government would lose much of its appeal to international Communist elements if criticism of the capitalist West should disappear from the Yugoslav press," while, by ceasing "our criticism of Tito's totalitarian methods," USIS would lose its credibility. The Embassy, together with the USIS posts, disagreed with IIA refusal of anti-Titoist rhetoric. For USIS, the criticism of Yugoslav totalitarian policies was much needed to "help keep alive democratic aspirations, and [...] show the international communist movement that Yugoslavia has not become a puppet of the U.S."<sup>148</sup>

Notwithstanding, the IIA embraced a policy of neutralism against the failings of the Yugoslav regime in observing fundamental human rights, decisively "conveyed our [general] distaste for totalitarian practices," and focused propaganda in "associating the United States [...] with [favorable] trends in Yugoslavia." For the IIA policymakers, the communist regime in Yugoslavia had no serious political alternative (except for smaller groups of dissidents like peasants and former aristocracy), as its young middle class was mostly consensual to the regime.<sup>149</sup> Despite that, both Washington and the field conveyed that the American cultural mission was to "encourage the Yugoslav people's democratic and independent aspirations," and their desire for "freedoms and the

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<sup>147</sup> USIE Country Paper – Yugoslavia enclosed in circular 2 from Belgrade to the Department of State, July 3, 1950, 511.68/7-350, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP (hereafter USIE Country Paper – Yugoslavia, July 3, 1950). See also Darko Bekić, *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu. Odnosi s velikim silama 1949-1955* (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), 37–77.

<sup>148</sup> USIE Country Paper – Yugoslavia, July 3, 1950.

<sup>149</sup> IIA Plan for Yugoslavia 1951-1952, Jan. 15, 1952 enclosed in Despatch 946 from Belgrade to the Department of State, April 9, 1952, 511.68/4-952, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

material advantages of Western forms of government and society.”<sup>150</sup> That “an apparent dilemma exist[ed] in respect of the U.S. policy of supporting the Tito regime on one hand, with military and economic assistance,” and on the other by fostering, through IIA/USIA, the cultural contacts which could “result in more or less political disaffection and contribute towards weakening the loyalty of party members,”<sup>151</sup> continued to preoccupy the public diplomats in Washington through the decades to come.

The IIA and USIS uncertainty reflects a wider asset of U.S.-Yugoslav relations during the Truman presidency. Because of Tito’s willingness to resist Stalin and slacken its posture towards the West, the United States (and its international aid agencies) assured economic aid, so much needed to withstand the pressure from the Cominform. Possible Soviet reprisal provided the United States and its allies the reasons for military assistance to Yugoslavia. But, as Lorraine Lees underscored, such an arrangement was full of tensions. In 1950 for instance, when Acheson informed the Yugoslav government that the recognition of Ho Chi Minh government of North Vietnam would provocatively disrupt the American public opinion and maybe lead to negate extraordinary aid, Tito lost his temper. “Yugoslavia had refused ‘to bow to the Soviets’ or to the West and would not ‘beg’ Washington for loans,” said the Marshall at a pre-election speech in Titovo Užice.<sup>152</sup> The U.S. ambassador George Allen grasped that the continuation of Yugoslav independence would remain an essential tenet of the wedge strategy, even if the Department’s policymakers could not foresee the role of Tito in a possible European war or Western defense system.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> USIE Country Paper – Yugoslavia, July 3, 1950.

<sup>151</sup> IIA Plan for Yugoslavia 1951-1952, Jan. 15, 1952 enclosed in Despatch 946 from Belgrade to the Department of State, April 9, 1952, 511.68/4-952, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>152</sup> M.S. Handler, “Tito Warns Against Pressure,” *The New York Times*, February 19, 1950; Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War* (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), 81–119.

<sup>153</sup> The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State, April 20, 1950, *FRUS*, Vol. IV, 1950, doc. 799; Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat*, 83. Lees stressed how the wedge strategy was more applicable to the arena of political bilateral relations between the two countries, rather than for the application of NATO’s military alliance network in South-Eastern Europe. She argues how the bilateral dialogue between Yugoslavia and the United States, whilst the former defending its Marxist orthodoxy and the latter battling communists movements as on the Korean peninsula, “demonstrated the ability of both countries to base a foreign policy on national security requirements rather than ideological imperatives” (119).

As a high-policy priority, the 1952 joint USIS-MSA<sup>154</sup> Country Plan, focused on Yugoslav official acquiescence, even though “grudging and slow,” to American cultural penetration. As the Department of State recognized, the Yugoslav “openness” consequently followed the U.S. economic and military support, together with the famine-relief aid, to Yugoslavia. By playing the role of “ambassador[s] of good will,” the U.S. military items, textbooks, lectures, specialists, trainees, journals, or CARE boxes, proved American “genuine interests” in assisting Yugoslavia.<sup>155</sup>

In order to sustain such openness, the Plan prioritized target groups such as the communist party activists, the youth, the non-communist officials, the rural population, the religious groups and Army officers, in addition to the industrial workers and educators.

The USIS channels of “transmission” consisted in books, magazines, newspapers, exhibitions and movies, USIS materials for the Yugoslav press, contacts with U.S. non-governmental organizations and the English teaching program. The *Voice of America* was appealing to a massive audience, whilst agricultural bulletins were specifically prepared for rural audiences.<sup>156</sup> With 17 American officers and 41 local employees in Belgrade, Zagreb and Novi Sad, the USIS libraries produced and distributed *SAD*<sup>157</sup>, the first Yugoslav variant of Soviet periodical *Amerika* and predecessor of *Pregled* [Horizons].<sup>158</sup>

We shall observe, in the following paragraphs, how the USIS policies in Belgrade and Zagreb were shaped by the contours of Yugoslav-American foreign relations in the

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<sup>154</sup> The Mutual Security Agency (MSA) program merged within the USIS post in 1952 when it had one responsible officer in Belgrade (USIS-MSA Information Plan for Yugoslavia 1952-1953, Aug. 1, 1952, enclosed in despatch from Belgrade to the Department of State, July 31, 1952, 511.68/7-3152, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP).

<sup>155</sup> USIS-MSA Information Plan for Yugoslavia 1952-1953, Aug. 1, 1952.

<sup>156</sup> USIS Country Program for Yugoslavia 1952-1953, Dec. 3, 1952, 511.68/12-352, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP; USIS-MSA Information Plan for Yugoslavia 1952-1953, Aug. 1, 1952, enclosed in Despatch 73 from Belgrade to the Department of State, July 31, 1952, 511.68/7-3152, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>157</sup> *SAD* was the first in loco produced review that started to be published in 1951, but eliminated in 1954 due to budget cuts. Its title in Serbo-Croatian had two meanings: as “now” and as the abbreviation for the “United States of America” (Sjedinjene Američke Države); (Despatch 254 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Sept. 6, 1951, 511.68/9-651, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP; Memorandum from Belgrade to the Department of State, April 28, 1954, 511.68/4-2853, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP).

<sup>158</sup> IIA Plan for Yugoslavia 1951-1952, Jan. 15, 1952 enclosed in Despatch 946 from Belgrade to the Department of State, April 9, 1952, 511.68/4-952, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

1950s and by the Yugoslav internal ideological adjustments. Seen as long-term investments whose dividend would increase by time, the U.S. Ambassador Allen and his staff just could not believe what “tremendous interest and response of [the] Yugoslav population [was] in [USIS] activities.” In only three months, from April to June 1952, around 50,316 Yugoslavs entered the USIS Belgrade post, and this number would not stop growing.<sup>159</sup>

## 2.2 The USIS Posts in Belgrade and Zagreb and the Soft Power Revenue

*That place was a vanguard home for the Belgrade’s intellectual circles.*

Petar Nikolić, former employee of USIS Belgrade<sup>160</sup>

*In a certain way, we went there as on a pilgrimage, the place was so important.*

Sonja Bašić, professor emeritus of Zagreb University<sup>161</sup>

*The eagerness of Yugoslav people to learn about America continues to astonish us here. Our information centers on [the] main streets of Belgrade, Zagreb and Novi Sad, with libraries, photo and exhibit rooms, American newspapers and magazines are very literally small windows through which Yugoslavs can and do, in ever increasing numbers, see America. [...] Ample evidence that our VOA radio program is heard comes to us daily through letters from every nook and corner of the country. America is reaching directly into homes of Yugoslavs in villages and hamlets from Slovenia to Macedonia. [...] My experience in Belgrade has given me one impression above all others - we must fight armed aggression with armed might, we can only fight bad ideas with better ones. [...] This is what USIE is trying to do and is doing with increasing success in Yugoslavia.*

Letter of Ambassador George V. Allen to the State Department,  
Belgrade, June 19, 1951<sup>162</sup>

George Allen substituted Bill Benton at the head of the information agency (OIC/OIE) in 1948 and held the post till 1949 when he departed to his ambassadorship

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<sup>159</sup> Telegram 291 from Belgrade to Secretary of State, Sept. 4, 1952, 511.68/9-452, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. In 1952, the city of Belgrade counted approximately 440,000 inhabitants (Radmila Njegić, “Razvoj stanovništva Beograda u posleratnom periodu,” *Godišnjak Grada Beograda*, no. 11–12 (1965 1964): 219.

<sup>160</sup> Interview with Petar Nikolić, July 5, 2014, Belgrade.

<sup>161</sup> Interview with Sonja Bašić, Nov. 26, 2013, Zagreb.

<sup>162</sup> Telegram 1940 from Belgrade to the Department of State, June 19, 1951, 511.68/6-1951, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

mission to Belgrade (remaining there until 1953). It was not a coincidence that Eisenhower sent him, in post-1948 Yugoslavia, to settle up the USIS mission and negotiate with the government the delicate process of supporting Yugoslav independence from the Soviets. Allen's 1951 letter to the State Department testifies an extraordinary and unexpected success of USIS mission in Belgrade throughout the 1950s. Staff numbers support this statement; in August 1951, only 10 persons were staffed at the American center in Belgrade of whom two Americans and eight Yugoslavs, while one was staffed at the Novi Sad library.<sup>163</sup> After the USIA opened the new post in Zagreb in 1953, the numbers increased to 17 Americans and 41 local employees in 1953.<sup>164</sup> At the end of the decade, the Zagreb center alone had 11 American officers, 28 local employees, six drivers and one courier.<sup>165</sup>

As Cull discovered, the members of the USIS field staff were veterans of the IIA, ECA, and even OWI programs, most of them senior journalists. The field staff included a small number of African Americans (not in Yugoslavia), "whose presence did something to counteract America's deserved reputation for bigotry."<sup>166</sup>

The United States Information Service of Belgrade was located in Čika Ljubina Street at n. 19<sup>167</sup> in the central pedestrian zone, at the crossroad of the historical Knez Mihaila and Čika Ljubina. It was sited, not just by coincidence, in the eminent business and university district, in proximity of the Republican Square (Trg Republike), the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences (Filozofski Fakultet) and the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Opened in March 1945,<sup>168</sup> before WWII officially ended, it continuously operated till 1998<sup>169</sup> (except in 1946 during the political incident

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<sup>163</sup> Despatch 166 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 20, 1951, 511.68/8-2051, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP; Bruce Buttles, PAO, to Edward Barnett, Assistant Secretary of State, June 28, 1951, 511.68/6-2851, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>164</sup> 1954-1955 USIS Mission Prospectus, Dec. 3, 1953, 511.00/3-1253, Box 2246, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>165</sup> Generalni konzulat SAD enclosed in report from P. Menac to DSIP, Jan. 17, 1959, Pov.k. 15/1-1959, Box 1C, Konzularni odjel/Povjerljivo D, Izvršno Vijeće Sabora (hereafter IVS) SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, Croatian State Archives (hereafter HDA).

<sup>166</sup> Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 98-99.

<sup>167</sup> Američki Informativni Centri u Jugoslaviji, 1973, Box 1, Records Relating to Culture Centers 1946-1988, USIA Library Program Division, RG 306, NACP. Today (2016), the former USIS building is occupied by the Spanish Cervantes Institute.

<sup>168</sup> Propaganda kapitalističkih zemalja u Jugoslaviji, 1953, 724/1953, Box 44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, Archives of Yugoslavia (hereafter AJ).

<sup>169</sup> Information Resource Center – U.S. Embassy Belgrade, E-mail message to author, June 16, 2015.

following the breakdown of two U.S. C-47 planes while overflying Yugoslav territory near the Austrian borders).<sup>170</sup> The American Center in Zagreb was not lacking in elegance and city-center adjustment compared to the one in Belgrade. Opened in May 1953 in the fancy and aristocratic Zrinjevac green area, the old park of Zagreb's high-town, it was intersecting Hebrang and Braće Kavurića Street n. 13 (today Zrinjevac Street).<sup>171</sup> Situated within the General Consulate's building, the USIS posts appeared vis-a-vis the Modern Gallery and, transversely, the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts (HANU). The imposing three floor building was previously occupied by a well-known Zagreb bookstore, Knjižara Vasić, a leading publisher in the 1920s and 1930s.<sup>172</sup>

USIS Zagreb surpassed by far the post's area availability. Owned by the U.S. government, it consisted of 403 square meters located on the ground floor, 10 rooms and a 40-seat reading room. On the contrary, the American Belgrade's center was leased by USIS, and its second flat (with exhibit windows on the first floor) consisted of 9 rooms, 70 seats and 290 square meters.<sup>173</sup> The cultural centers were open six days a week, twice a day, which was, for the Yugoslav customers, an unusual opening hour pattern. Both the centers were opened during the morning and evening (USIS Belgrade from 9 am to 1 pm, and 3.30 pm to 7.30 pm; USIS Zagreb from 8 am till 12.30 pm and from 4 pm till 7.30 pm), a circumstance that provided enough time for both working and retired people, university students, white-collar workers and academics, to visit the center.<sup>174</sup>

As for the American library in Novi Sad, its small spaces and reduced staff, made it Belgrade's branch and not an information center.<sup>175</sup> Notwithstanding, it owned a

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<sup>170</sup> Radina Vučetić, "Amerikanizacija u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi '60-ih" (PhD. dissertation, University of Belgrade, 2011), 129. The only account, produced by now, on the USIA's posts in Yugoslavia can be found in Vučetić PhD. study, 121–185.

<sup>171</sup> The first USIS post in Zagreb was based in a small building of Kumičić Street, in a small library room and two offices (Despatch 4 from American Consulate Zagreb to Department of State, July 3, 1953, 511.68/7-353, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP). The USIS post in Zagreb opened in January 1951, and closed its doors in January 1998 (Marica Bahlen, Information Resource Center – U.S. Embassy Zagreb, E-mail message to author, June 18, 2014).

<sup>172</sup> Interview with Nada Apsen-Pintarić, May 31, 2014, Zagreb.

<sup>173</sup> Space occupied by U.S. Information Center Overseas, Feb. 19, 1969, Box 3, Records Relating to Culture Centers 1946-1988, USIA Library Program Division, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>174</sup> Summary Hours opened to Public, Feb. 17, 1969, Box 3, Records Relating to Culture Centers 1946-1988, USIA Library Program Division, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>175</sup> Bruce Buttles, PAO, to Edward Barnett, Assistant Secretary of State, June 28, 1951, 511.68/6-2851, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

privileged geostrategic position as Novi Sad was the capital of the autonomous region of Vojvodina, situated on the left bank of the Danube in the vicinity of Rumanian and Hungarian borders, culturally a reference point of Serbian national identity. Again, the library was situated in the central National Heroes Square (Trg Narodnih Heroja) n. 5, reopened (after restauration) in November 1952, in a “modern and attractive form.”<sup>176</sup>

The closing of Budapest’s and Bucharest’s American centers, issued in the late 1940s by the communist parties of Romania and Hungary, was crucial for the enlargement of the American libraries in Belgrade and Zagreb, recalls Nada Apsen-Pintarić,<sup>177</sup> since their holdings were then all sent to Yugoslavia.<sup>178</sup>

It was the Department’s policy for the information program – conceived as a combination of policy strategy and culture persuasion – to house the USIS offices in whole or in part within the same building as the diplomatic mission (contrariwise to the British Council’s separate status abroad). Part of the American cultural strategy was to locate the American centers in positions of easy access by public means of transportation and arrange ground-floor exhibit rooms. The strong point of the libraries consisted both in their large collections of periodicals, publications, leaflets, films, photos, as well as in radio receivers, monitors and mechanical production equipment, playbacks, film strips and projectors, recording equipment and specialized supplies for libraries. The USIS personnel had, or at least required, broad competence skills, from public relations, press and publication, library, film and exhibition management, to radio programming and exchange of persons. Besides their library routine work, the USIS centers organized movie evenings and lectures, arranged thematic exhibits, produced radio broadcasts, and distributed books and leaflets through the extension

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<sup>176</sup> Semiannual Evaluation Report – Yugoslavia enclosed in despatch from Belgrade to the Department of State, Dec. 17, 1952, 511.68/12-1752, Box 2247, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>177</sup> I met Nada Apsen in Zagreb on May 31, 2014, where we had a four-hour interview on her role in the American Center in Zagreb during her 40-years career. She entered in service as an office administrator on January 5, 1953, and retired in 1996. She was first appointed to Librarian and Head Librarian positions. After the war exploded in former Yugoslavia, Apsen was nominated Political Adviser of the first Croatian ambassador, Peter W. Galbraith, and became responsible to send Croatian newspaper reports (named by her as Nadiagrams) to the State Department and Pentagon between 1991 and 1995 (Interview with Nada Apsen-Pintarić, May 31, 2014, Zagreb; Warren M. Christopher, the Secretary of State, to Nada Apsen-Pintarić, Official Recognition and Appreciation of the Department of State, January 1993, Nada Apsen Private Collection).

<sup>178</sup> In April 1950, 38 pouches of books arrived to the American library in Belgrade from Bucharest (USIE Report 610 for April and May 1950, June 20, 1950, 511.68/6-2050, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP).

services. The officers in Belgrade, Zagreb and Novi Sad were engaged in organizing translations of American authors, coordinating the arrival of American classical artists and jazz performers, welcoming U.S. specialists, and searching for candidates for exchange programs.<sup>179</sup>

The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) was the leader and front-runner of every USIS mission. He reported to the ambassador and was among his principal cooperators. Responsible for the realization of the U.S. cultural policy objectives, the PAO could confirm or modify the Country Plan.<sup>180</sup> As the Chief Public Relations Officer of the Ambassador, he had three primary roles including the setup of the country's cultural policy lines (the Plan and the Program/schedule of implementation), the administration of his staff and the representation of the USIS with the Yugoslav government.<sup>181</sup> With his staff, he analyzed the country's social structure and detected target groups and means of communicating with them.<sup>182</sup> But what is even more important, he was in charge of managing the USIS budget, also for the branch posts.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> For some examples, see William C. Johnstone to several IFI officers, May 12, 1952, 511.00/5-1252, Box 2245, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>180</sup> 1954-1955 USIS Mission Prospectus, Dec. 3, 1953, 511.00/3-1253, Box 2246, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP; Airgram 398 from the Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, April 3, 1953, 511.00/4-353, Box 2247, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>181</sup> Alice R. Hager, IFI/E, to Henry F. Arnold, IFI/E, July 9, 1953, 511.00/7-953, Box 2248, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>182</sup> After the PAO proposal, the Country Plan passed into Ambassador's hand that, after approbation, forwarded it to Washington. Here, the USIA headquarters waited for the final concurrence from the Department of State. Sequentially, the Plan turned into an approved action document on which, throughout the years, the Department and the field post could make adjustments (Draft of the 8<sup>th</sup> Report to Congress enclosed in Memorandum to all USIA offices and State, Aug. 27, 1957, Box 17, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP; Robinson McIlvaine to Under Secretary of State, May 19, 1955, 511.00/5-1955, Box 2070, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP).

<sup>183</sup> Message 1272 from USIA CA to USIA circular, Nov. 22, 1957, Box 7, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP. Besides USIS, other U.S. international agencies operating within the Embassy: the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), the Military Assistance Section and the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), which predecessor was the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA). The MSA merged with USIS in May 1952 into a single operating unit under the coordination of Bruce Buttles, Belgrade's PAO (Semiannual Evaluation Report enclosed in Despatch 44 from Belgrade to the Department of State, July 13, 1953, 511.68/7-1353, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP; Telegram 1462 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, May 20, 1952, 511.68/5-2052, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP).

### 2.2.1 1950-1953: “Business is booming at USIE...”<sup>184</sup>

Between 1950 and 1953 many Cold War factors – both in bilateral relations and internal Yugoslav developments – resulted the USIE/USIS “business booming.” Scholars agree in the appraisal of Truman’s success in sustaining Tito and drawing his country closer to the West.<sup>185</sup> During Eisenhower’s election campaign, his future Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, articulated his anti-containment critics as timid and sterile. But “Dulles’s passionate rhetoric,” underlined Tony Smith,

was not always matched by action. In the case of Eastern Europe, Dulles followed the precedent of the Truman administration and worked to encourage the example of Yugoslavia’s independence from Moscow. The fact that Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito was a communist who was thoroughly opposed to democracy was not the issue. Priority should be given to breaking up of the Soviet empire, if not through democracy then by encouraging the self-determination of the nations of Eastern Europe.<sup>186</sup>

Eisenhower and Dulles backed a “New Look” in foreign policy which consisted in a more forceful response to communist aggression and affirmation of U.S. nuclear superiority.<sup>187</sup> The Eisenhower and Dulles wedge strategy, as conceived after the Korean War ended and Soviet threat to Yugoslavia vanished, was more aggressive and “envisioned more military and political gains for the West. Tito *would* be enticed to join NATO; [...] Tito *would* also be convinced to inspire, if not lead, a Titoist liberation movement in the satellites.”<sup>188</sup>

But the optimistic Tito’s military ties to the West through the Balkan pact that seemed to place him in a neutralist pro-Western context, were shaken by the after-effect of Stalin’s death in March 1953. The latter led to the reapproachment of Yugoslavia

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<sup>184</sup> Manuscript for USIE Newsletter enclosed in despatch 189 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 24, 1951, 511.68/8-2451, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>185</sup> Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat*; Bekić, *Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu*; Tvrtko Jakovina, *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici* (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 2002); Ljubodrag Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Hladni rat* (Beograd: Arhipelag, 2014).

<sup>186</sup> Tony Smith, *America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton University Press, 2001), 189. As a hard-liner anticommunist, Dulles wanted to replace the “static doctrine of containment” by “roll-back” and “liberation” for the “captive nations” of Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, he was careful to caution against war. As he declared in his 1952 *Life* article, “We do not want a series of bloody uprisings and reprisals [in Eastern Europe]. There can be peaceful separation from Moscow, as Tito showed... and we can be confident that within two, five, or ten years, substantial parts of the present captive world can peacefully regain national independence.” (190).

<sup>187</sup> The nuclear deterrent was essential, Dulles argued in 1956, “but that did not mean its invariable use against local aggression, or ‘nibblings’” (Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, Chapter 6).

<sup>188</sup> Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat*, 122; John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, Chapter 5.

with the Soviet Union, culminated in the underwriting of the Belgrade (1955) and Moscow (1956) Declarations. The mid-1950s meant for the Yugoslav foreign policy leaders a search for alternatives that Tito shifted towards Third World nations with whom he engaged in intense personal diplomacy (as in the case of his extensive trip to India and Burma in 1954, and Indonesia, India, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt in 1958/1959).<sup>189</sup>

Better U.S.-Yugoslav relations in early 1950s soon resulted in declining of the anti-American narratives in the Yugoslav public sphere and by party leaders. Bruce Buttles, the USIS PAO in Belgrade, reported on crowds previously just staring at the USIS exhibit windows or visiting only the exhibit section (because “comfortable anonymity” was “politically safe”) that suddenly began visiting the Library and taking books away.<sup>190</sup> The *crescendo* trends extremely enhanced between 1950 and 1953. A 1950 report shows that in January 3,019 Belgrade citizens visited the post in Čika Ljubina and borrowed 701 books.<sup>191</sup> In June, they were already 4,061.<sup>192</sup> Then the visitor’s number jumped to 9,730 in October 1951, and to 16,494 in October 1952 with more than 2,955 books circulating.<sup>193</sup>

Between 1951 and 1952, an unusual increase, from USIS point, occurred with the new registered borrowers (to be registered in USIS library was politically undesirable even if not prohibited) whose numbers increased from 152 in 1950 to 705 new

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<sup>189</sup> Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Hladni rat*, 123–187. The Asian-African Conference in Bandung (1955), which was, not as sometimes a historical post-factum interpretation believed, the prototype of the Non-Aligned Movement but rather a platform of discussions for India, Pakistan, China, Indonesia, Egypt, Japan, and other countries, held no Yugoslav participation. Hence, the Conference gave Yugoslavia an occasion to publicly condemn colonialist discrimination and present a compromising solution for the “Algerian” question, in the core of the international arena. At the 1956 Brioni Conference with Nehru and Nasser, Tito explored the alternatives to the bipolar Blocs politics and shaped, in the final document, conceptual guidelines for the Non-Alignment as peaceful cooperation, anti-colonialism, and disarmament (Dimić, *Jugoslavija i Hladni rat*, 278–279; Jakovina, *Treća Strana Hladnog Rata*, 39–68; Vladimir Petrović, “Poštteni posrednik’. Jugoslavija između starih i novih spoljnopolitičkih partnerstava sredinom pedesetih godina,” in *Spoljna politika Jugoslavije: 1950-1961.*, ed. Slobodan Selinić (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008), 462–71).

<sup>190</sup> Manuscript for USIE Newsletter enclosed in despatch 189 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 24, 1951, 511.68/8-2451, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>192</sup> USIE Report 62 for June 1950, July 27, 1950, 511.68/7-2750, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>193</sup> Despatch 358 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 10, 1952, 511.68/11-1052, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP; Telegram 980 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, Feb. 5, 1952, 511.68/2-552, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

registered borrowers in 1952.<sup>194</sup> USIS testified in its many reports of university, high school and junior high school students, coming to their place to learn English, borrow children's books, American literature, study for their exams in architecture, agriculture and medicine.<sup>195</sup>

The library extension service, inaugurated in 1949, meant USIS servicing of Yugoslav institutions, faculties and learned societies with press and publication materials. In this way, the American center could reach eminent Yugoslav institutions such as the Academy of Sciences and Arts, the Bibliographic Institute, and most importantly the University with its scientific and technical faculties (Machinery, Technology, Veterinary, Mathematics, Agriculture, and Pharmacy) and human and art sciences (Applied Arts, Architecture and Philosophy). Surprisingly, the American Library in Belgrade also supplied Yugoslav government institutes and ministries with law materials, and industrial plants (the chemical Hempro, the glass factory Pančevo, or aircraft factory in Zemun) with technical bulletins. But then periodicals such as *Tehnika Narodu!* (Technology to the People), *Prosveta* (Education), *Narodna Krila* (People's Wings), and newspapers *Republika*, *Borba*, *Politika*, publishing houses such as *Kultura*, regularly received press materials.<sup>196</sup>

As public interest grew, the lack of personnel became so obvious that Alex Draginich, as the Belgrade's PAO, complained repeatedly to the State Department.<sup>197</sup> Bruce Buttles, who inaugurated the USIS bolder strategy, substituted Draginich on May 1 1951.<sup>198</sup> In his extensive 1952 report, he evaluated the program in Yugoslavia as "flexible and modest," identical to those in Western Europe programs except for the missing exchange programs. Only in the case of the *Voice* broadcastings, he underlined, Yugoslavia was comparable to Eastern Europe, with a higher level of emissions. The

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<sup>194</sup> USIE Report 178, Dec. 1949-Jan. 1950, Feb. 28, 1950, 511.68/2-2850, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP; Despatch 358 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 10, 1952, 511.68/11-1052, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>195</sup> Despatch 358 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 10, 1952, 511.68/11-1052, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>196</sup> USIE Report 178, Dec. 1949-Jan. 1950, Feb. 28, 1950, 511.68/2-2850, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>197</sup> USIE Report 397 for Feb. and March 1950, April 11, 1950, 511.68/4-1150, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>198</sup> Despatch 166 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 20, 1951, 511.68/8-2051, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

success of the American cultural program in Yugoslavia, remarked Buttles, was indirectly due to Yugoslav antipathy towards the Stalinist regime. Consequently, whilst the USIS was “carefully avoiding anti-communist propaganda,” it could extensively market “much anti-Soviet material in volume to the Yugoslavs.” He, therefore, concluded that as “long as Yugoslavia remains a communist state, it is patent that the free circulation of Western ideas is inimical to the maintenance of control by the regime,” which for the USIS program included “continuous frustrations, interruptions and delays stemming from the resistance of communists inside and outside the government.”<sup>199</sup> Yugoslavia presented a “cyclical atmosphere for USIS operations” that varied from active official resistance to relaxations that sometimes approached cooperation.<sup>200</sup>

“Tremendous response to the program” was the USIS Zagreb experience. According to the first report after the re-opening in Brace Kavurića Street, USIS staff was enjoying “stimulating and invaluable experience” with the public, while “greater understanding [was] deepening [...] the friendship between Americans and Yugoslavs.”<sup>201</sup> An average daily attendance of about 1000 persons had some 100 books circulating every day. In June 1953, the post had 3,116 registered borrowers, and because of unexpected crowds the initial program of magazines and newspapers circulation was stopped. 1953 saw the extension service established providing the possibility for out-of-town borrowers from Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, to lend the books by mail.

To the old and new potential borrowers, the American library sent a cautionary letter of information inviting them to ask for books without any postage fee and proposing special subject lists to particularly interested borrowers. The response was immediate and wide-ranging. Of the 250 extensive borrowers in June 1953, 150 were from Ljubljana, so USIS Zagreb decided to donate more than 100 books to their University. The widest interest, reported the Library’s desk, was in periodicals such as

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<sup>199</sup> Semiannual Evaluation Report – Yugoslavia enclosed in despatch from Belgrade to the Department of State, Dec. 17, 1952, 511.68/12-1752, Box 2247, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>200</sup> Semiannual Evaluation Report enclosed in despatch 44 from Belgrade to the Department of State, July 13, 1953, 511.68/7-1353, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>201</sup> Report from USIS program enclosed in despatch 4 from American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, July 3, 1953, 511.68/7-353, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

*Life, Time, and Newsweek, The Saturday Evening Post, House Beautiful* and fashion magazines, in addition to specialized magazines on movie making, theatre, or radio.<sup>202</sup>

The pro-western paces of Yugoslav foreign relations in 1953, such as the sign of the Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey (and externally with NATO),<sup>203</sup> and the Marshall's official visit to London between March 16 and 21 (his first visit ever to a Western European capital, concurrent with Stalin's death on March 6) proved to be positively supportive of the USIS mission in Yugoslavia.<sup>204</sup>

And indeed, when on October 8, 1953, the ambassadors of the United States and United Kingdom declared that military occupation of Zone A would soon cease and the territory pass to Italy, the Trieste question became an international incident, thus proving to be a Cold War hot spot *par excellence*, and provoked an immediate down turning of USIS activities.<sup>205</sup> Nada Apsen recalled her memories on the protests directed to the American center in Zagreb, "the demonstrators gathered around the building yelling "Trst je naš!" (Trieste is ours) and "Dole Papa, dole Rim i Pella skupa s njim!" (Down with the Pope, down with Rome and Pella together with them); then they threw torches on the library, broke the exhibit windows and set fire causing books and shelves to be destroyed."<sup>206</sup> After the London Memorandum was signed, on October 5, 1954,

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<sup>202</sup> Report from USIS program enclosed in despatch 4 from American Consulate Zagreb to Department of State, July 3, 1953, 511.68/7-353, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP; USIE Report 610 for April and May 1950, June 20, 1950, 511.68/6-2050, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>203</sup> On the political repercussions see Bojan Dimitrijević, "Jugoslavija i NATO 1951-1958. Skica intenzivnih vojnih odnosa," in *Spoljna politika Jugoslavije: 1950.-1961.* ed. Slobodan Selinić (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008), 255–74.

<sup>204</sup> Katarina Spehnjak, "Posjeta Josipa Broza Tita Velikoj Britaniji 1953. godine," *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 33, no. 3 (2001): 597–631.

<sup>205</sup> After the annunciation, Yugoslavia reacted by sending troops on its Western border, bloody protests occurred in Trieste by both nationalities, while Yugoslav cities testified both formal and spontaneous massive demonstrations. A Cold War breeze returned between Belgrade and Rome, whilst anti-American narratives arouse in Yugoslav newspapers. The London Memorandum of October 1954 ratified the new border, and relations passed to normality, also thanks to the softer line of the new Italian Prime Minister Scelba. Notwithstanding, the Trieste and Istrian question remains today a disputed issue in the public national discourse of Italians, Slovenians and Croatians living in the former Zone A and B (Bogdan C. Novak, *Trieste 1941-1954. La lotta politica, etnica e ideologica* (Milano: Mursia, 2013), 405–414, 425–429; John Creighton Campbell, *Successful Negotiation, Trieste 1954: An Appraisal by the Five Participants*, Reprint (Princeton University Press, 2016); Yugoslav warfare tones can be found in *Borba* (Naša slovenska braća bit će s nama i Trst će kad tad biti naš," October 12, 1953; "Suprostaviti ćemo se svakome tko pokuša da ugrozi našu slobodu," October, 14, 1953) and *Vjesnik* ("Vlade Sad i Velike Britanije predale zonu A STT i grad Trst Italiji," October 9, 1953)).

<sup>206</sup> According to Apsen-Pintarić, some of the demonstrators were usual library borrowers as well, obligated by the authorities to participate in "Trst" demonstrations (Interview of Nada Apsen-Pintarić, May 31, 2014, Zagreb).

the political environment surrounding the American Libraries in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Novi Sad, returned to normality and routine. The latter, in the years to come and solicited by an outstanding reception, would mostly concentrate on perpetuating a personal contact policy and on establishing a wide network outside the perimeters of the capital cities.

### **2.2.2 1954-1959: The Inspection Practices in the Field**

There was scarce investigation of the USIS posts by Washington's information agencies in the early 1950s. The first inspection of the Yugoslav posts was conducted in Belgrade by the USIA inspector Robert S. Byrnes from May 23 to 27 1954, when he discussed the USIS problems with Joseph Kolarek, the Yugoslav PAO, and Ambassador James W. Riddleberg. The Byrnes report testified to "USIS program [that] was gaining ground within Yugoslavia," to quite good relations between USIS and Embassy staff, and to a need for a Joint Administrative Service to regulate work issues between the cultural and diplomatic sections. Moreover, inspector Byrnes brought up the lack of housing facilities as a chronic, but insolvable, problem of the American staff in Yugoslavia, one that would persist for more than a decade. It concluded with the statement over damage that the 1953 riots made to USIS program in Yugoslavia, when many funds allotted by the Agency for the fiscal year 1953, were simply returned to Washington because of the temporarily closure of the program.<sup>207</sup>

In January 1955, the USIA established the Inspection Staff as a successor of the former Foreign Service Inspection Corps of the State Department that would in future provide regular biennial overseas inspections.<sup>208</sup> But it was only with the directorship of George V. Allen at the USIA that the evaluation of USIS work became a matter of high priority. Under his management, the Agency began a major series of in-depth investigations, including non-government members as well.

Part of these series was the 1959 inspection completed both in Belgrade and Zagreb by Lawrence S. Morris and the Agency's auditor Robert L. Beliveau. The general

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<sup>207</sup> Report on USIS Yugoslavia, April-June 1954, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>208</sup> Manual of Inspection Procedures, USIA, May 1955, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP.

situation in Yugoslavia was again described as fluctuating and complex, since “Yugoslavia must constantly resorts to balancing off East against West, and which way the pendulum swings depends upon whether it is her hunger for technology or her fear of becoming a «battleground of the Cold War».”<sup>209</sup> The report stressed that when American cultural material was “satisfying Yugoslav hunger on new technologies” it was permissible, but then controls were tightened when the USIS recounted on Russia and China totalitarian practices.<sup>210</sup> The balance of Yugoslavia between neutralism from 1949 to 1958, and the shift towards non-alignment, becoming definite in 1958/1959, meant for the Yugoslav foreign policymakers a constant balance.<sup>211</sup> Or as Walter Roberts remembers about the Yugoslav Foreign Office telling him in 1960, “They told us, ‘confidentially,’ that this was done to rein in the Soviets. I personally had no doubt they told the Soviets that they did it in order to rein in the Americans.”<sup>212</sup>

Roberts’s point then correctly outlines what the Investigation report of 1959 mentioned as Soviet pressure. “They have examined,” noted Morris, “the books on the shelves of the USIS Library in Belgrade,” and protested to the Yugoslav authorities on “dissemination in a friendly country of anti-Soviet propaganda.” The USIS staff rightly felt, as we shall observe in the final section, that they had to balance between advancements and retreats, as “we never know how far we can go.” In other words, the game was “to determine the point at which the other will be provoked to drastic action.” As the USIA primary cultural focus was to bring about the process of “first true understanding, then sympathy and finally adaptation,” weak Soviet’s position in Yugoslav society, and by the U.S. economic aid, formal or informal, keep Yugoslav “standard of living rising above that of the satellite countries [...] to show the Yugoslavs themselves the advantages of dealing with the West.”<sup>213</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP (Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959): 4.

<sup>210</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 5–6.

<sup>211</sup> Rinna Kullaa, *Non-Alignment and Its Origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge* (London; New York: I.B.Tauris, 2012).

<sup>212</sup> Mark Taplin, “Global Publicks: Walter Roberts: U.S. Public Diplomacy in Yugoslavia -- ‘We Had Quite a Program There,’” accessed February 22, 2016, <http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-roberts-us-public-diplomacy-in.html>.

<sup>213</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 42–47. Beside political impediments, the major difficulties of the American posts in 1959 regarded – as similarly reported in the 1954 report – the bad

Therefore, the report emphasized four major tasks for the U.S. cultural mission in Belgrade and Zagreb, and that was to encourage Yugoslav independence by the United States example; explain the democratic motivations of Washington's foreign policy; demonstrate the U.S. political, economic and cultural dynamism and freedom; and elaborate a peaceful and prosperous future assured by U.S. scientific advancements. These propositions were shaped in the 1959 Country plan approved by the USIA on September 29, 1959. The new plan provided an additional tool for the American cultural effort, the Monthly Themes, which were monthly cadence projects on which the entire USIS team had to work and shape its exhibits. The *Pregled* periodical, started in January of the same year, would reflect, with smiles and in cheerful tones, themes related to the entire span of the *American way of life*, from education and university, to the benefits of the free enterprise system, the supermarkets and advertising industry, the mass media creativity, the social welfare services, and the advantages of a bipartisan political system.

Despite the fact that USIA materials were poorly accepted on Yugoslav national radio and television, inspector Morris evaluated the American program in Yugoslavia as being “developed with vigor and imagination,” appraised the PAO attitude as assertive and the relationships with Yugoslav leaders as mostly positive. Indeed, the USIS major success would prove to be the penetration of the program among influential Yugoslavs and the Party's top bureaucracy.<sup>214</sup> Above all and mostly essentially, it was “contributing to a gradual process of westernization in Yugoslavia.”<sup>215</sup>

### **2.2.3 The Cultural Approach and the Personal Contacts Policy**

In USIA language, a psychological objective was defined as a “political purpose capable of realization through influencing of attitudes and behavior,” while the psychological task was described as a “subsidiary objective designed to create or maintain attitudes and behavior that will contribute to the realization of political

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housing situation for officers, the lack of support from the Administrative Section of the Embassy and the lack of clothing for the employees (47).

<sup>214</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 48.

<sup>215</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 17–19.

purpose [...] through the resources available at USIS.” The program activity was therefore directed to the Priority Target Audience Groups, capable of fulfilling the country objectives because of their influence on political and social structure.<sup>216</sup> In every group, three type of leaders were distinguished: the *opinion creators* “whose prestige causes them to influence the opinion of the group,” the *controllers of communication* “who control [...] a group’s special channels” and the decision-makers or action-takers “who are empowered to act for the group,” also known as the *prime movers*. The propaganda itself, embraced three types of operations: direct operations focused through the mass media on the whole constituency; indirect operations to the constituency through the communication leaders; and finally operations seeking to influence the leaders regardless of their constituency.<sup>217</sup>

For Joseph C. Kolarek, who became Belgrade’s Public Officer in 1954, reaching Yugoslav intellectuals, opinion molders, and party prime movers would become a priority policy. Following Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s bolder strategy against communism, Kolarek initiated a more aggressive policy in the field.<sup>218</sup> He started the so-called “Personal Contact File” campaign in which each USIS officer, after approaching any influential communist official, would create an information card on his career, interests, attitudes and friends. Among these lists, some Yugoslavs would be chosen as *Pregled* or *Bilten* recipients, or otherwise as invitee of cultural exhibitions and movie evenings at the posts. Obviously, the chief targets remained the highly ranked communists, from whom USIS could learn where the political decisions were made, by whom and why.<sup>219</sup>

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<sup>216</sup> Airgram 1188 from the Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Feb. 12, 1953, 511.00/2-1253, Box 2246, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>217</sup> By definition, the target audience group was “any number of individuals having in common certain interest which influence their politically significant behavior and by virtue of which they can be more or less appealed to as a group.” Collectively speaking, the target group had its own preference channels of communication and a “common and distinctive ideology or systematic pattern of ideas.” The State Department privileged groups with major geographical accessibility, those more politically active and members of national minorities, whereas less attention was given to confirmed communist and pro-U.S. groups (Airgram 882 from the Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Feb. 4, 1953, 511.00/2-1053, Box 2246, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP).

<sup>218</sup> Beside the PAO in Belgrade, another significant figure was the cultural affairs officer in Zagreb, the so-called Branch PAO, a position that, in the middle 1950s, was assigned to Jack Crockett, responsible for the cultural program, the film presentations, the radio scripts and the translations of USIS Zagreb.

<sup>219</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 39.

Having Yugoslav media under strict government control, culture was a free channel that approached and attracted cultural leaders, academics, film producers, painters, writers, and students. To reach them, USIS used different communication approaches: first, those informal, interpersonal contacts with individuals; then meetings, conferences, lectures for a group (i.e. the jazz concerts at the posts); then the messages mediated through mail or telegraph (the extension service); and finally those related to a massive audience, such as the *Voice of America*.<sup>220</sup>

The American public diplomats were concerned with the Yugoslav managerial class, the Djilas's "New Class," in other words partisans ranks who made vital decisions but possessed little technical knowledge and education; then scholars and educators not fully in harmony with the regime; the art leaders and personalities (considered "those best prepared to listen"); and the university students considered, by the 1959 Country Plan, "the only true hope for greater democratization."<sup>221</sup>

As oral interviews and archival records confirm, the USIS posts in Belgrade and Zagreb symbolized, indeed, a reference point of the city's cultural vanguard, academia and intellectual leaders. Many, nowadays famous, Croatian cultural leaders were assiduous visitors of the American Information Center from the 1950s and onwards: young persons that afterwards became eminent personalities like the professor and linguist Stjepko Težak; the writer and literature professor Tomislav Sabljak (nowadays member of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, HAZU); the painters Josip Vaništa and Mirko Rački; the composer Bruno Bjelinski; the film director Obrad Gluščević whose wife Maja worked in the library as well, and his colleague Krsto Papić; the cinematographer Goran Trbuljak; the music critics Dražen Vrdoljak and Mladen Raukar; the writers Branislav Glumac and Luko Paljetak (whose wife used to order literature for him by phone since he lived in Dubrovnik); the lawyer Vladimir Ibler; the painter and sculptress Milena Lah; the art historian and academy professor Vera Horvat-Pintarić; the ballet artists and married couple Ana Roje and Oskar Harmoš;

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<sup>220</sup> An Outline for the Study of National Communication Systems, Bureau of Social Science Research, Nov. 1953, IEV.G.41, Box 37, Research Memoranda 1963-1999, USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>221</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP: 11; Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (San Diego; New York; London: Harcourt Publishers, 1957).

the jazz musicians Boško Petrović and Dubravko Majnarić (of whom the latter received the supreme Croatian national cultural award, the *Vladimir Nazor Award for Lifework*, in 2014); the pop-singer Đurđica Barlović, the first singer of the pop group *Novi Fosili*, later a soloist; the deaf-mute mime actor Zlatko Omerbegović; the writer Igor Mandić; the well-known academic and intellectual Predrag Matvejević; many professors of the English Department like Željko Bujas, the author of the major English-Croatian dictionary; prominent doctors, and some priests.<sup>222</sup>

The majority of them belonged to the young generation, while the scientists and artists that were communist oriented, rarely, and almost never came to the American center.<sup>223</sup> “Some of them came only once, and fearfully asked to be cancelled from the evidence” recalls Zdenka Nikolić.<sup>224</sup> The former Library director, Nada Apsen, added other relevant names: Franjo Durst, famous gynecologist and professor; leading personalities from the Meteorological Institute; the painter Ivo Vojvodić from Dubrovnik; the directors of Strossmayer Gallery, Ljubo Babić and Vinko Zlamalik;<sup>225</sup> the political scientist Štefica Deren-Antoljak; Anton Bauer, former director of Glyptoteque Museum (the HAZU sculpture museum) who saved the Ban Josip Jelačić sculpture by hiding it in the museum’s basement;<sup>226</sup> the art historian and professor Radovan Ivančević; the professor of international law Radovan Vukadinović (who in 1970/1971 occupied a senior fellow position at the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University); the jazz conductor, composer and drummer Silvestar Silville Glojnarčić and many more.<sup>227</sup>

According to memories, the Belgrade’s post was often visited by Vida Ognjenović, Serbian theater director, writer and diplomat, who in 1989 was among the

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<sup>222</sup> Interview with Zdenka Nikolić, June 3-27, 2014, Zagreb.

<sup>223</sup> This fundamental detail was confirmed by all the former employees of USIS Yugoslavia to which I spoke to.

<sup>224</sup> Interview with Zdenka Nikolić, June 3-27, 2014, Zagreb.

<sup>225</sup> The Strossmayer Gallery of Old Masters (Strossmayerova Galerija Starih Majstora) is a fine art museum in Zagreb, exhibiting the collection donated to the city by Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer in 1884. Today, it belongs to the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts (HANU).

<sup>226</sup> The statue of the Croatian Ban (viceroy) was removed from the main Zagreb Ilica Street in 1947 when the new communist government of Yugoslavia denounced Jelačić as a “servant of foreign interests.” Ban of Croatia between 23 March 1848 and 19 May 1859, Jelačić was a member of an old Croatian noble family, a noted army general, remembered for his military campaigns during the revolutions of 1848; he served under Ferdinand I and Franz Joseph I of Austria. He is also recalled for the abolition of serfdom in Croatia.

<sup>227</sup> Interview with Nada Apsen-Pintarić, May 31, 2014, Zagreb.

founders of the Democratic Party, the first opposition party in Serbia. It was a favored place of Olja Ivanjicki,<sup>228</sup> the well-known Serbian contemporary artist, of film director Branko Bauer, and of many students of the Belgrade musical schools.<sup>229</sup>

The policy of personal contacts was practiced both inside and outside the American centers. Sometimes, personal connections were made by the local USIS employees themselves: in 1950 for example Slavko Todorović travelled to Rijeka where he surprisingly discovered numerous personalities interested in collaborating with the American Center; the Radio Rijeka for radio scripts exchange, the head of the Scientific Library for book donations, the Rijeka hospital for medical films.<sup>230</sup>

Welcome attitudes expressed by ordinary people to U.S. cultural representatives were experienced as well. For example, when Bruce Buttles attended the 105<sup>th</sup> foundation anniversary of the “Žika Popović” People’s Library in Šabac (at that time a leading commercial town located in the North-West central Serbia) in November 1952, he was received with such audience enthusiasm “that the ceremony master had to curtail the applauses to go on with the rest.” “It was obvious,” asserted the USIS final report, “that the audience, which consisted of students and town’s people, was pro-American.”<sup>231</sup> USIS Zagreb also encountered good relationships with external Croatian organizations: for example the Končar Factory where the American cultural center, invited by the Trade Unions, provided English teaching lessons, films, recordings, periodicals, and newspapers.<sup>232</sup>

Working for the American Center in Belgrade and Zagreb was not an easy task in the Yugoslav communist society. The employees often felt overwhelmed by work and the expanding services.<sup>233</sup> Over the years, the USIS local employees often suffered

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<sup>228</sup> After she experienced a cultural exchange under the Ford Foundation auspices, Ivanjicki brought the pop-art in Yugoslavia and inspired a whole generation of young artists (Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam*, 253-258).

<sup>229</sup> Interview with Petar Nikolić, July 5, 2014, Belgrade.

<sup>230</sup> Despatch 152 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Sept. 1, 1950, 511.68/9-150, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>231</sup> Semiannual Evaluation Report – Yugoslavia enclosed in despatch from Belgrade to the Department of State, Dec. 17, 1952, 511.68/12-1752, Box 2247, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>232</sup> Despatch 267 from Zagreb to the Department of State, April 10, 1953, 511.68/4-1053, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>233</sup> Field Evaluation Report Belgrade, April 9, 1954, Box 38, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP; Robert S. Byrnes, IOA, to Jack Kolarek, PAO, June 1, 1954, Box 38, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP;

harassments, some of them were briefly jailed, while during the 1953 riots they were even socially marginalized for being “associated with the Americans.” According to Petar Nikolić, the first Yugoslav USIS employees were fierce anti-Communists, looking with sympathy to the United States and in high suspicion of their own government. They belonged to the pre-war middle and high bourgeoisie and aristocracy, many of them had relatives shot and their property confiscated after the war.

I remember those old ladies in elegant and somehow aristocratic outfits, coming to work with a poodle, [one of them] very distressed because the communists nationalized her family’s enterprises, [...] this is why they profoundly hated communism. A lady called Ruža Todorović was such a woman, always wearing a cocktail dress and with fresh coiffure.<sup>234</sup>

Many of these employees, after ending their experience at the American center, encountered difficulties in finding a job elsewhere. “After being employed in the American Library [...] I was looking for a job elsewhere because working hours were tough, but after an unsuccessful search, I gave up. And our phone was tapped until 1990.”<sup>235</sup> Notwithstanding, Yugoslav employees of USIS enjoyed some other privileges such as higher salaries, and received nicer, colorful outfits from the United States.<sup>236</sup>

Suzanne Hildenbrand defined librarianship as a field dominated by women, a “gendered history.”<sup>237</sup> Not surprisingly, the majority of Yugoslav employees at the American Library were women who shaped the library into an unconventional space of domesticity with a smile and “accessibility to all.”<sup>238</sup> In 1964, of 11 Yugoslav employees at the American Center in Zagreb, eight were women.<sup>239</sup> This gender shift contributed to make the American Libraries in Belgrade, Zagreb and Novi Sad, “accepted community institutions,” building “a visible U.S. presence and an institutional base for furthering U.S. objectives.” Indeed, the USIS libraries were not like the ordinary public ones where records were kept in order to see the collection grow. As “special purpose” libraries, they selected materials and designed services for the purpose of reaching specific audiences and reader groups; as community centers

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<sup>234</sup> Interview with Petar Nikolić, July 5, 2014, Belgrade.

<sup>235</sup> Interview with Zdenka Nikolić, June 3-27, 2014, Zagreb.

<sup>236</sup> Interview with Nada Apsen-Pintarić, May 31, 2014, Zagreb.

<sup>237</sup> Suzanne Hildenbrand, *Reclaiming the American Library Past: Writing the Women in* (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publications, 1996).

<sup>238</sup> Interview with Zdenka Nikolić, June 3-27, 2014, Zagreb.

<sup>239</sup> Spisak osoblja Američke Čitaonice u Zagrebu, March 3, 1964, 56/2-02, Box 29, Republički protokol, IVS SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA.

they served the local needs.<sup>240</sup> What is more, they were “true circulating libraries,”<sup>241</sup> which meant that when new collections arrived from Washington, the old ones were donated to museums, universities, town libraries or prominent cultural leaders. In such a way, ideas took individual, uncertain, everyday life paths, and “persons capable of taking political or economic actions [...] or capable of transmitting the information”<sup>242</sup> got the occasion to circulate the books from hand to hand.

## 2.3 Communicating *In* and *Within* the Field

*Some books leave us free and some books make us free.*

Ralph Waldo Emerson

*A good novel tells us the truth about its hero; but a bad novel tells us the truth about its author.*

Gilbert K. Chesterton

Presentations depicting America’s cultural life were distributed to the Yugoslav republics, their executive governments, Councils for Science and Culture, their universities, high schools, cultural institutes, newspapers and publishing houses, then theatres, film studios, and so forth. From Zagreb, the USIS covered Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Belgrade concentrated its efforts on Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro.<sup>243</sup>

The Information Center Service from USIA headquarters provided guidelines to USIS cultural officers, directors, English teachers and librarians, coordinated the Agency’s program with the overseas missions and other U.S. government and non-government agencies, and supplied the installations abroad with books, magazines, music, English teaching materials, library equipment, exhibits, and related materials.<sup>244</sup>

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<sup>240</sup> Study of USIS Libraries, Aug. 1967, E-4-67, Box 1, Estimates and Evaluations 1966-1978, USIA Office of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP: 1.

<sup>241</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP: 31.

<sup>242</sup> Dan Lacy (ICS) to Johnstone (IFI), March 24, 1952, 511.00/3-2452, Box 2244, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>243</sup> Semiannual Evaluation Report – Yugoslavia enclosed in despatch from Belgrade to the Department of State, Dec. 17, 1952, 511.68/12-1752, Box 2247, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>244</sup> ICS of the USIA, Dec. 4, 1957, Box 9, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP.

This background support helped USIS on the ground to send ready-made messages in implicit codes and innovative audio and visual languages which nurtured audiences' imagination and created problematic needs for those wishing to emulate them. As Laura Belmonte demonstrated, carefully constructed cultural narratives of freedom, progress and abundance were means of the U.S. protecting its national security.<sup>245</sup> But by presenting the American *way of life* to audiences abroad, the U.S. representatives introduced new, politically challenging points of reference.

Whether as movies, news, scientific reviews or radio broadcast, the USIS information was centered over "one important basic idea," understandable to large audiences, even to those with a lower literacy level. It appealed to *emotions* and to *intellect*. It had to "give hope for the future," "strengthen foreign countries' national pride," and "avoid giving the impression of [U.S.] self-interest."<sup>246</sup>

As we shall find out in Chapter 3, the core focus of American cultural policies in Yugoslavia relied on major essential topics connected with democracy, capitalism and freedom. The monthly and running themes were transversely delivered throughout the USIS program activities and the subjects stressed by the program content. Transposed in cyber-language, USIS activities were the *hardware* components of the program (the library and its books, the English program, the Music, Film and Exhibit Section, the Information Media Guarantee Program, the P.L. 480 Translation Program), while its content served as *software* input. In the next section we shall observe how the *hardware* components served the goals of the U.S. ideological struggle by establishing the USIA-USIS network in the whole of Yugoslavia.

### 2.3.1 Reading, Listening, and Watching

Jürgen Habermas has argued that during the eighteenth century the growing middle classes sought to influence the emerging public sphere by creating their own institutions and sites, mostly through newspapers, periodicals and books.<sup>247</sup> Above all, libraries and

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<sup>245</sup> Laura A. Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010).

<sup>246</sup> Semiannual Evaluation Report – Yugoslavia enclosed in despatch from Belgrade to the Department of State, Dec. 17, 1952, 511.68/12-1752, Box 2247, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>247</sup> Wayne A. Wiegand, "Community Places and Reading Spaces," in *Libraries and the Reading Public in Twentieth-Century America*, ed. Christine Pawley and Louise S. Robbins (University of Wisconsin Press,

reading rooms were those public spaces capable of political influence and activism. Libraries, argues Yale sociologist Jeffrey Alexander, can also function as sites where political and social dissent is articulated.<sup>248</sup> In the Yugoslav experiment, the American libraries had a double leitmotiv: being a place of alternative culture, a source of otherwise unavailable knowledge, a socializing catalyzer, and a place of “politically compromising” effect (not dissent in action).

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2013), 27. On how the Cold War and its cultural struggle framed U.S. libraries at home and abroad, look into Louise Robbins, *Censorship and the American Library: The American Library Association's Response to Threats to Intellectual Freedom, 1939-1969* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1996) and *The Librarian Spies: Philip and Mary Jane Keeney and Cold War Espionage* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2009). A revealing hidden story of the distribution book program in the Eastern Europe financed by the CIA and destined to leadership and intellectual elites is the Alfred A. Reisch's *Hot Books in the Cold War. The CIA-Funded Secret Western Book Distribution Program Behind the Iron Curtain* (Budapest–New York: Central European University Press, 2013).

<sup>248</sup> Alexander provides a bridge between place and the social nature of reading by asserting that “communicative institutions” in civil society regulate the public discourse so as to make available information that exerts influence on political questions (Jeffrey C. Alexander, *The Civil Sphere* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 53–92.

In early 1953, USIS Belgrade passed a major reorganization, the library was amplified with a shiny periodical room, two spacious reading rooms and a work



room.<sup>249</sup> With their exhibit windows on the ground floor, the Library's open book

**Figure 2-1: Visitors at reading room of the American Library in Zagreb in 1953 (Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD). Source: Enclosure 3 in despatch 4 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, July 3, 1953, 511.68/7-353, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.**

shelves on the second, the Information Office on the third, and the Music and Film Section on the fourth, USIS Belgrade offered a full cultural experience.<sup>250</sup> On the other hand, Zagreb had its Library, with a Reference and Technical section, and the reading room, on the ground floor. Here, behind a large desk, crowds waited to pick up their

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<sup>249</sup> Despatch 44 from Belgrade to the Department of State, July 13, 1953, 511.68/7-1353, Box 2472, CDF 1955-1959, NACP.

<sup>250</sup> Manuscript for USIE Newsletter enclosed in despatch 189 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 24, 1951, 511.68/8-2451, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.



copy of the daily *Bilten* while glancing at the colorful exhibit windows.<sup>251</sup> Almost

**Figure 2-2: Crowds waiting for the distribution of the daily Bulletin/Bilten in 1953 in front of the American Library in Zagreb (Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD). Source: Enclosure 3 in despatch 4 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, July 3, 1953, 511.68/7-353, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.**

preannouncing the newest trends in library layouts, the USIS posts had their children's corner with low shelves, bright book displays, and two small benches.<sup>252</sup>

The *Radio Daily Bulletin* and other in loco USIS publications would not exist without the effective USIA's Press and Publication Service (also known as the International Press and Publication Service or Division). This service sent to posts all over the world wireless and air bulletins, newsletters, magazine reprints and pictures. As years passed, the service came to include pamphlets, pilot models, and "background and action kits," USIS Technical Newsletters, transcripts of the President's speeches, official texts, and summaries of congressional activities, glossy prints, and exhibit

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<sup>251</sup> In Zagreb, the Consulate offices were on the second floor, whilst Film and Music Section, together with the Cultural Affairs Officer, occupied the third floor (Photograph No. 3, "View of the new American Consulate Building and U.S. Information Center in Zagreb, Yugoslavia," June 6, 1953, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP).

<sup>252</sup> USIE Report 610 for April and May 1950, June 20, 1950, 511.68/6-2050, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

layouts. Washington's bulletins included current developments of U.S. science, medicine, economy and culture, and commentaries from *The World Today*, *U.S. This Week*, or *Behind the Curtain*.

Extremely useful for visual presentations were the photographic features of the United States, included titles that included *The Town Library of the U.S.*, *50 years of U.S. Auto Industry*, *Typical U.S. High School Student*, *This is the United States – Cities and towns*, *Rural Youth in the U.S. – Vermont Farm Boys*, *New Machinery for U.S. Farmers*, etc.<sup>253</sup> The Film Section relied on pre-fab Filmstrip Lectures, Kits and Program, which consisted of still-picture frames created for screen projection, while the Film Information Guides suggested the type of audience, story background and policy relationship.<sup>254</sup> Pamphlets of the highest paper quality had to send a message of prosperity, prestige and “standards of excellence,” and to endure the hand-to-hand process.<sup>255</sup>

To counter deliberate misrepresentations of the United States and to depict the fundamental democratic processes of the American life, was the main “story” of the press and publication program. Although many IPS materials came unrequested from Washington, many other times it was the post that demanded specific content. For instance, in 1949, while the Yugoslav government was undertaking an enormous plan of road-building, USIS requested Washington to send “airmail photos of [U.S.] highway and roads construction methods,” “equipment for cement, asphalt paving,” workers “clothing, and particularly protective footwear,” because Belgrade was rebuilding its streets “but using primitive methods.”<sup>256</sup>

The American Library served as a sort of research center too, providing *Politika* and *Republika* journalists the statistic material they needed. USIS was proud to be a

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<sup>253</sup> Report of the IPS, 1947-1949, Box 1, Special Collection Branch, Oversize Scrapbooks 1947-1958, USIA Library Program Division, RG 306, NACP; Airgram 3319 from the Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, April 24, 1953, 511.00/4-2453, Box 2247, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>254</sup> The Film Kit also contained other visual related materials as magazine reprints, pamphlets, posters or photo displays, exhibit suggestions, introductory remarks, display sheet announcements for mobile units, etc.

<sup>255</sup> Airgram 377 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 22, 1950, 511.68/11-2250, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>256</sup> Report of the IPS, 1947-1949, Box 1, Special Collection Branch, Oversize Scrapbooks 1947-1958, USIA Library Program Division, RG 306, NACP.

reference for the Yugoslav technical periodical *Narodna Krila* (People's Wings),<sup>257</sup> the *Slovenski Poročevalec* of Ljubljana<sup>258</sup> and *Vestnik* of Maribor.<sup>259</sup> From the 1950s the press feature *Šta ima novog u SAD* (What is New in the U.S.) was sent to Zagreb, Ljubljana and Tanjug (Yugoslav Press Agency).<sup>260</sup>

But the most significant, extremely popular, and far reaching, was certainly *Bilten*. Issued daily in Serbian, Croatian and English, it was personally delivered to foreign officials, eminent individuals, and picked up at the posts. In 1959, it was published in about 11,000 copies.<sup>261</sup> Another important local publication was the *Review of the News* in 13,000 copies, of which 8,600 were mailed to persons all over Yugoslavia. Background for editors were also sent personally to leading Yugoslav government officials, as well as the list of new books sent monthly to 5,000 persons. But receiving these publications was not always easy: receivers of the *Bulletin* were sometimes subject to harassments by postal officials and police, while, at other times, local officials were more zealous than their superiors in Belgrade and returned the approved material.<sup>262</sup>

Besides the press and publications services, the American Libraries offered a completely free of charge English teaching program. Beginning in 1939, the English program was established by the Public Law 335 within the State Department's exchange programs between the U.S. and the American republics. With the Fulbright Act (1946) and the Smith-Mundt Act (1948) the program was launched world-wide.<sup>263</sup> Basically, it was envisioned "to reach national teachers of English" and encourage them

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<sup>257</sup> USIE Report 178, Dec. 1949-Jan. 1950, Feb. 28, 1950, 511.68/2-2850, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>258</sup> Bruce Buttles was very proud of the fact that the *Slovenski Poročevalec* repeatedly asked for USIS photographs and used them in exhibits windows that in a short period were seen by 200 000 Ljubljana citizens (Despatch 644 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Jan. 8, 1952, 511.68/8-152, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP).

<sup>259</sup> Despatch 920 from Belgrade to the Department of State, May 28, 1951, 511.68/5-2851, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>260</sup> USIE Report 178, Dec. 1949-Jan. 1950, Feb. 28, 1950, 511.68/2-2850, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>261</sup> *Bilten* started with publication in April 1953 in 400 copies, reaching 5000 copies in in June 1953; long lines and street crowds persisted even in these conditions, and all copies were "sold-out" (Report from USIS program enclosed in despatch 4 from American Consulate Zagreb to Department of State, July 3, 1953, 511.68/7-353, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP).

<sup>262</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 21.

<sup>263</sup> Functions, Responsibilities and Recommended Organizations for the ICS, Aug. 1, 1973, Box 4, Records Relating to Culture Centers 1946-1988, USIA Library Program Division, RG 306, NACP.

to “include information on the United States in [...] language instructions.” The English teaching textbooks were accessible either at the USIS Libraries or donated to local cultural institutions.<sup>264</sup> For this purpose, in late 1952, the Belgrade MSA launched two projects, the Rapid Language Instruction that generated a wave of English learning among apprentices in small shops, radio mechanics, and auto mechanics; and the Georgetown University Language training.<sup>265</sup>

Then, in July 1957, the USIA launched another pioneer program with the motion picture *Teaching English Naturally* (1957). Filmed at the American University campus, it had a twenty minute narration, live dialogues and presented an informational-drill technique for teaching conversation by a graphic presentation method.<sup>266</sup> Direct English teaching by USIS employees was discontinued in 1959, however, the Library continued to provide technical advice and materials to Yugoslav universities. Even though it was a USIA decision, direct English teaching was not dropped in Zagreb because of its extraordinary popularity and participation. Taught on a full time basis to teachers, doctors, and lawyers, a sprinkling of engineers, economists, newspapermen and architects, the English teaching classes attracted more than 70 people (although the applicants were much higher).<sup>267</sup> As Sonja Bašić revealed, the American officers were especially concerned to serve the English department of the Zagreb and Belgrade Universities, its students and professors, to pay them for international conferences abroad, or to obtain for them new books, copies of journal articles or bibliographical references.<sup>268</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> 1954-1955 USIS Mission Prospectus, Dec. 3, 1953, 511.00/3-1253, Box 2246, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>265</sup> Semiannual Evaluation Report Yugoslavia enclosed in despatch from Belgrade to the Department of State, Dec. 17, 1952, 511.68/12-1752, Box 2247, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>266</sup> Message 3 from USIA CA to all USIS posts, July 1, 1957, Box 7, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>267</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 34.

<sup>268</sup> Interview with Sonja Bašić, November 26, 2013, Zagreb. Unlike Zagreb, the American post in Belgrade moved its focus to supporting English teaching at the Institute of Phonetics of the Serbian Academy by textbooks, equipment, or by furnishing English summer seminars in the 1960s and 1970s (Borba protiv inostrane propagande u FNRJ, Jan. 14, 1959, 1989/1, Box 44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ; Seminar za nastavnike engleskog jezika, 1971-1972, 3843, Box 150, Serija 15.1, Republički sekretarijat za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu 1965-1979, RG 1415, HDA).

### 2.3.2 American *Crazy Sounds*

*Young Yugoslavs love American jazz, and any afternoon in the music library is like a little stateside jam session.*

USIE Report, July 27, 1950, Belgrade<sup>269</sup>

The U.S. and Yugoslav archives do not conserve many details about the Music Program of the American cultural centers. Nevertheless, their primacy as the first Music Library in Yugoslavia makes them worthy of some mention. According to the USIA policymakers, the first and foremost aim of the Music Section abroad was to stimulate the “world-wide interest in and knowledge of American music.”<sup>270</sup> But that was an understatement. As scholars have recently shown, music was a Cold War weapon appealing to emotions, excitement and delirious attractions (just to recall the extraordinary success of the jazz ambassadors, Dizzy Gillespie, Louis Armstrong, and Duke Ellington, on their State Department sponsored tours abroad).<sup>271</sup>

The musical records in USIS, both in Belgrade and Zagreb, may not have had such a “delirious” impact, nonetheless they attracted youngsters, students, jazz lovers, rock n’ roll fans and classic musicians. Basically, they contained both the commercial long-playing phonograph records and the printed scores of American compositions. The recordings were usually used for concerts, although we know they were loaned to those interested in American music, pianists, musicians, soloists, choirs, and symphonies. Almost analogously, as for the IMG program, the ICS secured the performance rights and renting of unpublished works.<sup>272</sup> Further, the Music Library also included nonmusical recordings, documentaries, poetry, short stories, novels, drama and humor.<sup>273</sup>

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<sup>269</sup> USIE Report 62 for June 1950, July 27, 1950, 511.68/7-2750, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>270</sup> Airgram 3319 from the Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, April 24, 1953, 511.00/4-2453, Box 2247, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>271</sup> Penny M. Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006). Music performances of jazz and classic within their political frames are discussed in Chapter 5.

<sup>272</sup> ICS of the USIA, Dec. 4, 1957, Box 9, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>273</sup> Message 3184 from USIA to all principal posts, June 19, 1958, Box 9, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP.

Since the early 1950s, the Belgrade Music Library held 406 recordings, of which 366 were received from Bucharest after the Romanian post was dismantled. Apart from having the possibility of borrowing recordings and taking them home, the library offered an exclusive milieu: records could also be listened to on-site. In the same way as the IPS furnished press material to Yugoslav editors, the American Music Section furnished Yugoslav radio stations: Negro Spirituals, Mozart, Bach and Grieg<sup>274</sup>, and jazz, Percy Faith, Tchaikovsky, George Gershwin, Jerome Kern, Aaron Copeland, Verdi, Rossini, and other artists that would visit Yugoslavia during the 1950s and 1960s within the Cultural Presentation Program of the Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the State Department.<sup>275</sup> But not all the portions of the Music Library turned out to be successful; except for the jazz tapes and records, most of the other acquisitions, such as comedies, transcripts, recorded plays, were banned by the Yugoslav authorities.<sup>276</sup>

### **2.3.3 Book Translations, IMG and the P.L. 480 Programs**

American authors and bestsellers made it outside the American Libraries' walls, too, thanks to a specifically crafted "Book Translation" program. As a by-product of the cultural Cold War, the program begun in 1947 under IIA, when the U.S. Army proposed that American authors be translated into German and Japanese for their occupied areas, and then incorporated into USIA in 1953. The USIA provided Yugoslav publishers with copyrights, translations and printing papers, thus guaranteeing the final very low (even lower than the Yugoslav average) book price. In 1953, it already involved 32 Yugoslav publishing houses, mostly from Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. By 1959, it aided the publication of more than 90 American authors in the languages of Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, the program dealt with restrictions by both the Yugoslav and American

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<sup>274</sup> So for instance in December 1949, Radio Belgrade played 13 hours, Radio Skopje 2.50, and Radio Ljubljana 30 hours of American music (USIE Report 178, Dec. 1949-Jan. 1950, Feb. 28, 1950, 511.68/2-2850, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP).

<sup>275</sup> USIE Report 397, Feb.-March 1950, April 11, 1950, 511.68/4-1150, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>276</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 19.

side. Every title had to be approved by the editorial board of *Jugoslovenska knjiga* (Yugoslav book) state publishers.<sup>277</sup>

Almost analogously, the Informational Media Guarantee Program (IMG), administered through July 1952 by the MSA and then by USIS, made widely available American books, periodicals, films, but also projectors, school equipment, printing papers. In order to overcome Yugoslav dollar shortages, the IMG converted dinars owned by the U.S. government at the Yugoslav National Bank (obtained through the Surplus Sales Agreement)<sup>278</sup> and payed in dollars for American copyrights.<sup>279</sup> In fact, the exchange rate was very favorable. While the real exchange scale was 750 dinar for \$1, the Yugoslav dinars were exchanged at rate of 300 to \$1 (at least until 1962 when the rate jumped to 600 dinars for \$1).<sup>280</sup> For example, the guarantee coverage for 1958 in Yugoslavia was of 1 million dollars<sup>281</sup>, rising in 1963 to 300 million.<sup>282</sup> Published through the IMG and approved by *Jugoslovenska knjiga* for books, and for the movies by *Jugoslavija film*, the National Radio-TV, the republican film centers, or the Federal Center for the Educational and Cultural Film (Savezni centar za prosvetni i kulturni film), American books, periodicals, newspapers and movies arrived at universities, colleges, and any cultural institution requesting them.<sup>283</sup> The distributors of Yugoslav film were the heaviest users of this program to the extent that “all American commercial films [were] imported thanks to this assistance.” The Yugoslav government discouraged

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<sup>277</sup> Propaganda kapitalističkih zemalja u Jugoslaviji, 1953, 724/1953, Box 44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ; Pismo američke čitaonice izdavačkim poduzećima, March 7, 1952, 23-1952, Box 317, Sektor za visoke škole, nauku i umetnost – Veze sa inostranstvom, Savet za nauku i kulturu Vlade FNRJ, RG 317, AJ. The Books Translation Program officers selected American books, identified a local publisher, arranged for a favorable transfer of foreign rights to the title, paid the rights fee, hired a translator, purchased copies for the local U.S. Information Center, and sent the customary royalty to the American publisher. “What seems at first like an unremarkable subsidiary-rights arrangement was in reality generously underwritten by the middlemen, the US government,” argues Greg Barnhisel in *Cold War Modernists: Art, Literature, and American Cultural Diplomacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 169–171.

<sup>278</sup> See The “Case” of Senator Fulbright in Yugoslavia, 242.

<sup>279</sup> 9<sup>th</sup> Semiannual Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, p. 17, Feb. 2, 1954, 511.00/3-2554, Box 2249, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>280</sup> Koča Popović, State Secretary of DSIP, to SIV, Jan. 18, 1962, 9223, Box 640, Međunarodni odnosi 1953-1970, Savezno Izvršno Veće (hereafter SIV) 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ.

<sup>281</sup> ICS of the USIA, Dec. 4, 1957, Box 9, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>282</sup> Walter R. Roberts, Cultural attaches, to Milan Bulajić, DSIP, May 21, 1964, Box 237, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ.

<sup>283</sup> See Box 237, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ.

publicity on the subject with the result that many Yugoslavs were not aware “they may order any American book they wish, and pay for it in dinars,” stated Joseph Kolarek to the USIS inspector in 1959.<sup>284</sup> Hence, the IMG had its transnational aspect of cultural collaboration and made the Yugoslav authorities collaborate with famous American publishing and film houses, such as McGraw Hill, Hall & Co. New York, Wiley & Son, Pocket Book Publishers, Princeton University Press, Curtis Circulating Co. and for the films the Guaranteed Pictures Inc., Motion Picture Export Association.<sup>285</sup> Henceforward, in the 1960s the collaboration was extended to U.S. news services as the CBS/ITN News film Service, the NBC, and the United Press TV.<sup>286</sup>

So, were there specific selection criteria for these two programs? Initially, the U.S. agents could only reject a publisher’s application for IMG or Book Translation coverage of a specific title. However, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 tightened the criteria and excluded hobby books, cookbooks, travel guides not focused on the United States, and fashion publications. More importantly, it proscribed that materials “patently lewd or salacious, [or that] conveyed political propaganda inimical to the best interests of the U.S.” would not be eligible. In 1954, the USIA stated that ineligible would be “Materials advocating or supporting an unlawful purpose;” “Materials prepared or distributed in order to convey, disseminate, or reinforce Communist propaganda;” “Materials of a salacious or pornographic;” and “materials of a sensational, cheap character.”<sup>287</sup> In conclusion, it was the Public Law (PL) 480 program that, mainly by

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<sup>284</sup> Thanks to this program also few copies of *Time*, *Life*, *Newsweek*, and the *New York Times* were available at Kiosks where they could be actually bought (Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 30; 46).

<sup>285</sup> Yugoslav Embassy Washington to the Savet for Science and Culture, June 17, 1952, 136, Box 7, Poverljive veze sa SAD i Kanadom 1950-1952, Savet za nauku i kulturu Vlade FNRJ, RG 317, AJ; Bogo Pregelj to the Yugoslav Embassy Washington, June 9, 1952, 317-99-852, Box 99, Veze sa SAD i Kanadom, Savet za nauku i kulturu Vlade FNRJ, RG 317, AJ; Vera Ćuković to the Yugoslav Embassy Washington, Nov. 4, 1952, 1952, 317-99-1101, Box 99, Veze sa SAD i Kanadom, Savet za nauku i kulturu Vlade FNRJ, RG 317, AJ.

<sup>286</sup> Nabavka američkih filmova za 1960 godinu sredstvima IMG programa, Dec. 23, 1959, 23-944, Box 237, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ; Informacija povod raspodele za uvoz knjiga, July 20, 1961, Box 237, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ.

<sup>287</sup> Barnhisel, *Cold War Modernists*, 163–164; Study of USIS libraries, Aug. 1967, E-4-67, Box 1, Estimates and Evaluations 1966-1978, USIA Office of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP: 34–35; Report on the Book and Library Program, July 1953, 53-07-001, Box 1, Interagency/Congressional Reports, USIA Office of Administration, RG 306, NACP. Because IMG had no annual appropriation, it ran debts that were charged to the USIA. The latter borrowed the money from the Treasury Department. Then the program underwent an extensive review in the late 1950s, after which Congress imposed much

financing the translation of American textbooks’, allowed “American influence into the Yugoslav universities.”<sup>288</sup> The program helped Yugoslav schools and universities to open up to international study resources. Operationally, Yugoslav universities submitted lists of books and reference titles to the Yugoslav Technical Assistance Office, which, therefore, forwarded them to USIS, and USIS to the USIA.<sup>289</sup>

Although the PL 480 program had other purposes beside the financial support of the USIA cultural program, when it was initiated in 1954, it launched an aid program based on the sales of U.S. agricultural surpluses for dinars. Very soon, Yugoslavia became one of the largest recipients of food by the PL 480. Thanks to the American loans, AID, counterpart and TCA programs, Yugoslavia undertook a large industrialization agenda. The U.S. financial support was fundamental in many cases, as for the procurement of diesel locomotives (popularly called “kenedijke” by John F. Kennedy), for the installations of the fertilizers factory in Pančevo, for the factory of chemical products and plastics in Zagreb, for the steel mill in Sisak and the thermal power plants in Kosovo. Likewise, through ICA, TCA, counterpart funds and CARE programs American books and textbooks (for universities, high schools, and research institutes) were also translated or purchased in Yugoslavia. However, further historical research has to be done to understand their impact on Yugoslav society and Party policymaking in both the 1950s and 1960s, and their relations with cultural policy-making of the American Centers in Belgrade, Zagreb and Novi Sad.

## 2.4 The “Menace” of American Propaganda

*On this issue we cannot waver. It was decided to introduce the control system. For this reason a regulation has been prescribed. However, political opportunity avoided the prescription of the regulations. The back down was linear. The Westerns came out as winners. For that reason the question of [foreign cultural missions in Yugoslavia] had to be treated as of high policy. Every measure has to be inspected for its consequences. [...] We think it would be better to have less measures, but more decisiveness to carry them out.*

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stricter criteria for title election. Despite these measures, it was dropped by Congress in 1968. (Barnhisel, *Cold War Modernists*, 164–166).

<sup>288</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 33.

<sup>289</sup> Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam*, 52–53; for a general overview consult John R. Lampe, Russell O. Prickett, and Ljubiša S. Adamović, *Yugoslav-American Economic Relations Since World War II* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990).

Report of the State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade,  
June 3, 1953<sup>290</sup>

*Such American propaganda, as it is today, according to our opinion is becoming a huge political problem, which we as UDBA, and only with our measures, aren't able to resolve. The Americans today want to penetrate every pore of our political and social life, especially [...] among the youth, throughout schools, universities, organizations of the People's Front, etc. What is more, they are trying to enter the JNA and our press.*

UDBA report, May 20, 1953<sup>291</sup>

*When they wanted to lay accusations against [me] because I am campaigning for Americans, because I said that Tito, now that he is with the Americans, will give a better life to the people and will come over to the West [...]. I was in UDBA (security police) for three months and then brought to court. They asked me did I say that, and I said, Yes I did. We are not in 1947 when Tito was with the Russians and they would chop off my head; but we are in 1950, and Tito is with the Americans, and we are no more afraid of you, I said. So they let me go home.*

Letter of a Yugoslav villager, to USIS, Belgrade,  
March 1953<sup>292</sup>

The Yugoslav communist policymakers were highly troubled by the margins of liberty the foreign “propaganda missions” enjoyed in their country. Paradoxically, the apprehension over “foreign propaganda” persisted despite the mounting opening trends of Yugoslav society during the 1950s. In a narrative that evoked but did not emulate the anti-American tones of the late 1940s<sup>293</sup>, the Yugoslav policymakers considered the U.S. propaganda as reactionary western infiltration and called for active resistance and more restricted law regulations.<sup>294</sup> But why was this the case since between 1952 and

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<sup>290</sup> Pitanje propagandnih stranih misija u FNRJ, June 3, 1953, Pov. br. 92562, Box 44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, Socijalistički Savez Radnog Naroda Jugoslavije (SSRNJ), RG 142, Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ): 18.

<sup>291</sup> UDBA Report, May 20, 1953, XI-109-VI-36, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze 1945-1990, Centralni komitet SKJ (CK SKJ), RG 507, AJ.

<sup>292</sup> Despatch 727 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, March 16, 1953, 511.68/3-53, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, NACP.

<sup>293</sup> In the hardcore anti-American lexicon antecedent the Tito-Stalin split, the United States were defined as the forefront of capitalist imperialism, warfare and psychotic, and the American libraries as residences of Yugoslav enemies (Neki problemi u vezi sa političkim stanjem i ratno-huškačkom propagandom u Beogradu, 1947, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet Saveza Komunističke Srbije (hereafter SKS), Istorijski arhiv Beograda (hereafter IAB); Carla Konta, “Antiamericanismo e titoismo. Gli anni Cinquanta e la «zona grigia jugoslava,”” *Contemporanea* XVI, no. 1 (March 2013): 69–76).

<sup>294</sup> On this point I disagree with Radina Vučetić when she argues that, after the 1949-1950 Yugoslav appeasement with the United States, the USIS in Belgrade and Zagreb continued undisturbed its cultural operations (Vučetić, “Amerikanizacija u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi '60-ih,” 129-130). Instead, archival investigations have brought up how several Yugoslav executive agencies struggled for years to find the right counteraction policy to limit foreign propaganda efforts.

1966, as Spehnjak and Cipek recalled,<sup>295</sup> the Yugoslav regime reached a high degree of consolidation and consent? Can it be that this protean nature of Yugoslav reception entailed a lack of coordination in its internal policymaking?

### 2.4.1 The USIS Margins of Liberty

In 1953, an inter-committee composed of members of the Yugoslav State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (DSIP) and the State Secretariat of Internal Affairs (DSUP) produced a long report about American, British, and French missions in Yugoslavia and their “political propaganda against our country.” They critically stressed that foreign propaganda was vigorously growing with the compliance of Yugoslav apathy and laissez-faire. By means of political influence, the “reading rooms and cultural centers” were intervening in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. Schools, cultural institutions, “and even the Army,” collaborated with the propaganda missions by playing their movies or dispatching their magazines. The report recalled an informal permission that Yugoslav authorities conceded to foreign diplomatic corps during the Yalta Conference on which foreign missions were repeatedly evoked. “Protests of diplomatic corps often prevented us from undertaking ulterior restraint,” declared the commissioners.<sup>296</sup> “For several sacks of books that we import by diplomatic mail on behalf of the Embassy, they import several wagons; for our weekly newsletters of a few hundred copies, they issue daily bulletins in total circulation of 20,000 copies,” ironically complained the inter-committee report on the theoretical reciprocity of the cultural propaganda. However, it was the lack of law regulations over the import of foreign books and the free play of foreign concerts, movies and theatre pieces that the Yugoslav policymakers deemed to be most problematic.<sup>297</sup>

The SSRNJ’s Commission for Foreign Relations criticized the English teaching courses as “political propaganda against our country” because they allowed foreign professors to induce Zagreb, Belgrade and Ljubljana University students by “easy and

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<sup>295</sup> Katarina Spehnjak and Tihomir Cipek, “Disidenti, opozicija i otpor - Hrvatska i Jugoslavija,” *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 39, no. 2 (2007): 259–260.

<sup>296</sup> Pitanje propagandnih stranih misija u FNRJ, June 3, 1953, Pov. br. 92562, Box 44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 14.

<sup>297</sup> Pitanje propagandnih stranih misija u FNRJ, June 3, 1953, Pov. br. 92562, Box 44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ.

cheap leisure, by jazz music.”<sup>298</sup> Similarly, the Committee for Science and Culture of the Republic of Croatia prohibited in 1952 the public ceremonies of the USIS book donations, usually performed at the Zagreb University with high representatives of the Republican authorities, the Dean, and the Embassy representatives, thus delegating the arrangements of the program to the Bibliography Institute.<sup>299</sup>

In the context of the Yugoslav strategy towards American propaganda, the role of UDBA, the Yugoslav secret policy, deserves particular attention.<sup>300</sup> On August 31 1953, UDBA stated that, although the American cultural missions had increased the copies of their publications, several covert interventions succeeded in dropping the USIS subscriptions of many political and social institutions (of 1,550 subscriptions, 203 unsubscribed after UDBA pressures). But, if under UDBA pressures, 1,302 people rejected USIS materials in August 1953, another 1,500 new subscribers asked for USIS magazines. Despite strong field efforts, the process of combatting American propaganda in the rural areas had contradictory effects: in Niš the number of receivers decreased from 200 to 12, in Svetozarevo from 100 to 10, while elsewhere, like in Kragujevac, Čačak and Zrenjanin it rose respectively from 33 to 105, from 20 to 70 and from 40 to 147. Additionally, the report complained that USIS Zagreb started the *Radio News Bulletin/Bilten* with 8,000 copies (when initially the post had only 2,000-3,000 copies from Belgrade) and that the *Agricultural Bulletin* increased from 4,000 to 7,000 copies. It seemed profoundly concerned because “the Americans were sending publications into the rural interior by train,” because “they exploited personal contacts with journalists to

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<sup>298</sup> Propaganda kapitalističkih zemalja u Jugoslaviji, 1953, 724/1953, Box 44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ. SSRNJ stands for Socialist League of the Working People of Yugoslavia (Socijalistički Savez Radnog Naroda Jugoslavije), formerly National Front (Narodna Fronta).

<sup>299</sup> Kratak osvrt na propagandnu delatnost inostranih ustanova, 1952, Box 86, Sektor za visoke škole, nauku i umetnost – Veze sa inostranstvom 1946-1952, RG 317, AJ.

<sup>300</sup> UDBA (or UDB-a) is the acronym of *Uprava Državne Bezbednosti* (The Administration of National Security). The archives of the temerarious Yugoslav secret services are until today, except for Slovenia, classified and inaccessible to researchers and general public. Fortunately, several UDBA reports can be found within the historical files of other Yugoslav institutions where they were sent for information. In spite of these archival limitations, the historical files produced by Yugoslav executive and consultative institutions on American propaganda report miniscule information over USIS posts, with high probability obtained by UDBA field officials in the libraries or by some local Yugoslav employees. What is more, Yugoslav archival documentation confirms that the letters from and to the USIS centers were opened and controlled.

insert pro-American materials in the Yugoslav press,” and because they reached Skopje with 4960 copies of American publications.<sup>301</sup>

UDBA’s major concern were the “politically very sensitive groups” that the USIS was reaching in Yugoslavia: students, professors, and intellectuals. They abhorred the book donation program as a means of exerting personal contacts and despised the American exhibits for their affirmation of American political and economic superiority and their underscoring the U.S. aids to a deprived Yugoslav population. By attracting more than 4,000 visitors per day, the American exhibits were dangerous because they implied “that in the event that Yugoslavia had a similar [capitalist] system, it would enjoy all the benefits of it.”<sup>302</sup> The fact that the American publications reached even the smallest Yugoslav villages – where the Yugoslav newspapers could not arrive as in the example of Krupanj, Negotin, Sremska Mitrovica, Titovo Užice, Kusejev, Veliko Gradište, Šapac, Čajetina and Bajina Bašta – was highly frustrating to UDBA officers. According to their sources, in some rural districts villagers discussed more “about life in the USA and England” and felt more “enthusiastic about the degree of Western agricultural development” than about the Yugoslav internal policies. The most disturbing fact above all was certainly that some of the receivers of American publications were members of the Communist Party.<sup>303</sup>

The Yugoslav secret service did not spare either the USIS PAO, Bruce Buttles, who was defined as the “the biggest enemy of Yugoslavia in the American Embassy,” particularly since his employees, according to their sources, were members of former monarchist Yugoslavia parties (in that case Slavko and Radmila Todorović), regarded as reactionary anti-Yugoslav elements.<sup>304</sup>

Even three years later, in 1956, UDBA’s report on “hostile activities” and “enemy propaganda,” condemned a large number of students that were connected with

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<sup>301</sup> Propaganda zapadnih kapitalističkih zemalja (UDB FNRJ III odeljenje), Aug. 31, 1953, 723/53, Box 44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ.

<sup>302</sup> Propaganda kapitalističkih zemalja u Jugoslaviji, 1953, 724/1953, Box 44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid.

<sup>304</sup> UDBA Report, May 20, 1953, XI-109-VI-36, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze 1945-1990, Centralni komitet SKJ (CK SKJ), RG 507, AJ.

foreigners in Belgrade and fostered enemy propaganda through the “foreign reading rooms.”<sup>305</sup>

1956 resulted in being very important for improvement of Yugoslav control over the foreign missions: an ad-hoc Commission gathered and proposed to establish statutes of the information centers, coordinate their activities towards the Yugoslav public and behave inflexibly in pursuing Yugoslav interests. They acknowledged that foreign publications did not direct attack “against our country, but a large anticommunist propaganda was developed.”<sup>306</sup> Soon after, a new regulation was introduced. It was again decided that the foreign press, publications and books could be distributed in Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana and Rijeka only by the state enterprise *Jugoslovenska knjiga* and in numbers decided by the Secretariat of Information and the DSIP. Content supporting criminal and harmful education of the young and inimical positions towards Yugoslavia were forbidden and retracted by official Yugoslav organizations.<sup>307</sup> In 1957 a survey on *Politika*, *Borba* and other republican daily newspapers, proved that foreign press materials, including those of USIS, were spreading sensational, unaesthetic, and tasteless views and developing feelings of “inferiority and colonialism” in the minds of Yugoslav audience.<sup>308</sup> Consequently, they urged to be stopped.

In 1957, the Ideological Commission, chaired by Veljko Micunović, a leading Yugoslav communist and government member, discussed foreign propaganda in some softer tones, affirming that some degree of cultural contact with foreign countries cannot be avoided. Yet, the commission concluded that higher restrictions were necessary, as it was a priority to establish a Yugoslav institution that would perform as a foreign cultural center.<sup>309</sup> Following these recommendations, the Belgrade Cultural Center (Kulturni Centar Beograd) was established in 1956 as an information-propaganda institution in order to neutralize foreign propaganda activities. Its activities

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<sup>305</sup> Pregled neprijateljske aktivnosti u 1955 do sada – UDB FNRJ II Odeljenje, Feb. 20, 1956, 1529/1, Box 44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ.

<sup>306</sup> Zapisnik sa sednice Komisije za proučavanje pitanja primene propisa o inostranoj propagandi, June 15, 1956, 1651/1, Box 55, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ.

<sup>307</sup> Pravni položaj stranih kulturnih institucija – Pravni savet DSIPa, 1956, 1651/1, Box 55, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ.

<sup>308</sup> Uticaj inostrane propaganda u jugoslavenskoj štampi, 1957, 1839/1, Box 55, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ.

<sup>309</sup> Sastanak ideološke komisije CK SKJ, June 28, 1957, VIII/II/2-b-(85-98), Box 5, Ideološka Komisija, CK SKJ, RG 507, AJ.

began partly in 1957, and then expanded in 1958. While planned as a reading room supplying foreign periodicals, the Belgrade Center remained still at an infant stage in the late 1950s (even if provided by a Photo, Audio, Film and Art section), mostly for financial reasons. The Film Section was the most vivid one since it borrowed foreign movies of the USIS Movie Section (and other foreign cultural centers) to interested Yugoslav institutions.<sup>310</sup>

In September 1958, the State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs introduced new limitations: the publications of the foreign centers needed to be approved by the Republic's Secretariat of Internal Affairs (SUP); all movie plays could be publicized only by sending personal invitations (these limitations were established for the Soviet and American cultural centers specifically); and the USIS was forbidden to donate printing paper to Yugoslav publishing houses for the publication of American books in translation. In November 1958, further restrictions were applied: all published or imported press material had to be sent to the State Secretariat of Internal Affairs (DSUP) for control (in late 1958 USIS Belgrade sent two pamphlets, *The USA on Disarmament* and *The Reward of Independency*, both were rejected); the names of the English teaching students had to be reported to the authorities; all the movies could be rented to Yugoslav institutions only, through the Federal and/or Republican Center for Schooling and Cultural-Education Film (or through the Belgrade Cultural Center for the capital region), and only after they were approved by the Federal Commission for Film Review or the DSUP. So even if many Yugoslav cultural and educational institutions continued to refer to the foreign centers to borrow films, this latter restriction reduced the lending activities of USIS Zagreb by more than 30 percent.<sup>311</sup>

The fact that the American reading room published 20,000 copies of the daily *Bilten* in 1957, that the USIS movie section possessed 60 movie projectors and 8,000

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<sup>310</sup> The major difficulty encountered by the Cultural Center in the eyes of the Belgrade's public, was that its service weren't free as in the case of the American or Soviet cultural centers (Informacija o Kulturnom centru Beograda, 1956, Box 537, Materijali o radu kulturno-prosvetnih institucija 1950-1968, Gradski komitet SKS, IAB).

<sup>311</sup> Borba protiv inostrane propagande u FNRJ, Jan. 14, 1959, 1989/1, Box 44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ. For an in-depth analysis on these issues see chapter 2, The Dissemination of American Movies within Yugoslavia: From USIS Centers to the Periphery.

movies were disseminated all over the country concerned the authorities<sup>312</sup> and made them consider a “long-term, intensive and organized ideological struggle to affirm our views and our praxis, to paralyze ideological and propaganda influence from both sides [the U.S. and the Soviet].”<sup>313</sup>

As the final point of these efforts the Secretariat of Information presented, in late 1960, a draft of the *Press Law and other Views of Information* for discussion in the general Federal Assembly.<sup>314</sup> The new regulations formally declared that the import of foreign press was free, except for materials “expressly destined for the Yugoslav people [...] and, therefore, [...] propaganda”<sup>315</sup>. The articles 67-79 related to the foreign press and they copied the regulations already introduced in 1958 adding a new one which prescribed that foreign bulletins could only contain information related to the specific foreign country (forbidding therefore American negative critics on the Soviet Union). Articles 100-115 related to the foreign information institutions, contained far more recently edited regulations yet obliged them to register as cultural institutions and respond to the Yugoslav government for expenses and activities. In addition, they were prohibited from being placed within a diplomatic mission and the control of their movie program was delegated to the Secretariat of Information (whose responsibility was to release permissions to play a film in the USIS centers). Finally, article 52 established the criteria for censorship by prescribing that political offenses “against the people and state” of Yugoslavia, materials “abusing moral” and those offending “the citizens and insult[ing] the public order and peace” should be censored.<sup>316</sup> The law was approved

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<sup>312</sup> Inostrana informativno-propagandna delatnost u Jugoslaviji, March 1959, 1935/1, Box 44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ. On its side, USIS Belgrade recalls on new Yugoslav restrictions in Telegram 282 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, Sept. 19, 1958, 511.68/9-1958, Box 2204, CDF 1954-1959, NACP.

<sup>313</sup> Rezime aktualnih zadataka na polju ideološke aktivnosti i propagande u vezi sa međunarodnom situacijom, 1959, 1966/1, Box 55, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ.

<sup>314</sup> Predlog zakona o štampi i drugim vidovima informacija enclosed in Veljko Zeković, Secretary of SIV, to the President of the Federal National Assembly, Oct. 3, 1960, Box 565, Javno informisanje 1955-1960, Savezno Izvršno Veće (SIV) 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ.

<sup>315</sup> Obrazloženje novog zakona o štampi enclosed in Veljko Zeković, Secretary of SIV, to the President of the Federal National Assembly, Oct. 3, 1960, Box 565, Javno informisanje 1955-1960, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ.

<sup>316</sup> Veljko Zeković, Secretary of SIV, to the President of the Federal National Assembly, Oct. 3, 1960, Box 565, Javno informisanje 1955-1960, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ.

and became operational on November 9, 1960, with the information centers having six months to adapt and negotiate the new rearrangements with the Foreign Affairs.<sup>317</sup>

Interestingly, the Yugoslav margins of liberty for USIS in Belgrade, Zagreb and Novi Sad had a general decreasing trend, while, in the meantime, Western cultural artifacts and styles – jazz and rock popular music, Hollywood movies, household appliances and the culinary arts, urban architecture, advertising and American supermarkets – gained territory in the Yugoslav everyday culture.<sup>318</sup> However, there are no indications that the restriction policies described above are related in any way to “westernization” of Yugoslav everyday life.

Besides the negative trends described above, there were Yugoslav voices outside the country that asked for relent. For example, when Milan Bartoš, the Counselor for Law Affairs at the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington, wrote to the DSIP stressing that, concerning our cultural policy “our system must relax and adapt to the international standard.”<sup>319</sup> Although this was more a single case than a shared position.

#### **2.4.2 Yugoslav Patterns of Resistance and its Cold War Positioning**

From their establishment in the late 1940s, the USIS activities in Yugoslavia encountered varying degrees of official political opposition, but the subsequent analysis will show that the reasons for Yugoslav bias and counteractions depended on several key factors: an anti-American attitude inherited from the late 1940s, the Yugoslav positioning as a neutralist, independent country in the Bloc’s competition, and opposite internal policy views as to what was the “Yugoslav way to socialism,” especially after the Sixth KPJ/SKJ Congress of 1954.

For this argumentation the triennium 1951-1953 represents a valuable example. In early 1951, the Yugoslav Army’s Chief of Staff, Koča Popović, arrived in the United States to secretly discuss military aid to Yugoslavia in order to enhance what

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<sup>317</sup> Veljko Micunović, Secretary of DSIP to SIV, Nov. 26, 1960, 91628/10, Box 610, Međunarodni odnosi 1955-1970, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ.

<sup>318</sup> Obviously, “this did not mean that Yugoslav culture became thoroughly ‘Westernized’ [because] Yugoslav cultural producers and policymakers were trying to establish a ‘third way’ between state-controlled models of cultural production followed in the East, and the market-led approach favored in the West” (Petar Romijn, Giles Scott-Smith, and Joes Segal, eds., *Divided Dreamworlds? The Cultural Cold War in West and East* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 7.

<sup>319</sup> Milan Bartoš, DSIP, to IVS NR Hrvatske, Feb. 14, 1959, Pov.k. 47/1, Box 1C, Konzularni odjel/Povjerljivo D, IVS SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA.

Eisenhower defined as the “South NATO wing.” The Military Assistance Pact, signed on October 1951, included the Yugoslav Army in the Mutual Defense Aid Program thus providing T-33A aircraft, artillery, machine guns, radars and electronic equipment, but, above all, training that transformed the Army from a guerilla-like one to an ordinary one.<sup>320</sup> The U.S. economic aid through international agencies started as early as September 1949, when the Export-Import Bank granted Yugoslavia’s request for a \$20 million credit, whilst the International Monetary Fund approved a \$3 million drawing for Tito’s government. From the early 1950s on, Yugoslavia became the protagonist of Eisenhower’s “wedge strategy” in order to “keep Tito afloat,” as Lorraine Lees notably analyzed. The strategy tied Yugoslavia to NATO through the Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey signed in 1953.<sup>321</sup> From 1950 on, the U.S. aid played a crucial role in the economic recovery of Tito’s regime. For Lampe, Prickett and Adamović, for the period 1950-1964 the “American assistance, broadly defined, covered 60 percent of Yugoslavia’s payment deficits on the current account,” and “added perhaps 2 percentage points to a rate of growth in national income during the 1950s which averaged 7.5 percent.”<sup>322</sup>

However, these positive trends in the arena of foreign policy and economic relations were not followed by analogous internal attitudes towards USIS cultural agents and agencies. In September 1951, *Omladina*, the official organ of the League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia (SKOJ), alarmingly stated that there was a tremendous Western infiltration happening in the Yugoslav press (Western sensationalist news were “petit bourgeois,” “bizarre” and non-educational) and called for anti-Western pressures on editors. Furthermore, *Politika* attacked the weekly magazine on politics and society, *NIN*, charging its editorial board of anti-communism.

Things escalated in February 1952, reaching a peak in April. On February 20, a fire attack produced by three small bottles making up a bomb, were thrown against the

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<sup>320</sup> Tvrtko Jakovina, *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici (1948-1963)* (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 2003), 32, 37–39.

<sup>321</sup> Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat*, 71; 92-93.

<sup>322</sup> John R. Lampe, Russell O. Prickett, and Ljubiša S. Adamović, *Yugoslav-American Economic Relations Since World War II* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 72.

Belgrade USIS post.<sup>323</sup> On April 1, the Belgrade municipal authorities initiated an anti-USIS campaign by warning the KPJ members against using the American reading room (because of “improper [...] bad influence” and boogie woogie dancing floors in its Music Section).<sup>324</sup> The next day the Politburo member Blagoje Nešković, defined by the charge d’affaires Jacob Beams as the “most intolerant communist,” visited the USIS exhibit room and completely scrutinized every bulletin, map, picture, and display.<sup>325</sup> The next day a Belgrade woman was arrested and held for 24 hours because of carrying in her hand a copy of *Bilten*. The USIS officers interpreted this as a counteraction for a favorable VOA listeners’ survey carried out months before.<sup>326</sup>

Later, on April 22, Beams was called to the DSIP where Jakša Petrić, responsible for the Western Hemisphere and British Commonwealth Affairs, complained about the distribution of *Atomic Energy for War or Peace* pamphlet and “inappropriate” movies sent to Yugoslav schools.<sup>327</sup> A negative trend again appeared on June 13, when Miroslav Radojčić, *Politika*’s journalist, condemned the American cultural activities as inimical and unacceptable.<sup>328</sup>

In 1952 and 1953 similar suppressions were repeated. In summer 1952 Zagreb’s Cultural Affairs Officer (CAO), Thereza Mravintz, was prohibited from participating at the Novi Vinodolski summer session for English teachers.<sup>329</sup> On March 10, 1953, Milorad Peršić, president of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Federation of Students, criticized those “reactionary students” – who “use and expand various Western propaganda literature,” and “have connections with their libraries.”<sup>330</sup> In June

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<sup>323</sup> Despatch 798 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Feb. 21, 1952, 511.68/2-2152, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, NACP; despatch 891 from Belgrade to the Department of State, March 20, 1952, 511.68/3-2052, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, NACP.

<sup>324</sup> Telegram 187 from Beams, charge d’affaires to the Secretary of State, April 1, 1952, 511.68/4-152, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, NACP.

<sup>325</sup> Telegram 1232 from Beams, charge d’affaires to the Secretary of State, April 5, 1952, 511.68/4-552, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, NACP.

<sup>326</sup> Telegram 1218 from Beams, charge d’affaires to the Secretary of State, April 3, 1952, 511.68/4-352, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, NACP.

<sup>327</sup> Despatch 992 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, April 22, 1952, 511.68/4-2252, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, NACP.

<sup>328</sup> Translation of Miroslav Radojčić, “Gifts,” *Politika*, June 13, 1952 enclosed in despatch 1150 from Belgrade to the Department of State, June 13, 1952, 511.68/6-1352, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, NACP.

<sup>329</sup> Despatch 46 from American Consulate Zagreb to Department of State, Aug. 1, 1952, 511.68/8-152, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, NACP.

<sup>330</sup> Extract translation of Milorad Peršić Address, March 10, 1952, Zagreb enclosed in despatch 885 from Belgrade to the Department of State, March 19, 1952, 511.68/3-1952, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, NACP.

*Duga* and *Omladina* eliminated Western supplied materials, while Petar Menac, director of the Consular Section of the IVS, rejected a request of the Zagreb Movie section to attain a mobile unit tour in Croatia.<sup>331</sup> *Timok*, Zaječar's newspaper published an attack on William King, information officer of USIS Belgrade, calling to American propaganda "aggressive," "cruel," "damaging," "insolent," and "misusing our democracy."<sup>332</sup>

Additionally, on July 12, *Politika* published an article entitled "Wax Dummies" where, with heavy handed and surly humor, it denoted USIS visitors as old, ignorant and anti-regime,<sup>333</sup> while *Borba* reported Djilas anti-American speech given in north-east Montenegro's town Bijelo Polje (White Field), declaring that "certain weaklings and men without character [...] do not hesitate to [spread] foreign, bourgeois, anti-socialist, anti-Yugoslav ideas for foreign money."<sup>334</sup>

The Yugoslav political attitudes towards USIA-USIS public diplomacy platforms drastically changed from one program to another. So, for example, the American participation at the Yugoslav trade fairs and the exchange programs with American universities were more than appreciated and both formally and informally supported. The U.S. cultural presentation program was equally welcomed. Yugoslav authorities were mostly reluctant when coming to the USIS field activities and the broadcasts of the *Voice of America*. Why was this the case? The reasons are stratified. The U.S. participation at the Yugoslav trade fairs, as observed in Chapter 4, was a matter of prestige for the organizers, a chance for improved economic relations and for gaining precious technological know-how. The U.S. cultural presentation program was not perceived as a political danger, as it invaded a space of the politically neutral. The

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Again, when President Tito received Peršić on March 15, they agreed that both Western and Eastern propaganda represented deviation (Despatch 885 from Belgrade to the Department of State, March 19, 1952, 511.68/3-1952, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, NACP).

<sup>331</sup> Despatch 984 from Belgrade to the Department of State, June 26, 1953, 511.68/6-2653, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, NACP.

<sup>332</sup> Translation of "Mr. King, We Had Enough of Your Propaganda," *Timok*, June 12, 1953 enclosed in despatch 1033 from Belgrade to the Department of State, June 26, 1953, 511.68/6-2653, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, NACP.

<sup>333</sup> Despatch 43 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, July 12, 1953, 511.68/7-1253, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, NACP.

<sup>334</sup> Reported in *Borba*, July 14, 1953. In his speech Djilas presumes, and therefore criticizes, that Yugoslav citizens were paid by the American centers to distribute propaganda materials (Despatch 52 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, July 15, 1953, 511.68/7-1553, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, NACP).

Yugoslav standpoint over the cultural exchange program, which counted some fifty different programs between state and private initiatives (as the Ford, Fulbright, Leader's Exchange programs among the most effective), appeared more controversial. Nonetheless, since it covered cultural aspects and was limited to restraint groups of cultural (the academics and scientists) and political (of middle-high and middle rank positions) leaders, it was especially welcomed as a Yugoslav modernizer and a channel for Yugoslav affirmation in the United States.

The stance towards USIS field operations (and VOA broadcastings as well)<sup>335</sup> was more conservative. Both in the 1950s, but also in the 1960s (as Chapter 3 proves), the American cultural centers in Belgrade, Zagreb and Novi Sad remained a "nail in the head" and "thorn in the side" of the Yugoslav mass organizations like the SSRNJ, as they personally contacted large masses instead of carefully picked categories, as was the case of the exchange programs. And since the *Voice* reached even larger groups of population, it was considered more politically dangerous. The USIS regarded its work as successful both because of its popularity among the audience and because of the liberal cultural trends that, following the approbation of the 1953 Constitution, left them more liberty in working with the Yugoslav cultural leaders.

As previously stated, the Yugoslav authorities constrained USIS operations on a pre-1948 anti-American ideological ground, but also because of its political positioning that Rinna Kullaa called the "Yugoslav neutralism based on the Finnish example." By definition, the latter was a "commitment to minimizing security risks to the Soviet Union along its European political border and to not interfere in the Soviet domination of domestic politics elsewhere in Europe."<sup>336</sup> The Yugoslav policymakers defended the restrictions on the foreign cultural missions, even if in a veiled manner, by affirming Yugoslav independence in internal policy and neutralism in foreign policy. Indeed, USIS officers were convinced that the motivation for "harassments" on the USIS posts were "Yugoslav [...] hyper-sensitivity vis-à-vis Russians and Chinese," and their way

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<sup>335</sup> See *The Voice of America Speaks...*, 205.

<sup>336</sup> Rinna Kullaa, *Non-Alignment and Its Origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge* (London; New York: I.B.Tauris, 2012), 2. Kullaa argues that the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry abandoned the neutralist pragmatic policy in favor of the Non-alignment when in 1958, in the aftermath of the Suez and Hungarian crises, it became clear that relations between Yugoslav and Soviet parties would not be harmonious, after an initial reapproachment of the mid-1950s.

to show “that all countries must obey the same laws.”<sup>337</sup> Nevertheless, further investigations could better show if this was the case.

Finally, to understand Yugoslav attitudes toward USIS ground operations, the 1950-1953 constitutional and economic reforms are crucial. Between the Fifth and the Sixth Congress of the KPJ/SKJ (1948-1952), the Yugoslav leadership conceived the idea of a self-managed socialist society. In the years that span between 1950 and 1953 Slovenian leaders Edvard Kardelj and particularly Boris Kidrič, conceived an economic reform that would strengthen the autonomy of the working councils and leave the enterprises, while remaining state-owned, to partially dispose of their profits.<sup>338</sup> For Boris Kidrič, “These changes [would] put the enterprises in a freer market competition where, exempted from state planning, they would gain profit.”<sup>339</sup>

At the Sixth Congress in 1952 the Yugoslav Communist Party changed its name in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Savez Komunističke Jugoslavije, SKJ), the National Front became the Socialist League of the Working People of Yugoslavia and more power was given to the local, now SKJ, party organizations. The 1953 Constitution endorsed the partial abandonment of centralism, reinforced the autonomy of republics, and introduced the self-management for many organizations, as institutions, hospitals, universities and enterprises. It was a “historical turnover” in which “state-owned and bureaucracy monopole” conceded “larger autonomy of economic and political subjects as well as local and regional communities.” In the meantime, other opening cracks appeared following the Yugoslav abandonment of the Stalinist line. In 1951, the Fourth Central Committee Plenum condemned the “dogmatic politics of education,” whilst in 1952 the Congress of Writers expanded the framework for freer “intellectual and spiritual production.” However, by accepting the self-management conceptions, argues Croatian historian Dušan Bilandžić, the Yugoslav leaders created a discrepancy between existing social relations built on autocratic and centralistic assumptions and the new anti-statistic and anti-bureaucracy conceptions of the KPJ/SKJ. And, while according to the spirit of the Sixth Congress, the Party had to

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<sup>337</sup> Telegram 745 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, Feb. 5, 1959, 511.68/2-559, Box 2204, CDF 1954-1959, NACP.

<sup>338</sup> Dušan Bilandžić, *Hrvatska moderna povijest* (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 1999), 302–308.

<sup>339</sup> Bilandžić, *Hrvatska moderna povijest*, 307.

become an “educator” and not “ruler of the masses, many leaders did not know how to act, while others interpreted these trends as power-losing.”<sup>340</sup> The Party was assigned the role of the controller on what Tito called “the influence of certain negative Western ideas,” when speaking up about young intellectuals at the Sixth Congress of the League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia.<sup>341</sup>

Discrepancy about what was permitted and what was controlled by official censorship or auto censorship in cultural production appears in many U.S. reports from Belgrade. In a 1956 memorandum, Stephen E. Palmer (second secretary of the Embassy) claimed that his recurrent meetings with painter Milica Lozanić-Petrović and vanguard sculptors Ana Bešlić and Jovan Soldatović, convinced him of the fact that Yugoslav artists enjoyed a highly privileged position to “express themselves in the way they wish,” while others such as screen writers – dealing with sensitive content for large masses – were submitted to censorship.<sup>342</sup>

USIS Belgrade very soon captured how crucial were the processes of decentralization affecting cultural institutions like theatres, cinemas, public libraries, and publishing houses.<sup>343</sup> In 1958, Seventh Congress of the SKJ promised to “emancipate creative arts from dogmatism and pledge[d] to exempt art and science from being used as instruments of political interests.”<sup>344</sup> In 1959, *Politika* and *Borba* defended modernist art against the attacks of the “dogmatists,” and requested a more democratic treatment of art in Yugoslavia. In 1960, Miroslav Krleža, prominent Croatian writer and Tito’s friend, whilst welcoming Jean Paul Sartre in Yugoslavia, proudly declared that the Seventh Congress “liberated art from even the most

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<sup>340</sup> Bilandžić, *Hrvatska moderna povijest*, 333–334, 337.

<sup>341</sup> Despatch 386 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Feb. 12, 1958, 868.46/2-1258, Box 4846, CDF 1954-1959, NACP. In Serbo-Croatian, the League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia was Savez komunističke omladine Jugoslavije or SKOJ.

<sup>342</sup> Stephen E. Palmer, Jr. to Robert J. Hooker enclosed in despatch 615 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, May 22, 1956, 868.44/5-2256, Box 4846, CDF 1954-1959, NACP.

<sup>343</sup> The liberalization tendencies in theatre drama programs was noticed by the Zagreb General Consulate in Despatch 285 from American Consulate Zagreb to Department of State, April 30, 1953, 511.68/4-3053, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, NACP.

<sup>344</sup> Chronology of the Cultural Policy in Yugoslavia enclosed in letter from Alexander G. Park, IRS/S, to Cody, IAE, March 27, 1963, M-32-63, Box 1, Research Memoranda 1963-1999, USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, RG 306, NACP (hereafter Chronology of the Cultural Policy in Yugoslavia, March 27, 1963); *VII kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Kultura, 1958).

insignificant administrative influence.”<sup>345</sup> Indeed, in its 1963 report, the USIA accentuated what recent contemporary historiography has proven: the Yugoslav fine arts and literature enjoyed a “measure of freedom unparalleled in any other communist-ruled country, except Poland.” The only limitation was that artists, writers and journalists “were prohibited from making direct attacks upon, or from questioning, the domestic and foreign policy of the Tito government.”<sup>346</sup> A position that Zagreb’s drama theatre director, Pero Budak, confirmed to General Consul Edward Montgomery, asserting that only few in Yugoslavia “adhered to the school of socialist realism,” and that “Yugoslav artists were eclectic [...], uncommitted to any school.”<sup>347</sup>

From October 1953 to January 1954, Milovan Djilas published 19 articles on SKJ’s newspaper *Borba* arguing that a new ruling oligarchy formed by party bureaucrats had established its power in Yugoslavia. Later his thoughts were collected in the first world-known Yugoslav dissident bestseller, *The New Class*, that forced him to his first (six years-long) imprisonment.<sup>348</sup> The Djilas case unveiled the duality of Yugoslav reform system that, while withdrawing from Stalinism, established an experiment that never abandoned its totalitarian-ending perspective and autocratic drifts.

### 2.4.3 Just Student “Mensa” Protests or Signs of Change?

It was a sunny afternoon of May 11, 1959, when 3000 Zagreb University students came to the downtown streets of the capital city. The main reason of their demonstration was the bad conditions of the food served at the University “Mensa,” the mess hall. Events precipitated when the University administration decided that the *Hotel Esplanade* (today a glamorous and luxury Zagreb hotel), under catering contract, would serve 2,000 students instead of 1,000. In addition, when the mess hall was partly closed for the preparation of the UDBA convention on May 13, the regular meal

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<sup>345</sup> Miroslav Krleža, “Pozdrav Jean Paul Sartreu,” *Vjesnik*, November 20, 1960, 7.

<sup>346</sup> Chronology of the Cultural Policy in Yugoslavia, March 27, 1963.

<sup>347</sup> Despatch 82 from American Consulate General Zagreb to Department of State, May 28, 1959, 868.44/5-2859, Box 4846, CDF 1954-1959, NACP.

<sup>348</sup> Until his fall from power in 1954, Milovan Djilas was Vice President of Yugoslavia, President of the Federal Parliament, and a Member of the Politburo and Central Committee. He was imprisoned under the Monarchy (1933-36), and under Tito (1956-61 and 1962-66). Among his works, by 1990 only published abroad (the first in the United States), are *The New Class* (1957), *Conversations with Stalin* (1962), *The Unperfect Society* (1969), *Tito: The Story From the Inside* (1981) and *Rise and Fall* (1985). He lived as a freelance writer in Belgrade till 1995, uncensored, but occasionally harassed by the police.

services declined even further. The grumbling and dissatisfaction reached its culmination on May 11. First around 1.30 pm 200 students went to the major Većeslav Holjevac.<sup>349</sup> Then they carried on to the Law Faculty chanting “Živio Tito – Hrana” (Long live Tito – we want food), “Živio Bakarić – Kruha” (Long live Bakarić – Bread), “Mi smo gladni” (We are hungry). When the large crowd moved towards Vladimir Bakarić’s office,<sup>350</sup> the demonstrators were blocked by the police trucks and a physical fight occurred. During the clash two persons died, while 150 students were injured, many of them arrested.<sup>351</sup> According to Dougal L. Stewart’s sources, first Secretary of Information of the British Embassy, the disillusionment of the student body, which had long been propagandized regarding the atrocious behavior of the pre-war Royalist police, was such that, in his opinion, the regime had lost major student support even from those firmly declared communists. The same sources reported that many students had suffered heavy blows from police truncheons, in the aftermath many lost their scholarships, and many were expelled from the University and the Party following the demonstration.<sup>352</sup> Analogous “mess hall” protests occurred in the same months in Belgrade, Skopje and Rijeka, but according to Marković they were complaining about bad living conditions not questioning communist legitimacy.<sup>353</sup> But for the U.S. Consular officers, these first autonomous, non-governmental protests were deciphered as a signal of disagreement and dissidence. Indeed, the fact that these demonstrations led, as the similar 1954 protest march, to arrests and imprisonments, ultimately proved how the police authorities considered them to be politically dangerous. For the U.S. officers the student marches revealed that the Yugoslav society at the end of the 1950s was changing and raising voices of discordance.

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<sup>349</sup> According to Consular sources Većeslav Holjevac took his car and went with the students to the mess hall to try the “atrociously bad food,” Macedonian unclesanded rice with sand and small pebbles.

<sup>350</sup> Vladimir Bakarić was at the time the president of the Communist Party of Croatia.

<sup>351</sup> Despatch 77 from American Consulate General Zagreb to Department of State, May 14, 1959, 868.44/5-1459, Box 4846, CDF 1954-1959, NACP.

<sup>352</sup> Despatch 17 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, July 14, 1959, 868.44/7-1459, Box 4846, CDF 1954-1959, NACP.

<sup>353</sup> The first “food” demonstration of Yugoslav students occurred in 1952 at the University of Belgrade (Predrag J. Marković, “Najava bure: studentski nemiri u svetu i Jugoslaviji od Drugog svetskog rata do početka šezdesetih godina,” *Tokovi Istorije*, no. 3–4 (2000): 51–62. See also, Hrvoje Klasić, *Jugoslavija i svijet 1968*. (Zagreb: Ljevak, 2012), 101–102.

The American mission in Yugoslavia relied on the cultural opening trends to promote an affirmative extensive network of its agents and activities. It provided the USIS libraries with methods of dissemination for books, periodicals, magazines and newspapers, as well as for its movies, concerts and cultural activities. By the end of the 1950s USIS Belgrade created *Pregled*, a new colorful periodical whose contents improved the engaging narratives on American freedom, democracy and economy, and in which its citizens lived full, happy lives in a classless society and shared economic bounty. In the next chapter, focusing on several study cases regarding the growth of the USIA-USIS field network, we will observe how “the astounding flexibility and adaptability of the Yugoslavs and [their] often bewildering willingness to experiment,” would frame the Yugoslav third way, in other words to regard its openness both as its major strength and weakness, as suggests the Yugoslav attitude towards the American centers in Belgrade and Zagreb.<sup>354</sup>

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<sup>354</sup> Dennison I. Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 344.

### 3 *AND THE WINNER IS ...*: THE EVOLUTION OF THE USIA-USIS NETWORK AND THE 1960S REVENUE

Chapter 3 explains the evolution of the U.S. public diplomacy networks in Yugoslavia using three case studies; the American Library content, the impact of USIS movies in the territory, and the USIA narrative of the African-American Civil Rights movement. These case studies focus on three USIA priority policies and practices; the persuasion rhetoric on democracy, capitalism and freedom; the USIS capacity of bringing the *American way of life* on screen in the most abandoned Yugoslav village; and the mission of converting world audiences to pro-U.S. outlook on the domestic race issues. Chronologically, the cases span from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s.

In the last section, the focus again returns to framing the linkages of the USIA-USIS policies to the Yugoslav-U.S. foreign relations in the Kennedy and Johnson years when the arousing debate on détente and the emergence of the global South, required new public diplomacy efforts to persuade foreign audiences abroad. While affirming itself as a Non-Aligned protagonist, internally Yugoslavia balanced between progressive economic pro-market reforms, institutional decentralization, and cultural liberalization on the one hand, and coercion and violent responses over multisource

reform requests (intellectuals, literates, students, liberal party leaders) on the other. We shall observe how often unpredictable Yugoslav policies on the USIA-USIS missions would, in the aftermath of the 1961 Press Law, reshape the USIA Country Plan for Yugoslavia towards a leaders-directed one, with long-term consequences for the Yugoslav young political generation and Yugoslav-U.S. cultural exchange cooperation.

### 3.1 *Democracy, Capitalism, and Freedom* on Bookshelves in Yugoslavia

*[W]hen the enemy endeavored to cut off his communication by sea, he was forced to divert that danger by setting fire to his own ships, which, after burning the docks, thence spread on and destroyed the great library [of Alexandria].*

Plutarch, c. AD 46 – AD 120<sup>355</sup>

*I ransack public libraries, and find them full of sunk treasure.*

Virginia Woolf

*The truth is libraries are raucous clubhouses for free speech, controversy and community.*

Paula Poundstone

There is something profoundly fascinating in the invisible journeys that library books take from home to home, hand to hand, from readers' pages to magic literary places. Indeed, libraries encompass a duality; associated with silent reading and absorbing knowledge, and to dynamic questioning and engaging discussions. For an average Yugoslav customer, in Belgrade, Zagreb or Novi Sad, the American Libraries were more than that. Students and professors found there foreign scientific and technical monographs, exam textbooks, and academic journals, whilst others came to read *The Times*, *Life*, *Better Homes and Gardens*, or the daily *New York Times*. Sometimes they ordered a new book, other times prepared a reference research or simply sat down and studied. The reading room made up a gathering community of people, intellectuals, scientists, doctors, students, retirees, and ordinary citizens, occasionally knowing each other, with an eye beyond the frontier and irritations towards the system inside.<sup>356</sup>

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<sup>355</sup> Plutarch, *The Life of Julius Caesar*, 49.6.

<sup>356</sup> Interview with Nada Apsen-Pintarić, May 31, 2014, Zagreb.

The U.S. books and magazines program abroad was an outcome of the Cold War, but its origin dates back to WWII period. Since the early 1940s, the Council on Books in Wartime, a publishers' trade group, collaborated with OWI to disseminate information "about books, about the war and the war aims of the U.S. and its allies for libraries and bookstores, holding book forums and fairs, and utilizing radio and films to promote its message." So, books, as "weapons in the war of ideas," became the core theme of the U.S. anti-Nazi propaganda.<sup>357</sup>

In the new Cold War circumstances, the books could provide "the fullest (and most favorable) portrait of American culture."<sup>358</sup> Although capable of persuading "other people to adopt a predetermined set of American views," the books, asserted Dan Lucy in 1956, were "tool[s] [for] the reader to serve his own ends."<sup>359</sup> Furthermore, the impact of books was somehow dissimilar from other types of cultural mediums. As a 1968 USIA study underlined, "People tend to buy books for longer-range informational purposes and to absorb the material in books at a slower and more reflective pace." Accordingly, mass media had a "short cycle of life," while books tended "to have a long cycle," particularly outside the United States.<sup>360</sup> In other words, books served long-term propaganda purposes.

The IIA/USIA book program would not merely replicate the OWI projects. From 1953 on, the USIA established a subsequent tightening of the book-selection criteria, the choice of what the government could send abroad was reduced, and the purpose of the program "veered from fostering international understanding of American culture to actively promoting American policies." By primarily targeting foreign elites and intellectuals, the book programs had a "pedagogical self-understanding" to "teach about

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<sup>357</sup> Greg Barnhisel, *Cold War Modernists: Art, Literature, and American Cultural Diplomacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 151. By the same author, see "Cold Warriors of the Book: American Book Programs in the 1950s," *Book History* 13, no. 1 (2010): 185–217, doi:10.1353/bh.2010.0010; and "Perspectives USA and the Cultural Cold War: Modernism in Service of the State," *Modernism/modernity* 14, no. 4 (2007): 729–54, doi:10.1353/mod.2007.0080.

<sup>358</sup> Barnhisel, *Cold War Modernists*, 153.

<sup>359</sup> Dan Lacy, "The Role of American Books Abroad," *Foreign Affairs* 34, no. 3 (1956), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1956-04-01/r-le-american-books-abroad>.

<sup>360</sup> Study of USIA Book Publishing Programs, January 1968, S-4-68, Box 24, Special Reports 1953-1997, USIA Office of Research, RG 306, NACP: 6.

America” and, through the promotion of modernist authors, showcase American artistic achievement and prestige.<sup>361</sup>

By comparing U.S. public diplomacy narratives after the 9/11 tragedy with those of the USIA in the Cold War, Laura Belmonte argues that – while structure and modality has changed – “a shared belief in the universality of American freedom, democracy, and free enterprise links U.S. information experts from the era of Harry S. Truman to that of George W. Bush.”<sup>362</sup> Such universality and its linked topics, imbue the content of USIS libraries in Yugoslavia.

USIS books on Yugoslav shelves were, indeed, of a general nature and related to all human interests such as fine arts, literature, education, public opinion, history, architecture, economy, industrial achievements, famous American personalities, and so forth.<sup>363</sup> They included ideas, facts or promises in order to accomplish “a psychological task.”<sup>364</sup> The USIA cultural messages were encoded, translated and transmitted to fit the triad of the American liberal tradition of democracy, capitalism, and freedom, hence associating these words with concrete material experiences. Freedom was freedom to choose a job, a book, or friends, to vote according to one’s own personal convictions and to gripe about unjust wages.<sup>365</sup> This said, through which authors were liberal philosophical concepts explained to presuming Marxist readers in Yugoslavia? To what extent was the program shaped by audience preferences and to what extent by policy objectives? How could the latter be achieved since the USIA policy in Yugoslavia opted for no criticism of Yugoslav communism?

### 3.1.1 American Modernism and USIA Selection Policy

The USIS library content and its movie program fostered strong images of the *American way of life*. USIA’s *Guideline Paper on Policies and Operations of USIS Centers* emphasized their role in projecting “the image of a democratic, dynamic,

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<sup>361</sup> Barnhisel, *Cold War Modernists*, 153–156.

<sup>362</sup> Laura A. Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 23; Elisabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, MA; London: Belknap Press, 2007).

<sup>363</sup> Circular 41, May 20, 1952, 511.00/5-2052, Box 2245, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>364</sup> Airgram 398 from the Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, April 3, 1953, 511.00/4-353, Box 2247, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>365</sup> Airgram 3319 from the Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, April 24, 1953, 511.00/4-2453, Box 2247, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

socially humane, and culturally significant United States.” While portraying Americans “as responsible and mature,” respectful “of the mind and the spirit,” the American Libraries would extol “the quality of American life, achievements, and ideals, for its intellectual vigor and creativity,” and foster the understanding of U.S. policy goals. USIS could “reap political benefits without being political in content” because in the centers “‘information’ and ‘culture’ meet, interact, and become one program.”<sup>366</sup> The *Guideline* highlighted that the Library was not “a merely recreational reading oasis, nor yet a narrowly conceived scholarly research center, although it should have aspects of both.” “As a living organism, continuously responsive to new ideas and changing demands,” the American Center had, with the exception of certain classics, no permanent book shelf.<sup>367</sup>

More than anything, the USIA book program was very concerned to select the authors which best matched its program goals. The IIA issued its first directive in early 1950s stating that “controversial authors could be included if the works in question supported the mission of positively presenting the United States to the world.” Since McCarthy wanted authors with questionable political affiliations rooted out, the IIA revised its order and librarians abroad were obliged to remove materials by “any controversial persons, Communists, fellow travelers, etc.”<sup>368</sup>

As a result of the McCarthy investigations, the IIA released the *Instructions for Selection and Detection of Material in Book and Library Program* in July 1953, which would remain effective throughout the 1960s as well. The instructions stated that:

works of avowed communists, persons convicted of crime involving a threat to the security of the United States, or persons who publicly refuse to answer questions of Congressional committees regarding their connections with the communist movement, shall not be used even if their content is unobjectionable, unless it is determined that a particular item is clearly useful for the special purpose of the program.<sup>369</sup>

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<sup>366</sup> Study of USIS Libraries, Aug. 1967 (Study of USIS Libraries, Aug. 1967), E-4-67, Box 1, Estimates and Evaluations 1966-1978, USIA Office of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP: 22.

<sup>367</sup> Study of USIS Libraries, Aug. 1967, 22–23.

<sup>368</sup> Louise S. Robbins, “The Overseas Libraries Controversy and the Freedom to Read: U.S. Librarians and Publishers Confront Joseph McCarthy,” *Libraries & Culture* 36, no. 1 (2001): 29; Barnhisel, *Cold War Modernists*, 176–177.

<sup>369</sup> Instructions for Selection and Detection of Material in Book and Library program, July 15, 1953 enclosed in Study of USIS Libraries, Aug. 1967, E-4-67, Box 1, Estimates and Evaluations 1966-1978, USIA Office of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP: 26; see also Policy Statement on the Book and Library Program by the IIA, July 8, 1953, Box 1, Interagency/Congressional Reports, USIA Office of Administration, RG 306, NACP.

Henceforward, anxious USIS librarians pulled books by authors such as Howard Fast, W.E.B. Du Bois, Lillian Hellman, and Dashiell Hammett. McCarthy's investigations slowed the pace of book arrivals abroad from 120,000 to 400 monthly. However, almost contradictorily, the investigations brought major attention to the book program and reestablished their centrality "as critical weapons in the war of ideas."<sup>370</sup>

Up until Frank Shakespeare's directorship of the USIA (1969-1973) and onwards, the ICS's Bibliographical Division identified and reviewed books of possible usage abroad, while occasionally involving private companies such as the Services of Operations and Policy Research Inc. in 1969. American Centers abroad received book recommendations with regular cadence: monthly Subject Bibliographies, bi-monthly Program Book List, and occasionally additional files.<sup>371</sup> For instance, a 1957 subject bibliography contained the books on American democracy; the Culture of the American Indian; American Nobel Prize Winners; Medical and Public Health; 150 Years of American Art; Woodrow Wilson; the Supreme Court and Constitution; Elections and Parties in America; Economics in American Life; Religious Values; Christmas; Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy; and so forth.<sup>372</sup>

The books were distinguished by those "available for discretionary use" and those "available for program use whenever needed," and could be "supplied on request" or "recommended to the field."<sup>373</sup> When Public and Cultural Officers, or the Library Director, needed books on a specific subject, they could consult – apart from the Subject Bibliographies – the *Books Recommendation for the Overseas Program*, known as the *Blue Book*, or write direct requests to Washington.<sup>374</sup>

The major figures of early American literature such as Washington Irving, Herman Melville, and Nathaniel Hawthorne, joined by the major writers of the later nineteenth

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<sup>370</sup> Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 296.

<sup>371</sup> Paul K. Morris, ICS, to Mr. Weathersby, IOP, Feb. 26, 1970, Box 13, USIA Director's Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>372</sup> Subject Bibliographies enclosed in message 152 from USIA CA to all USIS posts, July 17, 1957, Box 7, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, NACP.

<sup>373</sup> Book Selection and Ordering Procedure, 1970, Box 14, USIA Director's Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>374</sup> Message 152 from USIA CA to all USIS posts, July 17, 1957, Box 7, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP.

century such as Whitman, Dickinson, Twain, found their way onto the Yugoslav bookshelves. Histories of American literature such as Wyck Brooks's *Flowering of New England* (1936) and Robert E. Spiller's *The Cycle of American Literature* (1955) provided narratives of an evolving literacy tradition and the grand American nation. Yet Greg Barnhisel suggests that the most innovative USIA accomplishment through the book program was its "modernism" agenda. Indeed, Washington's cultural policymakers bolstered a Cold War modernist project aimed at a "liberal understanding of American history." These narratives captured the centrality of freedom and individualism, cooperation between private enterprises and government, the rule of cultural diversity and the certainty that history evolves towards greater freedom and fulfillment, through the framework of the book program.<sup>375</sup> Predictably, another core theme concerned the anti-communist literature, such as Czeslaw Milosz's *Captive Mind*, a formerly leftist poet who had worked for the Polish government; Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*, and George Orwell's *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen-Eighty Four*. Other anti-communist books focused on the most ominous characters of Soviet communism such as the gulags, the Great Terror, and the arbitrary imprisonments.

Frank Tannenbaum's *Philosophy of Labour* and Frederick Lewis Allen's *The Big Change: America Transforms Itself 1900-1950* attempted to dispel the harsh image of the United States' capitalism abroad. Books such as Learned Hand's *Spirit of Liberty*; Carleton Coon's *Story of Man*; Robin M. Williams's *American Society: A Sociological Interpretation*, Carl Bridenbaugh's *Cities in Revolt: Urban Life in America 1743-1776*, and Arthur Breton's *The Restoration of Learning*, had intellectual and sociological pretensions.<sup>376</sup>

Since Poe was among the few American writers held in high esteem by the European literary critics, the USIA book program initiated a literacy agenda to purposely explain classic and contemporary American literature. ICS lists favored classics such as Twain, Hawthorne, Dickinson, Henry James, and Melville in addition to contemporary titles like Willa Cather, William Dean Howells, Henry James and F.

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<sup>375</sup> Barnhisel, *Cold War Modernists*, 154-156.

<sup>376</sup> Barnhisel, *Cold War Modernists*, 180-186; Belmonte, *Selling the American Way*, 163-224; a transnational cultural Cold War history of Orwell's *Nineteen-eighty four* can be found in Andrew N. Rubin, *Archives of Authority: Empire, Culture, and the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 51-90.

Scott Fitzgerald. Hemingway appeared less acceptable (but not forbidden), whilst the works by and about Ezra Pound, a controvert expatriate American poet, were forbidden in all programs after 1953. Among the modernists, it was William Faulkner who played the biggest part in the book program and whose ascendance solidified the “cultural dominance of literary elitism and liberal anti-Communism.”<sup>377</sup> By the early 1960s, the U.S. cultural diplomats and USIS officers suggested that it was their effort abroad that won general audiences and critical opinion in Europe. Still, the USIA book program lacked anything by Wallace Stevens, William Carlos Williams, Gertrude Stein, and Hart Crane; and predictably of John Dos Passos, Clifford Odets, and Langston Hughes because of their earlier communist associations.<sup>378</sup>

### 3.1.2 USIS Periodical Collection and the ‘Invaluable’ *Pregled*

*Magazines play a vital role in the process of communications. They are the vanguard of serious analysis [...] the springboard for introducing new ideas in the sciences, literature, and the arts. They link the realm of instant communications with the world of books.*<sup>379</sup>

The USIA administration was particularly proud of the “richness and diversity of American periodical literature.”<sup>380</sup> The Agency obtained the information on the kind of books and periodicals the audiences mostly preferred from two sources: the survey reports and the ICS statistical reports. The ICS *List of Periodicals Recommended for Program Use* was a selection guide for the foreign posts and included titles pertaining to the fields of political, international, cultural, educational and economic affairs, as well as entertainment and fashion magazines. Among the 648 titles of the *Periodicals Recruitment for Program Use*, readers were mostly attracted by *Reader’s Digest*, *Time*, *Newsweek*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Atlantic Monthly*, *American Heritage*, *U.S. News & World Report*, *Current History*, *Fortune*, *Esquire*, *Architectural Forum*, *Art in America*, *NEA Journal*, *Today’s Health*, *American Literature*, *Theatre Arts*, *Opera News*, *American*

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<sup>377</sup> Barnhisel, *Cold War Modernists*, 185–186; Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 234, 302.

<sup>378</sup> Barnhisel, *Cold War Modernists*, 187–194.

<sup>379</sup> Magazines at the American Center, Periodical list, Nov. 13, 1973, Box 1, Records Relating to Culture Centers 1946-1988, USIA Library Program Division, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>380</sup> Study of USIS Libraries, Aug. 1967 (Study of USIS Libraries, Aug. 1967), E-4-67, Box 1, Estimates and Evaluations 1966-1978, USIA Office of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP: 24.

*Political Science Review*, *Publishers Weekly*, *Trans-Action* (from November 1963), and *Public Interest* (from Fall 1965).<sup>381</sup>

The American newspapers (international daily and Sunday editions) played a crucial role in attracting daily audiences; like the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Times Herald*, *New York Herald Tribune* (became *International Herald Tribune* 1967), *Christian Science Monitor*, *Washington Star*, *Wall Street Journal*; the U.S. domestic magazines such as *Saturday Review*, *Publishers Weekly*, *National Safety News*, *Broadcasting*, *Telecasting*, *Reporter*, *Business Week*, and many more.<sup>382</sup>

Among the U.S. government publications, *American Education*, *Foreign Agriculture*, *Monthly Labor Review*, *Problems of Communism*, *Public Health Report*, and *Survey of Current Business* seemed very popular. However, readers were most pleased by all those colorfully illustrated, simply written and widely popular magazines, which were not on the ICS core list: *Life*, *National Geographic*, *Sports Illustrated*, *Saturday Evening Post*, *Look*, *Scientific America*, *Holiday*, *Popular Mechanics*, *Popular Science Monthly*, *Better Homes and Gardens*, *Ebony*, *U.N. Monthly Chronicle*, and *New Yorker*.<sup>383</sup> Because of the USIS donations and the IMG Program, American periodicals were available in other cities besides Belgrade, Zagreb and Novi Sad: in 1968, for example, the Scientific Library of Dubrovnik held *Life*, *Time*, *International Herald Tribune*, *National Geographic*, *Atlantic*, *Reader's Digest*, *Read's Marina Equipment News*, and *Pregled*.<sup>384</sup>

When, at the end of 1960, the USIA surveyed the most appreciated pamphlets abroad, USIS Belgrade chose, in order of relevance, *Facts about the USA*, *Handbook on U.S. Economy*, and *Elections USA*. Other titles enlisted revealed a high interest of Yugoslav readers in material covering general issues of the American life: *USA – Its*

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<sup>381</sup> Not all the periodicals were always present at the posts: for example, *Time*, *Newsweek* and the *U.S. News and World Report* were reintroduced, after a four-year break, in 1950, as a result of Yugoslavia's political relenting after 1948. (USIE Report 397 for Feb. and March 1950, April 11, 1950, 511.68/4-1150, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP).

<sup>382</sup> Analysis of Periodicals for which there are more than five subscriptions, Table 3, July 1 to January 31, 1959, Box 2, Reports and Studies 1953-1998, USIA Office of Administration, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>383</sup> Study of USIS Libraries, Aug. 1967: 24, 31-33.

<sup>384</sup> Naučna biblioteka u Dubrovniku, Oct. 25, 1968, 171/1-1968, Box 3, 1968-1972, Republički sekretarijat za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu 1965-1979, RG 1415, HDA.; Naučnoj biblioteci Dubrovnik, Oct. 31, 1968, 1/2-1968, Box 3, 1968-1972, Republički sekretarijat za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu 1965-1979, RG 1415, HDA.

*Geography and Growth, City Pamphlets, Window to America, America's Parks, Outline of History of the USA, and Man and Outer Space.*<sup>385</sup>

The first attempt at a fashionable, in loco, USIS magazine was *Pregled's* predecessor, *SAD*, a Serbo-Croatian liberally illustrated publication in color and black-white. Designed to be the Yugoslav counterpart of the Russian language magazine *Amerika*<sup>386</sup>, it started in December 1951 with 25,000 copies (the second issue increasing to 30,000) and consisted of 16 articles over 56 pages, a map of the United States and an introductory note of Ambassador Allen.<sup>387</sup> When in 1953 USIS sent 5,097 questionnaires to *SAD* readers, the return level, around 42 percent, surprised the officers in the field.<sup>388</sup> Individuals and Yugoslav official organizations, like the town libraries, voiced enthusiasm, requested more copies and added emotional comments of approval.<sup>389</sup> The magazine appealed to both urban (Zagreb, Belgrade, Ljubljana, Rijeka, Osijek, Skopje, and Novi Sad) and rural population, which equally asked (99 percent of all) to receive more publications about the United States.<sup>390</sup>

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<sup>385</sup> Other titles appreciated by the Yugoslav audiences were: *Changing Pattern of Higher Education in America, Outline of American Government, Newspapers in the U.S., Miracles from Molecules, Space: The New Frontier, Labor News: How a Union Works, Life of Lincoln, Social Security in the USA, Education in the U.S., The American Consumer, Atoms for Peace, Declaration of Independence and Constitution, Voice of America*, and many more (Survey of Post Utilization and Assessment of IPS Materials and Services, Feb. 1961, PMS-45, Box 1, Program and Media Studies 1956-1962, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP).

<sup>386</sup> This USIA magazine circulated from 1944 to 1994, with an interruption, due to Soviet prohibition, from 1952 to 1956 (Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 6, 117, 229).

<sup>387</sup> Propaganda kapitalističkih zemalja u Jugoslaviji, 1953, 724/1953, Box 44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 5.

<sup>388</sup> The Bureau of Social Science Research of the American University, in charge of the data analysis, found those percentages to be relatively high: they considered the Yugoslav public unaccustomed to these sort of surveys and the political climate generally unpleasant for their execution. (Yugoslavian Reaction to *SAD* a New USIS Magazine, July 1953), IEV.YUG.1, Box 38, Research Memoranda 1963-1999, USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, RG 306, NACP: 7).

<sup>389</sup> Some of the passionate comments uttered: "The publication goes from hand to hand, and many are waiting impatiently for their turn" and "Some friends of mine have seen the publication and liked it very much, so I am giving their addresses below." A few respondents referred to the fear of political reprisal: "Many of my friends would like to get your publication, but they are afraid to ask because they fear the probable consequences" (Yugoslavian Reaction to *SAD* a New USIS Magazine, July 1953, 14-15).

<sup>390</sup> As might be expected, respondents living in larger cities liked more the articles on drama and theater like "Roots of Modern American Art," "The Member of the Weeding" (a prize-winning Broadway play), "Vermont Symphony Orchestra," and "Ceramics," while the article "Hybrid Corn" was far more appealing to the agricultural population (Yugoslavian Reaction to *SAD* a New USIS Magazine, July 1953: i-iii, 1, 8, 23).

Although dropped in 1954, probably because of financial troubles, the *SAD* project was not abandoned. In 1957, the American cultural officers in Belgrade started the most popular, fashionable and widespread USIS publication in Yugoslavia, the monthly periodical *Pregled* (Horizons). Published in Serbo-Croatian, but in the Serbian “ekavica” variant which brought complaints from Croatian readers, *Pregled* lasted from July 1957 to 1994.<sup>391</sup> In the beginning, the magazine had a monthly circulation of 12,000 copies and was distributed to persons all over Yugoslavia who, in the past, had showed some interest in USIS activities.<sup>392</sup> Only four years later, *Pregled* reached 25,000 copies and was published 11 times per year in 66-colorful pages.<sup>393</sup>

By avoiding any criticism of the Yugoslav communist society, it presented the *American way of life*, its social and political assets, as highly appealing, attractive and dynamic. A USIA survey conducted between December 1965 and June 1966 catches the periodical’s extraordinary popularity. The questionnaires, written in Serbo-Croatian, were sent in pre-stamped envelopes to 31,839 Yugoslav readers. Of 10,853 returns (34 percent of the total, according to USIS a high response rate for a dictatorial regime), there were 4,546 replies giving their opinion of the magazine of which 99 percent were favorable or mostly favorable feedback (many of the returns added a separate letter where they expressed gratitude and appreciation of *Pregled*).<sup>394</sup>

### 3.1.3 *Battles for Hearts and Minds in Books, Pamphlets and Monthly Themes*

*The Center’s focal point is the library, for books are purveyors of ideas, and the right book in the right hands at the right moment can be a powerful persuader.*<sup>395</sup>

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<sup>391</sup> Interview with Nadia Apsen-Pintarić, May 31, 2014, Zagreb; Vučetić, “Amerikanizacija u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi,” 138; *Pregled*, July 1967, 33; Aleksandra Pavlović, University Library Svetozar Marković Belgrade, E-mail message to the author, March 22, 2016.

<sup>392</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP: 23.

<sup>393</sup> Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963, January 30, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP: 6.

<sup>394</sup> USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington for IOP/R, Jan. 27, 1967, YO6601, Box 41, Africa, Eastern Europe and Multi-Areas, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>395</sup> Study of USIS Libraries, Aug. 1967 (Study of USIS Libraries, Aug. 1967), E-4-67, Box 1, Estimates and Evaluations 1966-1978, USIA Office of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP: 22.

The following pages will not explore the USIA overall effort of telling America's story abroad, neither present a comprehensive view of its priority themes in the 1950s and 1960s.<sup>396</sup> The intention is to underscore the specificity of USIA messages to Yugoslav audiences, while emphasizing common points of the American cultural propaganda in the European area. Laura Belmonte argues that "America's ideological offensive was not a ham-handed, one-size-fits-all model, but a sophisticated endeavor utilizing the most advanced communications methodologies of the era." The images of America as offered by USIA policymakers suggest how the United States constructed its national identity as defining and protecting national security, and how carefully constructed narratives of progress, freedom and happiness fused the material and immaterial into a discourse justifying American predominance in international affairs.<sup>397</sup>

Such a process goes, notwithstanding, beyond the Cold War era. John Fousek asserts that the American nationalist globalism ("a tradition of thinking about American national mission and destiny"), while becoming predominant in 1950s public discourse, developed its key elements during WWII.<sup>398</sup> Wendy Wall challenges this traditional interpretation by situating the creation of an "American character" and consensus earlier, during the Great Depression crises and the rising of Marxism and fascism. In a splintering society torn by economic hardship, suggests Wall, Americans of all political persuasions, economic backgrounds, religions, and ethnic and racial origins, latched onto a single unifying *American Way* in order to rescue the American experiment. In

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<sup>396</sup> Many excellent scholarly works have already done this. Laura Belmonte (*Selling the American Way*) adopted a thematic approach on issues such as family, gender, race, capitalism and democracy; Greg Barnhisel (*Cold War Modernists*) focused on the USIA's promotion of modernism; Nicholas Cull (*The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*) favored a chronological line linked to presidential policies, while Kenneth Osgood (*The Total Cold War*) and Shawn J. Parry-Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955* (Westport, Connecticut ; London: Praeger, 2001) focused on presidential propaganda rhetoric in Truman's and Eisenhower's era. An Italian perspective on USIA policies can be found in Simona Tobia, *Advertising America. The United States Information Service in Italy (1945-1956)* (Milano: LED, 2009) e *Ascoltatori Italiani buonasera!: Voice of America e l'Italia 1942-1957* (Milano: Libraccio editore, 2014). For variable outlooks on USIA rhetoric and policy operations, look into Yale Richmond, *Practicing Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Odyssey* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008); Donna Vincent Roa, *Propaganda, Public Diplomacy & Idea Invasion: The Story of USIA's Worldnet* (Vincent Roa Group, LLC, 2016); Greg Barnhisel and Catherine Turner, eds., *Pressing the Fight: Print, Propaganda, and the Cold War* (University of Massachusetts Press, 2012).

<sup>397</sup> Belmonte, *Selling the American Way*, 28–29.

<sup>398</sup> John Fousek, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 187.

such circumstances, democracy, free enterprise, Judeo-Christian tradition, and patriotism gained new meanings of ideals worth fighting for.<sup>399</sup>

The USIA policy papers for Yugoslavia, its VOA broadcasts and *Pregled* magazine, targeted American values of democracy, capitalism, and freedom, frequently interweaving with one another, as priority messages. The USIA *Recommendations for Scopes and Types of Programming in EUR Area Beginning FY 1957 or Earlier* included the “American economic system,” “America as an adult in the world family of nations,” “America as a great hope for prosperity for all mankind,” “America as a «human institution» based on freedom and dignity of every individual”; and “the resourcefulness of America in terms of technology, business practices, looking ahead” as the chief propaganda themes.<sup>400</sup>

The USIS ground rhetoric and program content relied on different, transversal initiatives. Worldwide programs like Truman’s “Full and Fair Picture” (1946), Eisenhower’s “Campaign of Truth” (1950) and “People’s Capitalism” (1955), and Johnson’s “Great Society” (1965) were presidential initiatives, limited in time, and usually focused on special exhibit events.<sup>401</sup> Political crises that suggested the superiority of American democratic capitalism (i.e. the Soviet suppression of the 1956 Hungarian revolution, the 1961 Berlin Wall or the 1962 Cuban missile crisis) inspired the “advocacy” mission of the USIA and presented occasions for “talks” on the U.S. democratic traditions. Furthermore, the celebration of American historical anniversaries, remembrances of the Founding Fathers and significant personalities that “made America” inspired the field officers to present narratives on American exceptionalism. Finally, *Pregled* pages, USIS exhibit windows and VOA radio waves delivered monthly themes on the American life, domestic policies and foreign relations developments.

There is a continuity of themes, from the late 1940s to the 1960s, in the U.S. cultural offensive abroad. The United States were such a great and wealthy superpower because they relied on a democratic system of individual freedom, while their high

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<sup>399</sup> Wendy L. Wall, *Inventing the “American Way”: The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

<sup>400</sup> Recommendations for Scopes and Types of Programming in EUR Area Beginning FY 1957 or Earlier enclosed in Robert C. Hickok, IOP/E, to IOP and IOA Officers, Aug. 15, 1955, Box 16, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>401</sup> Study of USIS Libraries, Aug. 1967, File E-4-67, Box 1, Estimates and Evaluations 1966-1978, USIA Office of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP: 1).

standard of living was a result of flexible social mobility, production innovations and competitive education.<sup>402</sup> As a very early USIS pamphlet put it (*The Gift of Freedom*, 1949), America's unique "combination of circumstances – free labor, free unions, social consciousness [...], sacred regard for individual human dignity, and economic capacity" was the highway to American workers' wealth and high living standards.<sup>403</sup>

According to *Meet some Americans... at work* (1951), released as part of the Truman's "Full and Fair" campaign, American workers had ordinary, but nevertheless, cheerful and almost idyllic life conditions. As a color-sensitive publication, it presented African Americans integrated within U.S. working society. It displayed workers as free to pursue higher education by a system of scholarships and credits, and the American farmers as living "the freest life on Earth." While building skyscrapers and metropolitan tunnels, semiskilled New York workers fought for just management in factory unions. Finally, everyone was smiling, the secretary and the storekeeper, the schoolteacher, the police officer, the tax collector, the journalist, the mail carrier, the lawyer, the housewife, and the artist.<sup>404</sup>

In order to counter Marxist propaganda on capitalist workers' exploitation, Yugoslav USIS centers distributed general pamphlets on American democratic unions (*The American Labor Movement*), comparative pamphlets on workers in free and totalitarian countries (*Free or Slave Labor*), and stories of miserable farmers in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Red China (*The Farmer and His Land: Promises and*

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<sup>402</sup> Making America's free enterprise system known abroad is what Dawn Spring called a "nation branding strategy." (Dawn Spring, *Advertising in the Age of Persuasion: Building Brand America, 1941-1961* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)). The role of the Advertising Council in branding "America" in the war and post-war era is explored in Inger L. Stole, *Advertising at War: Business, Consumers, and Government in the 1940s* (University of Illinois Press, 2012), 121–175.

<sup>403</sup> *The Gift of Freedom*, Jan. 1949, Box 10, Master Files Copies of Pamphlets and Leaflets 1953-1983, USIA IPS/Publication Division, RG 306, NACP. Another pamphlet created on the Whitman's poems was the 1959 *I Can Hear America Singing*. Throughout the verses of Whitman's homonym lyric, this pamphlet narrated, in naïve tones, the expansion of the American land from the Great Plains, through the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Coast. In a triumphant tone, it proclaimed America's land fertility, religious richness, and technological leadership (i.e. the Manhattan skyscrapers). America was a land where "the worker works eight-hours a day, [and] receives an equitable wage" (*I Hear America Singing*, 1959, Box 1, Publications 1950-2000, USIA Information Programs, RG 306, NACP).

<sup>404</sup> *Meet some Americans...at work*, 1951, Box 1, Publications 1950-2000, USIA Information Programs, RG 306, NACP.

*Facts*).<sup>405</sup> By mid-1952, centers in Belgrade and Zagreb distributed over 28,000 copies of *Consumer Capitalism*, renamed in Yugoslavia as *The American System Works*.<sup>406</sup>

The most famous narrative about America's free enterprise system was certainly the 1955 "People's Capitalism" campaign created by long-serving president of the Advertising Council, Theodore S. Replier, and Eisenhower's close advisor. Under the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship, Replier spent six months traveling to Burma, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Laos, Singapore, Philippines, Pakistan, India, then Egypt, Greece, Italy, England, hence becoming "the first non-government American to study our information activities abroad." Upon his return, he found "capitalism synonymous with either colonial exploitation or restrictive practices," and felt the United States needed an "inspirational concept" to counteract this "serious propaganda handicap." He recommended the name and helped the USIA create an exhibit representing "America's system of free enterprise capitalism."<sup>407</sup> The campaign envisioned glorifying the achievements of the American middle class, such as the growth of its income, the abundance of opportunities, and the ownership of capital of a large number of Americans.<sup>408</sup> Devised for wide-reaching trade fairs around the world, the main aim of the exhibit was to persuade people that American capitalism was not Marx's *Capitalism*.<sup>409</sup> On February 14 and 15, 1956, almost 25,000 people, including 100 invited foreign journalists, filed through the main hall of Washington's Union Station to preview "People's Capitalism" where two homes were displayed: a common dwelling in 1776 and a modern, 1956 prefabricated steel house stocked with new furniture and labor-saving appliances.<sup>410</sup> Along with the exhibit, PAOs abroad received feature packets of press releases, speeches, magazine reprints, glossy photographs

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<sup>405</sup> Airgram 682 from the Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Oct. 7, 1950, 511.00/10-750, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>406</sup> Semiannual Evaluation Report – Yugoslavia enclosed in despatch from Belgrade to the Department of State, Dec. 17, 1952, 511.68/12-1752, Box 2247, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>407</sup> Spring, *Advertising in the Age of Persuasion*, 144–145.

<sup>408</sup> Excerpt from Speech by the Honorable Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President, over the Mutual Broadcasting System, Dec. 1, 1955, Box 13, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP; Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, 133.

<sup>409</sup> Information Campaign on the American Economy by Abbott Washburn, Deputy Director of the USIA, Box 13, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>410</sup> The People's Capitalism Exhibit: a Study of Reactions of Foreign Visitors to the Washington Preview, March 1956, IRI.G.7., Box 38, Research Memoranda 1963-1999, USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, RG 306, NACP.

which focused on the U.S. economic system, cultural events, Hollywood, women's education, labor, sports and other subjects. Obviously, neither the pamphlets nor the exhibits were concerned with domestic criticism of the American economic system or aggravated forms of urban poverty. Hence "convinced that they could not answer such criticism directly without undermining «People's Capitalism», U.S. information officials tried to divert attention to the positive features of democratic capitalism," states Laura Belmonte.<sup>411</sup>

Other two very rhetorically innovative pamphlets were *The People's Capitalism* (1956) and *Primer of the American Economy* (1957). The first was a report summarizing a roundtable held at Yale University in November 1956. By gathering the best American economists, professors and intellectuals, business and labor representatives, the pamphlet stressed the changing nature of American capitalism, in order to dismantle the propagandist caricature of capitalism as the bloated selfish exploiter of the masses. Indeed, the publication sent two basic messages: first, that capitalism in the United States was a subject of vivid discussion, not an imposed *status quo* (as in the Soviet Union); secondly, that the "new American capitalism" was creating a new type of owners, shareholders, small and medium enterprise business persons, and farm owners.<sup>412</sup> The second pamphlet, whereas addressing the same argument, used quite a different strategy. In *Primer of the American Economy* an English student at the Tuck School of Business Administration, was the narrator's voice making a general eulogy to the American economic system.<sup>413</sup>

USIS celebrated America's democracy through U.S. historical anniversaries, as was that of President Abraham Lincoln's 150th birthday in February 1959. *Pregled* devoted its entire issue to this "typical representative of remarkable American qualities."<sup>414</sup> The

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<sup>411</sup> Belmonte, *Selling the American Way*, 224–225. For further details and impact analysis, see pages 220–226 and Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, 133–141.

<sup>412</sup> The roundtable collected leading personalities from Yale University, the Advertising Council, Washington Post and Time Herald, Ford Glass Company, Transportation Displays, Holiday Magazine, and C.J. La Roche & Company (People's Capitalism by David M. Potter, Yale University and The Advertising Council, Part I, Nov. 16-17, 1956, Box 19, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP; Spring, *Advertising in the Age of Persuasion*, 145).

<sup>413</sup> A Primer on the American Economy by Christopher Buxton, 1957 enclosed in John M. Begg, IOC, to E. J. Heffron, IOC, May 31, 1957, Box 19, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>414</sup> David M. Potter, "Lincoln i značaj Američke unije," *Pregled*, February 1959, 2.

American post in Belgrade received 10,000 copies of the *Lincoln* pamphlet.<sup>415</sup> The movie *Face of Lincoln* (26' in black-and-white); collected works, selected speeches and his writings, Lincoln's biography by Paul McClelland Angle, William Herdon, Jesse Weik, and Carl Sandburg; and special historical studies, drama and literature pieces, books for children and youth, appeared in the library.

The *Pregled's* narratives focused on the image of President Lincoln as the incarnation of U.S. democracy, an inspiration for worldwide freedom struggles, an American of universal character but humble working-class provenience, a symbol of patriotism and unity, the savior of the Union and democracy for the entire humanity.<sup>416</sup>

Yugoslav USIS libraries were regularly furnished with the *American Democratic Concepts*, a special reference list on the U.S. political system, the Constitution, the Presidency, the Congress, the Courts, the elections and the two-party system.<sup>417</sup> Yet Yugoslav audiences were eagerly fascinated by technical information about the United States and the American everyday life. "Fed up to the teeth with propaganda in its natural state," Yugoslavs preferred "American Factories," "Small Town America" or "New York and Its People," to conventional titles such as *The Democratic Way of Life* (and indeed, USIS officers in Yugoslavia were advised to avoid any films, publications and exhibit material beset with straightforward propaganda).<sup>418</sup>

The variety of USIS publications produced in loco expresses this attentiveness to technological and cultural knowledge. Indeed, some of the most noticeable were *Vesti ove nedjelje* (News of the Week) and *Građa za urednike* (Materials for Editors), both weeklies printed in 600 and 400 copies; then *Šta ima novog u SAD* (What is New in the U.S.), *Ljudi i događaji* (People and events) and *Medicinski Bilten* (Medical Bulletin),

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<sup>415</sup> Message 1503 from USIA CA to USIA circular, Nov. 28, 1958, Box 7, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>416</sup> *Pregled*, February 1959, 2–20.

<sup>417</sup> Message 143 from USIA CA to all principal USIS posts and Barcelona, Bombay, Calcutta, Dacca, Istanbul, Ankara, Lahore, Madras, and Zagreb, July 17, 1957, Box 7, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP; List of Reference Materials enclosed in Airgram 81 from the Department of State to All American Diplomatic and Consular Posts, July 13, 1962, 511.00/7-1362, Box 1046, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>418</sup> USIE Country Paper – Yugoslavia enclosed in circular 2 from Belgrade to the Department of State, July 3, 1950, 511.68/7-350, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

three monthly publications printed in 400 and 500 copies.<sup>419</sup> Other attractive publications were *Poljoprivredni Bilten* (Agricultural Bulletin) in 4,000 copies, *Ekonomski bilten* (Economic Bulletin) in 3,000 copies, and *Prosvetni Bilten* (Educational Bulletin) and *Vojni Bilten* (Military Bulletin) both in 400 copies.<sup>420</sup>

Not surprising then that *Pregled*, which elaborated the pamphlet subjects in more sophisticated terms, had such a widespread demand and enthusiastic reception. Yet beside economic and political issues, *Pregled* addressed themes of special social interest, such as the American women, the gender roles and family images. Crucially, family and gender narratives would gain a central point in the cultural Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union. Elaine T. May unveiled how many Americans embraced domesticity and traditional gender roles as an antidote to anxieties unleashed by atomic weapons and political instability. Particularly, Cold War public ideology was crucial in shaping post-war American family roles, the images of the bread-winning man and the children-dedicated housewife in white suburban neighborhoods. Yet these roles changed in the 1960s, when the *baby boom* generation aged and women sought to crush their domesticity boundaries on the wave of the second American feminism inspired by Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique* (1963).<sup>421</sup>

It is very illuminating to follow *Pregled* articles as gender roles began to change from the early to the late 1960s, particularly reflecting on women's choices of maternity or career (or sometimes both). In November 1961, an article stated that even if women were satisfied with occupying leading management positions, "for many young women the happiest day is the one when she leaves service to get married." And continued,

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<sup>419</sup> Pravo na propagandu – Pravni savet DSIPa, March 2, 1956, Pov. br. 91022/1, Box 55, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ.

<sup>420</sup> UDBA Report, May 20, 1953, XI-109-VI-36, Box 6, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze 1945-1990, CK SKJ, RG 507, AJ.

<sup>421</sup> At the time it was published, *The Feminine Mystique* became an instant best-seller and inspiration for millions of American women in which Friedan elevated nondomestic achievement, demoted full-time domesticity to a lower status and legitimated open protest against what she called the "housewife trap" (Joanne Meyerowitz, "Beyond the Feminine Mystique: A Reassessment of Postwar Mass Culture, 1946-1958," *The Journal of American History* 79, no. 4 (March 1, 1993): 1481-82). Nevertheless, as the main critics awakened, although Friedan was writing during the civil rights era, she barely mentioned African-American women, she ignored the status of the working-class women, and she never discussed American laws limiting women's autonomy in credit, property or earning issues (Gail Collins, "Introduction," in Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique*, ed. Gail Collins and Anna Quindlen, 50th Anniversary Edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013), xi-xix). For more, see Elaine T. May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*, Revisited and updated edition (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2008).

The daughters and grandchildren of feminists who fought for the right to vote and women's equality with men serve their husbands and homes without words. They aspire to get married and raise children by marrying at an average age of 20 with young men of 23. Even if today the majority of young girls attend college, still there is a smaller number of those who wish to devote their lives to poetry, painting and public life than was the case twenty years ago. As students, many of them are already married.<sup>422</sup>

But circumstances for American women changed and by 1965, in an issue dedicated exclusively to women, an article commenced in a slightly different tone:

Both those who admire her and those who criticize her, agree that the American woman can be always recognized because she possesses a number of characteristics: she is beautiful and youthful, vigorous and capable, independent, restless, confused and disappointed, but more than anything, happy. Whether this picture is the truth or not, the American woman is more suited to these descriptions, mainly because she has always led movements that changed the way we understand the world and our institutions, profound changes that shook up and confused men and women all around the world.<sup>423</sup>

*Pregled* photographs depicted fashion women of all colors, often cheerful, or immersed in working and intellectual activities. In April 1964, *Pregled's* back cover portrayed a stereotyped lady, relaxed and smiling, satisfied and wealthy with her nails red and fancy white clothing.<sup>424</sup> Articles emphasized women's new job opportunities; they were doctors, industrial workers, laboratory researchers, and academic professors. The examples were almost infinite; the notable stage and television actress Julie Harris,<sup>425</sup> the gospel singers and activist Mahalia Jackson, the chess champion Lisa Line,<sup>426</sup> the vanguard painters Jane Wilson, Joan Mitchell, Grace Hartigan and Lee Bontecou,<sup>427</sup> the CEO and owner of the *King Bee Manufacturing Company*, Zella Ritz-Voller,<sup>428</sup> and Ella Fitzgerald, the first Lady of Jazz<sup>429</sup>. Yet images of young American mothers walking with their babies along the New York's Fifth Avenue, proved that, despite her infinite working opportunities, the American woman was still interested in motherhood.<sup>430</sup>

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<sup>422</sup> "Američke žene," *Pregled*, November 1961, 61.

<sup>423</sup> "Američke žene," *Pregled*, January 1965, 3.

<sup>424</sup> "Back cover," *Pregled*, April 1964.

<sup>425</sup> On women's role in Hollywood, see *Pregled*, April 1964, 10–13.

<sup>426</sup> *Pregled*, January 1965, 2–11.

<sup>427</sup> *Ibid*, 41–43.

<sup>428</sup> *Ibid*, 44–46

<sup>429</sup> *Ibid*, 48–50.

<sup>430</sup> "Američke žene," *Pregled*, January 1965, 4.

Nowadays, reported *Pregled*, women in America have greater access to qualified jobs,<sup>431</sup> “the family is democratizing,” and “the participation of women [...] is extending to financial issues.”<sup>432</sup> The issue of November 1967 reported further curious stories:

Last year André Robertson from Hicksville on Long Island in the New York State, who is happily married and has four children, made a very important decision: she decided to work as an assistant teacher in a summer school for culturally undeveloped children. Afterwards, André Robertson will make another important decision: to enroll or not in a two-year study course for a teacher’s degree [...].<sup>433</sup>

Many American housewives had a dream, a job outside their homes, and the *American dream* made their aspirations come true.<sup>434</sup> Stories on “average American families” living in private suburban homes, with five rooms, a television, a radio, a fridge and an automatic laundry machine,<sup>435</sup> reinforced the gender and family narratives on affluence, prosperity and free choice. It is hard to deduce which of these stories had a stronger emotional impact on the Yugoslav women in the 1960s. However, we can presume, as Radina Vučetić suggests, that the abundance of the American ordinary life, the items at the supermarkets and their price, as well as the household appliances that helped housewives’ daily work, certainly made the foremost effect in a socialist country where shortages of consumer goods could not satisfy the needs.<sup>436</sup> It was *Pregled*’s strategy to solicit a comparison of the American and Yugoslav systems, and subsequently to deduce that the American one was highly superior from every point of view.<sup>437</sup>

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<sup>431</sup> “Žene radnice,” *Pregled*, January 1965, 12–24.

<sup>432</sup> “Promene u američkoj porodici,” *Pregled*, January 1965, 25–26.

<sup>433</sup> “Nov način života američke žene,” *Pregled*, November 1967, 50.

<sup>434</sup> *Ibid.*, 50–54.

<sup>435</sup> “Profil prosečne američke porodice,” *Pregled*, January 1968, 9–11.

<sup>436</sup> Vučetić, “Amerikanizacija u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi,” 140–141. How the Yugoslav population encountered the shortages of goods by shopping expeditions abroad, especially in Trieste and Graz, and how these expeditions were in fact containing elements of control and legitimizing the regime by offering freedom to travel and consume, see Breda Luthar, “Shame, Desire and Longing for the West. A Case Study of Consumption,” in *Remembering Utopia: The Culture of Everyday Life in Socialist Yugoslavia*, ed. Breda Luthar and Maruša Pušnik (Washington, DC: New Academia Publishing, 2010).

<sup>437</sup> Vučetić, “Amerikanizacija u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi,” 138–148.

### 3.2 USIS Movies within Yugoslav Territory: From Centers to Peripheries

*We often tolerate artistic productions from the West, because ours are not attractive enough. In this way, we justify the lower number of viewings of our films.*<sup>438</sup>

Movies embody one of the most powerful communication and entertainment medium of today and this was true especially in the wave of the cultural Cold War. Recent comparative and transnational scholarly studies revealed how the Cold War forged the longest and most sophisticated cinematic conflict in history between the American and Soviet film industries that lasted more than four decades.<sup>439</sup> In *Hollywood's Cold War*, Tony Shaw evidenced how the American film industry entered the conflict for profit and propaganda reasons. Moreover, Hollywood-State relationships were far more consensual than that between filmmakers and government in the communist regimes, simply because their owners and employees shared Washington's ideological worldview. In fact, while in some instances the Washington propaganda agencies merely assisted in making or trimmed movies, on other occasions, agencies such as the FBI, CIA and USIA financed, produced and marketed films.<sup>440</sup> Nevertheless, those who refused adaptation to these "Cold War" criteria, were blacklisted or marginalized.<sup>441</sup>

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<sup>438</sup> Zapisnik sa sednice Komisije za ideološka pitanja, Sept. 11, 1965, Box 209, Zapisnici i materijali ideološke komisije GK SKS Beograd 1965-1967, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB: 68.

<sup>439</sup> While the American film executives habitually prided themselves on creating harmless and apolitical entertainment, Shaw and Youngblood demonstrated that the American film has always been political in one way or another and traditionally hostile to extremism (Tony Shaw and Denise J. Youngblood, *Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014), 15, 17).

<sup>440</sup> Tony Shaw, *Hollywood's Cold War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007). On this topic, see for example: David W. Ellwood and Rob Kroes, *Hollywood in Europe: Experiences of a Cultural Hegemony* (Amsterdam: Vu University Press, 1994); Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, And Transformed American Culture Since World War II*, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1998), 205-262; Stanley Corkin, *Cowboys As Cold Warriors: The Western And U.S. History* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004); Mark Glancy, *Hollywood and the Americanization of Britain: From the 1920s to the Present* (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2015); Nicholas J. Cull and James Chapman, *Projecting Empire. Imperialism and Popular Cinema* (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 129-348.

<sup>441</sup> Many of them fled to Europe (Paris, Rome) where they contributed to artistic development of European cinema, among them Joseph Losey, Jules Dassin, Michael Wilson, and Carl Foreman. For an overall comprehension of this dark and pivotal chapter in American social and film history, see Rebecca

From the 1930s on, Hollywood movies dominated the film public sphere in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Apart from the inter-period 1944 to 1949/1950 (from the liberation of Belgrade to the unreserved rupture with Stalinism), when Soviet movies overshadowed Yugoslav cinemas, the next decades saw American movies almost continuously exceeding the Soviet ones (and West and Eastern European) in number, projections, and audience affection.<sup>442</sup>

In the 1950s and 1960s, the movies were the most popular entertainment in Yugoslavia. In 1958, for a population of some 19 million inhabitants, mostly of rural and semi-urban areas, there were approximately 120 million paid admissions to the movies.<sup>443</sup> Tito himself was a “movie addicted” personality: his private cine-operator recounts that there were years when the Yugoslav dictator watched one film per day, mostly Westerns, as his favorite pastime.<sup>444</sup> The westerns had such a profound impact on Yugoslav movie makers that they invented the genre of “partisan western,” which narrated the National liberation struggle of World War II (Narodno-oslobodilačka borba or NOB) between partisans and fascist-Nazi forces as action battles between cowboys and Indians in John Wayne western style.<sup>445</sup>

In Tito’s Yugoslavia, American movies arrived through two main channels. Yugoslavia imported Hollywood movies through the IMG program, which meant that the films were imported at very low prices because they were paid in dinars, owned by

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Prime, *Hollywood Exiles in Europe: The Blacklist and Cold War Film Culture* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2014).

<sup>442</sup> The only exceptions were in 1962, when among 208 imported films, there were 48 Russian and 35 American (Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam*, 90 and Vučetić, “Amerikanizacija jugoslovenske filmske svakodnevnice šezdesetih godina 20. veka,” *Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju*, no. 1 (2010): 39–65).

<sup>443</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP: 24.

<sup>444</sup> Ž. Štaubringer, “Tito o filmu – filmski radnici o Titu,” *OKO*, May 19-June 2, 1977, 14; Dragan Batančev, “A Cinematic Battle: Three Yugoslav War Films from the 1960s” (M.A., Central European University, 2012), 16. On the Yugoslav film industry and its relation with its public and party leaders, consult Zoran Janjetović, *Od “Internacionale” do komercijale: Popularna kultura u Jugoslaviji 1945-1991* (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2011), 172–218.

<sup>445</sup> The most famous titles were *Ešalon doktora M.* (Echelon of Doctor M., 1959), *Kapetan Leši* (Captain Leshi, 1960) and *Obračun* (Clash, 1960) of director Žika Mitrović (Radina Vučetić, “Kauboji u partizanskoj uniformi: američki vesterni i partizanski vesterni u Jugoslaviji šezdesetih godina 20. veka,” *Tokovi Istorije*, no. 2 (2010): 130–51). Another film using American western and Italian neorealism was the Veljko Bulajić’s *Vlak bez voznog reda* (Train without schedule, 1959). While Vučetić emphasizes the American influence on Yugoslav directors, Ivo Škrabalo and Nikica Gilić avow that these trends actually derive from highbrow cultural traditions linked to the West and antecedent to the film era (Škrabalo, *Hrvatska filmska povijest ukratko*, and Nikica Gilić, *Uvod u povijest hrvatskog igranog filma* (Zagreb: Leykam International, 2011), 84–85).

the U.S. government at the Yugoslav National Bank, at an advantageous exchange rate. Hollywood made its way thanks to visits of Eric Johnston, president of the Motion Picture Association of America, in 1948 and 1957.<sup>446</sup> The second channel brought the USIA movies that were “extremely short, of news-reel length” documentaries or educational movies.<sup>447</sup> In Yugoslavia, USIS movie documentaries spanned from science (chemistry, geology, physics, and geography) to literature, art and foreign relations. The USIS Film Program, conducted by USIA’s International Motion Pictures Service, fall into three categories: the invitational showings on USIS premises; the film loans to Yugoslav organizations; and the commercial film distribution of USIS movies. We will concentrate on the first two categories because, as Joseph Kolarek pointed out in 1959, the commercial distribution of USIS movies proved to be completely unsuccessful.<sup>448</sup> The USIS mobile motion-picture units penetrated “the back country to the end of the road,” and a bit beyond, “bringing an American message on the silver screen to thousands of rural dwellers at a single showing, many of whom have never visited their own country’s capital city,” observed Robert E. Elder.<sup>449</sup> Indeed, the American missions in Belgrade and Zagreb created an unprecedented network of movie circulations, the potential impact of which has not, to date, been explored.

### 3.2.1 Showing, Lending, and Educating

From 1953 onwards, foreign movies could enter Yugoslavia by the *Jugoslavija film* enterprise and the foreign cultural missions. Following approval by *Jugoslavija film*, the film was delivered to the Federal Commission for Film Review (Savezna komisija za pregled filmova) then passed to the Republic commissions. As for the USIS movie section, it was subject to the Federal Commission who were permitted to rent movies to

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<sup>446</sup> Radina Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam. Amerikanizacija jugoslavenske popularne kulture šezdesetih godina XX veka* (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2012), 84–110. Johnston personally met President Tito in April 1957 (Eric Johnston, predsednik Motion Picture Association of America, April 1957, I-3-a/107-57, Box 57, Prijemi stranih ličnosti i delegacija, Kabinet Predsednika Republike (hereafter KPR), RG 837, Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita (hereafter AJBT)).

<sup>447</sup> Alessandro Brogi, *Confronting America: The Cold War between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 174, 175–177; Charles A. Hobbie, *The Time of the Monkey, Rooster, and Dog: A Peace Corps Volunteer’s Years in Korea* (Bloomington: iUniverse, 2011), 146, 228.

<sup>448</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 26.

<sup>449</sup> Robert R. Elder, *The Information Machine. The United States Information Agency and American Foreign Policy* (Syracuse University Press, 1968), xi.

Yugoslav organizations only if free of charge.<sup>450</sup> The Regulation of Film Reviews for Public Showing of May 4, 1953 (Uredba o pregledu filmova za javno prikazivanje) and the Film Law of April, 18, 1956, prohibited the American posts to provide public movie showings.<sup>451</sup> Each spectator had to be personally invited. Although for some time USIS tried to get around this device and posted a notice advising those interested to pick up the invitation at the door, the Yugoslav authorities protested that “it was not in the spirit of the law.” The practice was dropped, and the American missions set up to develop a special audience: they selected some 70 films and obtained the names of clubs, associations, and individuals possibly interested in their projection. Through phone calls and personal visits they established a list of contacts, members, and began to send personal invitations to “science enthusiasts, engineers, workers, painters, musicians, architects, doctors, photographic groups, [and] mountaineers.”<sup>452</sup>

By the mid-1950s, the regulations on movie showings (both mobile and in posts) and film lending activities varied from republic to republic.<sup>453</sup> The film showings at the Belgrade auditorium had to be approved by the city’s Film Censorship Committee, but mobile projections in the surrounding places were permitted.<sup>454</sup> In Croatia, the major downfall of film showings and mobile trip operations to Croatian, Slovenian and Bosnian schools dropped considerably when, in 1954, the Republic’s Secretariat of Education, Science and Culture “circularized teachers, instructing them that all foreign documentaries had to be borrowed through the Zagreb Office of the Secretariat.”<sup>455</sup> Henceforward, USIS Zagreb only continued to distribute catalogs and maintain direct contact with the final users.

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<sup>450</sup> Pitanje propagandnih stranih misija u FNRJ, June 3, 1953, Pov. br. 92562, Box 44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 15-17.

<sup>451</sup> Pravni položaj stranih kulturnih institucija – Pravni savet DSIPa, 1956, 1651/1, Box 55, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 22.

<sup>452</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 24.

<sup>453</sup> In 1954, the American posts in Yugoslavia owned two mobile units and 27 film projectors for showing in suburban and rural areas (IMS Budget FY 1954, July 7, 1953, Box 8, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP).

<sup>454</sup> USIE Report 610 for April and May 1950, June 20, 1950, 511.68/6-2050, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>455</sup> Despatch 156 from USIS Zagreb to USIA Washington, June 26, 1956, Box 4, Europe and Canada, USIA Foreign Service Dispatches, RG 306, NACP. The same telegram reported that the director of the Lower State Gymnasium of Bosanska Kupa (Bosnia-Herzegovina) commented of the film lending program: “all the movies you loaned us [...] contributed to widening the cultural horizon of the students [...] we often could not borrow because of the insufficient number of copies. We would like to see more movies about the U.S. in the Second World War, and more travelogues about America.”

Since the early 1950s, the USIS post in Belgrade had at their disposition more than 400 movies, two vehicles with integrated movie projectors, an automatic translation machine, a machine for automatic photo slides, and gave weekly projections of American movies in Zemun, Pančevo, Šumadija, Vojvodina and Novi SAD.<sup>456</sup> Preoccupied by such a propaganda machine and decisive at preventing the foreign cultural missions from “publicizing materials at their convenience,”<sup>457</sup> in 1957 the Yugoslav authorities decided to set up several film distribution centers in each of the six republics. Two years later, further restricted laws prohibited USIS to directly distribute the movie catalogs. Then, the lending activities declined a further 30 percent,<sup>458</sup> while the foreign missions were obliged to “distribute only films of non-propagandist character.”<sup>459</sup>

Henceforth, the Yugoslav government instituted new distribution centers that would be responsible for foreign movie lending, sending foreign catalogs, communicating with foreign cultural missions, and regulating their members’ registration. Among these, the Cultural Center Belgrade (Kulturni centar Beograd) operated for Serbia, the Center for Cultural, Educational and Teaching Film (Centar za kulturno-prosvjetni film i nastavni film) and the Film Library Nikola Tesla (Filmoteka N. Tesla) for Croatia Zagreb.<sup>460</sup> In Rijeka, there was the Distribution Center (Distribucioni Centar); in Sarajevo, the Teaching Film (Prosvjeta film); in Osijek, the Center for Film of the University for Adults (Sveučilliste za odrasle – Centar za film)

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<sup>456</sup> Propaganda kapitalističkih zemalja u Jugoslaviji, 1953, 724/1953, Box 44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 18–20.

<sup>457</sup> Republički sekretarijat za informacije, July 10, 1964, 8/54-1964, Box 42, Kinematografija 1964-1965, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA.

<sup>458</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 26. Still, in 1959, the mobile units of the American posts projected 715 movies in 4,724 showings, attended on average by 810,000 citizens of the most remote villages of Yugoslavia (Prevođenje i štampanje knjiga američkih pisaca po BTP, Nov. 25, 1962, Box 240, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ).

<sup>459</sup> Republički sekretarijat za informacije, July 10, 1964, 8/54-1964, Box 42, Kinematografija 1964-1965, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA.

<sup>460</sup> The Zagreb distribution center belonged to the Republican Secretariat of Culture and, besides the American posts, it provided service to the British Council, the French Institute and the House of Soviet Culture. From 1965, in the wave of the decentralization processes that affected the cultural institutions after the 1963 Constitution, the responsibility of movie lending activities transferred to Filmoteka 16, at that time the major film library in Zagreb (Republički sekretarijat za informacije, July 10, 1964, 8/54-1964 and Posudba filmova inozemnih ustanova, May 17, 1964, 2/38-1965 in Box 42, Kinematografija 1964-1965, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA).

and the Center for the Advancement of Technical Education (Centar za unaprijeđenje tehničkog obrazovanje); and in Skopje, the Department of Cultural, Educational and Teaching Movies (Zavod za kulturno prosveten i nastaven film).<sup>461</sup>

In order to match the new Yugoslav film regulations, in 1962 all the foreign cultural missions sent to the Belgrade Cultural Center the majority or part of their film holdings: 244 from the American post; 285 from the British Council; 173 from the French Institute; and 25 and 24 from the Indian and Czech posts. The Russian Home of Culture discharged its entire collection.<sup>462</sup> Though resistance remained alive, the American cultural mission continued to directly contact the movie users, and many Yugoslav institutions resisted mediation as well (for this reason the American center, with the Soviet Home, was defined as a propagandistic-political institution).<sup>463</sup>

USIS movie section furnished an extensive network of Yugoslav educational institutes, foremost schools, colleges and universities. An ample 1964 dossier of the Croatian Republican Secretariat of Culture, found in the Croatian State Archives, offers a minutely detailed description of the lending processes, the mechanisms of contacts, their geographical impact and covers the lending activities of the Croatian Center for Cultural, Educational and Teaching Film from January to June and from October to December 1964.<sup>464</sup> This extensive list of the institutes that asked for USIS movies comprehended every region and the main city of the Republic of Croatia. It includes Croatian primary schools from Zagreb, Varaždin, Podravska Slatina, Niš, Slunj, Daruvar, Mošćenička Draga and Konjščina; high schools from Zagreb, Makarska, Sinj, Vukovar, Slavonska Požega;<sup>465</sup> the state colleges from Zagreb, Rijeka, Varaždin, Krk,

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<sup>461</sup> This information has been collected from several documents with identification numbers 8/6-1964, 8/24-1964, 8/11-1964, 8/14-1964 located in Box 42, Kinematografija 1964-1965, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA.

<sup>462</sup> Informacija o delatnosti strane propagande, May 3, 1962, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

<sup>463</sup> Informacija o delatnosti strane propagande, Feb. 2, 1962, 232, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB: 19-20.

<sup>464</sup> According to the statistics of the Republican Secretariat, in 1964 297 USIS movies were rented, 1,067 projections given to 95,819 spectators (Dostavljanje godišnjeg izvještaja o korištenju filmskog fonda, Dec. 19, 1964, 8/142-1964, Box 42, Kinematografija 1964-1965, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA).

<sup>465</sup> The mentioned Zagreb schools were: the 1st and 3rd Gymnasiums, the High School for Physical Culture, the School Center for Education of Staff in Commerce, the Technical School Klaićeva and P. Pilota, the School for Tourism, the High Neuropsychological School, and the Railway Traffic School. Surprisingly, among the 14 Zagreb schools mentioned, four were catholic: the Religious High School, the

Otočac, Ploče, Metković, Koprivnica, Bosanski Novi, Senj, Ivanić Grad, and Samobor; university faculties and research institutes from Zagreb, Gospić, Split, Belgrade, Skopje, Đakovo, and Rijeka;<sup>466</sup> hospitals and care facilities,<sup>467</sup> cultural and professional associations, reading rooms, and industry councils.<sup>468</sup>

The USIA movies ranged from popular science (*A is for Atom, Nuclear Ship Savannah, The Story about Fuel, Satellite Research, Atomic power and the USA*), geography (*All about New York, San Francisco, The Mountain*), to popular medicine (*The Story of Doctor Jucawi*); from history and art (*The Face of President Lincoln, The Life of Indians, Museum of Art, Pan-American Festival, The Boston Symphony Orchestra, The Art of Maya, Abstract Art*), to agriculture (*Preservation of Fruit and Vegetables by Freezing, Farmer at his Job, Harvest Carried Out by One Man*), to international and domestic U.S. events (*Tito in the United States, Inauguration of President Kennedy, Kennedy's Journey to Europe, The Story about John Glenn*).<sup>469</sup>

Inter-diocesan School, the Franciscan High School and the High School for Priests Kaptol. Other high schools that appeared in the list were the Textile School Vukovar, the School for Medical Nurses Šibenik, the School for Students in Enterprise Slavonska Požega, the Garden School "Arboretum opeka" Vinica and the Franciscan High School Sinj.

<sup>466</sup> The Medical, Theological, Social Sciences, Veterinarian, Economic, Agricultural and Technological faculties of the Zagreb University, the Pedagogical Academy Gospić, the Medical Faculty Skopje, the Electro Technical Faculty Split, the Economic Faculty Rijeka, the Institute of Pathophysiology of the Medical Faculty Belgrade, the Institute of Oncology of the Clinical Hospital Ljubljana, and the Histological-Embryological Institute of the Medical Faculty in Ljubljana. Among the catholic theological institutes appeared the Diocesan Seminary of Split, the High Seminarian School in Đakovo, the Franciscan High Seminary in Makarska, and lastly from Zagreb the Theological Institute, the Seminary of Conventual Franciscans, the Seminary of the Holy Spirit and the Theological Institute of Jordanovac.

<sup>467</sup> The School of Public Health A. Štampar, the Health Station in the company "Kombinat – Borovo," the Public Health Home "Peščenica" and "Trešnjevka" in Zagreb, "M. Pijade" in Petrinja, the Zagreb hospitals "Zelengaj" and "Rockfellerova."

<sup>468</sup> The majority of them were from Zagreb: the Photochemistry Industry, the Centre for Education Rade Končar, the Radio Television and School Radio Television Zagreb, the Military Posts, the Pioneer City, the Aero Club, the Technical Museum, the Tuškanac Kindergarten, and the Student Homes of the Seminary and Technical School. The others were: the Alliance for Physical Education – Students Croatian Club Zadar, the Library and Reading Room Mursko Središće, the People's Reading Room Omišalj, the Company Engineers and Technicians of Cotton Industry Klanjec, the Aeronautics Section of the Flying Club "Wings of Kvarner" Rijeka, the 3. Maj Shipyard Rijeka, the Electro Technical Society SR Croatia, the Center for the Workers Education Bedekovčina, the Iron Foundry and Machine Factory Slavonska Požega, the Horse Association of Serbia, the Yugoslav Red Cross, the Club of Geography Students, the Service for the Narrow Movie Zadar and Virovitica, the Municipal Assembly Remetinac, the Center for Adult Education Karlovac, and the Societies of Automotive, of the National Technique Nikola Tesla, of the Hungarian Cultural Association, of Engineers and Technicians Sisak, and of the Mountaineering Club Sljeme. All the above lists have been collected from Box 42, Kinematografija 1964-1965, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA.

<sup>469</sup> Centar za kulturno-prosvjetni film i nastavni film, April 2, 1964, I9/64, Box 42, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH, 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA; Centar za kulturno-prosvjetni film i nastavni film, April 10,

The content of the movies followed the theme-patterns of a post's library, its pamphlets and its *Pregled* periodical. Many portrayed ideal and ideological projections of *American Life* as inspiring, competitive and personally fulfilling. *There's Music in the Town* (USIA, 1954), by depicting the New England High School Musical ensemble, its students practicing, after-school activities, earning money for instruments, typified "the genuine interest [of American] students in developing their musical skills," their "satisfaction of self-expression," and the "deeper appreciation of the world around them."<sup>470</sup> Others as *Man's Machines* (USIA, 1957) – suggested for government officials, management groups, schools, and universities – emphasized that automatic machines were the major factor in raising the American standard of living and liberating "the wage earner from unpleasant toil."<sup>471</sup> Finally, politically hot movies, as *Tito in the U.S.* (News of the Day, 1964), while presenting Tito's 1963 visit to Kennedy and evincing Tito as "a leader who has traveled widely and whose country has played a significant role in world affairs," delivered a highly symbolical account of the American Revolution and historical liberties.<sup>472</sup>

In Williamsburg, Virginia, Marshall Tito saw an America conscious of its revolutionary past, [that] remind[ed] every visitor of the way Americans of 200 years ago lived and worked, dreamed of liberty and, when the time came, fought for it. [...] The revolution set in motion the creative forces that were to shape the dynamic society of 20th century America, [where] the press was the people's voice of protest and rebellion. [...] On his visit to New York, President Tito saw this vitality in a city as diverse as America itself.<sup>473</sup>

Yugoslav organizations handled these and analogous USIA movies through the Republican secretariats of culture, in charge of censoring these materials by controlling their territorial dissemination. In the same way as for other U.S. public diplomacy activities, the Yugoslav authorities played between toleration, restraint and institutional,

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1964, 8/3-1964, Box 42, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH, 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA; Filmovi iz područja nuklearne energije, April 30, 1964, T-MM/VM-931, Box 42, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH, 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA.

<sup>470</sup> Telegram 624 from USIA CA to USIS posts, March 31, 1954, Box 8, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>471</sup> Outgoing message 830 from USIA CA to USIA circular, Oct. 2, 1957, Box 7, U.S. Information Agency: Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, National Archives.

<sup>472</sup> Transcript of the motion picture "President Tito in the U.S.", News of the Day, 1964, enclosed in Office Memorandum from E.C. Conte to IMS New York Staff, March 18, 1964, Box 34, Movie Scripts 1942-1965, USIA, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>473</sup> Transcript of "President Tito in the U.S." (1964) enclosed in E.C. Conte to IMS/NY, March 18, 1964, Box 34, USIA Movie Scripts 1942-1965, RG 306, NACP.

often invisible, forms of control. As we shall observe in the final paragraph, varied institutional ties constrained American propaganda in a boundary between censorship and liberty that moved along political, often arbitrary, lines.

### 3.3 A Cold War ‘Case’: The Civil Rights Struggle in the American Cultural Mission in Yugoslavia

*We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed.*  
Martin Luther King, Jr.<sup>474</sup>

Among all the USIS themes delivered to Yugoslav audiences, the African American civil rights struggle best illustrates how the U.S. public diplomacy became a weapon of foreign policy, and represents a special case.<sup>475</sup> As scholarly research shows, from the early 1950s on, the U.S. State Department became increasingly concerned that domestic racial relations could have a negative impact “on the dozens of countries on the verge of independence from Western colonial powers;” the new nations’ view of racism in the United States would be a strong reason for them to ally themselves with the Soviet Union rather than with America.<sup>476</sup> As Brenda Plummer demonstrated, the

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<sup>474</sup> Letter from Birmingham jail, April 16, 1963 quoted in Jonathan Rieder, *Gospel of Freedom: Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Letter from Birmingham Jail and the Struggle That Changed a Nation* (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2013), 59.

<sup>475</sup> For more details, see Carla Konta, “Languages of Freedom in a Coca-Cola Communist Country,” in *Discourses of Emancipation and the Boundaries of Freedom. Selected Papers from the 22nd AISNA Biennial International Conference*, ed. Leonardo Buonomo and Elisabetta Vezzosi (EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2015), 243–51.

<sup>476</sup> Ingrid T. Monson, *Freedom Sounds: Civil Rights Call Out to Jazz and Africa* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 107-108. From the mid-1990s on, scholars began to study how the civil rights struggle was shaped by the Cold War, the emergence of the “global South,” and the anti-colonialization movement. Among many scholarly works, are recommended Michael Krenn, *Black Diplomacy: African Americans and the State Department, 1945-1969* (Armonk, N.Y.: Routledge, 1999); Brenda G. Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996); and Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 2001). Other important studies include Brenda G. Plummer, ed., *Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1988* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Richard Lentz and Karla K. Gower, *The Opinions of Mankind: Racial Issues, Press, and Propaganda in the Cold War* (Columbia: University of Missouri, 2010); Robert C. Lieberman, *Shaping Race Policy: The United States in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011); Daniel S. Lucks, *Selma to Saigon: The Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War* (Lexington, Kentucky:

worldwide demands for decolonization put new pressures for change in race relations in America and African-American involvement in international affairs,<sup>477</sup> while the NAACP and its leaders exerted their power in order to take their human rights agenda before the United Nations.<sup>478</sup> Undoing the negative impact of domestic racial relations became part of Washington's foreign policy agenda; by sending ambassadors for jazz and African-American sportsmen abroad, American policymakers intended to overcome hostile international responses to the violent repression of the national civil rights struggle.<sup>479</sup>

Since the early 1950s, the USIA proposed the supposed domestic advancement of African-Americans as a top priority issue of U.S. public diplomacy abroad, "as an effective means of combatting communist propaganda" and demonstrating the progress of African-Americans in the U.S..<sup>480</sup> In Yugoslavia, the USIA bulletins planned to deconstruct the anti-American stories that had become popular in its mainstream press in the late 1940s by taking their cue from Soviet anti-Americanism;<sup>481</sup> nonetheless, because of the Yugo-American partnership in the early 1950s these anti-American narrations partly vanished from Yugoslavia's public discourse. When, in the wake of the *Brown vs. Board of Education* verdict, the African-American desegregation movement exploded, it spilled over, almost immediately, from U.S. national boundaries:<sup>482</sup> the Yugoslav press expressed sympathy and *Borba* defined it as an "anachronistic and painful phenomenon."<sup>483</sup>

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University Press of Kentucky, 2014); Manisha Sinha and Penny Von Eschen, *Contested Democracy: Freedom, Race, and Power in American History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); and Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy*, Revised edition (Princeton; N.J.; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2011).

<sup>477</sup> Brenda G. Plummer, *In Search of Power: African Americans in the Era of Decolonization, 1956-1974* (Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 5–20.

<sup>478</sup> Carol Anderson, *Eyes off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

<sup>479</sup> Linda Heywood et al., *African Americans in U.S. Foreign Policy: From the Era of Frederick Douglass to the Age of Obama*, (Urbana; Chicago; Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 2015), Kindle edition, Chapter 7; Thomas L. Damion, *Globetrotting: African American Athletes and Cold War Politics* (Urbana; Chicago; Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 2012).

<sup>480</sup> Thruston B. Morton, Assistant Secretary of State, to Hugh J. Addonizio, House of Representatives, March 2, 1954, 511.00/2-2354, Box 2249, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>481</sup> "Dobici," *Vjesnik*, Oct. 17, 1948, 4; Velizar Savić, "Njujork – «grad» čuda i njegova stvarnost," *Borba*, Jan. 30, 1947, 4.

<sup>482</sup> The U.S. Supreme Court decision ended the system of segregation in schools in 1954. While American legal history often discussed *Brown* as unrelated to the Cold War, Mary Dudziak discovered how the Justice Department's instructions in the *Brown Case* argued that school segregation undermined U.S.

*Pregled* articles and the *Voice*'s broadcastings in Yugoslavia evidence such a USIA agenda. Certainly, these two communication channels were the most suitable for their audience pool and impact. Indeed, according to a 1961 VOA survey, 69 percent of all Yugoslav listeners turned to the *Voice* at least once a week; whilst between 1965 and 1966 *Pregled* had a monthly distribution of 32,000 copies.<sup>484</sup> Even though the Yugoslav regime never took advantage officially of the problem of U.S. racial relations (at least not after 1950), USIS in Yugoslavia saw it as a major blot on U.S. society and a litmus test for America's sincerity. The USIA "civil rights" campaign started much earlier than the first civil rights protest ever took place; indeed, it was in 1952 when the American post distributed 35,000 copies of the *Negroes in America* (Crnci u Americi) pamphlet in order to dismantle the "prevalent misconceptions" on "persecution of the colored people of the South." Soon, USIS called June Davis, an African-American Fulbright scholar in Slavic languages, from London to Zagreb University for a two-months summer session and used the *Voice* "to carry special commentaries on the colored problem."<sup>485</sup>

### 3.3.1 The Voice of America Reports...

Much before the *Brown Case* escalation, VOA paid high attention to African-American history and to their contribution to U.S. society and to American education, science, sports, music and social welfare. In May 1950, the broadcast "Outstanding Negroes of the United States" outlined:

Of the hundreds of national and racial groups that compose the people of the United States, few have contributed more to the enrichment of the country than the Negro. Almost every field of

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prestige, hence harming U.S. foreign relations. By grappling with Cold War concerns, the Supreme Court pushed for formal legal change to aid the U.S. image abroad (Mary L. Dudziak, "Brown as a Cold War Case," *The Journal of American History* 91, no. 1 (June 2004): 32–42).

<sup>483</sup> "Kukluksklanovski apostol proglašen krivim," *Borba*, Aug. 4, 1957, 4.

<sup>484</sup> Memorandum from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Jan. 27, 1967, YO6601, Box 41, Africa, Eastern Europe and Multi-Areas, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP. As a point of comparison, the USIA magazines *Amerika* for the Soviet Union and *Ameryka* for Poland were printed in, respectively, 50,000 and 30,000 copies (Marsha Siefert, "From Cold War to Wary Peace: American Culture in the USSR and Russia," and Antonszek and Delaney, "Poland: Transmissions and Translations," in *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism After 1945*, ed. Alexander Stephan (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007), 191, 223; Yugoslav Reactions to Western Broadcasting, July 5, 1961, RN-15-61, Box 4, Research Notes 1958-1962, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>485</sup> Despatch 482 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Dec. 22, 1952, 511.68/12-2252, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP and *Crnci u Americi* enclosed in Despatch 482.

endeavor is represented among the Negro men and women of achievement and their names [...] have become household words throughout the land.<sup>486</sup>

Personalities such as Booker T. Washington, Mary McLeod Bethune, scientist George Washington Carver, New York State Representative Clayton Powell Jr., Langston Hughes and Richard Wright in literature, then jazz and blues artists, were named as worthy symbols of the American nation.<sup>487</sup> The VOA broadcasts gave voice to the Negro Theater in Harlem and Brooklyn,<sup>488</sup> while Jazz Notes regularly figured as one of the features of the VOA broadcast “Arts in the USA.”<sup>489</sup> Each month, “Negroes in the News” reported on African-American achievements in U.S. society. It provided information such as “William Gordon wins Nieman Fellowship for study at Harvard University,” or “Negroes in training awarded over \$330,000 by National Medical Fellowship,”<sup>490</sup> or “Blind honors student wins Root-Tilden scholarship for law study at New York University.”<sup>491</sup> On a regular basis, it reported the success of African-American artists in the motion picture industry, such as “Dorothy Dandridge – popular night club singer selected for starring role in [...] *See How They Run*.”<sup>492</sup> Such articles provided proof to the Yugoslav public of the advancing integration of African-Americans in U.S. society and in its fields of education, banking, the business sector, as well as in public and civil services, and the arts.

When in January 1953, the VOA endorsed the “Negro History Week” initiative – held throughout the United States from February 8 to 15 (sponsored by churches, schools, colleges, community agencies and study groups), it was to reveal not only the progress of civil rights in the United States, but also to reflect “the spirit of American

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<sup>486</sup> Outstanding Negroes of the United States, May 25, 1950, 356, Box 1, Library Reference Reports, USIA Voice of America, RG 306, NACP: 1.

<sup>487</sup> Ibid, 1-10.

<sup>488</sup> Reports on the Arts n. 46, Aug. 16, 1951, Box 3, Library Reference Reports, USIA Voice of America, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>489</sup> Reports on the Arts n. 66, Jan. 10, 1952, Box 3, Library Reference Reports, USIA Voice of America, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>490</sup> Negroes in the news n. 10, July 15, 1952, Box 4, Library Reference Reports, USIA Voice of America, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>491</sup> Negroes in the news n. 11, July 29, 1952, Box 4, Library Reference Reports, USIA Voice of America, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>492</sup> Negroes in the News n. 15, Sept. 26, 1952, Box 4, Library Reference Reports, USIA Voice of America, RG 306, NACP.

democratic ideals in action.”<sup>493</sup> So the VOA provided stories about courageous African-American men and women, and initiatives such as “the National Council of Negro Women,” which, according to its director Dorothy Ferebee, “is proud to add its influence and resources to [...] that struggle for equality of status, which will permit women [...] their true influence in the quest for universal peace.”<sup>494</sup> The broadcasts on “Negro” culture not only fought the traditional communist propaganda on Americans as “cultural barbarians,” but helped the United States government in its global propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union and its communist allies. The latter widely reported and successfully exploited the racial tension and violence that accompanied the rise of the Civil Rights movement in the United States – especially after *Brown vs. Board of Education* and the 1958 Little Rock events – as a blatant example of hypocrisy on the part of a nation that claimed to be a leader in the free world.<sup>495</sup>

### **3.3.2 *Pregled* Reports...: Lessons on Democracy, Freedom, and Emancipation**

As Mary Dudziak revealed, “from 1946 throughout the mid-1960s, the federal government engaged in a sustained effort to tell a particular story about race and American democracy: a story of the triumph of good over evil, a story of U.S. moral superiority.”<sup>496</sup> *Pregled*’s role in forming Yugoslav public opinion on the African-American struggle was invaluable. It attested that democracy in America was leading to social justice even though the struggle was hard, and confirmed that democratic change, however, slow and painful, was superior to the Soviet’s dictatorial approach. The key figure of such historical narrative was Abraham Lincoln, the “Emancipator,” an illustrious, courageous man who kept alive the American Revolution and liberated the slaves.<sup>497</sup> Speeches on the African-American struggle were often introduced by citing Lincoln’s famous Gettysburg speech of 1863: “our fathers brought forth on this

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<sup>493</sup> Negroes in the news n. 23, Jan. 30, 1953, Box 6, Library Reference Reports, USIA Voice of America, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>494</sup> Negroes in the news n. 28, April 15, 1953, Box 7, Library Reference Reports, USIA Voice of America, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>495</sup> Penny Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 92–95.

<sup>496</sup> Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*, 13.

<sup>497</sup> Harvey Wish, “Linkoln i prava čoveka,” *Pregled*, Feb. 1959, 11–14.

continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.”<sup>498</sup> In *Pregled*'s articles, the African-Americans' battle for liberty and equality, was actually the endless American Revolution. As in the words of President Johnson:

We are the children of the Revolution. [...] The history of America is a history of a revolution still going on today. This revolution has conquered this continent and expanded democracy. [...] Our achievements have raised hopes and aspirations of people all over the world for a better life. Our political ideas have helped 'freedom' to become a shared symbol of people gathering in every part of the world.<sup>499</sup>

Historical accounts on the African-American struggle against slavery and inequality usually started by narrating the arrival of the first Dutch ship in Jamestown (Virginia) in 1619 and continued by the “happy ending” of the Proclamation of Emancipation in 1863.<sup>500</sup> The 14th and 15th amendments were portrayed as the continuation of this story. Then things got worse when in the late 19th century the Supreme Court reversed the Proclamation with *Plessy vs. Ferguson* (1896) by establishing the “separate but equal” rule. Nonetheless, the *Pregled* articles related a better turn of events in the 20th century with the foundation of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Urban League Supreme Court victories, with the New Deal and Roosevelt's Black Cabinet, during the Second World War, and, finally, with the Supreme Court *Brown vs. Board of Education* verdict in 1954.<sup>501</sup> From time to time, *Pregled* evidenced the advancement of African-Americans in U.S. society, their entrance in government, and the desegregation of airports, schools, public restrooms, restaurants, hotels, and public fountains. There were quotations by Roy Wilkins, the secretary of NAACP, affirming that “in the field of civil rights, the black position is evolving so completely, that it can only make progress toward full equality.”<sup>502</sup> The segregationist community of the United States was – according to *Pregled* – made up of a small and gradually declining minority. The integrationists included the younger generation and educated people, even in the Deep South. In the civil rights struggle, good news were from the United States: the protests, the sit-ins,

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<sup>498</sup> Harvey Wish, “Linkoln – Emancipator,” *Pregled*, Aug./Sept. 1965, 8.

<sup>499</sup> “Lindon Bejns Džonson govorio o ‘moralnom zadatku Amerike’,” *Pregled*, April 1965, 23.

<sup>500</sup> Arthur E. Sutherland, “Ustavna prava rasnih manjina,” *Pregled*, Dec. 1965, 22.

<sup>501</sup> “Stalna borba za građanska prava,” *Pregled*, Feb. 1959, 32–36.

<sup>502</sup> “Građanska prava integracija,” *Pregled*, Dec. 1961, 34.

and the occupations of public segregated places, the court victories of the NAACP, were widespread and overwhelming.<sup>503</sup>

Crucially, two other figures played a key role in affirming the truth and faithfulness of the American fight for democracy and equality: Martin Luther King Jr. and John F. Kennedy.<sup>504</sup> Both of them were seen as symbols of the fight for freedom, and strong and determined enemies of racial inequality. *Pregled* covered the events of the 1963 “March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom”, which culminated in Martin Luther King’s famous “I have a dream” speech. Stories about the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the National Women’s Committee on Civil Rights (NWCCR) were eagerly followed to show that racial equality would soon be achieved.<sup>505</sup> Certainly, it is very difficult to assess to what extent the USIA/USIS presentations of the African-American desegregation struggle was successful in convincing its public, due to the absence of any U.S. or Yugoslav contemporary surveys on the issue. However, one survey report might be helpful in decoding the impact of these messages: in 1961, thirty Yugoslav refugees in Germany were asked to name the negative aspects of American life; the most common answers were “gangsters” and “absence of social welfare provisions,” but with no mention of the racial question.<sup>506</sup>

### 3.4 A New Plan for the 1960s: The Yugoslav Press Law and the USIA Leaders ‘Shift’

In his inauguration address on January 20 1961, John F. Kennedy argued that “the same revolutionary beliefs for which our forbearers fought are still at issue around the globe,” and stressed that “the energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring [...] will enkindle our country and all who serve it – and the glow from that fire can truly light the world.”<sup>507</sup> Such a doctrine, (adopted by both his predecessor Eisenhower and his successor Johnson), relied on the presumption that the American-style institutions and

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<sup>503</sup> “Položaj crnaca danas,” *Pregled*, Jan. 1961, 48–52; “Predlog zakona o građanskim pravima će uskoro biti iznet na glasanje,” *Pregled – mesečne novosti*, June 1964, 25–26.

<sup>504</sup> Arthur J. Jr. Schlesinger, “Džon Ficdžerald Kenedi,” *Pregled*, Nov. 1964, 35–38.

<sup>505</sup> Shirley Smith, “Žena u borbi za građanska prava,” *Pregled*, Jan. 1965, 39–40.

<sup>506</sup> Yugoslav Refugee Attitudes, April 2, 1962, RN-10-62, Box 4, Research Notes 1958-1962, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>507</sup> Robert G. Torricelli and Andrew Carroll, *In Our Own Words: Extraordinary Speeches of the American Century* (Kodansha America, 1999), 222–223.

values and the free market, would enable other nations to become more prosperous, modern, stable, and friendly.<sup>508</sup>

Both Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, looked at the Cold War as a long-term struggle and a paradigm for international relations. But, in the same way, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson embraced a stronger “exuberant activism”.<sup>509</sup> Kennedy’s close advisers believed that Eisenhower’s foreign policy establishment was slow moving, bloated and unwieldy. The new President resolved to “cut back the National Security Council staff” as the main national security decision making body, and to rely on more direct contacts with individual departments and task forces.<sup>510</sup> Furthermore, he thought that Eisenhower and Secretaries Dulles and Herter had all but ceded the newly emerging states in Latin America, Asia, and Africa to the communists. However, Kennedy’s strategy of “flexible response,” was a reaction to Eisenhower’s deterrent strategy which, in Kennedy’s opinion, relied too heavily on the threatened use of nuclear power to achieve its goals. Flexibility was necessary to “extend the means available to deter undesirable shifts in the balance of power.”<sup>511</sup> By initiating the creation of the volunteer Peace Corps, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the inter-American Alliance for Progress, Kennedy proved his flexible strategy to be efficacious, especially when in 1963 he signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, accepted by both the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, his presidency was hardly stroke by the intelligence fiasco of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, a U.S. supported military action carried out by anti-Castro Cuban exiles; his Vienna Summit talks with Khrushchev which henceforth saw the escalation of the bipolar struggle in the aftermath of Berlin’s Wall erection; and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.<sup>512</sup>

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<sup>508</sup> According to Frank Costigliola, such doctrine “incorporated elements of John Winthrop’s 1630 dream of a model ‘city upon a hill’; mid-nineteenth century faith in manifest destiny; and twentieth century confidence in U.S. superiority in production, technology, and societal institutions,” as Woodrow Wilson’s ideology of mission to the rest of the world (Frank Costigliola, “US Foreign Policy from Kennedy to Johnson,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, vol. 2, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 114.

<sup>509</sup> Costigliola, “US Foreign Policy from Kennedy to Johnson,” 112.

<sup>510</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), Kindle edition, 3827-3829.

<sup>511</sup> Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 3909-3911.

<sup>512</sup> James N. Giglio and Stephen G. Rabe, *Debating the Kennedy Presidency* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); Philip A. Goduti, *Kennedy’s Kitchen Cabinet and the Pursuit of Peace: The Shaping of American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963* (McFarland, 2009); Charles Kenney, *John F. Kennedy: The Presidential*

The bipolar struggle reflected on Yugoslav-U.S. foreign relations which had to balance between the two superpowers. In early September 1961, Tito gathered in Belgrade India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru; Indonesia's first president, Sukarno; Egypt's second president, Gamal Abdel Nasser; Ghana's first president Kwame Nkrumah and twenty other state delegations. Opened just two weeks after the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Soviet Yuri Gagarin's space success, the First Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade only impacted Washington's anti-communist moods.<sup>513</sup> Tito's anti-Western and anti-American conference speech left Ambassador Kennan constrained: "Tito's statements on Berlin and on Soviet resumption of tests came as a deep disappointment [...]. Passage on Berlin contains no word that could not have been written by Khrushchev; and that on [Soviet resumption of nuclear testing], is weaker and more pro-Soviet than even those of Nasser and Nkrumah."<sup>514</sup> Kennan suggested Washington should carefully reflect "on its implications for our treatment of conference and, in more long-term, our attitude towards role of Yugoslavs."<sup>515</sup> But then, Secretary Rusk and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Kohler, especially after Kohler's reassuring meeting with Ambassador Marko Nikezić on October 19, calmed the waters, so that the pragmatic line seemed to win.<sup>516</sup>

Nonetheless, voices contrary to U.S. softness towards Yugoslavia urged the stopping of economic aid, and anti-communist hard-liners in Congress and Senate prevailed. On June 6, 1962, during the Aid Act voting, the U.S. Senate adopted the Frank Lausche (D-Ohio) amendment which restricted U.S. economic aid to all communist dominated countries, including Poland and Yugoslavia. On June 12, the House's Ways and Means Committee, while considering the Kennedy administration's

*Portfolio: History as Told Through the Collection of the John F. Kennedy Library and Museum* (PublicAffairs, 2000); Theodore Sorensen, *John F. Kennedy and Europe*, ed. Douglas Brinkley and Richard T. Griffiths (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1999).

<sup>513</sup> Tvrtko Jakovina, *Treća Strana Hladnog Rata* (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2011), 50–61; Bogetić, *Jugoslavensko-američki odnosi 1961.-1971.*, 30–34.

<sup>514</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State, September 3, 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XVI, doc. 93, 202–204; "Text of the Final Declaration of the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Nations," *The New York Times*, September 7, 1961.

<sup>515</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State, September 3, 1961.

<sup>516</sup> Letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Kennan), Oct. 19, 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XVI, doc. 102, 212–216; Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia, October 20, 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XVI, doc. 105, 220–222; David L. Larson, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Yugoslavia: 1943-1963* (University Press of America, 1979), 292–302.

request for widened authority to negotiate trade agreements, reported legislation (H.R. 1818) that included a provision withdrawing the most-favored-nation (MFN) status from Poland and Yugoslavia. The bill passed the House on June 28 by a vote of 298 to 125.<sup>517</sup> Foreign Secretary Popović and Ambassador Nikezić rushed to meet Rusk, who was also unpleasantly surprised, since the MFN retreat “was contrary to the wishes of the Administration.”<sup>518</sup> Between 1961 and 1963, the Cold War “breeze” imposed on relations between Belgrade and Washington; Veljko Mićunović, appointed as Ambassador in Washington in October 1962, in his meeting with Rusk underlined “Yugoslavia’s sense of bewilderment and consternation,” since “great political damage had been done to Yugoslavia’s international reputation and prestige.”<sup>519</sup> The State Department interpreted Brezhnev’s most cordial visit to Tito in October 1962, and Tito’s visit to Moscow in December, to be a result of U.S.-Yugoslav distancing.<sup>520</sup> It was Tito’s first official visit to the United States on October 17, 1963 (Kennedy’s last meeting with a foreign statesman, a month before his assassination), and the Senator’s Fulbright visit to Yugoslavia only two days after the Johnson election in November 1964, that rebalanced reciprocal relations and reaffirmed a pragmatic standpoint.<sup>521</sup>

### 3.4.1 Applying and Resisting the Yugoslav Press Law

*There are members of the League of Communists that do not take enough care and fall into this error and are not able to take a proper attitude toward foreign propaganda and foreigners [...] first of all the communists have to clean up their positions.*<sup>522</sup>

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<sup>517</sup> The most-favored-nation (MFN) is a status or level of treatment accorded by one state to another in international trade, which means the recipient of the treatment must, nominally, receive equal trade advantages as the “most favored nation” by the country granting such treatment. MFN allows smaller countries, in particular, to participate in the advantages that larger countries often grant to each other. For Yugoslavia in 1962, the retraction of MFN meant doubling or trebling import tariffs on Yugoslav export commodities.

<sup>518</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, June 12, 1962, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XVI, doc. 129, 273–274; Bogetić, *Jugoslavensko-američki odnosi 1961.-1971.*, 74–76.

<sup>519</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, October 23, 1962, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XVI, doc. 139, 290–292.

<sup>520</sup> Bogetić, *Jugoslavensko-američki odnosi 1961.-1971.*, 85.

<sup>521</sup> Bogetić, *Jugoslavensko-američki odnosi 1961.-1971.*, 139–162. In the aftermath of the Kennedy-Tito meeting, Congress withdrew the MFN restrictions towards Yugoslavia (152). See also, John R. Lampe, Russell O. Prickett, and Ljubiša S. Adamović, *Yugoslav-American Economic Relations since World War II* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 68–69.

<sup>522</sup> Izveštaj o preduzetim merama u pogledu inostrane propagande i odnosa prema strancima, Jan. 24, 1962, 2-6, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

*After the publication of the Law, there were attempts to resist it because they could not comprehend that they no longer had the liberties they enjoyed before. [...] Foreign reading rooms cannot give courses of foreign languages anymore because, for this purpose, we have specific institutions in town. [...] Because of a certain liberalism and lack of understanding for the seriousness of the problem, a number of communists did not realize what they actually needed to do, how to behave, what to take into account and how to prevent certain phenomena. Towards members of the SK who continued to visit the reading rooms, receive foreign propaganda publications and participated in various competitions of foreign radio stations, strong partisan measures were taken. Such measures continue to be taken....*<sup>523</sup>

The 1961-1963 “freezing” biennium hardly hit the USIA-USIS mission. But a negative reversal of the U.S. cultural missions in Yugoslavia likewise resulted from a bolder Yugoslav non-aligned positioning, since Tito’s anti-colonialist speech at the UN 15th General Assembly in New York in September 1960.<sup>524</sup> In the 1960s, Yugoslav foreign relations policymakers would persist in strengthening the non-aligned positioning as a new “nation-building” identity course.<sup>525</sup>

Both the American and Yugoslav archival sources demonstrate that the 1960 Yugoslav Press Law represents a point of *caesura* for the development of American propaganda on Yugoslav territory. The Second Plenum of the Party’s Central Committee,<sup>526</sup> held in November 1959, accused foreign “enemy propaganda” of operating in Yugoslavia through visits of foreigners to industrial and production plants, through Yugoslav citizens who undertook exchanges abroad and the activities of foreign cultural missions. The Yugoslav Press Law, affirmed a 1961 analysis, embodied the “measures for paralyzing and limiting these influences,” and prevented the “weaknesses of Yugoslav institutions” and “the lack of communist consciousness.”<sup>527</sup> Therefore in 1962, the Ideological Commission, responsible for administrating the propaganda activities for the Central Committee, brought up the issue of foreign propaganda at the highest level. In its final report, the Commission stressed the dual view of the party

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<sup>523</sup> Informacija o delatnosti strane propagande, May 3, 1962, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

<sup>524</sup> Jakovina, *Treća strana Hladnog rata*, 46.

<sup>525</sup> William Zimmerman, *Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia*, 3rd ed., Princeton Legacy Library (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).

<sup>526</sup> The acronym for this organization is CK SKJ, or otherwise Centralni Komitet Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije (Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia).

<sup>527</sup> O nekim vidovima neprijateljske propagande, June 5, 1961, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

leaders on foreign propaganda: some of them considered foreign influences as a weakening feature of Yugoslav political conjecture, while others regarded it as an internal problem, but not as its source. In the opinion of the Commission, Yugoslav political and social developments were both the cause and consequence of the foreign propaganda operations. Because of its non-alignment, Yugoslavia was an open community, therefore under attack by the “psychological warfare” of “block politics,” and by “moral pressure” that was exploiting its weaknesses in order to popularize and impose foreign values and lifestyles.<sup>528</sup> The 1966 SSRNJ Ideological Commission meeting, chaired by pro-Western diplomat Leo Mates, similarly expressed: “Our country has gradually liberalized its contacts with foreign countries and according to our Constitution precept Yugoslavia is a community open” to foreign influence.<sup>529</sup>

In order to combat foreign propaganda, the Ideological Commission appointed a permanent working group to the Commission for Political and Ideological-Educational Work of the Federal Board of the SSRNJ (Savezni odbor SSRNJ or SO SSRNJ).<sup>530</sup> Reflecting the grueling bilateral relations between the United States and Yugoslavia in the 1961-1962 biennium, many local Ideological Commissions of the League of Communists of Serbia (Savez Komunista Srbije, SKS) of Belgrade’s surrounding municipalities, vividly discussed the impact of counterpropaganda measures and the outcome of the Press Law. Savski Venac, Zvezdara, Palilula, Zemun, Stari Grad, Vračar, Novi Beograd, Voždovac, took almost universal positions and agreed to develop systematic activities to counter react. They criticized the “film and

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<sup>528</sup> Zapisnik sa sastanka Komisije za ideološki rad CK SKJ, June 1, 1962, II/2-b-(162-169) K-10, Box 10, Ideološka komisija VIII, Centralni komitet SKJ (CK SKJ), RG 507, AJ.

<sup>529</sup> Informacija sa savetovanja o političkom radu i stanju informiranosti po pitanjima međunarodne situacije i naše spoljne politike, May 21, 1966, Box 256, Komisija za politički i idejno-vaspitni rad 1966, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 3, 9. Interestingly, Mates affirmed that foreign influence could be defeated by the melioration of the standard of life of Yugoslav workers’.

<sup>530</sup> O nekim vidovima stranog uticaja u našoj zemlji, June 20, 1962, II/2-b-(162-169) K-10, Box 10, Ideološka komisija VIII, CK SKJ, RG 507, AJ. Besides this Commission, other institutions and agencies dealt with foreign propaganda in Yugoslavia: the SSUP, DSIP and the Federal Secretariat for Information, the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Secretariat for Education of SIV, the Office of Technical Assistance, and the Center for Scientific and Technical Movies. Their representatives were grouped in the Coordination Council for Information Activities (Kordinacioni savet za informativnu delatnost) established in the DSIP (Informacija o problemima vezanim za inostranu propagandu u našoj zemlji, April 15, 1966, 16/2-1966, Box 256, Komisija za politički i idejno-vaspitni rad 1966, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ).

entertainment press for spreading a foreign way of life, mentality and traditions,”<sup>531</sup> and the lack of critical appraisal of young people towards foreign artists and cultural workers. They urged the representatives of *Avala-film*, *Kolo*, *Interfarm*, *Metropola*, *Jugoinvest*, *Automobil-Beograd* and all the other Belgrade enterprises, to establish a more severe regulative stance to foreign visitors.<sup>532</sup> Finally, they insisted that all the bulletins, publications and press sent by foreign Embassies or cultural posts be returned to senders or destroyed.<sup>533</sup> The University Committee expressed an equally critical attitude and, in order to prevent these “dangerous activities,” purchased TVs and technical books, they “instructed students to avoid the foreign reading rooms,”<sup>534</sup> and obliged foreign professors and students on exchanges, wishing to lecture at the University, to ask the Rectorate and Secretariat for approval.<sup>535</sup>

Among all the cultural missions, Yugoslav authorities recorded the American one to be the most resistant in accepting the new regulations. In the following months, the USIS officers insisted in contacting the movie users directly,<sup>536</sup> and were very tenacious in sending propaganda materials to Yugoslav industrial plants, even after several had been returned.<sup>537</sup> Furthermore, when the Yugoslav authorities denied certain amendments for the application of the law, and to prevent the financial supervision by the Secretariat of Information, the USIS transferred its financial sector to the Embassy. Henceforth, after USIS and Yugoslavia signed a new agreement on June 14, 1961, the

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<sup>531</sup> Informacija o aktivnosti OK SKS Savski Venac, July 14, 1961, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

<sup>532</sup> Informacija o merama OK Palilula, July 17, 1961, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

<sup>533</sup> Informacija Opštinskog komiteta SKS Voždovac, July 1961, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB. See also: Informacija o preduzetim merama Opštinski komitet SKS Zvezdara, July 14, 1961; Informacija o merama OK Vračar, July 14, 1961; Informacija o preduzetim merama protiv strane i neprijateljske propagande OK Zemun, July 15, 1961; Informacija o merama OK Novi Beograd, July 15, 1961, locate in Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

<sup>534</sup> O uticaju strane propagande (Informacija UK SKS), July 17, 1961, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

<sup>535</sup> Informacija Univerzitetskog komiteta SKS o rešavanju pitanja uticaja strane propagande na univerzitetu, Jan. 18, 1962, 02-167, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

<sup>536</sup> Informacija o delatnosti strane propagande, Feb. 2, 1962, 232, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB: 19–20.

<sup>537</sup> Informacija o nekim pitanjima u vezi strane propagande, Jan. 20, 1962, 02-19, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

number of registered USIS officers dropped from 108 to 22.<sup>538</sup> Besides demanding separation from the diplomatic mission, the Press Law removed the posts from diplomatic immunity and extraterritoriality. Public Officer, Walter Roberts, who arrived in Belgrade in the spring of 1960, recalled in this way the negotiations in the aftermath of the law's approbation:

If you read that press law from A to Z, it meant the end of USIS, [but not] of the British Council, because as you know the British Council [was] a non-governmental organization. They had to register and were as a Yugoslav incorporated organization. USIS could never have done that. I personally was convinced that my days were numbered, [...] because the press law denied diplomatic status to any information, or cultural program. In other words, it denied diplomatic status to the relationship with the Yugoslav people. And of course, we bitterly protested, but in vain. [...] We then started negotiations about how to make our program livable. And in the course of it, we used certain gimmicks, like putting an American resident in Belgrade in charge of our library. And as weeks and the months went by, the Yugoslavs became less interested in enforcing it. So within a year or so, we were back to where we were before.<sup>539</sup>

At that juncture, USIS resisted and, both in Zagreb and Belgrade, remained united to the Embassy and Consulate until 1998<sup>540</sup> also thanks to ambassador Kennan who “talked to Tito about [the Press Law and] wanted that law to become a non-law.”<sup>541</sup> As a result of political lobbying and eager audience interests, USIS activities in the 1960s continued on an uprising current. Compared to other foreign centers, USIS distributed a

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<sup>538</sup> Neka pitanja informativne-propagandne delatnosti SAD u FNRJ, Oct. 24, 1962, Box 240, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ.

<sup>539</sup> Mark Taplin, “Global Publicks: Walter Roberts: U.S. Public Diplomacy in Yugoslavia -- ‘We Had Quite a Program There,’” accessed February 22, 2016, <http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-roberts-us-public-diplomacy-in.html>. Walter Roberts (1916-2014) is one of the most prominent figures of the U.S. public diplomacy history. He was U.S. diplomat and scholar, involved early on in VOA radio broadcasts to Nazi Germany during World War II. He held, afterwards, important positions within the U.S. government as the Deputy Area Director for Europe in the newly created USIA (1953); member of the U.S. Delegation to the Austrian Treaty Talks (1955); long-term supporter, Senior Fellow and board member of the Salzburg Seminar for American Studies (nowadays Salzburg Global Seminar); Counselor for Public Affairs (PAO) at the American Embassy in Yugoslavia (1960-1966) and U.S. Mission to the UN in Geneva, Switzerland (1967-1969); Deputy Associate Director of USIA (1969); and executive director of the Board for International Broadcasting which oversaw Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (1975-1985). Both George H.W. Bush (1991) and William J. Clinton (1994), appointed Roberts as a member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. In 2001, Roberts co-founded the Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication and the Public Diplomacy Council. He wrote *Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies 1941-1945* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 1973), the first historical “best-seller” on the Tito-Mihailović talks of March 1943, banned in Yugoslavia for several decades.

<sup>540</sup> Status američke čitaonice, Nov. 25, 1962, Box 240, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ; IRC Belgrade, E-mail message to the author, June 16, 2015.

<sup>541</sup> Mark Taplin, “Global Publicks: Walter Roberts: George Kennan and Public Diplomacy -- ‘Basically, George Kennan Was an Old-Line Diplomat,’” accessed February 22, 2016, <http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-roberts-george-kennan-and-public.html>.

record number of printed materials (2,680,000 of 3,727,160 foreign distributions in 1965); it frequently conducted mail public opinion surveys (seen as extremely irritating for Yugoslav's ideological commissions), and *Pregled* had the highest circulation among all foreign publications in Yugoslavia.<sup>542</sup>

But besides the Press Law, from the early 1960s Yugoslav authorities engaged in other forms of coercive policies towards the USIS posts and their users. The situation escalated in early 1961. On May 19, a part-time USIS employee of Novi Sad was called in by local Interior authorities and warned that some of his duties (like carrying the *Daily Bulletin* from Novi Sad station to the reading room) constituted "a criminal act." Ambassador Kennan, waiting for the settlement of the Press Law question, advised them to discontinue temporarily the *Bulletin* for Novi Sad and instructed the post not to lend films or projectors. Meanwhile, the Interior authorities questioned the Yugoslav Assistant of the Cultural Attaché Office in a two-hour interview. On June 6, "a local employee at the reading room in Belgrade observed individuals [...] identified as «plain clothes men» from the Interior who have appeared from time to time in the past, when there had been reason to give extra protection."<sup>543</sup> On June 8, Kennan decided to close temporarily the posts because of the absence "of firm assurance from Yugoslav authorities that continued operation of American reading rooms [...] would be regarded by them [...] as not contravening Yugoslav law."<sup>544</sup> This highly embarrassing situation stopped when both parts signed the new agreement between USIS and the Yugoslav government on June 14 1961.<sup>545</sup>

Tensions resurged again in 1962, when the Municipal Committee of Palilula strongly criticized a Belgrade professor and Party member, whose wife was employed at the American Embassy, for receiving the American publications by mail.<sup>546</sup> In January 1962, a telegraphist of Belgrade's train station was stopped and severely criticized

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<sup>542</sup> Informacija o problemima vezanim za inostranu propagandu u našoj zemlji, April 15, 1966, 16/2-1966, Box 256, Komisija za politički i idejno-vaspitni rad 1966, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ.

<sup>543</sup> Telegram 1004 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, June 6, 1961, 511.682/6-661, Box 1074, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>544</sup> Telegram 1008 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, June 7, 1961, 511.682/6-761, Box 1074, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>545</sup> Neka pitanja informativne-propagandne delatnosti SAD u FNRJ, Oct. 24, 1962, Box 240, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ.

<sup>546</sup> Informacija o merama preuzete na teritoriju OK Palilule, 1962, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

“because he participated in a prize contest of the American reading room.” The same report described how two Party members, employees of the Belgrade Graphic Institute, have declared themselves to be frequent visitors of the American Library just “to see what is written in their press.” But since they were “non-politically influential,” the Municipal Committee of Savski Venac decided not to punish them.<sup>547</sup>

Another “informal” restriction arose two months later, when Danilo Pejović, a philosophy professor at Zagreb University,<sup>548</sup> a Party member and Djilas political sympathizer, was warned by UDBA to stop contacting the USIS Zagreb officers<sup>549</sup> and prohibited to have luncheons with Ambassador Kennan if not via visits of protocol.<sup>550</sup> In June another incident occurred, this time when Tomislav Kuzmanović, an art student at the Sarajevo University and frequent visitor of the Consulate’s magazine facilities, was called to a four-hour session with faculty members of the SKJ. He was strictly warned against further use of American magazines among other students, because the exhibition of *House and Garden*, *Holiday*, *Look*, and *Arts* would “make [students] prone to make comparisons between life in Yugoslavia and life in the United States,” hence making them more dissatisfied.<sup>551</sup>

Censorship practices based on the Press Law applied to American publications as well. On January 29 1963, Branko Karadjole, the Assistant Director of DSUP for the

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<sup>547</sup> Informacija o aktivnosti OK SKS Savski Venac po pitanjima kontaktiranja naših institucija i građanima sa strancima i delovanju inostranih propagandnih ustanova, Jan. 22, 1962, 59, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB: 6–7.

<sup>548</sup> Danilo Pejović spent nine months on a Ford grant at the New York University with his wife in 1960/1961 and, according to his testimony to the USIS officers in Zagreb, “since their return, [they] have been more unhappy then before (Airgram 30 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, April 17, 1962, 868.43/4-1762, Box 2708, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP).

<sup>549</sup> Airgram 30 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, April 17, 1962, 868.43/4-1762, Box 2708, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>550</sup> In his last conversation with General Consul Joseph Godson, Pejović underlined how the Consulate “office telephones [were] tapped and all [...] mail inside [the] country [...] opened.” While Godson concluded: “It was a sad meeting and an even sadder parting, a sharp reminder of unrelenting totalitarian police control of its citizens” (Airgram 47 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, June 12, 1962, 868.43/6-1262, Box 2708, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP).

<sup>551</sup> According to what Kuzmanović reported to the Consular officer, students at Sarajevo University were divided between the “Russians” and “Americans.” Yet, while shaken by the interview, Kuzmanović “retained sufficient courage to borrow two more Art magazines” (Despatch 122 from American Consulate Sarajevo to the Department of State, June 6, 1962, 511.682/6-662, Box 1074, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP).

Western Hemisphere,<sup>552</sup> called the Embassy political section warning them against some *Bilten* articles on Cuba published days before (and particularly Secretary Rusk's speech at Punta del Este from January 26), because it presented "controversial, slanted, and one-sided cold war material for broad public dissemination." The issue wasn't banned because it was the first violation of the law, but Karadjole requested more circumspection for the future.<sup>553</sup> Nevertheless, the sharpest restrictions applied to the Party members, since the "communists that participate[d] in the contests of foreign radio stations, or who receive[d] different gifts from foreigners or visit[ed] the foreign reading rooms," were expelled from the party lines.<sup>554</sup> Still, there were, in Walter Roberts memories, interesting moments of tangling with Yugoslav authorities, when they had a softer approach to the USIS, and even apologized:

We had a mailing list of our magazine called *Pregled*. One day, at some occasion, one of the Yugoslavs approached me and said: "Have you discontinued *Pregled*?" And I said, no, not at all. "Well, I didn't get my copy this month." Well, I said, give me your name and I'll see that a copy be sent to you. In the next two or three or four days, other people of the staff, both local employees and Americans, said they heard that *Pregled* was not distributed. So finally I came to the conclusion that *Pregled* was not sent out by the post office. So, I took my jacket and went to the Foreign Office. [...] And Mr. Milan Bulajić, who was the American desk officer said: "Out of question." I said, "No [...] it's a fact but let's find out what happened." One Sunday, a week later, [...] Milan came over to my house and he said: "I'm red-faced. I apologize. *Pregled* was thrown by the Ministry of the Interior into the Danube River. Lock, stock and barrel." We found out. But that was the only time.<sup>555</sup>

### 3.4.2 A New USIA Plan for Yugoslavia: Crafting the New Yugoslav Leadership

Wilson Dizard has well described the USIA's perennial failure to get full support and acceptance within the U.S. executive branch, Congress and Senate. The USIA's operations were surmounted by much favored psychological and secret operations,

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<sup>552</sup> DSUP, or otherwise Državni Sekretarijat za Unutrašnje Poslove, was the State Secretariat for Internal Affairs.

<sup>553</sup> Despatch 449 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, January 31, 1962, 511.682/1-3162, Box 1074, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>554</sup> Informacija o delatnosti strane propagande, May 3, 1962, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

<sup>555</sup> Mark Taplin, "Global Publicks: Walter Roberts: USIS Magazines and Exhibits in Yugoslavia - 'I'm Red-Faced. I Apologize,'" accessed February 22, 2016, <http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-roberts-isis-magazines-and.html>.

which excluded the information agency from policymaking.<sup>556</sup> George Allen's (1957-1960) and Edward Murrow's (1961-1964) USIA directorships shortly overturned these trends. By the time Allen left, the USIA had 202 posts in 85 countries; it employed 3,771 Americans and a further 6,881 foreign nationals while the VOA daily audience was around fifty million. The USIA director sat on the NSC, attended cabinet meetings, and by 1960 was meeting the President at the White House every three weeks. Allen's leadership gave a positive shift to the Agency by maintaining excellent relations with Congress, initiating jazz ambassadors to go abroad, and pushing for broader English teaching activities.<sup>557</sup> In January 1961, John F. Kennedy nominated journalist Edward R. Murrow to lead the USIA. Both of them were particularly concerned to renew the American image abroad using the power of new media communication channels such as the television.<sup>558</sup> In Murrow's years, the USIA played a role in major foreign policy stories such as Berlin, Cuba, Vietnam. The agency's research department careered under Leo Crespi, its polls found wide circulation and, every day, President Kennedy read the USIA's digest of world editorials. Nonetheless, Murrow's era demonstrated a growing incompatibility between the USIA and VOA, since Murrow expected the broadcasts to be able to manipulate its content as policy dictated. Executives left USIA "out of the loop" in one of the hardest covert actions of the U.S. government, the landings at the Bay of Pigs. According to Cull, "Murrow spent much of the next three years recovering

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<sup>556</sup> Wilson P. Dizard Jr., *Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 63–103.

<sup>557</sup> Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989*, (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 149–168; 186–188.

<sup>558</sup> Murrow was familiar with the power that television had in shaping public opinion and influencing policies: in the wake of the McCarthy purges in early 1954, as the anchorman of the CBS, he initiated the *See it Now* series (remembered for their "Good luck, and good night" closing) by which he contributed to discredit McCarthy's tactics in rooting out communist elements within the government. Some excellent depictions of the relationship between Cold War ideology and political culture, television documentary, and McCarthy's purges can be found in: Thomas Rosteck, *See It Now Confronts McCarthyism: Television Documentary and the Politics of Representation* (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University Alabama Press, 2005); Thomas Doherty, *Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Robert L. Ivie, "Diffusing Cold War Demagoguery: Murrow versus McCarthy on 'See It Now,'" in *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, by Martin J. Medhurst et al., (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997), 81–101; and Brian Thornton, "Published Reaction When Murrow Battled McCarthy," *Journalism History* 29, no. 3 (2003): 133–146. For a remarkable film interpretation of Murrow, see George Clooney, *Good Night, and Good Luck*, Drama, (2005).

from the implications of that single decision.”<sup>559</sup> Murrow believed the agency should not just inform but persuade, and personally oversaw propaganda operations during the most tense Cold War moments: Operation Mongoose (a covert program of sabotage of the Castro regime in Cuba), the disastrous Bay of Pigs incident, and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 (when the Soviet Union endeavored to build missile sites towards the United States on the Cuban island).<sup>560</sup>

Under Murrow’s directorship, the USIA produced the most ambitious Country Plan for Yugoslavia that predicted a radically different, leaders-oriented, cultural agenda. Approved in 1962 and released in 1963, the new USIA plan, crafted on the State Department’s *Guidelines of U.S. Policy and Operations for Yugoslavia*, emphasized the crucial role of the USIS posts in Yugoslavia in linking the country to the West. USIS objectives were to “influence the evolution of Yugoslavia’s political, economic, and social institutions along more democratic and humanistic lines and with increasing association with the West” (Objective B); and “to maintain and expand the channels of communication with the Yugoslav people and to use these channels to help them understand United States policies” (Objective D).<sup>561</sup>

Even though USIS activities were controlled by the Yugoslav 1960 Press Law, dissimilarly to other Eastern European countries, Yugoslavia presented a unique case since it permitted the USIS a relatively wide range of freedom. In addition, individual deregulations, temporary permits, and ad hoc negotiations, made the USIA’s job much easier. Since American representatives were strictly forbidden to disseminate information that reflected adversely on other countries, with the exception of “the diplomatic corps or circle of specified state leaders, organs and establishments,” the

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<sup>559</sup> 17th Review of Operations, USIA, July 1 - December 31, 1961, Box 1046, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 189–191.

<sup>560</sup> Wilson P. Dizard Jr., *Inventing Public Diplomacy*, 123–128. On Murrow’s use of covert propaganda programs within the USIA, see Gregory M. Tomlin, *Murrow’s Cold War: Public Diplomacy for the Kennedy Administration*, (Potomac Books - University of Nebraska Press, 2016).

<sup>561</sup> The other two objectives were also related to USIS activities in Yugoslavia, but had minor impact on policy execution. They were: “To assist Yugoslavia to build a firm, secure base of national independence and development, and to support the determination that Yugoslavia has shown to preserve and strengthen its national independence” (Objective A) and “To adopt courses of action bringing the United States maximum benefits from (a) the divisive effects of Yugoslavia’s independent status upon the international communist movement, and (b) the stimulus provided Soviet-dominated Eastern European governments by Yugoslavia’s example to seek greater freedom of action from Moscow in shaping their own policies and institutions” (Objective C) in Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963, January 30, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP: 1.

USIA new Country Plan took a sharp leader's directed path.<sup>562</sup> The new Plan established that:

- a) Yugoslav leaders and opinion molders were to be persuaded to promote objective information on the United States;
- b) USIS would enlarge its policy of cultural contacts with Yugoslav policymakers, mass media editors, and spokespersons;
- c) the government and intellectual leaders would become the U.S. priority target groups in Yugoslavia, and the goal of USIS to influence the Yugoslav leadership and, ultimately, adapt Tito's regime to Western values and standards.<sup>563</sup>

The Country Plan enlisted 2,000 Yugoslav leaders to whom the USIS would send unrestricted, "un-sanitized," U.S. bulletins. This group included parliamentarians and assemblymen (members of the Federal People's Assembly, of the Republican Assemblies and of the Assemblies of the Autonomous Regions); Executive Council leaders (members and secretaries of the Federal Executive Council and members of Republican Executive Councils); ministries, agencies, and commission leaders (officials of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, State Secretaries and Under-Secretaries, Republican Secretaries and Under-Secretaries, and Presidents and Secretaries of Commission and Committees at the Federal and Republican level); and press and information leaders (editorial boards of newspapers, radio, and television, both at federal and republican level).<sup>564</sup>

The new USIA Country Plan for Yugoslavia urged the enlargement and the realization of what would be major and subversive platforms of influence on the Yugoslav leaders, intellectuals, academics and opinion molders: the U.S. Leader's Exchange Program (from 1958) and the Fulbright agreement (signed in November

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<sup>562</sup> Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963 (Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963), January 30, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP: 1.

<sup>563</sup> As the Country Plan underlined, the Yugoslav leaders were "most likely to be influenced towards a true understanding of American systems and policies, and who, upon their return, are in a position to influence others" (Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963: 5).

<sup>564</sup> As in the 1950s, the general audience targets remained the youth, the managerial class, the press corps, the working class, the intellectual community and the professionals (scientists, doctors, lawyers, judges, and translators) (Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963, January 30, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP: 3, 6).

1964).<sup>565</sup> Indeed, while the Yugoslav Press Law intended to reduce USIS margins of freedom, it inspired a new shift towards a leader-oriented policy, with unpredictable and controversial outcomes in the decades to come.

### 3.4.3 The Yugoslav 1960s: Public Opinion, Leadership and the Experiment

*We will never be able to solve propaganda. It is an octopus with thousands of tentacles that adapts to certain circumstances. But we can do a lot if we lead our propaganda in the direction that will, in a certain way, paralyze what we don't want to [...] exist.*<sup>566</sup>

American propaganda continued to preoccupy Yugoslav policymakers even after the approval of the Press Law. They were aware that the Federation's gigantic bureaucracy and system of institutions, associations, organs, agencies, leagues, syndicates, councils, and committees, was impossible to entirely coordinate with the propaganda agenda.<sup>567</sup> Whilst they felt that much had been done on the juridical ground, they considered the trends to be intensifying, not diminishing. Very rightly, they suspected that sophisticated and long-term "permanent ideological influence" of American social norms, ideals, and moral concepts would orient young people and university students. They were irritated by the U.S.'s "considerable cultural arrangements with organizations and individuals," and by American cultural infiltration on TV, in the musical and entertainment press, film enterprises, and children's literature.<sup>568</sup> Against these penetrations, the Central Committee urged a stronger ideological battle.<sup>569</sup> It was necessary to "bring more order and intensify control,"

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<sup>565</sup> Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963: 4–7. As for the youth exchanges, the associations like the Experiment in International Living, the American Friend Service Committee, and The Four-H Club were particularly involved in such cultural programs.

<sup>566</sup> Magnetofonske beleške o propagandi, Oct. 28, 1968, Box 257, O inostranoj propagandi i idejno-političkom radu 1968-1970, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB: 16, 19.

<sup>567</sup> Zapisnik sa sednice Komisije za ideološka pitanja, Sept. 11, 1965, Box 209, Zapisnici i materijali ideološke komisije 1965-1967, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

<sup>568</sup> Zapisnik sa sednice Komisije za ideološka pitanja, Sept. 11, 1965, Box 209, Zapisnici i materijali ideološke komisije 1965-1967, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB: 2-5.

<sup>569</sup> Uloga i zadaci sredstava informacija u ostvarivanju aktualnih političkih zadataka - Aktualni politički pregled, 1968, n. 24, D-2950, Idejno-politička pitanja i ideološki rad, CK SKH, RG 1220, HDA: 7–13.

asserted the Executive Committee in 1967.<sup>570</sup> Nonetheless, under the veil of severe directives it seemed evident that the “opening of our country towards the foreign world, this circulation of people [made] our measures to be of limited impact.”<sup>571</sup>

The Yugoslav Press Law was modified several times during the 1960s: in 1966<sup>572</sup> and 1968, but no radical alteration was made to the articles regarding foreign propaganda. The 1968 amendments provided individual Yugoslav citizens the right to initialize a press publication, but expanded the motives for prohibition including the “attack on the social realities established by the Constitution, the social self-management, [...] and the violation of the honor and reputation of the nationalities of Yugoslavia.”<sup>573</sup> Such elusive definitions left the doors open for political manipulations and invisible boundaries of censorship.

The Yugoslav authorities were correct when fearing the influences of “American” ideas on Yugoslav young generations. An interview conducted on 30 Yugoslav refugees by the Italian Research Institute in 1960 and 1961, shows that these young male workers, mostly from the Yugoslav middle-income group, saw “freedom” in predominantly economic terms and the U.S. as an “example of a democratic country.” Their image of America was shaped by the American movies and the VOA broadcasts. They were indignant about the “absence of political rights and freedom [and] party control over life, and favoritism for party members” in Yugoslavia. But most of all, they

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<sup>570</sup> O nekim vidovima delovanja neprijateljskih elemenata i odnosu komunista prema tim pojavama – Sjednica Izvršnog komiteta CK SKJ, Oct. 10, 1967, D-2442, Idejno-politička pitanja i ideološki rad, CK SKH, RG 1220, HDA.

<sup>571</sup> Magnetofonske beleške o propagandi, Oct. 28, 1968, Box 257, O inostranoj propagandi i idejno-političkom radu 1968-1970, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB. In fact, these directives, published as *Explanations for the Application of Regulations in the Area of Foreign Propaganda* in 1968, provided a long list of juridical restraints: the foreign cultural missions were subject to the Secretariat of Information of the SIV, they had no diplomatic immunity, and all their financial management and the list of new books, publications, press, and musical recordings had to be reported to the Secretariat. They could organize film showings inside the information posts, but only after obtaining permission from the authorities (unlike the 1950s regulations, they could either invite personally or announce by poster, exclusively in the post spaces). Before film catalogs could be distributed to Yugoslav institutions, the posts had to request permission of the DSIP, while for outside exhibitions they needed the approval of the Secretariat of Information (Objašnjenja za primenu propisa u oblasti inostrane propagande, Sept. 1968, 36/1, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB).

<sup>572</sup> Savezni sekretarijat za informacije sekretaru drugu dr. Milivoju Rukavina, April 22, 1966, 05-1015/1, Box 565, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ.

<sup>573</sup> Informacija o dosadašnjem radu na pripremanju novog Zakona o štampi i drugim vidovima propagande, Jan. 24, 1968, 01/172, Box 565, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ.

depicted the American life with “Almost everyone has his home and television set,” “You live like a human being,” and “Freedom.”<sup>574</sup>

In 1964, the Institute of Social Science of Belgrade conducted a public opinion survey on the subject “Who is Yugoslavia’s best-friend country?” While the United States figured third after the Soviet Union and the UAR and India (a very high score given the political cautions that surrounded these surveys), the results displayed that the “younger the respondents, the more they favored the United States and other capitalist countries.” What is even more interesting, the majority of them responded that they were not politically active nor did they want to become members of the SKJ.<sup>575</sup> Between March 1968 and January 1969 a group of American and Yugoslav social scientists (the first from the Bureau of Applied Social Science, Columbia University and the second from the Institute of Social Science, Belgrade) joined in a collective research on the Yugoslav opinion leaders.<sup>576</sup> The findings were quite remarkable, as they demonstrated that the members of the federal governmental institutions had more “conformist” attitudes on economic development, less propensity for freedom of criticism and were less aware of public social criticism, while on the other hand, those who participated on the regional and local level of power were more likely to support freedom of criticism and more aware of the public moods. Perhaps the most remarkable finding of the study, however, was that in a socialist society operating under a one-party government, there was a wide range of opinions among influential people and that they enjoyed a high level of mass media output and involvement in policy advising.<sup>577</sup> Just a

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<sup>574</sup> Yugoslav Refugee Attitudes, April 2, 1962, RN-10-62, Box 4, Research Notes 1958-1962, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>575</sup> Jugoslavensko javno mnijenje o tome koja nam je zemlja najveći prijatelj, Nov. 4, 1964, Box 38, Series II-4-a (Političko stanje u zemlji), KPR, RG 837, AJBT.

<sup>576</sup> The interviewers included federal legislators, administrators, mass organization leaders from the SKJ, SSRNJ, SSJ, and SKOJ; directors of enterprises, economic planners and advisors in government; directors and chief editors of newspapers of the largest national circulation, of television networks, of radio stations, and publishing houses, leading journalists and commentators; and intellectuals such as university professors, editors, leading literary writers, theatrical and film directors and writers artists, for a total of 517 individuals occupying 569 of these positions. The top 20 positions, the President and the cabinet members, were excluded. An innovative and exhaustive critical examination of the intellectual origins of communications research in 20th-century America, with particular attention to the developing links between university campuses, the military, and the media industry perspective, can be found in Timothy Glander, *Origins of Mass Communications Research during the American Cold War: Educational Effects and Contemporary Implications* (Taylor & Francis, 2000).

<sup>577</sup> Yugoslav Opinion Leader Study, 1968-1969, YO6801, Box 41, Africa, Eastern Europe and Multi-Areas, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP. The difference in political attitudes

brief outlook on the public opinion studies regarding the Yugoslav leaders and youth indicates how Yugoslav society was profoundly changing in the 1960s. Without anticipating any correlation, it is noteworthy to underline that the USIS priority target for the 1960s was exactly the same groups of leaders included in the 1968-1969 research.

From early 1960s on, the Yugoslav press started improving in more objective news reporting, separated news from editorials, and were open to foreign press agencies like AP, UPI, Reuters, AFP, and USIS.<sup>578</sup> The pro-Western tendencies of Yugoslav journalists (mainly the younger generations), were recognized very early by the Ideological Commission of the Central Committee that criticized the acceptance by Yugoslav journalism of the market consumer mentality, the bourgeois aristocratism and the prevalence of interests in Western over Eastern countries.<sup>579</sup> Despite negative cyclical political actions against the American cultural missions, the perception of the USIS representatives when approaching lower ranked politicians and party administrators was constructive. In 1966, the USIS librarians undertook a large tour of the Yugoslav cities and national libraries in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Compared to receptions in the 1950s, USIS representatives felt “that an old and enduring ice was broken.” When they came to visit the National Library of Cetinje in Montenegro, Niko Martinović, the Library’s director and president of the Yugoslav Association of Librarians, made a public toast to USIS thanking them “for your help to all Yugoslav libraries over these years, [so] I thank you in my name, and in the name of my colleagues and in the name of all the Montenegrin people.”<sup>580</sup> Compared to the severe and stern rhetoric of many Yugoslav ideological commissions

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between higher and lower Yugoslav hierarchy has been acknowledged by a USIS officer in 1962: “we had been able to convince at least lower echelons in the hierarchy of the necessity of continued close cultural relations with the West. Indeed, we have evidence that leaders at the lower level exercised quite some influence on the higher echelon for he [Tito] later disavowed any anti-Western intentions” (Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963, January 30, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP).

<sup>578</sup> Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963, January 30, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>579</sup> O nekim vidovima stranog uticaja u našoj zemlji, June 20, 1962, II/2-b-(162-169) K-10, Box 10, Ideološka komisija VIII, CK SKJ, RG 507, AJ.

<sup>580</sup> Message 44 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Nov. 9, 1966, CUL 9, Box 56, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP.

(from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy), lower ranked politicians such as Niko Martinović, expressed a diametric standpoint.

These two perspectives, while deriving from different political backgrounds, represent in fact the experimentation of the Yugoslav way to socialism.<sup>581</sup> On the one hand, the highest-ranked politicians tried to rationalize the propaganda problems as a side-effect of the Yugoslav non-Aligned international policy; on the other, they identified a possible risk of the Western “infiltration” in Yugoslav society. While defining these practices as “antisocialist,”<sup>582</sup> they deemed that it was impossible to restrict the dissemination of “foreign propaganda” without Yugoslavia losing international prestige as an “open community.”<sup>583</sup> Nonetheless, the middle echelons perceived and looked for cooperation with the West from a mainly pragmatic, and less ideological, point of view. We will observe these phenomena in more details when examining the cultural exchanges with the United States. From the point of view of the Yugoslav policymakers, the American propaganda in Yugoslavia was particularly inclined to interpret the liberalization of the Yugoslav regime and the supposed abandonment of Marxist ideology as a consequence of American aid and of its rapprochement with the West. What is more, they admitted that many other Yugoslav citizens shared this particular view.<sup>584</sup>

This strategy might be recognized in the *Pregled*'s accounts on American democracy and freedom. Articles like “The Spiritual Heritage of America,”<sup>585</sup> “Freedom in America,”<sup>586</sup> “Faith in Freedom and Democracy,”<sup>587</sup> “Artistic Freedom for

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<sup>581</sup> Dennison I. Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

<sup>582</sup> Stenografske beleške Komisije za ideološko-vaspitni rad SSRNJ, May 5-6, 1966, 16/6680, Box 256, Komisija za politički i idejno-vaspitni rad 1966, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 10/2.

<sup>583</sup> Informacija: Donošenje posebnog zakona o inostranoj propagandi, Aug. 21, 1969, 034-1564/1-69, Box 565, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ.

<sup>584</sup> Neka pitanja informativne-propagandne delatnosti SAD u FNRJ, Oct. 24, 1962, Box 240, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ. As the members of the Savski Venac Municipal Committee concluded “[those who visit the American library] interpret the evolution of democratic management in our enterprises and communes as inevitable steps that they expect to happen when reading about social life in the West” (Informacija o aktivnosti OK SKS Savski Venac po pitanjima kontaktiranja naših institucija i građanima sa strancima i delovanju inostranih propagandnih ustanova, Jan. 22, 1962, 59, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB: 6-7).

<sup>585</sup> Dorothy Lafferty, “Duhovno nasleđe Amerike,” *Pregled*, January 1966, 2.

<sup>586</sup> Walter F. Murphy, “Sloboda u Americi,” *Pregled*, July 1966, 2.

<sup>587</sup> “Vera u slobodu i demokratiju,” *Pregled*, January 1966, 8.

Everyone,”<sup>588</sup> “The Role of Religion in a Free Society,”<sup>589</sup> or “Protests in front of the White House,”<sup>590</sup> depicted U.S. society as one where dissent was possible, plural opinions were allowed, and where even demonstrations and oppositions were interpreted as signs of a healthy democracy. The main objective was, obviously, to “prick the imagination” of Yugoslav readers, and their “appetites” for the *American way of democracy*.

The 1960s were a decade of profound change for the Yugoslav Titoist regime. The new 1963 Constitution represents only one – even if paradigmatic – example of how decentralization and liberalization was implemented in executive policies, while the expulsion of Aleksandar Ranković from the party lines in 1966 indicates the abandonment of centralization policies and the victory of Kardelj’s federalist stance.<sup>591</sup> When student protests erupted at the Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana Universities in June 1968, another image of Yugoslavia appeared. As Hrvoje Klasić pointed out, the repression – which meant mainly expulsion from the Universities and the Party of students and professors, and imprisonment for some of them – started imminently after Tito’s public appeasement with the students.<sup>592</sup> Analogous forms of reaction followed the uprising of the Croatian nationalist movement (the *Croatian Spring*) in 1971, the affirmation of the Serbian “liberals” in the Central Committee of the SKJ in Serbia in 1972, and their subsequent breakdown.<sup>593</sup> Those events once more suggest that *liberalization* had a different meaning in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

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<sup>588</sup> “Sloboda stvaranja za sve,” *Pregled*, July 1967, 14.

<sup>589</sup> Charles P. Taft, “Uloga religije u slobodnom društvu,” *Pregled*, March 1966, 13.

<sup>590</sup> “Zaštita demokratije pred Belom Kućom,” *Pregled*, January 1966, 56.

<sup>591</sup> Ranković (1909-1983) was a top Yugoslav communist leader, one of the founders of the Yugoslav state, creator and head of the Yugoslav secret services (first OZNA than UDBA). As a highly regarded personality in the party ranks, he was dreaded both by his colleagues and by his enemies. He was also the main ideologist and leader of the centralizing fraction of the KPJ/SKJ. On the Forth Plenum, look into: Ivan Dragović, *Brionski Plenum* (Beograd: GMT Servis, 2002); Vojin Lukić, *Sećanja i saznanja: Aleksandar Ranković i Brionski plenum* (Titograd: Novica Jovović, 1989); Latinka Perović, *Zatvaranje kruga: ishod političkog rascjepa u SKJ 1971./1972.* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1991), 41–52.

<sup>592</sup> Therefore, Klasić claims that, even if student demonstrations in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana had not an antisocialist character, they were brutally blocked because any accusation of the deficiency of the Yugoslav economic and political system was interpreted as a threat to the monopoly of the communist elites in power (Hrvoje Klasić, *Jugoslavija i svijet 1968.* (Zagreb: Ljevak, 2012), 222–274, 448–450.

<sup>593</sup> Posthumous narrations of these events recounted by their protagonists can be found in Savka Dabčević-Kučar, *'71. - hrvatski snovi i stvarnost*, vol. 1, 2 (Zagreb: Interepublic, 1997) and Perović, *Zatvaranje kruga*.

and that economic reform and political federalization did not intend to become a liberal democracy or multi-party system.

The American cultural mission in Yugoslavia was pursuing the objective of changing the regime from outside while, in the meantime, internal, often opposite, movements pushed for reforms. Among them, the Croatian literates and linguists in 1967, the Yugoslav students in 1968, the Marxist intellectuals of the Praxis School (1963-1974), the Croatian “springers” in 1971, the Serbian liberals in 1972. Nevertheless, censorship and coercion fallouts never really abandoned the official Belgrade policies. Hence, to what extent did the American cultural mission in Yugoslavia enhanced the liberalization trends by making available Western ideas, projections, images, messages, and, most of all, policy practices? Were the Yugoslav attitudes towards foreign propaganda at the highest level indeed, part of an ideological dispute or, conversely, expressed the awareness of the peril of U.S./Western “infiltrations”?

In the first part of this study we analyzed processes, mechanisms, channels, messages and personalities that shaped the USIA-USIS mission in Yugoslavia during the 1950s and 1960s, scrutinized the impact of the American policies in the field, and reconstructed their interconnections with foreign and internal policy developments. The next chapters will be dedicated to following the visible and invisible networks and programs that the USIA-USIS missions built during these two decades, through the American exhibitions at the Belgrade and Zagreb International Trade Fairs, the Voice of America broadcasts, and the State Department-sponsored tours of American musicians, artists, and actors in the so-called Cultural Presentation Program.

# 4 *EXHIBITED!* AMERICAN MODERNITY, ABUNDANCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL VANGUARD AT THE YUGOSLAV TRADE FAIRS

*Consumption goods, doubling as phantom images of themselves, are living contradictions. They are meant to be consumed, yet at the same time they have reached consummation, a higher level of sense and meaning, of dreams and desire. [...] The automobile as an object of consumption has a finite life; its only future is the scrap heap. Nevertheless, as a dream object it keeps riding on.*<sup>594</sup>

In the May 5 1947 issue, *Life* magazine presented a photo-essay entitled “Family Status Must Improve: It Should Buy More for Itself.” In this short report, the reader could observe the imaginary post-war adjustment of Ted and Jeanne Hemeke and their three children from their life in an unpleasant, rude cottage – where Ted arrived home in

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<sup>594</sup> Rob Kroes, *If You've Seen One, You've Seen the Mall: Europeans and American Mass Culture* (University of Illinois Press, 1996), 94.

working man's clothes and Jeanne struggled with a dirty coal furnace in the kitchen<sup>595</sup> – “to their symbolic entry into the new post war order when [...] Ted wore the middle-class badge of a suit, the children were fashionably dressed, and Jeanne approvingly surveyed a kitchen stocked with shiny new appliances.”<sup>596</sup> According to the Twentieth Century Fund economists, by 1960 the U.S. family would “acquire, in addition to a pleasant roof over its head, a vacuum cleaner, washing machine, stove, electric iron, refrigerator, electric toaster and [...] matching dishes, silverware, cooking utensils, tools, cleaning materials, stationery and postage stamps.”<sup>597</sup> In fact, the majority of American post-war economic theorists and actors, from the anti-New Deal big businessmen to moderate liberal capitalists, to labor and its allies on the left, endorsed (even if for different reasons) the importance of mass consumption as a highway to prosperity and middle-class wealth.<sup>598</sup>

In the post-war world, mass-consumption society and culture became the synonym for the United States, the euphemism of a conventional view of the *American way of life* and a paradigm of affluence, material wealth and freedom of choice. Meaning more than just availability of products and services, the advent of the mass-consumption era rescinded the separation between object and image, commerce and art, making the advertisement industry an instrument of accommodating dreams and fantasies.<sup>599</sup> “The experience, or at least the promise, of freedom that U.S. citizens in their role of consumer could share in, became the central ingredient of America's modernity. Shopping became a reassertion of one's identity,” claims Dutch historian Rob Kroes.<sup>600</sup> We shall keep in mind this essential ingredient when examining the American exhibitions at the Yugoslav trade fairs.

Much of the consumption of American mass culture took place in private endeavors where people watched television in their living rooms, Hollywood movies in the quasi-private places of the darkened movie theaters, American music via radio or on records in homes or dance clubs. There was an area outside the private homes that served

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<sup>595</sup> *Life*, May 5, 1947, 32–33. This analysis has been inspired by Lizabeth Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2003), 112–116.

<sup>596</sup> Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic*, 112–113.

<sup>597</sup> *Life*, May 5, 1947, 33.

<sup>598</sup> Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic*, 114–120.

<sup>599</sup> Kroes, *If You've Seen One, You've Seen the Mall*, 94–95.

<sup>600</sup> *Ibid*, 95.

effectively and successfully “as a site of exposure of American mass culture” and which traveled worldwide via the entertainment industry and under commercial auspices “creating the demand, if not the desire, for its consumption.”<sup>601</sup> Thus, in the cultural Cold War, there was another medium by which American mass culture interacted with and was assimilated by audiences abroad: the international trade fairs and exhibitions.

The U.S. national pavilions epitomize privileged case studies of the cultural Cold War by bringing up multifaceted dimensions of politics and culture. According to Haddow, these promotional events became favored government vehicles for administrators and business supporters to counter communism through the promotion and transplantation of democratic capitalism overseas. As in the case of the Chicago International Trade Fair of 1950, the American Pavilion at the 1958 Brussels World’s Fair and the American 1959 Sokolniki Fair in Moscow, the U.S. policymakers significantly advanced the deployment of culture as a Cold War weapon, along with economic aid and military power. Through the creative process of conceptualizing trade displays and exhibitions, special interconnections and relationships were established among government agencies, corporate associations, advertising firms, industrial designers, and the art world.<sup>602</sup>

Moreover, the exhibitions as case studies illuminate foreign policy relations and diplomatic moods. Additionally, they consider the public opinion impact by involving public-opinion molders. Lastly, in the Cold War struggle for hearts and minds they stress the relevance of private artistic actors, designers and architects, engaged by state agencies to achieve national success.<sup>603</sup>

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<sup>601</sup> For Kroes, the advertisements created economic demand while conveying imaginary Americas at the same time. In such a way, “they have contributed to a European repertoire [...] a realm of reverie, filled with iconic heroes, setting standards of physical beauty, of taste, of proper behavior. [...] Europe’s significant Other has become America, as commercially constructed through advertising” (Rob Kroes, “Imaginary Americas in Europe’s Public Place,” in *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism After 1945*, ed. A. Stephan (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007), 347). See also, Beatriz Colomina, Ann Marie Brennan, and Jeannie Kim, eds., *Cold War Hothouses: Inventing Postwar Culture, from Cockpit to Playboy* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2004).

<sup>602</sup> Robert H. Haddow, *Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s* (Washington: Smithsonian, 1997); Andrew James Wulf, *U.S. International Exhibitions during the Cold War: Winning Hearts and Minds through Cultural Diplomacy* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015).

<sup>603</sup> One of the first comprehensive studies on how American policymakers, business executives, industrial designers and artists were involved in the creation and promotion of U.S. trade fairs in the 1950s is *Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s* by Robert Haddow, while for a

As we shall observe in Chapter 4 and 5, Washington's public diplomacy utilized soft power instruments of visual and emotional (sound) persuasion that covered all bodily senses and were, in that sense, totalizing. In this chapter, focused on the American pavilions at the Yugoslav trade fairs, we shall investigate the U.S. participation as part of a general public diplomacy effort to "sell America's story abroad" by presenting the visual allure of commodity products, the charm of aesthetically appealing and technologically advanced kitchen appliances and the attraction of technological aids. Our focus will, therefore, be on those means with high appealing visibility, codifying messages, whetting appetites: the stories of American success bolstered to promote the culture of abundance and the Yugoslav participation in it.<sup>604</sup>

In public spaces of mass culture consummation, the American exhibitions at Zagreb and Belgrade Trade Fairs exemplified an all-round effort of "selling" representations of American modernity, technological advancement, and consumerist abundance in order to generate imaginary spaces for a Yugoslav average public. Moreover, as Jakovina pointed out, every spring and autumn when International Trade Fairs were running, Zagreb became "a promotional battlefield of two ideologically, economically, religiously and politically opposite blocs," the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>605</sup> The Yugoslavia belonging to the "socialist forces of the world," its non-Aligned policies and political linkages with Third World countries, its unique, often debated,

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deeper insight into the role of designers and architects for U.S. exhibitions abroad, look into Jack Masey and Conway L. Morgan, *Cold War Confrontations: US Exhibitions and Their Role in the Cultural Cold War* (Baden, Switzerland: Lars Müller Publishers, 2008). A fascinating two-sided account on this topic can be found in Greg Castillo, *Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010) where the author explores tactics used by the American government to seduce citizens of the Soviet bloc with state-of-the-art consumer goods, and the reactions of the Communist Party staged socialist home expositions intended to evoke the domestic ideal of a cultured proletariat.

<sup>604</sup> Partial scholarly studies have addressed the issue of U.S. participation at the Yugoslav trade fairs, in particularly on Supermarket USA the case study of 1957. On his part, Tvrtko Jakovina has recreated the political echoes of the U.S. participation among the Yugoslav party elites, while Shane Hamilton has analyzed how technology served as soft power instrument in the "Yugoslav kitchen debate" during the U.S. exhibition (Tvrtko Jakovina, "Narodni kapitalizam protiv narodnih demokracija. Američki supermarket na Zagrebačkom velesajmu 1957. godine," in *Zbornik Mire Kolar Dimitrijević* (Zagreb: FF Press, 2003), 469–79 and Shane Hamilton, "Supermarket USA Confronts State Socialism: Airlifting the Technopolitics of Industrial Food Distribution into Cold War," in *Cold War Kitchen: Americanization, Technology, and European Users*, ed. Ruth Oldenziel and Karin Zachmann (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2011), 137–59).

<sup>605</sup> Jakovina, "Narodni kapitalizam protiv narodnih demokracija," 478.

American partnership, made the Zagreb Trade Fair, and to lesser degree the Belgrade one, an exemplary battlefield of cultural Cold War practices.<sup>606</sup>

## 4.1 Washington's Exhibition Program

*American industrial strength supports your freedom.*<sup>607</sup>

An important part of USIA's job was to give foreign audiences a picture of American life evoked with "familiarity and friendliness."<sup>608</sup> Part of this mission were the USIA exhibits abroad usually classified into two groups, namely the exhibits prepared by the agency for the post's specific uses and the special international exhibitions prepared specifically for trade fairs and circulating exhibitions in Eastern Europe. After the creation of the USIA, the supervision of these two sections passed from the State Department to the International Press Service Displays and Photographic Division, and then transferred to the ICS where, in 1956, they became part of the Branch of the Exhibits, English Teaching and Special Program Division. In 1965, the Smithsonian Institute was assigned the organization of fine art exhibitions abroad, while the ICS continued responsibility for the showings overseas. With the fiscal year 1966, the USIA acquired the entire responsibility for the International Trade Fair program from the Department of Commerce, until then operationally in charge of it since its inception in 1954. Finally, in 1968, an Agency directive limited the participation in international trade fairs principally to Eastern European countries.<sup>609</sup>

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<sup>606</sup> Both the United States and the Soviet Union, together with the Communist ruled countries of Eastern Europe "laid claim to the same cultural heritage, the same Enlightenment tradition, and the same concepts of human worth and social progress." Following this argumentation, the question of heritage became a Cold War engagement at the international fairs worldwide. (Jack Masey and Conway L. Morgan, *Cold War Confrontations*, 15).

<sup>607</sup> Robert C. Hickok to Mr. Dennis, Feb. 3, 1956, Box 38, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>608</sup> A Study of USIA Operating Assumptions, Volume 3, Dec. 1954, S-27-54, Box 6, Special Reports 1953-1997, USIA Office of Research, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>609</sup> Functions and Responsibilities and Recommended Organization for the ICS: Report of a Study Group, Aug. 1, 1973, Box 4, Records Relating to Culture Centers 1946-1988, USIA Library Program Division, RG 306, NACP: 32-34. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (but not Yugoslavia), these exhibitions operated under the Cultural Exchange Agreements or similar arrangements, while the Trade Missions or Labor Missions were allocated to the Department of Commerce and Labor under Executive Order 11034

From very early on, the IIA commenced discussions over the possible usage of exhibitions and commercial enterprises at world fairs in channeling propaganda and attracting large audiences: “We know of no more important instrument of psychological warfare than the actual display of America’s industrial, economic and labor resources.”<sup>610</sup> Starting in 1954 and grounded on a close cooperation between government agencies and American individuals and business enterprises “that have patriotically contributed [...] to exhibit American industrial quality, progress and power,”<sup>611</sup> the Trade Fair program aimed to incorporate “our [American] spiritual values [...] and reflect purposes beyond mere commercial expediency.”<sup>612</sup> Its objectives were officially proclaimed by the President’s Congressional Message of January 10, 1955:

To impress upon the peoples of the world that the United States’ great productive capacity is dedicated to the preservation of peace and [...] to the improvement of mankind’s standard of living; [to prove that] American owners, managers and workers, living under a free political system and enjoying free enterprise, are cooperating in the production of all kinds of goods and services not only for the benefit of our own people but for all with whom we trade; to counteract and overshadow the efforts of the Soviet bloc countries in their intensive program to use international trade fairs as instruments to stimulate good will; [and] to supply tangible evidence that the United States is capable of and willing to expand mutually beneficial two-way trade pursuant to these objectives.<sup>613</sup>

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of June 25, 1962 (Special International Exhibition – Seventh Annual Report, July 1, 1968 – June 30, 1969, Box 13, USIA Director’s Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP: 3–4).

<sup>610</sup> G. J. Hummel, IPS, to Charles P. Arnot, IPS, Feb. 29, 1952, 511.00/2-2952, Box 2244, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>611</sup> Roderick L. O’Connor, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, to Frank Thompson Jr., House of Representatives, March 2, 1956, 511.00/8-1855, Box 2071, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP: 3–4.

<sup>612</sup> E. O. Titus, IOP/E, to some IOP officers, Sept. 20, 1954, 511.00/9-2054, Box 2250, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>613</sup> The Impact of the U.S. Trade Fair Program. The Analysis of Visitor Reaction in the Far East, South Asia, Europe and Latin America, April 25, 1956, PMS-3, Box 13, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP. As Haddow notes, the artists and designers who created trade fairs and exhibitions for government offices, such as the Department of Commerce, the USIA, and the Eisenhower White House Project, developed strong working relationships with business groups including the Committee on Economic Development (CED) and the Advertising Council. Because of these interactions, a new generation of artists, architects, and designers like R. Buckminster Fuller, Charles and Ray Eames, George Nelson, Peter Blake, Ivan Chermayeff and Thomas Geismar who were trained to conceptualize and incorporate displays celebrating American capitalism and material abundance into public exhibitions and their art (Robert H. Haddow, *Pavilions of Plenty*).

Between 1954 and 1969 alone, the USIA was involved in 343 separate showings, visited by millions of people at Expos and World Fairs, whose influence, for scale reasons, is incalculable, but their impact cannot be denied.<sup>614</sup>

Official Yugoslavia looked upon trade fairs, commercial exhibits, biennales, triennials, and cultural presentations as necessary concomitants to economic progress and cultural enlightenment.<sup>615</sup> From the U.S. point of view, the Zagreb Autumn International Trade Fair and the Belgrade Technological Trade Fair were the two major Yugoslav fairs considered worthy of participation. Along with Izmir, Damascus and Plovdiv, Zagreb's fair was considered by "the U.S. officials [...] as the best American exhibitions there to date"<sup>616</sup> and a "strategic show window" counteracting the Soviet Bloc propaganda in Yugoslavia. In the context of Yugoslav trade history, the Zagreb Fair had an old, pre-war, prestigious tradition and a prominent place among the southeastern European fairs. The American pavilion in Zagreb was the largest permanent U.S. pavilion in the world. As a split-level of excellent design, it was built in 1957 and included 2,780 square meters of covered space, 2,400 square meters of outdoor area, plus some additional storage space.<sup>617</sup> USIS officials participated in the pavilion's arrangement by designing the fair's 30-meters long exhibit window in charge of daily changes of photographic fair materials. In addition, the post officers prepared press releases and provided photographs, while, just before the opening, USIS Zagreb arranged the press kits, diagrams, displays, and descriptions (on the occasion of the

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<sup>614</sup> Masey and Morgan, *Cold War Confrontations*, 11.

<sup>615</sup> Similarly, the Yugoslav participation at International Trade Fairs, as in the case of the Brussels EXPO '58 with an inspiring piece of modern architecture, the pavilion designed by Croatian architect Vjenceslav Richter, was as "an attempt to internationally showcase the specific brand of socialism [...] since its break from the Soviet bloc." In the Brussels case, however, the Yugoslav pavilion failed in its objective because it subsisted between a politically engaged avant-garde striving for the transformation of Yugoslav society and an apolitical 'autonomous' modernism merely interested in exploring its own aesthetic potential (Vladimir Kulić, "An Avant-Garde Architecture for an Avant-Garde Socialism: Yugoslavia at EXPO '58," *Journal of Contemporary History* 47, no. 1 (January 2012): 161, 182).

<sup>616</sup> Robert Hickok, ICS, to Harris, ICS, and Wilson, I, Oct. 1, 1964, Box 21, Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>617</sup> The rental space and other fair expenses were covered by Embassy dinars either held by the Treasury Department or generated by P.L. 480 and various ICA aid agreements. The American pavilion was renewed in 1967 when Ambassador Elbrick and the Fair's general director Ivan Baćun signed an agreement that prolonged the exhibit rights for the next ten years (Telegram 49 from the American Consul Zagreb to the Secretary of State, March 3, 1967, CUL 4 US-YUGO, Box 335, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967-1969, RG 59, NACP).

1959 fair, which attracted some 1.3 million Yugoslavs – a number “which could never be reached anywhere” – USIS distributed over 300,000 pamphlets).<sup>618</sup>

Held for the first time in 1957, the International Technical Fair in Belgrade on industrial equipment and other engineering products was Zagreb’s strong rival and the second Yugoslav fair by status, with a high commercial significance, since Yugoslavia’s foreign trade was oriented towards the capital city. The event was in high consideration of the U.S. representatives in Belgrade because it drew mass audiences from the central and southern parts of the country. “Workers and children, particularly those from rural areas,” usually very difficult to reach with more restricted and conventional media, and “key governmental officials, industrial bureaucrats and the military,” all flooded the Belgrade fair, giving the Embassy officers a unique opportunity of expanding and developing contacts.<sup>619</sup>

## 4.2 Pleasing the “Whetted Appetites” at the Yugoslav Trade Fairs (1955-1964)

In May 1950, the director of the Zagreb Trade Fair sent a first-time invitation to the U.S. Department of Commerce pleading for the American participation at that year’s exhibition, held from September 23 to October 9 1950.<sup>620</sup> Due to a lack of successful involvement of American firms by the Yugoslav Commercial Attaches of the Embassy in Washington, the 1950 Zagreb fair was characterized by a very limited American participation. The exhibit displayed some mining equipment by Ingersoll-Rand, General Motors products and CARE packages and none of the American companies made any sales at the fair. The third post-war Zagreb Trade Fair, more aimed at stressing the

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<sup>618</sup> Despatch 93 from the USIS Belgrade to the USIA Washington, July 1, 1960, 868.191-ZA/7-160, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>619</sup> Ibid. Other relevant fairs were occurring in Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s, but witnessed a minor American participation. Among them the Zagreb Spring International Fair; the Novi Sad Agricultural Fair; the Ljubljana’s International Timber Processing and Forestry Fair, International Motor and Motor Vehicle Show, International Fair and Packing Materials Show, International Electronics Fair, International Wine Fair, International Building and Construction Fair, and the Modern Electronics Fair; Zadar’s International Shipping, Fishery and Tourist Fair; and Skopje’s International Tobacco Fair (Despatch 80 from Zagreb to the Department of State, Feb. 2, 1960, 868.191/2-260, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP; Despatch 26 from Zagreb to the Department of State, Feb. 15, 1961, 868.191/2-1561, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP).

<sup>620</sup> Despatch 566 from Belgrade to the Department of State, May 29, 1950, 868.191-ZA/5-2950, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

benefits of the Five Year Plan rather than showing goods available for present consumption, achieved a high attendance of 561,907 visitors, a number maximized by extensive official efforts to bring various groups from all over the country through reduced transportation fares and other price concessions.<sup>621</sup>

In the following year, the fair's directorship guided by Ivan Šnidaršić and assisted by Sokolić, chief of the Fair Committee's Propaganda Section, extended the formal permissions to Yugoslav firms for trade with foreign producers and made available major amounts of foreign currencies for Yugoslav firms. Šnidaršić repeatedly renewed the invitation to U.S. greater participation for the 1951-1954 years: "we all know how important it is that every possible effort be made to bring America and Yugoslavia closer together," he claimed.<sup>622</sup> Despite these invitations, for several years USIS Zagreb was not allowed to participate near the American expositors,<sup>623</sup> even if sometimes they obtained an initial permission,<sup>624</sup> this was often suddenly retracted just before the fairs opening (as in August 1951)<sup>625</sup> because of the high "apprehension [of] the influence of the American information in such large and sudden doses."<sup>626</sup>

Between 1952 and 1954, the Zagreb Trade Fair evolved from an exhibit of "propaganda purpose" to a more "regular international commercial show," increasing its foreign participation from 52 foreign exhibitors in 1947, 234 in 1949, 247 in 1951 and 680 in 1952.<sup>627</sup> From 1953 onwards, Yugoslavia began liberalizing its trade policies by expanding the exhibitions in other including Osijek, Novi Sad, Ljubljana, and Skopje,

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<sup>621</sup> Despatch 172 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Sept. 9, 1950, 868.191-ZA/9-950, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP; Despatch 353 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 17, 1950, 868.191-ZA/11-1750, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>622</sup> Despatch 145 from Zagreb to the Department of State, April 12, 1951, 868.191-ZA/4-1251, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>623</sup> Airgram 366 from the Department of State to the American Embassy Belgrade, June 13, 1951, 868.191-ZA/4-1251, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>624</sup> Telegram 88 from Allen to the Secretary of State, July 19, 1951, 868.191-ZA/7-1951, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP; and then accepted in Telegram 3084 from Acheson to Allen, Aug. 8, 1951, 868.191-ZA/8-851, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>625</sup> Ivan Šnidaršić to the USIS/Embassy Belgrade, Aug. 6, 1951, enclosed in despatch 147 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1951, 868.191-ZA/8-1651, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>626</sup> Despatch 147 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1951, 868.191-ZA/8-1651, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP; Despatch 316 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Sept. 25, 1951, 868.191-ZA/9-2551, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. Fair representatives would not allow the participation of an USIS desk at the American pavilion until 1955.

<sup>627</sup> Despatch 257 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Oct. 10, 1952, 868.191-ZA/10-1052, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

whilst Yugoslav enterprises engaged in international expos in Milan, Brussels, Paris and Casablanca.<sup>628</sup> Although the Yugoslav commercial ties with Western European countries were vastly augmented, the Yugoslav fairs lacked a major and stable American participation until 1955 (as until then local or European agents represented the U.S. firms).<sup>629</sup> In addition, only after 1953, the year of Stalin's death and meliorating Yugo-Soviet bilateral relations, the Yugoslavs permitted the Soviet bloc to participate at the fairs.<sup>630</sup>

Instead, as far as the Belgrade Fair was concerned, in its first 1957 edition it already witnessed an intense Soviet bloc countries participation (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Poland and Soviet Union, but only through Yugoslav agencies). Impressive from an architectural point of view, the first Belgrade International Fair accommodated 650 Yugoslav and 850 foreign firms with the contribution of Italy, England, Belgium, Netherlands, West Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, France, Austria, Greece, in addition to the Soviet Bloc and 11 Near-East and Asian countries. Even if the Fair had a remarkable business turnover (the total value of the 1957 contracts was 134 billion dinars or 12 percent of all Yugoslav foreign trade) and an outstanding attendance (almost 1.2 million of first edition visitors), it lacked American participation until 1960.<sup>631</sup>

#### 4.2.1 The “Atoms-For-Peace” Debut at the 1955 Zagreb Trade Fair

*The United States pledges before you – and therefore before the world – its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma, to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man should not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.*

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<sup>628</sup> Despatch 746 from Belgrade to the Department of State, March 18, 1953, 868.191/3-1853, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>629</sup> Despatch 147 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Sept. 13, 1954, 868.191-ZA/9-1354, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>630</sup> Despatch 49 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, Aug. 14, 1953, 868.191 ZA/8-1453, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>631</sup> Despatch 245 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 26, 1957, 868.191-BE/11-2657, Box 4841, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP; Despatch 450 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Feb. 29, 1960, 868.191-BE/2-2960, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP. From 1957 to 1959, U.S. firms participated at the Belgrade's Fair only through representatives, although with the Trade Information Exhibit desk that furnished a commercial library, pamphlet materials and officers available for consultations to businessmen.

Inscription of President Eisenhower UN speech at the Atoms-for-Peace exhibit<sup>632</sup>

*We are convinced that the only real way, which ensures the progress of humanity is the use of nuclear energy in peaceful industrial purposes toward the end of raising the standard of living and eliminating want and backwardness, which, to a great extent, are a cause of war.*

Inscription of President's Tito speech at the Atoms-for-Peace exhibit<sup>633</sup>

*Long live America.*

Vojislav Kazić, Guest book of the Atoms-for-Peace exhibit<sup>634</sup>

The Cold War confrontations transformed the atomic question into more than a mere issue over nuclear forces or weaknesses. It developed into cultural war waging to persuade worldwide audiences and leadership about the purpose, each of its own – Soviet or American – nuclear program. In the line with President Eisenhower's celebrated address to the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953, in which he heralded a new Atoms-for-Peace campaign designed to "hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds of people" and redirect nuclear research toward "peaceful [...] efficient and economic usage [of] [and towards] an international atomic energy agency [...] set up under the aegis of the United Nations,"<sup>635</sup> the USIA conceived and designed the Atoms-for-Peace exhibition.<sup>636</sup> On its side, the State Department engaged from the early 1950s in the so-called "Release of Non-Classified Atomic Information" program maintained abroad by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),<sup>637</sup> which was exploiting the USIA channels in order to disseminate the newest acknowledgements on American peaceful nuclear science.<sup>638</sup>

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<sup>632</sup> The inscription letters were 10 centimeters high topped by the exhibit title, flanked by a two meters portrait of President Eisenhower and an American shield of similar size (Report on the Atoms-for-Peace Exhibit enclosed in despatch 006542 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Dec. 15, 1955, Box 21, Country Project Correspondence 1952-1963, USIA Office of Research, RG 306, NACP).

<sup>633</sup> The Tito speech was delivered to the Federal Assembly on March 8, 1955. Here quoted in Report on the Atoms-for-Peace Exhibit, Dec. 15, 1955.

<sup>634</sup> Report on the Atoms-for-Peace Exhibit, Dec. 15, 1955, 5.

<sup>635</sup> NCS 5507/2, March 12, 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. XX, doc. 14.

<sup>636</sup> Atomic Energy Developments in Europe enclosed in Instruction 4103 from the Department of State, Nov. 25, 1955, 511.00/11-2555, Box 2071, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>637</sup> The United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was an agency established after World War II by Congress to foster and control the peacetime development of atomic science and technology. President Harry S. Truman signed the McMahon/Atomic Energy Act on August 1, 1946 (in effect as PL 585, 79th Congress, from January 1947) transferring the control of atomic energy from military to civilian hands. Such a shift gave the first AEC members a complete control of the plants, laboratories, equipment, and personnel assembled during the war to produce the atomic bomb (Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E.

Very indicatively, the United States debuted at the Zagreb Trade Fair with the USIA Atoms-for-Peace exhibition (*Atomi za mir*). In the view of Tito's "widespread misunderstanding of U.S. atomic position [versus] neutralist countries," this exhibit was considered politically mandatory and crucial to "stress identity of interests" of both sides, the "opportunity for Yugoslavs to bring [the] peaceful uses message," the support of Yugoslav development of peaceful atomic energy and its participation to AEC's international isotopes distribution program.<sup>639</sup>

The Atoms pavilion, exhibited in September 1955, had a more glorious affect than in any other Communist country. Its fabulous success was testified by a 20-page USIS report from Zagreb. Recalling the fact that only two years before, in October 1953, the Trieste question smashed USIS windows and menaced the security of the personnel, Yugoslav PAO Joseph Kolarek proudly reported how Yugoslavia's highest officers toured the Atoms exhibit "along with more than a quarter of a million other Yugoslavs."<sup>640</sup> The 12-day exhibit reached more than 150,000 visitors with a daily average of 12,000 and some 108,000 at the Belgrade Kinoteka Film Museum, to where the exhibit was transferred after Zagreb. Visited by the vice-president Edvard Kardelj, the Croatian Assembly president Vladimir Bakarić, the then chief of the Yugoslav Mission for American Military Aid, General Franc Poglajn, Branko Drašković from DSIP, and prominent Communist leaders such as Aleksandar Ranković and Svetozar Tempo-Vukmanović, the American pavilion gained high publicity.<sup>641</sup>

Never had an American publication issued by USIS had such a wide spread distribution as the "Atom – Nada Sveta" (Atom – Hope of the World), a handsomely colorful and illustrated pamphlet, printed in 150,000 copies, then distributed to 88,000 visitors from Zagreb and 62,000 Belgrade visitors, adults and students, with additional copies being sent via mail. Posters were put up in all major Serbian cities, American

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Anderson, *The New World: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Volume I 1939-1946* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

<sup>638</sup> Airgram 1434 from the Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, May 12, 1953, 511.00/3-1253, Box 2248, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>639</sup> Message 122 from USIA-State to Belgrade, March 31, 1955, 868.191/3-3155, Box 4841, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>640</sup> Report on the Atoms-for-Peace Exhibit, Dec. 15, 1955, 1.

<sup>641</sup> According to a USIS report, President Tito, together with Moša Pijade, president of the Federal Assembly, visited the U.S. pavilion out of official working hours.

cultural centers, insertions were paid for in radio broadcasts and daily newspapers, and invitations were sent to schools, agricultural and technical organizations.

In spite of this positive feedback and cooperation, police and fair authorities in Zagreb prohibited the Atoms-for-Peace films *Introducing the Atom*, *Atoms in Medicine*, *Atoms in Agriculture* and *Industry and Power*, scheduled at the pavilion's film projection panel. To counteract this, the USIS installed a rear-view projector in one of its windows so that movies could be seen from outdoors. Two movies – *Atomic power for Peace* and *A is for Atom* – were scheduled continuously for 4 hours nightly beginning at 7 PM. During the first two nights, about 800 spectators saw the film before the police ordered them to stop because “spectators interfered with traffic by crowding the sidewalk and overflowing into the street.”<sup>642</sup>

Certainly, the negative official reactions in connection with the staging of the exhibit reflected to a large extent the conditions under which USIS operated in Yugoslavia. While in Belgrade the efforts made to find an adequate indoor space for exhibition were many times denied, the Zagreb Fair management imposed Tito's speech as an inscription next to Eisenhower's less than a week before opening, because apparently the American exhibition failed to obtain the Federal Executive Council permission.<sup>643</sup> Moreover, Zagreb authorities denied the USIS officers a refreshment reception for journalists and guests, the fair authorities denied a telephone line for the pavilion, whilst the official opening procession intentionally avoided the visit to the American pavilion while visiting all the other foreign pavilions.<sup>644</sup>

Nevertheless, the American pavilion, together with the cultural mission, received – as never before – an abundant and decidedly favorable press attention in newspapers, magazines, children's weekly, and economic periodicals: “the first and only one of this kind in Yugoslavia;”<sup>645</sup> “it was the greatest attraction at the International Fair;” “shows the enormous power of atomic energy used for peaceful purposes,”<sup>646</sup> and “people were

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<sup>642</sup> Report on the Atoms-for-Peace Exhibit, Dec. 15, 1955, 9.

<sup>643</sup> Report on the Atoms-for-Peace Exhibit, Dec. 15, 1955, 15–16.

<sup>644</sup> Report on the Atoms-for-Peace Exhibit, Dec. 15, 1955.

<sup>645</sup> “Atomi za mir. Nastup Sjedinjenih Američkih Država na Velesajmu,” *Privredni Vjesnik*, Sept. 2, 1955, 3.

<sup>646</sup> “Atomi u službi čovječanstva,” *Glas Istre*, Oct. 14, 1955, 3–4.

very thankful to the organizers.”<sup>647</sup> The aftermath of the fair proved a successful soft power instrument. Inspired by the contacts made out of the Atoms exhibit, the Yugoslav Nuclear Energy Commission sent twelve of their most prominent scientists and nuclear researchers to the United States in 1956,<sup>648</sup> while, in the spirit of that collaboration, the Yugoslav Commission for Atomic Energy received the Atoms-for-Peace library collection as a gift from the U.S. government during a high-level ceremony attended by Ranković, Vladimir Velebit, and other distinguished members of the government.<sup>649</sup> Apart from the 1955 Atoms Exhibit, the U.S. participated in several other “nuclear” fairs in Yugoslavia, but none proved to be such a successful propaganda story.<sup>650</sup>

The first years of American informal and formal participation at the Yugoslav fairs illustrate several key points of USIA strategy related to these exhibitions. Certainly, it proves the preference of USIA and USIS policymakers for exalted style-appealing propaganda that was very well recognized in public discourse. Secondly, it undoubtedly points to, and even more so with the 1957 “Supermarket USA” exhibition, its preference for propaganda benefit rather than a commercial one. Apart from the exciting newspaper reports, we do not possess any other evidence of the Atoms exhibition impact. Nevertheless, the choice for the appealing “nuclear” theme was surely an affirmation of the USA super-power, whose corrosiveness and anti-Soviet orientation could not go unnoticed to the Yugoslav officers and party leaders in that late September 1955.

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<sup>647</sup> *Naš Vjesnik*, Oct. 28, 1955.

<sup>648</sup> Despatch 453 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, March 6, 1956, 868.1901/3-656, Box 4841, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>649</sup> Despatch 654 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, June 4, 1957, 868.1901/6-457, Box 4841, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>650</sup> For example, the U.S. companies presented their nuclear research equipment at the Belgrade Technical Fair (August 23 – September 2) in 1960 where USIS made up an American Information Commercial Booth (Despatch 312 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 23, 1960, 868.191-BE/11-2360, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP). A relatively notable collaboration was the exhibit “Atoms in Effect” (Atomi u dejstvu) organized collectively by AEC and the Yugoslav Commission for Nuclear Energy, with permission from the highest party members and expenses totally relegated to the American government, presented at the 1963 Belgrade Trade Fair (Beleška o saglasnosti za organizovanje izložbe “Atomi u dejstvu,” May 11, 1963, 75, Box 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ; Koča Popović, Secretary of State, to SIV, 91429, April 30, 1963, Box 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ). This illustrative and educational exhibit established cooperation between American and Yugoslav scientists and was specifically designed for specialists and advanced students thanks to the Student Teacher Demonstration Program prepared by the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies (Airgram 60 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Sept. 26, 1962, 868.191/9-2662, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP).

### 4.2.2 The “American Supermarket” and the Yugoslav “Kitchen Debate”

*Officials are inclined to view trade fairs from the point of view of what they contribute to the Yugoslav economy at a particular phase of its development and officially at least are not pleased with large displays of consumer goods, produced by more developed economies, which they see as whetting popular appetites that cannot be satisfied. The general public, on the other hand, comes to fairs to see a show and be amused. They want to see customer goods, cars, and recreational items. Industrial equipment and tractors interest them less. [...] U.S. exhibits [...] realizing the value of whetted appetites in a country with a Communist regime, quite properly err on the side of pleasing the general public.<sup>651</sup>*

*Therefore, the Americans brought the supermarket to Yugoslavia. Nobody knew what a supermarket was. And it was sensational!*  
Nada Apsen-Pintarić, former director of USIS library Zagreb<sup>652</sup>

The report quoted above, written by an unknown USIS officer in Belgrade, illustrates and confirms the uniformity of American policies in the Eastern European countries when it comes to the basic principles that motivated the U.S. participation at the Eastern European trade fairs. Taken as the topmost example, the Moscow Sokolniki exhibit of summer 1959 ended as “an epic propaganda battle” in which the “Americans mounted a massive exhibition of consumer capitalism,” while the “Soviet mobilized a counterattack against the Western culture invasion.”<sup>653</sup> However, the Soviets failed, while, as Greg Castillo emphasized, the American pavilion “bombarded Soviet visitors with multimedia images of American daily life and then deposited them in a multistory warehouse overflowing with retail goods.”<sup>654</sup>

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<sup>651</sup> Despatch 93 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, July 1, 1960, 868.191-ZA/7-160, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>652</sup> Interview with Nada Apsen-Pintarić, May 31, 2014, Zagreb.

<sup>653</sup> Hixon, *Parting the Curtain*, 185. The American success at the Moscow exhibit represents the paradigm of the state-private network. As never before, the response of the American business community to Eisenhower’s appeal was unprecedented: the Radio Corporation of America provided a complete color television studio, American Express endorsed a travel exhibit, food companies such as General Mills, General Foods, Grand Union and others provided food displays and demonstrations, Pepsi-Cola offered free soft drinks, IBM donated its RAMAC electronic “brain” while companies such as Sears, Kaiser, Whirlpool, Macy’s, Singer, Kodak, and DuPont contributed with thousands of dollars (Ibid, 168–169).

<sup>654</sup> Castillo, *Cold War on the Home Front*, xxii. During the six-week exhibit, the U.S. pavilion was visited by 2.7 million visitors, even if tens of thousands of gatecrashers made the actual number much higher. A 24-meter high and 60-meters long, gold-anodized geodesic dome that served as the information center of the exhibit dominated the American pavilion. Inside, giant slides displayed colored pictures of American

At the opening of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, Vice President Richard Nixon engaged in what would become one of the most notable verbal Cold War sparring matches with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, the “kitchen debate.”<sup>655</sup> Staying in front of an American model kitchen and a sunshine yellow GE washer-dryer, Nixon and Khrushchev engaged in a heated and lengthy dispute, not over presumably missiles, bombs and diplomatic issues, but, surprisingly, over the relative merits of American washing machines, televisions and electric ranges. For Nixon, the American superiority rested on the ideal of the suburban home complete with modern appliances and distinct gender roles of the male breadwinner and the full-time housewife. The availability of labor-saving devices were proving in fact the essence of American freedom and superiority of the free enterprise over communism.<sup>656</sup> Apart from pointing to the American post-war dream of successful breadwinners supporting attractive housewives in affluent suburban homes, the kitchen debate illuminated ideological conveyances, as Castillo accentuated, “over citizen enfranchisement, housework and gender equity, and the economics of mass consumption and planned obsolescence.”<sup>657</sup>

In September 1957, the United States Department of Commerce, along with the USIA and the American businessmen, launched the “Supermarket USA” exhibition at the Zagreb Trade Fair. Most of the one million socialist citizens, who visited the exhibition, had never seen an American-style supermarket, owned a mechanical refrigerator, or purchased a prepackaged convenience food. It was a transnational effort to revolutionize the production and distribution of food in Yugoslavia. The American planners expected that a radical transformation of Yugoslav consumer culture would

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life accompanied by a musical score and a voiceover commentary in Russian (Hixon, *Parting the Curtain*, 174).

<sup>655</sup> The “Kitchen Debate” was partly recorded on the Ampex color videotape, a new technology pioneered in the United States by the Ampex Company. It is nowadays available on Ampex Data Systems, *The Kitchen Debate (Nixon and Khrushchev, 1959) Part I*, accessed November 10, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D7HqOrAakco> and Ampex Data Systems, *The Kitchen Debate (Nixon and Khrushchev, 1959) Part II*, accessed November 10, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6RLCw1OZFw>.

<sup>656</sup> Elaine T. May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*, Revisited and updated ed. (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2008), 10–14. A challenging transatlantic revision of the Kitchen Debate, and its newly discovered social and political implications in cultural Cold War can be found in Ruth Oldenziel and Karin Zachmann, eds., *Cold War Kitchen: Americanization, Technology, and European Users* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2011) and Shane Hamilton and Sarah Phillips, *The Kitchen Debate and Cold War Consumer Politics: A Brief History with Documents* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2014).

<sup>657</sup> Castillo, *Cold War on the Home Front*, xi.

follow in the wake of that exhibition.<sup>658</sup> John A. Logan of the National Association of Food Chains drew up the plans for an American-style supermarket-stocking 4,000 items in a space of 1,000 square-meters. It was the first USA Supermarket in a communist country.<sup>659</sup> The American goods on display were fresh and included yellow bananas, juicy grapes, and prepackaged meats. The Yugoslav women expressed adoration at the exhibit products with such exclamations as “Look at the meat, it’s all packed and assorted, the price is marked on [it] and you just know it’s clean.” “Why would it be so difficult for us to package meat this way? A little paper, that’s all there is to it. [...] Hygienic, it’s wonderful” commented a housewife.<sup>660</sup>

At the pavilions entrance, Eisenhower’s huge poster and message was stating “All countries today stand on the threshold of more widely shared prosperity, if they utilize wisely the knowledge of science and technology available to this age. International fairs help to spread this knowledge [...] in the creation of a better life for all.” Besides the supermarket, the fair visitors admired one of the latest models of U.S. air conditioned, fully power-equipped car, the Zagreb youngsters admired a full line of automatic dispensers of candies, soft drinks, and pastries, whilst elsewhere in the pavilion there were displays of agricultural equipment and home appliances, a laundry-mat and a furnished American style five-room apartment.<sup>661</sup>

As Hamilton underlined, the revolutionary potential of American supermarketing in a communist country seemed apparent to many visitors of the American pavilion. Certainly, for the Yugoslav consumers accustomed to rationing, the abundance displayed at the exhibition was overwhelming.<sup>662</sup> According to the *New York Times* the

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<sup>658</sup> Shane Hamilton, “Supermarket USA Confronts State Socialism: Airlifting the Technopolitics of Industrial Food Distribution into Cold War,” in *Cold War Kitchen: Americanization, Technology, and European Users*, ed. Ruth Oldenziel and Karin Zachmann (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2011), 137–59. Nonetheless, Supermarket USA was not the first attempt by American policymakers and businessmen to transform European food retailing. Beginning with 1953, a traveling Modern Food Commerce exhibit, funded by the Marshall Plan, introduced the basics of supermarkets to businessmen and consumers in France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and West Germany (145).

<sup>659</sup> “U.S. Supermarket In Yugoslavia,” *The New York Times*, Sept. 22, 1957; see also *Vjesnik*, issues 6, 8, 19 September, 1957.

<sup>660</sup> “Typical American Supermarket Is the Hit of Fair in Yugoslavia,” *The New York Times*, Sept. 8, 1957.

<sup>661</sup> “U.S. Supermarket in Yugoslavia,” *The New York Times*, Sept. 22, 1957; Tvrtko Jakovina, “Narodni kapitalizam protiv narodnih demokracija. Američki super-market na Zagrebačkom velesajmu 1957. godine,” in *Zbornik Mire Kolar Dimitrijević* (Zagreb: FF Press, 2003), 472–73.

<sup>662</sup> Hamilton, “Supermarket USA Confronts State Socialism: Airlifting the Techno-politics of Industrial Food Distribution into the Cold War Yugoslavia,” 143.

party officials who visited the exhibition together with the Soviet government representatives, were reportedly “visibly embarrassed.”<sup>663</sup> Every hundredth visitor received a bag, which he was free to fill with food. Female students, hired from the Zagreb University, acted as American shoppers and cashiers. The young students pushed carts around the model store, often borrowing a baby from a mother in the crowd and surrounding the child with packages of processed foods. It was the representation of an unknown self-service system.<sup>664</sup>

For a regime that struggled with cyclical famines and domestic shortages, the Supermarket USA introduced an industrial model of food production and distribution that was challenging for the Yugoslav system. It was, for Hamilton, “a demonstration of the systemic nature of American supermarketing and an exercise in techno-politics” that used “technology as an instrument of power.”<sup>665</sup> Finally, relying on Cold War geopolitics to justify the penetration of a socialist economy, the executives working on the exhibit expected that Supermarket USA would lead to an expansion of American economic hegemony in Eastern Europe generally, and Yugoslavia in particular. Steplock, the economic consultant of the fair in this sense affirmed: “The changes in the Yugoslav economy over the last few years have been very substantial. The desire of the Yugoslavs to learn and improve their economy holds forth the promise of increased mutually advantageous trade.”<sup>666</sup> In fact, American food-processing corporations – including Armour, Campbell Soup, Kraft, Minute Maid, Pillsbury, Sunkist, and Wesson Oil – donated the equipment and supplies for the Zagreb exhibit hoping to establish prosperous economic relations. At first, the Supermarket USA enjoyed great success in the aftermath of the fair: together with the refrigerated cabinets, the United States sold a host of technologies required in the supermarket retailing-food-processing machinery: industrial freezers, meat-wrapping machines, can and jar-making machinery, and other packaging machines.<sup>667</sup>

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<sup>663</sup> “U.S. Supermarket In Yugoslavia,” *The New York Times*, Sept. 22, 1957.

<sup>664</sup> Hamilton, “Supermarket USA Confronts State Socialism: Airlifting the Techno-politics of Industrial Food Distribution into the Cold War Yugoslavia,” 143.

<sup>665</sup> *Ibid*, 140.

<sup>666</sup> Telegram 761 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, Sept. 3, 1957, 868.191/9-357, Box 4841, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>667</sup> Hamilton, “Supermarket USA Confronts State Socialism: Airlifting the Technopolitics of Industrial Food Distribution into Cold War Yugoslavia,” 152–153.

The American intentions partly failed. In one sense, the USIA achieved its goal very soon: the first American-style supermarket opened in Belgrade in April 1958, the same American model from the fair bought by the “Vračar” enterprise,<sup>668</sup> and the number and popularity of these supermarkets continued to increase rapidly. Although, from a propaganda point of view, the Yugoslav consumers adopted the American style of consuming and partly enjoyed the feeling of free (even if limited) commodity choice, these supermarkets were American only in the sense that they sold branded goods at a central location. Indeed, as Patrick H. Patterson suggests, the Yugoslav supermarkets in both the 1960s and 1970s tended to be quite small and sold only a limited range of groceries generally manufactured in Eastern Europe, and combined American self-service shopping with more personalized forms of retailing such as the open-air markets (the *pijacas*).<sup>669</sup> Nevertheless, according to the Trade fair surveys conducted jointly by Yugoslav and American poll agencies, the Supermarket USA was a successful propaganda story,<sup>670</sup> impressing the visitors, whetting images, with new gender and leisure spaces that partly revolutionized the idea of consuming and the consumer in Yugoslavia during the next decades.

### 4.2.3 Selling the American Market Economy

In the years to follow, USIS continued exploring themes which could have an increasing “psychological impact on the audience;”<sup>671</sup> at the following Zagreb fairs USIS presented “Marketing and Services in an Industrial Economy” (1960), “Productivity – The Key to Abundance” (1961), “The Constructive Use of Leisure Time” (1962), “Transportation USA” (at the Belgrade Fair, 1962), and “Intensive Farming” (1964).

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<sup>668</sup> *Samoposluga “Cvetni trg”*: *desetogodišnjica osnivanja prvog supermarketa 1958-1968* (Beograd, 1968), 4 quoted in Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam*, 367.

<sup>669</sup> Patrick H. Patterson, “Making Markets Marxist? The East European Grocery Store from Rationing to Rationality to Rationalizations,” in *Food Chains: From Farmyard to Shopping Cart*, ed. Warren Belasco and Roger Horowitz (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 196–216.

<sup>670</sup> See the references on the 1957 Supermarket USA exhibit in Visitors’ reaction to the U.S. Versus Major Competing Exhibits at the 1958 Zagreb Trade Fair, Dec. 1958, PMS-35, Box 1, Program and Media Studies 1956-1962, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP. Yugoslav newspapers gave a rather unsympathetic report of the U.S. exhibition and its audience impact (Jakovina, “Narodni kapitalizam protiv narodnih demokracija,” 474–477).

<sup>671</sup> Robert Hickok, ICS, to Harris, ICS, and Wilson, I, Oct. 1, 1964, Box 21, Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP.

The first of these high appealing exhibits, “Marketing and Services in Industrial Economies,” was attended by 1.2 million Yugoslavs of a total attendance of 1.4 million, with a participation of 124 U.S. firms and 84 exhibitors in a pavilion of 8483 square meters. As was traditional, the fair was opened by Marshall Tito accompanied, for the occasion, by other high Yugoslav officials (Edvard Kardelj, Vladimir Bakarić, Ivan Gošnjak, Milentije Popović, and Zagreb’s mayor Većeslav Holjevac), foreign diplomats and, exclusively, George Allen, USIA director and former ambassador to Yugoslavia. The exhibit consisted, after the entrance gate dedicated to the Presidential message and poster, of a small area devoted to photomurals of drug stores in America. The Compact Cars section displayed the Corvair, the Falcon, the Lark and the Valiant, whilst the Shopping Centers USA portrayed the type and size of a community-shopping complex in America. Besides the Drug Fair, Space Exploration (where two satellite models, Pioneer V and Tyros I, portrayed the “man in space”), the Fashion and the Ampex Video Tape sections, the “Kitchen” section shone as the star of the exhibit. That part was particularly catching because the visitor to the fair could observe three kitchens, one of the 1920s, one of the 1960s and one of the future, all designed to show how research and design have simplified the housewife’s chores. As the Moscow exhibit in Sokolniki, “the kitchen of the future proved to be about the biggest attraction at the U.S. exhibit.”<sup>672</sup>

In 1961, when the U.S. pavilion presented “Productivity – The Key to Abundance,” an entire exhibition woven by the story line of productivity and the worker, dramatizing on how technology could enhance the value of an individual worker, put a premium upon his safety, training, skills, education, and new job opportunities, enabling him to acquire and enjoy a more abundant standard of living.<sup>673</sup> Though it lacked the major crowding of the Supermarket USA or the RCA color television of 1958, its Aeromobile 200-2,<sup>674</sup> a ground effect vehicle travelling on a cushion of air a few inches above the

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<sup>672</sup> Despatch 25 from Zagreb to Department of State, Nov. 25, 1960, 868.191-ZA/11-2560, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>673</sup> Draft Planning Paper of the U.S. Department of Commerce for the U.S. Exhibition 1961 International Trade Fair, Zagreb, March 21, 1961, Box 5, Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP; Despatch 411 from Zagreb to the Department of State, Dec. 27, 1960, 868.191-ZA/12-2760, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>674</sup> Despatch 22 from Zagreb to the Department of State, Oct. 4, 1961, 868.191-ZA/10-461, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

ground, developed by an Illinois country doctor, managed to attract the highest number of visitors for the American pavilion generally.<sup>675</sup>

More importantly, it sent a well-defined message of the benefits of market capitalism: “As the individual worker produces more – through better machinery, higher safety standards and better training for his job – his added contribution is reflected in greater material rewards and opportunities to cultivate a more meaningful life. Thus, the country as a whole grows and prospers” quoted President Kennedy in his poster message.<sup>676</sup> In more simplistic terms, “Productivity – The Key to Abundance” wanted to prove that the growing U.S. productivity had meant jobs for more people, higher living standards, increased investments in industry and agriculture, and more social welfare policies.

Transportation USA was a USIA exhibit that came from the Soviet Union and constituted the U.S. pavilion of the Belgrade Technical Fair in spring 1962 and the Ninth Ljubljana International Electronics Fair in October 1962. Designed by George Nelson, Transportation USA was the second exhibition to travel to the Soviet Union. It featured a Cessna Skyhawk airplane, a Ford Thunderbird hardtop car, a 4-meter model of a Boeing 707 passenger aircraft, a scale model of a concept car on a circular track and additional information on public transport systems. The emphasis was again, as for many other exhibitions, “on the range of choice available to the American traveler.”<sup>677</sup> USIS Belgrade ordered other new items for the Yugoslav shows such as a Mack 25 ton Dumper, a caterpillar Traxcavator, a Desert Rat remote area vehicle, a Dodge pickup with a camper body and an International Harvester Scout, all displayed on 600 square meters of outdoor space. The 1,200 square meters of interior space was occupied by

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<sup>675</sup> “The Machine is an example [...] of what individual initiative and genius, combined with the assistance of big business and government, can produce. Some 15 American firms donated parts for the machine, and it was presented as being sufficiently well advanced to merit public presentation. [...] it is an excellent example of the result of America’s free enterprise spirit and technological opportunities” (Content and Theme of U.S. Exhibition – Walkthrough and Background Information, June 26, 1961, Box 5, Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP). See also 10th Semiannual Report – Special International Program, Jan. 1 – June 30, 1961, S-50-61, Box 17, Special Reports 1953-1997, USIA Office of Research, RG 306, NACP: 18–19 and Telegram 111 from Zagreb to the Secretary of State, Sept. 18, 1961, 868.191-ZA/9-1861, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>676</sup> Despatch 26 from Zagreb to the Department of State, Oct. 30, 1961, 868.191-ZA/ID-3061, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP: 19.

<sup>677</sup> Masey and Morgan, *Cold War Confrontations*, 304.

photographic panels, models, and mock-ups, a Ford station wagon, a Lincoln Continental, a Plymouth Coronado, an air-stream trailer, a U.S. rubber storage tank, a model of the Pan American terminal building in New York and Tele-register, a model of automatic equipment for making airline reservations. The most visited was the John Glenn capsule, whilst USIS showed three films about the Glenn flight, rocket belt and general American transportation and distributed over 200,000 Transportation USA pamphlets.<sup>678</sup> Walter Roberts, Belgrade's Public Officer, recalled,

We had beautiful exhibits coming from the United States, and they were always part of the Belgrade fair. As a matter of course, and policy, Tito came to these fairs. [He] was very interested. I remember the capsule in which Glenn, later Senator Glenn, circled the Earth; we got that capsule to show it. I remember I showed it to Tito [who] said "Well, I'd have to lose a lot of weight to get into it."<sup>679</sup>



**Figure 4-1: John Glenn Capsule arrives at Belgrade Airport (Courtesy of Mark Taplin). Source: Taplin, Mark. "Global Publicks: Walter Roberts: USIS Magazines and Exhibits in Yugoslavia -**

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<sup>678</sup> Airgram 270 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Sept. 19, 1962, 868.191-BE/9-1962, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP. Despite the Yugoslav Press Law of 1960, the Federal Secretariat of Information permitted the distribution of foreign materials, such as brochures and pamphlets, only if related to the fair's theme (Telegram 6358 from Belgrade to Secretary of State, April 8, 1964, Box 21, Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP).

<sup>679</sup> Mark Taplin, "Global Publicks: Walter Roberts: USIS Magazines and Exhibits in Yugoslavia - 'I'm Red-Faced. I Apologize,'" accessed February 22, 2016, <http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-roberts-isis-magazines-and.html>.

‘I’m Red-Faced. I Apologize.’ Accessed February 22, 2016. <http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-roberts-isis-magazines-and.html>.

In the same year, USIS participated at the Zagreb Autumn Fair with “Constructive Use of Leisure Time,” a theme of “mass appeal,” “first class in every way,” enhancing “the prestige of the United States,” not too narrow nor too specialized but “representative of some important aspects of the American way of life.”<sup>680</sup> The U.S. exhibition included the “Creative Home” section on American recreation rooms, workshops, photo equipment, paint spray cans, slides and film projectors. It integrated also an “Outdoor Living and Recreation” unit with an A-frame ski lodge, summer cottage, plastic swimming pool, squab diving equipment, archery equipment, and American made camp trailer. The Mercury capsule, even if not related to the exhibition, proved very popular among the Yugoslav public, as was the space race generally.<sup>681</sup> The section of Plastics USA, originally the first touring exhibition in the Soviet Union in 1961, was focused on the products in industry rather than industry itself, putting the emphasis on “the variety and adaptability of plastics for use in automotive design, medicine, clothing, home furnishings and houseware.”<sup>682</sup> Among other noteworthy sections, the “Constructive Use of Leisure Time by Women,” which included clothes making and home beauty aids, was the most gender oriented.<sup>683</sup> In “Constructive Use of

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<sup>680</sup> Airgram 251 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Dec. 29, 1961, 868.191-ZA/12-2961, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP. In 1962, the Zagreb Trade Fair touched records: it saw the participation of 37 countries from four continents, including nine underdeveloped countries as Ghana, Guinea, Ethiopia, Mali, Sudan, Nigeria, Togo and Liberia with 1.6 million attendees. Prominent visitors to the Fair were Luigi Preti, Italian Minister of Foreign Commerce, Kjell Holler, Norwegian Minister of Industry, Tadeusz Kropozinsky, Deputy Minister of Commerce of Poland, Frederick Erroll, British Minister of Commerce, Major German Titov, Soviet cosmonaut and others. Among the prominent Yugoslav party leaders there appeared, besides Tito, more than 30 of the highest leaders: presidents, vice presidents, secretaries of the Federal Executive Council, the League of Communists and the Republics Assemblies (Airgram 33 from Zagreb to the Department of State, Oct. 29, 1962, 868.191-ZA/1-1663, Box 2706, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP).

<sup>681</sup> The Yugoslav passionate follow-up of the U.S.-Soviet space race, their rocket shuttle, astronauts and cosmonauts is narrated in Radina Vučetić, “Soviet Cosmonauts and American Astronauts in Yugoslavia. Who Did the Yugoslavs Love More?” in *Soviet Space Culture. Cosmic Enthusiasm in Socialist Societies*, ed. Eva Maurer et al. (New York; Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 188–205. For the visit of the Apollo 11 crew to Yugoslavia, look into Radina Vučetić, “Komadić Meseca za druga Tita. Poseta posade Apollo 11 Jugoslaviji,” in *1968 - Četrdeset godina posle / 1968 - Forty Years Later* (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008), 313–38.

<sup>682</sup> Masey and Morgan, *Cold War Confrontations*, 302.

<sup>683</sup> Airgram 33 from Zagreb to the Department of State, Oct. 29, 1962, 868.191-ZA/1-1663, Box 2706, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP: 15-17.

Leisure Time,” USIS wanted to communicate that Americans work hard (with the “Do-It-Yourself” unit for example) but still put a lot effort into organizing their leisure time. On the contrary, and that was the main Consulate’s criticism, the final message perceived was that “Americans are very rich people with a great deal of spare time that they use for sports, arts and crafts and so forth.” Consequently, USIS urged and strongly recommended that, since the Yugoslav public was getting accustomed to more sophisticated messages (“they are no longer impressed by displays of consumer goods and luxury items”), “our message should be more for the «eye» than for the «ear»” and that greater emphasis should be placed upon more sophisticated technologies such as the U.S. automatic computer systems.<sup>684</sup>

The codification of messages commenced with the Supermarket USA, determined to prove and persuade Yugoslav citizens of the superiority of the U.S. free market system over state-centered communist economies (and by far supporting pro-market reforms of the Yugoslav self-management socialism), ended – almost symbolically – with the “Intensive Farming: A Story of American Food from Field to Table” at the Zagreb 1964 fair. Managed by Fritz Berliner and designed by Peter Muller from Munk Associates of New York, the Intensive Farming exhibition presented a technologically advanced story of the history of American agricultural triumph over nature. The exhibition units included the graphic history of American intensive farming and addressed several interrelated issues on the county agents, irrigation, pesticides, egg production, automatic milking, hot feeding, grain, seeds and feed equipment, rural electrification, film packaging, milk processing, apple cutting, pickle injection, potato chips production, hot meat merchandising, outdoor barbecue, and the vacation home. The exhibition incorporated an emotionally sound message of President Johnson, just running for his second mandate and first elections in November 1964:

The Toil of Man to feed his kind is the struggle that unites all people. I know the sacrifices involved. I grew up on a farm. I return there whenever time permits, to the land, where human solidarity is a necessity and where progress through work of mind and body is hard to win. Eighty years ago 80 percent of American labor farmed the fields to feed our forbearers. Today in America less than eight percent suffice to feed all of us and more. If we, together, are to win

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<sup>684</sup> Airgram 717 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Jan. 16, 1963, 868.191-ZA/1-1663, Box 2706, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

our war on poverty, to win a world free of hunger, we must share our “know how.” That is what our exhibition, rendering a glimpse of American farming methods, attempts to do.<sup>685</sup>

In other words, intensive farming meant “a nearly constant amount of cropland [per hectare and per hour of work] to provide more than enough food for an expanding population [...] by means of capital input in the form of such things as fertilizers, improved seeds, pesticides, irrigation, better tillage practices and mechanization.”<sup>686</sup> When on September 11, the American Day at the fair, Edvard Kardelj and his spouse accompanied by Pero Pirker, Zagreb’s Mayor, and Miko Tripalo, president of the City Committee of SKH, visited the U.S. pavilion, Kardelj found himself “very impressed with slides explaining the voluntary relationship between government and individuals.”<sup>687</sup>

The key point was that “U.S. agriculture [was] productive because of free enterprise orientation and [the] government as [a] service not as a director.”<sup>688</sup> The USIS officers were particularly insistent on this because the “private peasants in Yugoslavia [were] subject to harassment and discrimination in favor of the Socialist sector of agriculture.”<sup>689</sup> They suggested American technological superiority was an end-product of its free institutions that provided the necessary incentives while nourishing “the vitality and ingenuity of [the] individual”<sup>690</sup>. Still, the State Department and USIA policymakers were not always univocal in defining the goals and methods of these exhibitions. In the case of the Intensive Farming exhibition, Nick Andrews from the Yugoslav Desk thought that an overwhelming propagandistic effort would harm the expanding trade relations with Yugoslavia while Edwin Pancoast, from the USIA

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<sup>685</sup> Production Script for Intensive Farming Exhibit – Department of Commerce, 1964, Box 21, Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>686</sup> Ibid.

<sup>687</sup> Telegram 37 from Zagreb to the Secretary of State, Sept. 14, 1964, Box 21, Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>688</sup> Charles H. Clarke, ITP, to USIA, State, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor and others, March 25, 1964, Box 21, Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>689</sup> Telegram 55 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, March 20, 1964, Box 21, Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>690</sup> Airgram 8549 from Department of State to Belgrade, Feb. 25, 1964, TP 8-1 YUGO (ZA), Box 21, Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP.

European area (IAE) was rather skeptic on the simplistic correlation of the exhibition message with American-style farming.<sup>691</sup>



Figure 4-2: A farm airplane designed for crop spraying by Piper Aircraft Corporation (Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD). Source: Photographs of American Pavilion at Zagreb Trade Fair 1964, Box 20, Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP.

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<sup>691</sup> Edwin Pancoast, IAE, to Robert Hickok, ICS/OD, Feb. 12, 1964, Box 21, Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP.



Figure 4-3: Farmhand Feedmaster by Daffin Corporation allows a farmer to grind and mix livestock feed to suit individual needs (Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD). Source: Photographs of American Pavilion at Zagreb Trade Fair 1964, Box 20, Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP.



Figure 4-4: Machine for film packaging of food products by W. R. Grace & Co. (Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD). Source: Photographs of American Pavilion at Zagreb Trade

Fair 1964, Box 20, Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP.

### 4.3 Displays Get Sophisticated (1967-1970)

According to Washington's policymakers, the end of the 1960s reserved four very popular U.S. exhibitions with high-pitched impact. In 1967, the USIA inaugurated a series of four exhibits designed to show leadership groups and the public of Yugoslavia how a free-enterprise economy met the consumer needs. The first was "Modern Management and Marketing" (1967), the second "Packaging-USA" (1968), followed by "Research and Development USA" (1969) and completed with "Industrial Design USA" (1970).

The second of these series, Packaging USA, was held in Zagreb between September 12 and 22, 1968, then moved to Budapest in May 1969, to Poznan (Poland) in June, and was ultimately modified and updated for the Berlin Industries Fair in September 1969. Focused on packaging design, materials, and production, as well as illustrations of various functions of packaging in distributions, merchandising, and advertising, marketing and customer service, Packaging USA projected an image of American experts and leadership in serving the final consumer.<sup>692</sup>

Visitors entered the exhibit over a plate-glass floor through a passageway surrounded by mirrors in which myriads of packages were projected into infinity. Next, 48 showcases displayed the variety of American packaging in terms of their salient functions or characteristics: product protection and preservation, consumer convenience, innovation, and design. The pavilion facilities also included a small lounge and library with USIS periodicals and reference materials. Bruce Wills, formerly manager of the Packing Division of the American Management Association, New York, conducted the exhibit seminar. These seminars relied on their ability to reach Yugoslav leadership groups in depth, where executives from American industry and specialists representing labor and government established fruitful and rare personal contacts.<sup>693</sup>

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<sup>692</sup> Special International Exhibition – Seventh Annual Report, July 1, 1968 – June 30, 1969, Box 13, USIA Director's Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP: 7.

<sup>693</sup> According to the USIA report, the Packaging USA seminars were unusually well attended. Yugoslav managers and merchandisers welcomed the opportunity to establish direct personal contacts with American packaging specialists (Ibid, 35).

That this, for the USIA Yugoslavia, was a special cultural Cold War battlefield and strategical political arena, is proven by the fact that Packaging USA was the second Zagreb fair to be visited by USIA director, Leonard H. Marks (1965-1968), who accompanied Ambassador Elbrick and President Tito on the opening day roundtrip.<sup>694</sup> The fact that on September 12, the fair's "America Day," the pavilion held a reception for 450 Yugoslav officials, dignitaries and commercial leaders, is very indicative of how things had changed from the incidents and frustrations of the Atoms-for-Peace exhibit in 1955, when the refreshment reception was denied to the organizers.<sup>695</sup>

The third of these sophisticated displays was the "Research and Development USA," presented firstly at Zagreb International Fall Fair in September 1969 and then re-used in the Budapest, Poznan and Bucharest International Fairs the following spring and in October 1970. It featured a wide range of products manufactured by leading American firms, background graphics, photos and texts illustrating the vital role of research and development in responding to consumer needs and preferences. The subject was dramatized by the display of an Apollo Command Module, famous for having completed a manned flight to the moon, lent to the USIA by the Smithsonian Institute. President Tito and his official party leaders were among the more than 800,000 visitors attracted by the Apollo 8 that made the pavilion an "unprecedented success" of the fair, while 125 leaders from all Yugoslav republics attended the pavilion's seminars and symposia.

Lastly, the much-travelled "Industrial Design USA" exhibit, reshaped from the Brno International Fair in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Industrial Fair, was initially exhibited in the Soviet Union, then in Zagreb and in an updated version in Bucharest and two other major Romanian cities, Iasi and Brasov. The exhibit included a wide-ranging array of products from American industry, contrasting some older items with contemporary versions, demonstrating effects of miniaturization, new forms and materials, and mass production.<sup>696</sup> Eugene Smith, the famous American designer of

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<sup>694</sup> The first one was "Marketing and Services in Industrial Economies" (1960) granted by the presence of George Allen (USIA director from 1957 to 1960).

<sup>695</sup> Special International Exhibition – Seventh Annual Report, July 1, 1968 – June 30, 1969, Box 13, USIA Director's Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP: 7.

<sup>696</sup> Special International Exhibition – Seventh Annual Report, July 1, 1968 – June 30, 1969: 15. Exhibitors included Abbott Labs, American Instrument Co., Bell Telephone Laboratories, Beckman Instruments,

“Why Ugliness-Why Not?” curated the exhibition<sup>697</sup> after Frank Shakespeare, the USIA director who followed Leonard Marks, personally besought him at the Bucharest Industrial Design exhibit.<sup>698</sup> Moreover, the Industrial Design seminars included prominent American leading designers as guests, such as Clare MacKichan from the General Motors Design Studios, Yay Doblin from Unimark International, and William Katavolos from the Parsons School of Design.<sup>699</sup> Another extraordinary success of the fair was the Moon Rock Exhibit that arrived in Zagreb after the Belgrade Technical Fair in February 1970 and that gained fabulous TV nationwide coverage.<sup>700</sup>

That Industrial USA was a political event of highest revenue is proven by the fact that President Nixon nominated Robert Murphy, at the time head of the board of directors of Corning Glass International and his personal adviser, to be his representative at the openings on September 10 1970.<sup>701</sup> Indeed, Robert Murphy was a unique diplomat for the history of Yugoslav-American foreign relations for the prestigious role he played in the Allies’ negotiations with Tito and his partisans in the last years of World War II. Apart from being a special representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa, he appeared at the Marshall Tito-General Wilson meeting and at the Tito-Churchill encounters in Naples and on the island of Vis. In 1954, he helped defuse tensions between Yugoslavia and Italy and until 1959 he served as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, when he finally retired.<sup>702</sup>

Examined from the point of view of Washington’s policymakers, the American exhibitions at the Yugoslav fairs point to a crucial argument. Whilst in general the

California Computer, Corning Glass, Cyanamid International, Eaton Yale & Towne, General Dynamics, General Electric, Parke-Davis Sunen, Uni-Royal, Vendo, and Xerox (“How to build a corporate image and sell in an East European market,” *Business Abroad*, Dec. 1969, enclosed in Henry A. Dunlap to Frank Shakespeare, March 17, 1970, Box 13, USIA Director’s Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP: 18–20).

<sup>697</sup> Henry A. Dunlap to Frank Shakespeare, Nov. 3, 1970, Box 13, USIA Director’s Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>698</sup> Frank Shakespeare, USIA Director, to Henry Dunlop, ICS, July 23, 1969, Box 13, USIA Director’s Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>699</sup> Frank Shakespeare to Clare Mac Kichan, General Motors, Oct. 14, 1970, Box 13, USIA Director’s Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>700</sup> Kempton B. Jenkins to Frank Shakespeare, Jan. 26, 1970, Box 13, USIA Director’s Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>701</sup> Informacije o dolasku Roberta Marfija na otvaranje Zagrebačkog Velesajma, Sept. 2, 1970, 09 542, Box 44, Savjet IVS za odnose s inozemstvom 1967-1973, RG 1409, HDA.

<sup>702</sup> “Robert D. Murphy,” U.S. Department of State Archives, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/stamps/67016.htm>.

USIA handled Yugoslavia as a case apart from the rest of Eastern Europe, in the specific case of the trade fairs, this “Coca-Cola communist country” was treated as part of the USIA’s East European tours. Was the USIA proving in this way that Yugoslavia’s economic paradigm needed as much “westernization” as its Eastern neighbors? There is no univocal response. It is unquestionable that, as much as in Eastern Europe, the American pavilions in Yugoslavia were consumer-care oriented. They insisted on instructing the public on tangible free enterprise benefits for an average customer. They explored new commercial routes for American corporations. Finally, did their role include only soft power commodification or do they suggest a larger Cold War battlefield inside a supposed neutral territory? We will discuss this in the final section of this chapter.

#### 4.4 Soft Power Commodities and Cold War Battlefields

“Among the strongest individual memories of life under state socialism – explains Slovenian scholar Breda Luthar – is the lack of desired goods, the «culture of shortages» and the «dictatorship over needs».”<sup>703</sup> Indeed, commodity culture had a central place, not only in everyday life, but also in the public and political discourse in Yugoslavia. At the Seventh Congress of the League of Communists in 1958, the SKJ program declared that in the worldwide arena “socialism in the economic battle with capitalism, had to win.” To achieve the socialist goal, namely “the individual happiness of every man,” socialism had to pursue the “maximum satisfaction of the individual and collective needs of its citizens,” accept “private ownership [...] over different commodities,” increased life standards, private ownership and personal consumption, and, finally, the productivity of work. The Yugoslav communists considered that consumption had to be increased and aligned with the pace of economic development by increasing the social control over trade and enlarging the network of supermarkets and the demand for commodity goods.

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<sup>703</sup> Breda Luthar, “Shame, Desire and Longing for the West. A Case Study of Consumption,” in *Remembering Utopia: The Culture of Everyday Life in Socialist Yugoslavia*, ed. Breda Luthar and Maruša Pušnik (Washington, DC: New Academia Publishing, 2010), 341.

As Igor Duda proposed, we could choose the year 1958 and the SKJ Program of the Seventh Congress to indicate the birth of the consumer society in Yugoslavia.<sup>704</sup> In the light of the Supermarket USA exhibition of 1957 and the first Belgrade American-style supermarket opened in April 1958, this coincidence seems rather suggestive. Moreover, the concepts of “individual needs,” “private ownership,” and “personal consumption” used in the 1958 SKJ Program imply that there was in play some ideological hybridization of Marxism with liberal capitalist concepts.

The organs of the League of Communists discussed the positive and negative sides of the consumer society, addressed negatively the bourgeois and snob mentalities, tendencies and acts, and considered positively those incomes produced by major personal engagement in superior work productivity (like extra hours).<sup>705</sup> The question about the morally acceptable consumer practices and the immoral embourgeoisement of the working class remained a debated ideological category for the communist organs.<sup>706</sup> Certainly, the Yugoslav government utilized the rising standard of living and commodification of culture as a weapon of consent.<sup>707</sup> The trade fairs in Zagreb and Belgrade were a trial field that exposed positive internal economic advancement and, consequently, higher standards of living and greater availability of consumer goods.

Concerning the USIA strategies at the Yugoslav fairs, their objective was two-fold: popularize American-style consumerism and *way of life* and affirm export trade relations with Eastern European countries for American businessmen and corporations. Exceptionally, the Yugoslav restrictive commercial legislation prevented larger foreign

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<sup>704</sup> Igor Duda, “Konzumerizmom do konzumizma? Potrošačka kultura u Hrvatskoj od 1950-tih do 1980-tih,” in *Potrošačka kultura i konzumerizam*, ed. Snježana Čolić (Zagreb: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2013), 85–86.

<sup>705</sup> Igor Duda, *Pronađeno blagostanje: svakodnevni život i potrošačka kultura u Hrvatskoj 1970 - ih i 1980 - ih*, 2nd ed. (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2014), 93–109.

<sup>706</sup> For example, Patterson has argued that the Yugoslav compromise around consumer practices and Marxist mentality ended up in, what he defines as, the “Yugoslav dream,” “modern but modest, rewarding but reasonable.” The Yugoslav variant of consumerism did not promote social differentiation through consumption, or at least did not explicitly, as in the case of free-wheeling practices in the West. “This was mass consumption, not massive consumption,” asserts Patterson (Patrick H. Patterson, *Bought and Sold*, 194, 148–196).

<sup>707</sup> Patterson claims that, while inside and outside the circles of official power a heated debate arose over the contradiction between Marxist ideology and massive embracement of consumption, consumerism was one of the critical factors that held the Yugoslav multiethnic society together during the “gold” 1960s and 1970s. Relying on extensive investigation, he argues that the economic downturn of the 1980s stripped the model of Yugoslav legitimacy and materialized publicly nationalist resentment and, ultimately, ethnic conflicts and war (Patterson, *Bought and Sold*).

trade relations (the lack of foreign currencies, state permissions for enterprises and so forth) which ultimately disappointed American business makers and executives. For the USIA, the first objective had the highest priority.<sup>708</sup> The U.S. pavilions became public spaces of mass culture consumption that trained appetites and imaginary desires. They were the embodiment of freedom of choice and freedom to choose, that, for the field officers, would entice pro-American stances and frames of mind. For both sides, the exhibitions represented soft power commodities with the intention of persuading the Yugoslav public.<sup>709</sup>

The USIS field officers in Zagreb mostly cared about the first impact. Since the fair audience tended to “see everything in one day,” they had to create “something truly dazzling or exciting.” To achieve it, the USIS management relied on the good demonstration techniques of their employees. So, for example, Warren Peace who demonstrated the apple peeling and coring machine at the Intensive Farming exhibit in 1964, proved to be “a showman with a captivating type of humor [who added a] chuckle [...] to an otherwise serious demonstration” and provided “the illusive bridge that binds the human race together and thus creates an additional and more lasting impact.”<sup>710</sup> The field officers concurred that an overtly propagandistic show would probably be less effective than one with an artful blend of commercial and educational elements. “Having had long experience with propaganda, most Yugoslavs tend[ed] to be somewhat skeptical of obvious attempts to indoctrinate, and skeptical of slogans, charts and statistics. This should be kept in mind and our approach to them should be subtle and indirect” was the leading thought of the exhibition management.<sup>711</sup>

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<sup>708</sup> Despatch 411 from Zagreb to the Department of State, Dec. 27, 1960, 868.191-ZA/12-2760, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>709</sup> Many scholars extensively analyzed the power of the consumer and commodity culture during the Cold War. For some inspiring insights, see Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2006); for a French “national case” perspective consult Richard F. Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 1993), while Elaine T. May explored how consumerism shaped cultural values, success, social mobility, life-styles, gender roles and domestic containment (*Homeward Bound*, 143–162).

<sup>710</sup> Robert Hickok, ICS, to Harris, ICS, and Wilson, I, Oct. 1, 1964, Box 21, Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>711</sup> Airgram 251 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Dec. 29, 1961, 868.191-ZA/12-2961, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

The collaboration with Yugoslav authorities of consular representatives, USIA officers, American architects, designers and managers, was generally stable with some negative outcomes along the way. Apart from periodical accusations of being overtly “propagandistic,”<sup>712</sup> the U.S. pavilions encountered some political complaints from the authorities. For instance, during the 1960 fair the director Ivan Baćun, while visiting the U.S. exhibitions with Bogdan Crnobrnja, Deputy Secretary of State, claimed that he was treated impolitely by three female students from the University of Zagreb working at the pavilion as demonstrators. The incident escalated in a political clash because Baćun requested Edward Montgomery, the Consulate General, to dismiss the employees, whilst, in the meantime, the other employed students threatened to abandon their jobs out of a sense of solidarity. Montgomery insisted for reallocation and threatened to interrupt America’s participation the following year, whilst Baćun threatened with UDBA to obtain the students’ names. Surprisingly, the episode ended with no particular consequences and the students remained in their jobs.<sup>713</sup>

Another political incident occurred during the Ninth Ljubljana International Electronics Fair in October 1962, where USIS participated with Transportation USA. During the exhibit, Dejan Kostić of the American Information Desk distributed some questionnaires asking visitors for information on relatives in the United States, travel habits and contacts in foreign countries, membership of U.S. associations, clubs and political parties, including the Communist Party. Marko Nikezić, the Undersecretary of DSIP, treated the issue personally and with the highest regard, demanding the urgent removal of the questionnaires, because they were “transgressing all proper limits and [...] would not be permitted in the future.”<sup>714</sup>

In the light of the evidence, facts and events analyzed above, what conclusion could be drawn of the effective impact of the American fairs at the Yugoslav, mainly Zagreb, trade fairs? Repeatedly, the reports from the Zagreb Consulate emphasize the fact that the U.S. pavilions were, year by year, the most visited at the Fair. The Yugoslav

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<sup>712</sup> See for example “Slabost najjačih,” *Ekonomska politika*, Sept. 17, 1960, 867.

<sup>713</sup> Despatch 9 from Zagreb to the Department of State, Sept. 19, 1960, 868.191-ZA/9-1960, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>714</sup> Airgram 495 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 17, 1962, 868.191-LJ/11-1762, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

newspaper gave a contradictory statement and description, as happened in the case of the Supermarket USA reports in *Vjesnik*.

To measure the medium and long-term effect and co-optation power of the fair exhibitions requires different sources and social science instruments. The American participation at the Sokolniki fair is in this case illustrative. While the general public opinion, newspapers and many scholars have highly validated the American exhibition in Moscow to have been psychologically and propagandistically effective,<sup>715</sup> Ralph K. White, the USIA officer charged with an initial effectiveness evaluation, noted the unrealistic Soviet expectations of what they were going to see, their disappointment over the scarcity of American technology at the exhibition, and the general lack of signage and visual information to guide the visitors. According to Masey and Morgan, the problem of analyzing the success of the Moscow Exhibition is that the U.S. pavilion had no competition at the Moscow fair other than Soviet preconceptions about the United States. From the USIA perspective, what can be learned from the American National Exhibition is that it confirmed the success of a method of presentation by combining impressive architecture, commodity goods and, above all, human contact.<sup>716</sup> Could this interpretation be applied to the American participation at the Yugoslav fairs? It certainly fits in with the positive outcomes of some notable U.S. pavilions: the Atoms-for-Peace, the Supermarket USA, the 1960-1964 consumer and commodity oriented themes and the sophisticated displays of the late 1960s.

Among the American pavilions, Supermarket USA represents certainly a more easily measurable final point. In May 1958, *Poljoprivredne Vesti* (Agricultural News) published a special issue on the first self-service store in Belgrade and Yugoslavia. According to the Embassy records, it offered the “most varied foodstuffs and kitchen supplies, including frozen meat, fruit and vegetables” and was equipped with refrigerators, cash registers, display stands, and purchase trolleys, already used for the Zagreb exhibition. The store attracted a huge number of visitors on the opening day, “deeply impressed by the huge quantities of packaged foodstuffs [...] in such cute and hygienic wrappings.” Among the first visitors, there were Karl Rankin, the U.S.

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<sup>715</sup> David Caute, *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 33–51.

<sup>716</sup> Masey and Morgan, *Cold War Confrontations*, 248–251.

Ambassador and Lloyd Larson, director of the ICA Mission. Larson stated that the new self-service store represented “an extraordinary progress” in comparison with the traditional Yugoslav method of food distribution, while Milorad Jovanović, director of the Vračar enterprise, expressed his gratitude for the help of two American experts, Rolin Moon and John Gallop, whose two months stay in Yugoslavia was covered by the Department of Agriculture and the Colonial Stores Company.<sup>717</sup>

The themes addressed at these pavilions perfectly illustrates what another exhibition, this time a contemporary one, has underscored over the relations of socialism and modernism. In late 2011 and the first months of 2012, the Museum of Contemporary Art in Zagreb organized an exhibition entitled “Socialism and modernity: Art, Culture and Politics (1950-1974).” Although it was a joint project by authors of different perspectives of the Croatian socialist past, it nevertheless underlined how the Yugoslav society and culture, created in the context of a cultural struggle for hearts and minds, produced its own version of modernity. Nonetheless, the distinctiveness of “western” modernity framed and conceptualized the Yugoslav modernity in spheres of architecture, urbanism and home furniture.<sup>718</sup> It would not be too impertinent to affirm that the U.S. pavilions at the Yugoslav fair publicized a kind of modernity and commodity culture that would develop in public places of both highbrow and mass-consumption culture in Yugoslavia.

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<sup>717</sup> Despatch 656 from USIS Belgrade to Department of State, June 27, 1958, 511.688/6-2758, Box 2204, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP. The first Yugoslav-styled supermarket was opened in December 1956 in Ivanec, a small town nearby Zagreb. According to Vučetić, it was the very first supermarket in this part of Eastern Europe (Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam*, 366–367).

<sup>718</sup> See for example the contributions of Sandra Kržić Roban, Ljiljana Kolečnik and Dead Duda in Ljiljana Kolečnik, ed., *Socijalizam i modernost: umjetnost, kultura, politika 1950.-1974.* (Zagreb: Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 2012).

# 5 BETWEEN ART AND SOUND DIPLOMACY: THE CULTURAL PRESENTATION PROGRAM AND THE YUGOSLAV *VOICE OF AMERICA*

*During the Yugoslav tour, the Nikolais group performed before enthusiastic capacity audiences [...]. The acclaim the group received in Skopje, Sarajevo, and Ljubljana was almost as great as in Belgrade. Certainly not all people could appreciate what to many was rather new, revolutionary theatre, but this did not affect the enthusiasm they displayed in receiving it. Yugoslav audiences are grateful for the opportunity to see what is new, experimental or avant-garde and there is no question that they look primarily to the U.S. for this.*

American Embassy Belgrade on the Alvin Nikolais Dance Company tour in 1968<sup>719</sup>

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<sup>719</sup> Ralph T. Backlund, CU/CP, to Edward D. Re, Dec. 19, 1968, Folder 8, Box 21, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Manuscript Collection 468 (hereafter MC 468), Special Collection, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville, Arkansas (hereafter UAL).

*Microhistory tries not to sacrifice knowledge of individual elements to wider generalization, and in fact it accentuates individual lives and events. But, at the same time, it tries not to reject all forms of abstraction since minimal facts and individual cases can serve to reveal more general phenomena.*

Giovanni Levi<sup>720</sup>

The performances of American artists sent on worldwide tours by the State Department agencies microhistories reveal the inner workings of the cultural Cold War. During several decades, the U.S. policy makers related to artists and musicians in order to exploit their prestige in Europe and worldwide, whilst the latter took advantage of the cultural diplomacy agenda either for personal success or for prioritizing their race or gender equality agenda.

It was on July 27 1954, that President Eisenhower requested from Congress five million dollars of additional funds at his discretion “to assist and encourage private musical, dramatic and other cultural groups”<sup>721</sup> in tours abroad. The President’s Special International Program for Cultural Presentation, or more simply the President’s Fund, was the forerunner of the Cultural Presentation Program officially enacted in August 1956 with the passage of Public Law 860, the International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act, administered by the State Department through its Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU).<sup>722</sup> Publicly, the purpose of the program was to “strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the cultural interests, developments and achievements of the people of the United States [...] and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic and peaceful relations [with] other countries.”<sup>723</sup> However, in private correspondence, President Eisenhower

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<sup>720</sup> Giovanni Levi, “On Microhistory,” in *New Perspectives on Historical Writing*, ed. Peter Burke, 4th ed. (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 109.

<sup>721</sup> Joseph N. Acinapura, “The Cultural Presentations Program of the United States” (MA thesis, Rutgers University, 1970), enclosed in D.W. Galvin, Vice President of Federation of Rocky Mountain States, Inc., to Dayton Coe, Department of State/ Cultural Presentation Branch, Dec. 2, 1970, Box 1, Records Relating to Selected USIA Programs 1953-1999, USIA Bureau of Programs, RG 306, NACP: 16–17 (hereafter Joseph N. Acinapura, “The Cultural Presentations Program of the United States”).

<sup>722</sup> In 1959, Secretary of State Herter removed cultural work from the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Public Affairs and established a new Bureau of International Cultural Relations (CU) as a home for the department’s cultural, exchange, and exhibitions activities. Reorganized again in 1960, CU became the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 181).

<sup>723</sup> Special International Program – Tenth Semiannual Report, Jan. 1-June 30, 1961, S-50-61, Box 17, Special Reports 1953-1997, USIA Office of Research, RG 306, NACP: 29.

expressed additional strategic goals, “depicting music as a psychological tool that could counteract the stereotypical perception of Americans as «bombastic, jingoistic, and totally devoted to the theories of force and power»” while the “National Security Council executive officer Elmer Staats described it as «a secret weapon».”<sup>724</sup>

Musical performances, as well as drama pieces or sport events, are commonly perceived as possessing “mass appeal in their ability to transport an audience into a variety of emotional states.”<sup>725</sup> But beyond inspiring emotions, artistic performances create communication spaces between the performers and the gathered public. In the case of the U.S. performers sent abroad, the channels enacted were more than one. By investigating the tours of the New York City Ballet to the Soviet Union, the Martha Graham Dance Company to Asia, and the Alwin Ailey Dance Theater to Africa, Clare Croft discovered how these performances appeared ‘in frames’ crafted by the State Department and its various public and private partners. “But these frames do not contain the full picture,” she argues; since these dynamic events were cultural diplomacy embodied “to be simultaneously propaganda and something more than propaganda.”<sup>726</sup>

The U.S. Cultural Presentation Program (CPP) in Yugoslavia engaged both private artists and CU actors, as well as Embassy representatives, Yugoslav art directors, music commentators and journalists in order to create linkages and communicate messages. The impact relied mostly on the cultural environment in Belgrade, Zagreb, Skopje, Ljubljana, Dubrovnik, and other Yugoslav cities. The medium and long-term political intentions encompassed a whole span of psychological effects, mostly focused on enhancing the idea of freedom through classical elitist and unconventional artistic expression.

This chapter will not be an account of the influence of American popular music, mainly jazz and rock’n’roll, on the Yugoslav musical arena and youth. Many scholarly studies have already produced appreciated accounts on these issues. The last two decades have witnessed a higher interest in the follow-up of the hybridization that occurred in Yugoslav popular music, both jazz, rock’n’roll and pop, a musical

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<sup>724</sup> Emily Abrams Ansari, “Shaping the Policies of Cold War Musical Diplomacy: An Epistemic Community of American Composers,” *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 1 (2012): 41.

<sup>725</sup> Kathryn C. Statler, “The Sound of Musical Diplomacy,” *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 1 (2012): 71.

<sup>726</sup> Clare H. Croft, *Dancers as Diplomats: American Choreography in Cultural Exchange*, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), Kindle edition, Introduction.

hybridization between mainly American, British and Italian traditions and local musical folklore.<sup>727</sup> When it came to jazz, and afterwards rock, the Yugoslav authorities, Tito and Kardelj personally, vividly discussed this genre. Since Tito was sensitive to “rock’s potential for rebelliousness,” he hoped that by applying a policy of toleration, he would win the rock scene over “to a supportive stance.” Ramet put it in this way: “His gamble paid off, and the 1960s in particular saw a rush of panegyric rock ballads praising him and his program of self-management.”<sup>728</sup>

In this chapter, discussion will be centered on the role of the State Department and its CPP in popularizing and supporting American classical soloists, choirs and orchestras, jazz and rock artists on tour in Yugoslavia, together with drama theatre and ballet groups, as well as experimental performers. Such cultural engagement was intended to affirm U.S. leadership in classical music and vanguard artistic experimentation, and to consequently dismantle prejudices over the United States’ supposed cultural backwardness. Finally, its goal was to inspire freedom of artistic expression in a communist regime and disseminate heterodox ideas of art unconventionality by linking the Yugoslav cultural scene to Western cultural elites. In this public diplomacy arena, the *Voice of America* – examined in the last section – appeared to be the right channel for publicizing the CPP, even though its end goals were

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<sup>727</sup> The first scholarly interest in the field goes back to the 1990s: Sabrina P. Ramet, ed., *Rocking the State: Rock Music And Politics In Eastern Europe And Russia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) constructs the first analysis of Yugoslav rock music as a cultural, diversionary and political phenomena, whilst several years later Aleksandar Žikić, *Fatalni ringišpil. Hronika beogradskog rokenrola 1959-1979* (Belgrade: Geopoetika, 1999) gives us a provocative account from a journalist’s perspective. During the 1990s, other relevant studies reframed the political and cultural labels of the Yugoslav musical scene as a hybrid between Western and local identity as in Predrag J. Marković, *Beograd između Istoka i Zapada 1948-1965* (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 1996), Aleš Gabrić, *Socijalistična kulturna revolucija. Slovenska kulturna politika 1953 - 1962*. (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1995) and Zoran Janjetović, *Od “Internacionale” do komercijale: Popularna kultura u Jugoslaviji 1945-1991*. (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2011). On jazz as a medium of personal and artistic liberation in a coercive regime, see Reinhard Köchl, Richard Wiedemann, and Peter Tippelt, *Duško Gojković: Jazz ist Freiheit* (Regensburg: ConBrio, 1995). For notable insights on how Yugoslav rock’n’roll has transformed from an ideological enemy to its ally and promotor look into Aleksandar Raković, *Rokenrol u Jugoslaviji 1956-1968. Izazov socijalističkom društvu* (Belgrade: Arhipelag, 2011), Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam*, 163–223; and for a more personal account Siniša Škarica, *Kad je rock bio mlad. Priča sa istočne strane (1956-1970)* (Zagreb: VBZ, 2005). Finally, a recent study about the Italian influences on Yugoslav pop culture and the transpositions of identities and cross-cultural exchange is those of Francesca Rolandi, *Con ventiquattromila baci. L’influenza della cultura di massa italiana in Jugoslavia (1955-1965)*. (Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2015).

<sup>728</sup> Sabrina P. Ramet, “Shake, Rattle, and Self-Management: Making the Scene in Yugoslavia,” in *Kazaaam! Splat! Ploof!: The American Impact on European Popular Culture since 1945*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and Gordana Crnković (Lanham; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 181.

of a political nature, both for the transmitter, the USIA, as for the receiver, the Yugoslav average listener.<sup>729</sup>

None of the relationships explored were unilateral or framed by superiority, neither political nor psychological. The CU accomplished the promotion of a large number of U.S. artists at the major Yugoslav festivals and cultural events, whilst, on the other hand, Yugoslav cultural leaders succeeded in making the U.S. appearances a matter of their own prestige and internationalist significance. Interpersonal and intercultural relations had extraordinary results: for example in 1963 Josip Depolo, director of the annual Dubrovnik Summer Festival, spent three months in the United States under the Foreign Specialist Grant and managed to link eminent cultural personalities of the U.S. art world to the Dubrovnik Festival.<sup>730</sup> This is demonstrated by the long list of American cultural elites who visited the Festival between 1966 and 1969, among them Curtis Davis (cultural director, National Educational Television), Mark Schubart (vice-president, Lincoln Center New York), actress Fay Marbe, Samuel Rubin (president, Rubin Foundation), music critic Paul Affelder, and several renowned professors from Stanford, Chicago and Harvard Universities (among them Wayne Vucinich, Erich Hamp, and David Bynum).<sup>731</sup>

## 5.1 Classic Style, Classy Performances

With the Executive Order 10716 issued on June 17 1957, the President passed the functions of his former Fund to the Department of State. The Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act (with the Executive Order 10912) then amended the latter in January 1961.<sup>732</sup> The program's purpose was two fold: to "provide tours in countries abroad by creative and performing artists and athletes from the United States, individually and in groups, representing any field of the arts, sports, or any other form

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<sup>729</sup> As an additional source of information for this Chapter, I consulted the "Jugosvirke Online Collection" (<https://jugosvirke.wordpress.com/>), an informal, open access, and web archive/blog containing digitized newspaper excerpts, photographs and posters on American artists who played in Yugoslavia in the Cold War era.

<sup>730</sup> Airgram 218 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State (CU), Sept. 13, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP: 13.

<sup>731</sup> Ugledne ličnosti i gosti iz inozemstva koji su pratili izvedbe Dubrovačkih ljetnih igara od 1966 do 1969, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

<sup>732</sup> Special International Program – Tenth Semiannual Report, Jan. 1-June 30, 1961, S-50-61, Box 17, Special Reports 1953-1997, USIA Office of Research, RG 306, NACP: 29.

of cultural attainment”; and to provide “United States representation in international artistic, dramatic, musical, sports [...] and other cultural festivals, competitions, meetings, and like exhibitions and assemblies.”<sup>733</sup> The operational authority of the Program was vested in the Secretary of State, while the action responsibility rested with the CU.<sup>734</sup> The USIA worked with the Department of State in recommending the Advisory Committee on the Arts, handled overseas performances and covered their promotional activities.<sup>735</sup>

Eisenhower charged the American National Theatre and Academy (ANTA) with organizing the CPP. Congress established this New York-based institution in 1935 to serve as the United States’ national theater company. While the State Department arranged the finance and travel logistic, ANTA provided the program’s advisory committees in music, dance, and theater. According to Ansari, the Music Advisory Panel “was responsible for around 65 percent of the tours ANTA organized and a sizeable proportion of its \$2.5 million budget.”<sup>736</sup>

Despite what was a major historiographical interest by today’s standards, the majority of the U.S. sponsored performers were not jazz nor rock musicians.<sup>737</sup> Emily Ansari’s analysis of the Music Advisory Panel’s approvals and rejections operating under the ANTA demonstrates that the vast majority of all were classical musicians, a total of 83 percent over the period spanning from 1954 to 1963. Among these 341 soloists or groups, the most favored were orchestras (among them New York Philharmonic), choirs such as the Robert Shaw Chorale, and chamber music groups, including the Juilliard String Quartet. On the other hand, jazz ensembles never made up

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<sup>733</sup> Cultural Presentation Program of the U.S. Department of State – A Report to the Congress and the Public by the Advisory Committee on the Arts, July 1, 1963-June 30, 1964, Folder 1, Box 49, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

<sup>734</sup> The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU), formerly the Division of Cultural Relations, was organized in 1961 within the Department of State with the responsibility for administering the principal provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act. It functioned as a part of the State Department until 1978 when it merged with the USIA.

<sup>735</sup> Ibid.

<sup>736</sup> Abrams Ansari, “The Sound of Musical Diplomacy,” 41–42.

<sup>737</sup> The topic of jazz men abroad have been a focus of Penny Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006) and “Duke Ellington Plays Baghdad: Rethinking Hard and Soft Power from the Outside In,” in *Contested Democracy: Freedom, Race, and Power in American History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 279–99, and Lisa E. Davenport, *Jazz Diplomacy: Promoting America in the Cold War Era* (Univ. Press of Mississippi, 2010).

more than a third of the groups approved, even if jazz was the second most funded category (apart from classical and jazz music, all other categories, such as folk groups, represented less than 3 percent of funds).<sup>738</sup>

The Music Advisory Panel comprehended well-known experts from the music world, including critics such as Jay Harrison (New York Herald Tribune) and Olin Downes (New York Times), and musicologist and journalist Paul Henry Lang. In addition, three eminent American composers, Howard Hanson, Virgil Thomson, and William Schuman, inspired the panel's most significant policies during its ANTA years (1954-1963).<sup>739</sup> All three of them built successful careers writing tonal music for traditional ensembles such as orchestras and choirs. Consequently, they discouraged jazz and folk music because "there are no standards by which to judge 'light music' except 'charm,' and charm is hard to judge, and it is not international in its acceptance," and the panelists agreed during a 1955 meeting.<sup>740</sup>

Not only the ANTA panel members despised jazz and other forms of "popular" music. Many high positioned cabinet members thought similarly. In his letter to Secretary Dulles dated on July 23 1954, Henry Cabot Lodge (at the time U.S. representative at the UN) proposed that the cultural presentation program should include "quality music, such as Boston Symphony, New York Philharmonic, and American opera singers, pianists, violinists, ballet dancers," all adjusted to the taste of the country in which they are shown, but required that "there must be no vulgarity – no matter how funny or clever or interesting," and ended "I would even avoid jazz music, acrobats, and the Fred Waring type of thing."<sup>741</sup>

Classical music was infused with social prestige and European elite culture that was more widely recognized than the number of listeners would suggest. What mattered was not only the music in itself, but the knowledge of its significance, argues Fosler-Lussier:

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<sup>738</sup> Emily Abrams Ansari, "Shaping the Policies of Cold War Musical Diplomacy: An Epistemic Community of American Composers," *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 1 (2012): 44.

<sup>739</sup> Ibid, 42. Among the three of them, Hanson was director of the Eastman School of Music and William Schuman of the prestigious Juilliard School of New York.

<sup>740</sup> Fosler-Lussier, *Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy*, 23.

<sup>741</sup> Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. representative at UN, to John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, July 23, 1954, 511.00/7-2354, Box 2249, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. Fred Waring was an American popular musician, bandleader and radio-television personality, as well as financial backer and eponym of the Waring Blender, the first modern electric blender on the market.

“Classical music and its avant-garde offshoot were part of a symbolic system in which the association with European elite culture was important to the value of music.”<sup>742</sup>

### 5.1.1 The Dubrovnik Summer Festival and the Zagreb Musical Biennale

*La Biennale de Musique veut être – dirons-nous – une espèce de «Documentum Temporis» présentant tous les caractères d'un bouillonnement agité et émouvant tumultueux mais chargé d'une considérable richesse artistique.*

Inscription on the Musical Biennale Leaflet for 1965<sup>743</sup>

It was at the beginning of the 1950s, when theatrical and musical events were springing up all over Europe (such as in Edinburgh, Avignon, Aix-en-Provence, and Santander), that the Dubrovnik Summer Festival was founded. As early as 1952, Croatian director and writer Marko Fotez, the prime mover behind the group of enthusiasts who started up the Festival in 1950, put on *Hamlet* at the Lovrjenac Fort. Soon, the performances of Goldoni's *Fishermen's Quarrels* in the old city harbor, renaissance comedies and mystery plays began taking place in the city squares, Rectors Palace, Sponza Palace and Gruž summer residence. The Dubrovnik Summer Festival, today one of the most exclusive theatrical and musical events in Europe, started its Festival music program in the early 1950s, initially conceptualizing it as the presentation of the best composers, soloists and orchestras of the country. Then, by the end of the 1950s, it grew into a real review of top solo artists and ensembles from all around the world.<sup>744</sup>

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<sup>742</sup> Fosler-Lussier, *Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy*, 25. The classical choice was subject to critics as well and essentially because its musical tradition was more associated with Europe than the United States, and was not universally familiar to broad audiences. Furthermore, many famous American composers, such as Rudolf Serkin, Isaac Stern, and Eugene Ormandy, were European born, whilst others such as Kurt Weil and Aaron Copland were trained in Europe or by European teachers (Ibid, 24–25).

<sup>743</sup> Muzički Biennale Zagreb, 1965, 7, File 2, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA. Translated from French: “The Musical Biennale wants to be - shall we say - a sort of “Documentum Temporis” with all the characteristics of a tumultuous, agitated and moving ferment but full of a considerable artistic richness.”

<sup>744</sup> Hrvoje Ivanković, “Dubrovačke ljetne igre,” *Leksikon Marina Držića* (Zagreb: Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža i Dom Marina Držića, 2016), <http://leksikon.muzej-marindrzic.eu/dubrovačke-ljetne-igre/>.

With the Dubrovnik Festival, the Split Summer Festival (founded in 1954) and the Music Biennale Zagreb (founded in 1961) became the major channels for promotional U.S. classical presentation program.<sup>745</sup> The program depended upon the USIS posts for organizational, logistics, press and financial support; the USIS Country Plan urgently stressed that top American performers were to be brought to the Music Biennale Zagreb in May and the Dubrovnik Festival in July-August.<sup>746</sup>

The CPP program, both musical and theatrical, started in Yugoslavia very intensively even from its very beginning. Between May and June 1955, Eleanor Steber, Metropolitan opera soprano and one of the major U.S. opera stars, performed in Zagreb, Belgrade and Osijek (near the Hungarian border) where she performed an “extraordinary effective work.”<sup>747</sup> It was one of the first high-class performances financed by the President’s Fund.<sup>748</sup> *New York Times* reports, “she let her temperament show a bit” when she refused to sing “Madame Butterfly” at Belgrade’s Theatre because “they didn’t have an obi [a Japanese sash]” and substituted for Tosca, but nevertheless received “critical acclaim,”<sup>749</sup> “made friends there” and returned to Yugoslavia already in August to sing Mozart’s *Idomeneo* at the Dubrovnik Summer Festival.<sup>750</sup>

Ruggiero Ricci, prominent American violinist of Italian descent, prolonged his private European tour to perform in Ljubljana, Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Belgrade in February 1956 under the auspices of the President’s Fund.<sup>751</sup> Besides Ruggiero Ricci, other eminent U.S. soloists and conductors paid a visit to Yugoslavia during the 1950s and 1960s. A 1971 report of the Croatian National Theatre included among the conductors Leopold Stokowsky, Igor Stravinsky, Robert Kraft, Zubin Mehta, Dean

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<sup>745</sup> For an extensive contemporary report by the Cultural-Educational Council of Yugoslavia [Kulturno-prosvetno veće Jugoslavije] on Yugoslav major festivals, look into *Festivali u Jugoslaviji*, Beograd 1963, 02-2808/1, Box 128, Komisija za idejno-vaspitni rad 1963, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ.

<sup>746</sup> Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963, January 30, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP: 6-7.

<sup>747</sup> “Metropolitan Soprano to Make Four-Month World Trip,” *New York Times*, Feb. 9, 1956.

<sup>748</sup> Instruction 161 from Department of State to American Embassy Belgrade, May 4, 1955, 511.683/5-455, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>749</sup> “Clothes Makes an Opera as Temperament Shows,” *New York Times*, June 4, 1955.

<sup>750</sup> “The World of Music: Council Seeks Charter,” *New York Times*, July 10, 1955; Američki ansambli, dirigenti i solisti na Dubrovačkih ljetnim igrama, 1971, File SAD, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

<sup>751</sup> Instruction 4063 from Department of State to American Embassy Belgrade, Nov. 25, 1955, 511.683/11-2555, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP.

Dixon, William Steiberg, Lukas Foss, Georg Byrd, and Stanislaw Skrowaczewsky. Amongst the soloists, appeared the pianists Alexandar Brailowsky, Alexandar Uninsky, Shura Cherkasky, Byron Janis, Rudolf Firkusny, Jakob Lateiner, and the African-American André Watts who has won over the world with his rhapsodic skills; the violinists Nathan Millstein, Jehudi Menuhin, Michael Rabin, and the legendary violin prodigy Roman Totenberg; sopranos such as Rhea Jackson, Leonore Lafayette, and the African-American opera star Martina Arroyo who also played at the Dubrovnik Summer Festival in 1961, 1962, 1964, and 1969; then alto Louise Parker, mezzo-soprano Lucretia West, base Norman Foster and baritone Georg Bailley.<sup>752</sup>

Besides Arroyo, Cherkasky, Janis and Watts, and the world famous Mehta (who came to conduct the Los Angeles Philharmonic) also performed at the Dubrovnik Festival. However, this July-August event accommodated many U.S. art elites. By 1971, the Festival involved the elegant performances of John Browning, “a great talent among young American pianists;”<sup>753</sup> then Van Cliburn who achieved worldwide recognition in 1958, at the age of 23, when he won the first quadrennial International Tchaikovsky Piano Competition in Moscow at the height of the Cold War; pianists Alexis Weissenberg, Alexandar Zakin and Lorin Hollander; coloratura sopranos Gianna D’Angelo, and Mattiwilda Dobbs, sopranos Lucilla Udovich and Felicia Weathers; the Metropolitan diva Blanche Thebom; and the master violinist Isaac Stern. On the Dubrovnik renaissance stages conductors included Harold Axs, Eliot Forbes, Bruce McInnes, Max Rudolf (German naturalized American), and Thomas Scherman.<sup>754</sup> The “Libertas” Festival – another synonym for the Dubrovnik Summer event – gained prestige and frequently attracted renewed U.S. musical critics and editorialist: Paul B. Affelder who served for *Musical America*, *Opera News*, *Metropolitan Opera*, and the

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<sup>752</sup> Suradnja Zagrebačke filharmonije sa umjetnicima i ansamblima SAD, September 30, 1971, File SAD, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS-a SRH, RG 1410, HDA; Poznatiji vokalni i instrumentalni solisti koji su do danas učestvovali na Dubrovačkim ljetnim igrama, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA; XX Dubrovačke ljetne igre - Festival Dubrovnik, 1969, File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

<sup>753</sup> Message 74 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, March 25, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>754</sup> Američki ansambli, dirigenti i solisti na Dubrovačkim ljetnim igrama, 1971, File SAD, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA; Poznatiji vokalni i instrumentalni solisti koji su do danas učestvovali na Dubrovačkim ljetnim igrama, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

*National Observer*; Mort Gerberg and Mary Leatherbee from *Life*; Stabley Karnow from *The Washington Post*; Christopher Bird from the *Times*; Claire Sterling from *Harper's Magazine*; Jan Maguire from the *New York Herald Tribune*, and many more.<sup>755</sup>

Apart from the large group of soloists and conductors, choirs, symphony orchestras, glee clubs, drama companies and ballet groups also played in Yugoslavia, both at the Dubrovnik stage and the Music Biennale in Zagreb, as well as in Belgrade and Ljubljana. In 1954, the Smith College Chamber Singers debuted in Dubrovnik and returned in 1958; in the same year, it was the turn of the Hora Smith College Chorus.<sup>756</sup> The Minneapolis Symphony Orchestra played at the National Theatre in Zagreb in 1957,<sup>757</sup> the same year as the Westminster Choir came to sing.<sup>758</sup>

The early 1960s were characterized by many well-known names. The Robert Shaw Chorale, for instance, sang in Zagreb, Belgrade, Sarajevo and Skopje between October 7 and 12, 1962, under the President's Fund sponsorship,<sup>759</sup> showing, according to USIS PAO, Walter Roberts, "a degree of precision and technical competence in the choral field [...] unmatched by any other chorus; the artistry of Shaw himself as conductor was also given equally high praise."<sup>760</sup> The state-private network functioned for the presentation program as it did for the broader cultural exchanges: acclaimed U.S. musicians, touring Europe privately were solicited by the State Department to prolong their stay and give performances in non-profitable countries. So that the Yale Glee Club, while on a private tour in Western Europe in 1963, was invited to Yugoslavia where the Embassy's Press and Cultural Service covered their expenses, and where on

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<sup>755</sup> Strani kritičari, publicisti i novinari koji su pratili Dubrovačke ljetne igre od 1966 do 1969, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

<sup>756</sup> Ansambli na Dubrovačkim ljetnim igrama 1950-1969, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA; *Pregled*, Feb. 1959, 30.

<sup>757</sup> IES Monthly Progress Report, Aug. 1957, Folder 2, Box 25, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL; Suradnja Zagrebačke filharmonije sa umjetnicima i ansamblima SAD, Sept. 30, 1971, Fascikl SAD, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS-a SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

<sup>758</sup> Status of Current Cultural and Sports Projects, IES Monthly Progress Report, Jan. 1957, Folder 2, Box 25, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

<sup>759</sup> "Najvažniji događaji 1962 – Kulturna razmena," *Pregled*, Dec. 1962, 38; Airgram 218 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State (CU), Sept. 13, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP: 13.

<sup>760</sup> Message 74 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, March 25, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP.

June 29 they provided “one of the most heart-warming performances we have ever witnessed in Belgrade.”<sup>761</sup>

Similarly, between September and October 1964, the USIS in Belgrade arranged the American Festival of Music (American Festival Week), not completely planned in advance, but that saw Arthur Rubinstein performing on September 23 at the Belgrade Trade Union hall. The next day was the turn of Ruggiero Ricci who gave a private performance (organized by Yugokonzert) in an “all-Chopin” program; whilst from September 27 to 30 there was the New York Pro Musica choral performance in Belgrade and Zagreb,<sup>762</sup> and the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra in Belgrade in early October. For PAO Roberts, it was the victory of USIS efficiency and capacity in the field (Roberts arranged the arrival of Rubinstein from Bucharest by the U.S. Air Forces). Rubinstein’s unexpected concert was quickly sold out and the involvement of Yugoslav TV, radio and advertising turned out to be above expectation. “He performed magnificently and evoked great enthusiasm from the audience,” commented Belgrade’s *Politika*.<sup>763</sup>

Outstanding U.S. orchestras and choruses filled the Dubrovnik stages in the second half of the 1960s. In 1966, it was the turn of the Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra, the Beaux Arts Trio, and the Sarah Lawrence Chorus (they returned in 1968), followed by the Harvard Glee Club – Radcliffe Choral Society in 1967, the Bach Aria Group in 1968, and the Amherst College Glee Club in 1969.<sup>764</sup> The 1970s commenced with an elite participation: the New York Chamber Soloists and the world renewed Juilliard Quartet, with an exclusive participation of Ruggiero Ricci and the Duke Ellington Orchestra.<sup>765</sup> The CU co-financed the U.S. presence at the Dubrovnik events, which the USIS post carefully organized, and the Consul discussed at the meetings with

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<sup>761</sup> Airgram 218 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State (CU), Sept. 13, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP: 13.

<sup>762</sup> This vocal and instrumental ensemble that specialized in medieval and Renaissance music had already performed at the Dubrovnik Festival in 1963 (Ansambli na Dubrovačkim ljetnim igrama 1950-1969, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA).

<sup>763</sup> Message 44 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, January 8, 1965, EDU 14-2 YUGO (BE), Box 382, Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>764</sup> Ansambli na Dubrovačkim ljetnim igrama 1950-1969, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

<sup>765</sup> XXI Dubrovačke ljetne igre - Festival Dubrovnik, 1970, File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

Dubrovnik authorities.<sup>766</sup> The CU sponsorship emerged from the Croatian and Serbian archives, as well as from the Bureau's reports. In the fall of 1967, the CU sponsored the Los Angeles Symphony to visit Eastern Europe: they turned to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Turkey, Iran, Lebanon, India, accompanied by Andre Watts and Zubin Mehta.<sup>767</sup> In 1971, the Bureau furnished \$5,000 (of the total cost of \$20,000) for the University of California Chamber Singers, "a very effective" student-singers group, to sing in Budapest, Belgrade, and Dubrovnik, as an addition to their already existing tour to other European countries.<sup>768</sup>

Amid the most prominent guests of the Yugoslav festivals figured the LaSalle String Quartet, the American Brass Quintet and the Juilliard Quartet. The LaSalle Quartet, best known for its espousal of the *Second Viennese School* of Schoenberg, Berg and Webern, and other European modernists, performed for the first time in Yugoslavia at the Dubrovnik Festival in August 1962 under the auspices of Yugokonzert and the Embassy. Afterwards, they returned to Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana in January 1963, under USIS sponsorship,<sup>769</sup> where during five days of crowded scheduled concerts, TV appearances and workshops, "they found the Yugoslav musicians eager to learn the [modern] techniques," reported first violinist Walter Levin.<sup>770</sup> They "broadened the awareness of the excellence of American ensembles in the field of chamber music," simply stated PAO Roberts.<sup>771</sup> Finally, they performed at the Music Biennale of Zagreb in 1965, even with a small contribution from the Yugoslav government (160,000 dinars).<sup>772</sup>

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<sup>766</sup> Bilješka Dubrovačkih ljetnih Igara o posjeti američkog konzula C. Johnsona, June 1, 1968, 02-103/19-68, Box 43, Republički protokol, IVS SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA.

<sup>767</sup> Charles Frankel to Katzenbach, Feb. 24, 1967, TH29-SA-8, Folder 2, Box 25, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

<sup>768</sup> John Richardson Jr. to Martin J. Billenbrand, April 23, 1970, Folder 1, Box 26, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

<sup>769</sup> Airgram 218 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State (CU), Sept. 13, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP: 13.

<sup>770</sup> Memorandum of Conversation between Walter Levin, LaSalle Quartet, and Ralph Jones and James A. Durand, Jr., EUR/SES, April 8, 1963, EDX 32, Box 3255, Central Foreign Policy File 1963, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>771</sup> Message 74 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, March 25, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>772</sup> Muzički Biennale Zagreb, April 19, 1965, 967, Box 41, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA.

The Juilliard String Quartet, a classical string quartet founded in 1946 at the prestigious Juilliard School in New York, included violinists Robert Mann and Robert Koff, violist Raphael Hillyer, and cellist Arthur Winograd. These elitist performers fascinated the Dubrovnik public in both 1964 and 1970.<sup>773</sup> As for the American Brass Quintet, their artistic innovation consisted in being the first quintet playing music originally written for brass, but substituted a bass trombone for the conventional tuba part. Being a rather innovative quintet, they were invited by the Music Biennale Zagreb to perform in 1966 and 1967 (in 1966 the Yugoslav government partially covered their salaries and travel expenses).<sup>774</sup>

Of all the festivals, the Zagreb Biennale was certainly the most vanguard and groundbreaking Yugoslav festival of contemporary classical music. Initiated back in 1961, this international festival was conceived by its founders, Milko Kelemen (the MBZ initiator and president), Ivo Vuljević (head of MBZ promotion) and Josip Stojanović (the director of MBZ), an “extraordinary project in need of special efforts [for] the democratization of music and culture in Yugoslavia.”<sup>775</sup> The Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, together with foreign governments, provided financial coverage for the international guests. In 1963, the Embassy contributed 562,000 dinars,<sup>776</sup> while Gunther Schuller’s participation (a distinctive American composer, conductor and jazz musicians) was gained through the American specialist grant.<sup>777</sup>

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<sup>773</sup> Ansambli na Dubrovačkim ljetnim igrama 1950-1969, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

<sup>774</sup> Koncertna direkcija Zagreb, Oct. 25, 1966, JS 24, Box 226, Republički sekretarijat za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu 1965-1979, RG 1415, HDA; Muzički Biennale Zagreb, 1967, File 2, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

<sup>775</sup> The MBZ was established in the period when New Music flourished within electronic and electro-acoustic music, as well as on the music scene and instrumental or music theatre. “In those days the Music Biennale Zagreb was a platform of contemporary music detached from any form of convention, thus not having turned into a classic festival, but rather prompted a possibility and necessity to confront, re-examine and disclose the reasons, style or experience of a new and distinct view of life. Of course, this view was not the only one, nor was it unambiguous, but its idiom could be easily identified” (“Music Biennale Zagreb’s History,” MBZ, access Jan. 19, 2016, <http://www.mbz.hr/index.php?opt=news&act=mlist&id=2372&lang=en>).

<sup>776</sup> Sekretarijat za kulturu NR Hrvatske, Feb. 26, 1964, 584, Box 41, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA.

<sup>777</sup> Airgram 218 from American Embassy Belgrade to Department of State (CU), Sept. 13, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP: 13.

The MBZ gained major leadership in experimental musical arts during its 1969 edition imbued with electronic music, accompanied by the “Computers and Visual Researches” exhibition. For the occasion, the Sonic Arts Group,<sup>778</sup> founded by Robert Ashley from Michigan and inspired by the musical innovations of John Cage and David Tudor, presented electronic music as “not having been made up in a laboratory but develop[ed] on the stage,” accompanied by electronic equipment and creations of sound.<sup>779</sup> *Vjesnik* expressed scandal and disbelief: “Like witchdoctors of a strange, new, technical religion, these engineers-musicians from Ann Arbor [were] casting spells and mixing with their electronic cans,” a scene that “astonished, staggered and scared”; “was this music anyway?” asked *Vjesnik* journalist and defined the performance as a “stupidity” and its music as “ugly.”<sup>780</sup>

In the context of the new wave of experimental music, a Yugoslav group led by Devčić, Frajt, Matičić, expressed themselves in playing electronic sounds.<sup>781</sup> Contrary to what was expected, journalists and music critics spoke negatively about the MBZ 1969 program,<sup>782</sup> which convinced the organizers to insist on major foreign and U.S. participation (even if, according to their bulletin, the MBZ accommodated Igor Stravinsky, Lukas Foss, John Cage and David Tudor during the 1960s).<sup>783</sup>

### 5.1.2 The Negro Theatre and the Vanguard Ballet

*All of Yugoslavia is singing today. The workers and the peasants are singing. The Communist officials, the man in the street, the students, all are singing the*

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<sup>778</sup> Known afterwards as the Sonic Arts Union, this first musical body to gain an international reputation by performing and creating live electronic music, interpreted their performance as “permanent creativity, a way of perceiving the world” and specialized in electronic-theatre music with cyber sonic devices (Michael Nyman, *Experimental Music: Cage and Beyond* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 22, 101–105).

<sup>779</sup> Muzički biennale Zagreb, 1969, File 2, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

<sup>780</sup> Bilten br. 13 - Muzički biennale Zagreb, June 13, 1969, 28-29, File 2, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

<sup>781</sup> Muzički biennale Zagreb, 1969, File 2, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

<sup>782</sup> Bilten br. 13 - Muzički biennale Zagreb, June 13, 1969, 28-29, File 2, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA; Bilten br. 14 - Muzički biennale Zagreb, Dec. 15, 1969, File 2, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

<sup>783</sup> Muzički Biennale Zagreb, n.d., File SAD, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

*songs of George Gershwin and the praises of the cast of the folk opera, "Porgy and Bess," which left this truly heartbroken country this morning.*<sup>784</sup>

*In 1951 I was in Italy when a delegation of ten Soviet performers, dancers, singers and instrumentalists arrived unexpectedly for an appearance at the Florence Festival. Italians observed cynically that the visit coincided with an election campaign in which Florence's Communist Mayor needed help. But the fact was that the Russians, who included such distinguished performers as Galina Ulanova, the famous ballerina and Emil Gilels, the illustrious pianist, cut a wide swath. They performed brilliantly; they stimulated interest in the festival: they drew the attention not only of Italy but of all Western Europe to their gifts as artists. The Italians, like other Western Europeans, might have reservations about Soviet benevolence but they were beguiled by the artistic visitors.*

Howard Taubman, *New York Times*, April 13, 1958<sup>785</sup>

Dance, ballet and drama speak universal languages. In engaging drama forms and ballet movements, ANTA realized that messages could reach and move hearts. In December 1954, Gershwin's opera *Porgy and Bess* was performed at the Zagreb National Theatre<sup>786</sup> and then Belgrade. The first ANTA proposed tour literally "welled up in joyous affection," "more than twenty curtain calls," "expressions of gratitude" (that were even extended for the military and economic aid that was sent), "hundreds of letters [...] expressed in crude English and Serbian" and "regret that this talented group of artists will not stay longer in our country" (according to *Borba*).<sup>787</sup> In Belgrade, members of the company "surprised the citizens [...] by engaging in a game of 'football' with a bunch of local youngsters in the street in front of their hotel."<sup>788</sup>

Authored by Du Bose Heyward, George Gershwin and Ira Gershwin and debuted in 1935, *Porgy and Bess* told the story of a crippled beggar, his drug-addict girlfriend, her violent ex-boyfriend, and their long-suffering and hard-praying neighbors. With their white authors and all African American characters, *Porgy and Bess* became, in fact, a

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<sup>784</sup> "Yugoslavs Sing Praise of 'Porgy'; U. S. Troupe Earns Gratitude and Affection of Nation in One-Week Stand," *The New York Times*, December 22, 1954, sec. Amusements.

<sup>785</sup> Howard Taubman, "Cold War On the Cultural Front; At Brussels the U. S. and Russia Will Compete or the Minds of Men with Their Arts. Cultural Cold War," *The New York Times*, April 13, 1958, sec. Magazine.

<sup>786</sup> Opera HNK Zagreb, Sept. 30, 1971, 3539/1, File SAD, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS-a SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

<sup>787</sup> "Yugoslavs Sing Praise of 'Porgy.'"; Joseph N. Acinapura, "The Cultural Presentations Program of the United States" (MA thesis, Rutgers University, 1970), enclosed in D.W. Galvin, Federation of Rocky Mountain States, Inc., to Dayton Coe, Cultural Presentation Branch, Dec. 2, 1970, Box 1, Records Relating to Selected USIA Programs 1953-1999, USIA Bureau of Programs, RG 306, NACP: 29-30.

<sup>788</sup> Taubman, "Cold War On the Cultural Front."

case study of the way white Americans “craved stories about African Americans featuring earthy authenticity and frictionless progress towards racial equality,” and the way African Americans “had to maneuver within the cultural marketplace created by such white desires.” In other words, it was a history of collisions between white fantasy and black pragmatism before, during and after the Civil Rights era.<sup>789</sup>

*Porgy and Bess* was not completely new to the Yugoslav audience when it came in 1954. Actually, it was in 1951 that Belgrade’s Opera demanded USIS assistance in providing piano and libretto copies.<sup>790</sup> The Opera director, reported Ambassador Allen, felt “anxious to receive all possible information about presentation, costuming, scenery as well as piano scores.”<sup>791</sup> However, when it came to Yugoslavia, *Porgy and Bess* meant sending a missive that, “with grace and charm,” would open up “new perspectives here for a communist-led people sensitive to reports on American racial prejudice and exploitation.” In order to achieve such an impact, artists entertained “personal offstage contacts” on the street, in places of entertainment, hotels and in private homes, they were invited to the Serbian Orthodox saint’s-day (“Slava” celebration) and sang Christmas carols and Negro spirituals at the Ambassador’s reception.<sup>792</sup> About the Zagreb performances, where the company received fourteen curtain calls and a half-hour ovation, a leading Yugoslav critic wrote: “They have not only shown us a new kind of art, but a new world... a world which was unknown to us and more or less distorted through literature, I may say falsified... I think we should be thankful that they have come and have made it possible for us to feel friendship and closeness to a world so far away from us.”<sup>793</sup> Crucially, while communist propaganda sedulously fostered “the notion that United States culture consists of comic books and gangster motion pictures,” and that American Negroes lived under conditions of “Uncle

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<sup>789</sup> According to African American writer James Baldwin, “What has always been missing from George Gershwin’s opera is what the situation of *Porgy and Bess* says about the white world. It is because of this omission that Americans are so proud of the opera. It assuages their guilt about Negro and it attacks none of their fantasies” (Ellen Noonan, *The Strange Career of Porgy and Bess: Race, Culture, and America’s Most Famous Opera* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 1.

<sup>790</sup> Telegram 1570 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, April 25, 1951, 511.68/4-2551, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>791</sup> Telegram 1683 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, May 12, 1951, 511.68/5-1251, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>792</sup> “Yugoslavs Sing Praise of ‘Porgy.’”

<sup>793</sup> American Cultural and Sports Groups Abroad under the President’s Fund, Jan. 1956, IES Digest, Folder 11, Box 24, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

Tom's Cabin," "Porgy and Bess" opposed "hard at these stereotypes."<sup>794</sup> Or as President Eisenhower put it in 1954, *Porgy and Bess* was receiving "fabulous success [...], playing to capacity houses" in a contribution that could "scarcely be exaggerated."<sup>795</sup> Similarly, Jack Raymond proclaimed them "America's top Ambassador at large"; or as "one communist said here, «This is more than money and easier to take than political tracts»."<sup>796</sup> Certainly, *Porgy and Bess* represented a special case of Cold War propaganda centered on dismantling the racial-problematic United States, undermining the Soviet's accusations of a lack of cultural enlightenment and proposing a racial narrative inclusive of the African American culture as a national one.

"I [see] the dance as a vision of ineffable power. A man could, with dignity and towering majesty, dance...dance as Michelangelo's visions dance and as the music of Bach dances," declared José Limón, the establisher of the American Modern Dance.<sup>797</sup> Decisively, the most eminent U.S. ballet groups and dance performers displayed this kind of soft power on Yugoslav stages. The American Ballet Theatre (1958), Jerome Robbins's Ballet (1959), New York City Ballet (1965), Alwin Ailey Dance Theatre (1968), American National Theatre of the Deaf (1969), Glen Tetley Dance Company (1969) performed at the Dubrovnik Summer Festival.<sup>798</sup> The American Ballet Theatre participated with *Billy the Kid* and *Rodeo* of Aaron Copland; Jerome Robbins's Ballet presented a *Concert* of Frederick Chopin; while the New York City Ballet – choreographed by George Balanchine, the founder of American ballet, – performed Tchaikovsky's *Serenade*, *Raymonda* of Aleksandar Glazunov; Felix Mendelssohn's *Scottish Symphony*; Paul Hindemith's *Four Temperaments* and George Bizet's *Symphony in C*.<sup>799</sup>

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<sup>794</sup> "Porgy Makes a Hit," *New York Times*, Dec. 23, 1954.

<sup>795</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower to the President of the Senate, July 27, 1954, 511.00/7-2354, Box 2249, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>796</sup> Jack Raymond, "Porgy Delights Belgrade Crowds," *The New York Times*, December 17, 1954.

<sup>797</sup> "Dance Troup Preserves Heritage of Jose Limon," *Sun Sentinel*, July 27, 1986.

<sup>798</sup> Ansambli na Dubrovačkim ljetnim igrama 1950-1969, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

<sup>799</sup> Ansambli na Dubrovačkim ljetnim igrama 1950-1969, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA; Muzičko-scenska djela na repertoaru Dubrovačkih ljetnih igara 1950-1969, n.d., Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

The grandiose José Limon Company performed at the National Theatre in Zagreb in 1957.<sup>800</sup> USIS reported of exultant audiences after Jerome Robbins's 1959 play: "It's you who are the revolutionaries! The Russian Ballet is static – you are the country of the future!"<sup>801</sup> Analogous admirations were aroused by the Martha Graham Company dance in November 1962 at Zagreb's Opera: "[they] opened up new concepts of dance not before seen here, plus a general admiration for the tremendous accomplishment in training and disciplining the dancers to such a high perfection in this style."<sup>802</sup>

In September 1968, one of the most renewed and groundbreaking U.S. choreographers, Alwin Nikolais, visited Yugoslavia and performed in Belgrade, Skopje, Sarajevo and Ljubljana (he then returned to the MBZ in 1969 and the Dubrovnik festival in 1971).<sup>803</sup> Nikolais employed lights, slides, electronic music, and stage props to create environments through which dancers moved and blended. He made use of props, masks and mobiles with esthetic as well as functional purposes, and popularized modern multimedia theater.<sup>804</sup> The Embassy report testified of "enthusiastic capacity audiences" and "standing ovation." However, the Nikolais dancers did not only attract youngsters in excitement: the performance was attended by, as well as the U.S. diplomatic corps and Ambassador Elbrick, Živan Berisavljević, Republican Secretary for Education and Culture, Milan Vukos, Vice-mayor of Belgrade, government officials, dancers and theatre leaders. The event seemed to go beyond mere artistic performances, since "a person of such profound and various talents coupled with a modest, warm, genuine personality leaves a tremendous impression on all who meet him."<sup>805</sup>

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<sup>800</sup> Cultural Presentation Staff, Activity Report of IES, Aug. 13 – 24, 1956, Box 25, Folder 1, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL; Opera HNK Zagreb, Sept. 30, 1971, 3539/1, File SAD, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS-a SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

<sup>801</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP: 16.

<sup>802</sup> Message 74 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, March 25, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP; Opera HNK Zagreb, Sept. 30, 1971, 3539/1, File SAD, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS-a SRH, RG 1410, HDA

<sup>803</sup> Republičkom sekretarijatu za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu, Feb. 14, 1968, JS-4165, Box 227, Republički sekretarijat za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu 1965-1979, RG 1415, HDA.

<sup>804</sup> Claudia Gitelman and Randy Martin, eds., *The Returns of Alwin Nikolais: Bodies, Boundaries and the Dance Canon* (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan, 2007).

<sup>805</sup> Memorandum from Ralph T. Backlund (CU/CP) to Edward D. Re, Dec. 19, 1968, Folder 8, Box 21, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, University of Arkansas Libraries.

Above all, the Nikolais case explores the cross-cultural interactions that public and cultural diplomacy was actually meant to do. In fact, during the group's stay in Belgrade, the Yugoslav theatre leaders, with Embassy support, organized several roundtables and meetings with members of the Opera, the BITEF<sup>806</sup> and the Atelje 212 theatres, at the time controversial because they were following global theatre trends with avant-garde explorations. During such meetings, Nikolais spoke with Mira Trajlović, BITEF and Atelje 212 director Mladen Sabljic, Belgrade's Opera director, actress Mladja Veselinović, Dušan Trninić, leading ballet dancer Katarina Obradović, Belgrade's Opera ballet dancer, and many others.<sup>807</sup>

Finally, in May 1969, the Glen Tetley Ballet Group, whose founder Glen Tetley is best known for having mixed ballet and modern dance, displayed "fervid intensity, sinuous nonstop propulsion, and voluptuous physicality"<sup>808</sup> when they played in Yugoslavia. Both Jerome Robbins, Jose Limon, Martha Graham, Glen Tetley, and Alwin Nikolais, were leaders in contemporary dance, innovative in techniques and controversial in styles and vanguard explorations.

The preference for classic performances, whether in music, theatre or dance, reinforced U.S. prestige abroad and pledged the embodiment of excellence. In the same way as *Porgy and Bess* and the ballet groups, these plays were dismantling racial and cultural prejudices and inspiring theatrical vanguard and artistic unconventionality. However, what measurable effects and goals have they accomplished, apart from making available otherwise expensive tours, and psychologically strengthening American prestige in highbrow culture? Were they increasing the appeal of the American dream instead? How could the State Department capitalize on these artistic performances and to what extent did they gain obedience or political acquiescence to U.S. foreign policies?

Recent historiographical works have pointed to several new perceptions of the U.S. Cultural Presentation Program in the Cold War: the preference of classical music over jazz and other styles and the relevance of the selection process; the overcoming of

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<sup>806</sup> Abbreviation of Belgrade International Theatre Festival.

<sup>807</sup> Photographs of Alwin Nikolais Dance Group in Yugoslavia, Folder 34, Box 346, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

<sup>808</sup> Allen Robertson, "Glen Tetley," ed. Selma J. Cohen, *International Encyclopedia of Dance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).



musical diplomacy as a weapon of cultural imperialism and of musicians as its passive actors; the consideration of the spectators responses; and the interest in how these musical actors were in fact “performing the nation.”<sup>809</sup> Gienow-Hecht argued that the real importance of these orchestras and soloists performing abroad lies in the fact that they legitimize “the nation’s political influence and boost its self-confidence to exert leadership abroad.”

**Figure 5-1: Alwin Nikolais Dance Company in Belgrade Yugoslavia, September 1968; Nikolais discussion at BITEF attended by leading theater, ballet as well as by dancers and other theater personalities (Courtesy of the University of Arkansas Libraries). Source: Photographs of the Alwin Nikolais Ballet Group in Yugoslavia, Folder 34, Box 346, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.**

In her view, the performances abroad were an act “similar to a speech at the United Nations, a banquet at an embassy, or a handshake on the White House lawn.” She demonstrated the shift from pre-World War I symphony orchestras as “places of

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<sup>809</sup> For a notable debate, see whole issue of *Diplomatic History*, 36, no. 1 (2012).

international encounter,” culturally opened, to a post–World War II focus on musical performances as “stages of national self-representation” enacted to demonstrate world leadership capability. CIA’s cultural officer Thomas Braden claimed that the Boston Symphony Orchestra in 1952 “won more acclaim for the U.S. in Paris than John Foster Dulles or Dwight D. Eisenhower could have bought with a hundred speeches.” When Leonard Bernstein reported how “Russian audiences screamed and stamped and all but tore the seats out of the floor,” he was actually “displaying hierarchy and leadership.”<sup>810</sup> Whether hailing from New York, Moscow, or Teheran, the orchestras enacted the desire to perform the country they represented in front of silent audiences by displaying hierarchy and leadership. Finally,

The political function of symphony orchestras on tour abroad is not just that they play beautiful music trying to establish dialogue but that they seek to display leadership and symbolize the authority behind the orchestra in a foreign environment, while audiences remain quiet and attentive. A state-sponsored guest concert is a way of saying *adsum* – I am present.<sup>811</sup>

## 5.2 Jazz Diplomacy or Simply “Jazz”?

*As long as I've been playing, they never say I done anything. They always say that some white guy did it.*

Miles Davis<sup>812</sup>

*Put it this way: Jazz is a good barometer of freedom. When pure jazz is not accepted and pseudo jazz with political and dogmatic coatings takes over, you can look for freedom of expression to step out of the picture. In its beginnings, the United States of America spawned certain ideals of freedom and independence through which, eventually, jazz was evolved, and the music is so free that many people say it is the only unhampered, unhindered expression of complete freedom yet produced in this country. But if I were told to play my music in only the keys of F-sharp the monotony and frustration of it would force me right out of jazz. Yet there are some people who in effect are permitted to express themselves freely in only one key.*

Duke Ellington<sup>813</sup>

*I think rock'n'roll in communist countries has much more importance than rock'n'roll in the West. We can't have any alternative parties or any*

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<sup>810</sup> Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, “The World Is Ready to Listen: Symphony Orchestras and the Global Performance of America,” *Diplomatic History* 36, no. 1 (2012): 18–19, 22, 24–25. Nevertheless, artists performing abroad, including Bernstein rarely behaved as planned: by talking to audiences, pitching music and emotions against wars and weapons, they questioned the entire Cold War scenario and “raised eyebrows across Washington” (25).

<sup>811</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>812</sup> Paul Tingen, “Miles Davis. The Making of Bitches Brews,” *JazzTimes*, May 2001, 54.

<sup>813</sup> Mark Tucker and Duke Ellington, *The Duke Ellington Reader* (Oxford University Press, 1995), 295.

*alternative organized politics, so there are not too many places where you can gather large groups of people and communicate ideas which are not official. Rock'n'roll is one of the most important vehicles for helping people in communist countries to think in a different way."*

Goran Bregović, front men of Bijelo Dugme [White Buttons] rock group<sup>814</sup>

Jazz and rock'n'roll might be distant as musical styles, but they have much in common by being a social catalyzer of Yugoslav youth. Both jazz and rock'n'roll were identified with youth rebellion and unconventional life styles. As Vučetić proved, the post-war Yugoslav communist leadership identified jazz with Western decadence and reminded of Djilas' 1947 assertion "America is our sworn enemy, and jazz, as its product, as well."<sup>815</sup> Nevertheless, the abandonment of Stalinism after 1950 meant for Yugoslav jazz men more freedom in forming jazz orchestras and arranging concerts. Despite Tito's softened, but still critical, opinion about jazz ("Jazz for me is not music, it is a racket," he stated in 1962),<sup>816</sup> in the 1960s the Radio-Television Serbia (RTS) Jazz Band played in honor of Tito's birthday – May 25 – the Day of Youth. During the 1960s, Yugoslav cultural authorities provided institutionalizing patterns for jazz, so in 1960 they established the Yugoslav Bled Jazz Festival, while almost every larger town had its jazz orchestra. Vučetić recognized in the institutionalization of jazz two major influences: the repositioning of Yugoslav authorities that in the late 1950s stopped considering this musical style politically dangerous; and the breakthrough of jazz concerts sponsored either by the American Embassy or by the State Department and the contribution of the *Voice of America* for the penetration of jazz in Yugoslavia.<sup>817</sup>

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<sup>814</sup> Sabrina P. Ramet, "Shake, Rattle, and Self-Management: Making the Scene in Yugoslavia," in *Rocking The State: Rock Music And Politics In Eastern Europe And Russia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 135.

<sup>815</sup> Duško Gojković, the Serbian world known jazz musician explained the role of jazz in post-war Yugoslavia in this way: "For us to play jazz was a kind of freedom. The [Party] Commissioner could not tell me how to improvise on the trumpet. This was the only thing where I could choose what to play, and this was freedom for us" (Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam*, 174, 173). On these issues, see also Radina Vučetić, "Trubom kroz Gvozdenu zavesu: prodor đeža u socijalističku Jugoslaviju," *Muzikologija*, no. 13 (2012): 53–77, doi:10.2298/MUZ120229012V.

<sup>816</sup> Vladimir Dedijer, *Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita*, vol. 3, 3 vols. Sabrana dela Vladimira Dedijera (Beograd: Rad, 1984), 609.

<sup>817</sup> Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam*, 178, 179-182. The VOA contribution in spreading jazz into Yugoslavia will be discussed in the last section of this chapter.

Penny Von Eschen was among the first scholars to address the issue of jazz diplomacy in the cultural Cold War. She explored how the U.S. officials, despite their misgivings about jazz, sent leading African-American jazz players to tours abroad – among them Dizzy Gillespie, Louis Armstrong, Duke Ellington, and Randy Weston, – believing that they could save the tarnished American “race problem.” By sending African Americans abroad, Washington’s bureaucracy suggested that talent and hard work, rather than skin color, determined individual success in the United States, while the jazz ensembles, which encouraged individual expression within the established parameters, rendered the music an apt metaphor for liberal democracy. But jazz musicians and U.S. policy makers often spoke different languages. For them, the tours meant a “long-overdue recognition from a society that had previously failed to acknowledge its greatest music,” even if such recognition was not without an edge. In fact, jazz arranger Quincy Jones who led the Dizzy Gillespie rehearsals before the tour, reported that ANTA briefed the crew to “indulge in your various idiosyncrasies discreetly,” to which Jones recalled, “we couldn’t believe it. If the New York Philharmonic were about to tour Europe for the State Department, would he feel obliged to say the same thing?”<sup>818</sup>

Von Eschen proved how musicians championed jazz as a model of racial equity that they aspired to achieve, not as a faithful reflection of the freedom and equality offered by U.S. society.<sup>819</sup> Therefore, while the government officials insisted on the music’s universalism and its broadly American roots, African American artists pledged that the particularity of the black experience had created jazz. Although the State Department sought to engender pro-American sympathies among the ruling elites abroad, musicians frequently democratized the tours, playing impromptu gigs for

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<sup>818</sup> Penny Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 35–36. Apart from professional recognition, jazz ambassadors enthusiastically accepted to tour because of their widely shared patriotism commitment, the pride of representing the nation and helping their country, for “the edgy, competitive masculinity of Cold War America” not foreign to jazz culture, for the intrigue of adventure and “the inherently secretive nature of covert action” (29–30).

<sup>819</sup> “The Gillespie tour began as the five-month-old Montgomery bus boycott brought unprecedented national and international attention to American racism and the Southern civil rights struggle.

ordinary citizens and jamming with local musicians.<sup>820</sup> Likewise, tour participants often articulated ideas more attuned to pan-African and broadly Third World concerns than to those of U.S. leaders. This inability to maintain a tight focus on national identities and priorities points to one of the reasons for the termination of the program in 1978.<sup>821</sup>

The CU sponsored jazz tours following the line of the Cold War hot spots. By looking at the itinerary of the 1956 Dizzy Gillespie tour (beginning in Iran, the tour culminated in Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Greece, with stops in Syria and the U.S. military allies Pakistan and Lebanon), “one can trace America’s increasing assumption of the former role of the British in assuring Western access to the region’s oil,” a commitment of the 1947 Truman Doctrine to take over British funding of anti-communist forces in Greece and Turkey. The Gillespie, as well as Dave Brubeck trip in 1958, moved through the Eisenhower conception of a “perimeter defense” against the Soviet Union along the Northern Tier extending from Turkey to Pakistan.<sup>822</sup>

Another revenue of the jazz tours transpired in the meaning that foreign audiences attached to them. Discussing jazz tours to Soviet Union, Lisa Davenport argued, “While American jazz musicians who traveled on cultural tours sought to dismantle the structures of American racism, Russian youth, jazz lovers, and fans sought to surmount the political structures of Soviet Communism.”<sup>823</sup> What were the consequences of the Yugoslav jazz case, what was the role of this highly tempered jazz diplomacy?

### 5.2.1 Big Masters, Private Arrangements

From the early 1950s onwards, and during the following two decades, jazz conquered Yugoslav radio, TV, the record industry and Yugoslav institutions and media. Moreover, Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana, came to be special destinations of

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<sup>820</sup> In Karachi, Pakistan, for example in 1956 Gillespie refused to play until the gates were opened to the ragamuffin children, while in Ankara, Turkey, he likewise opened the gates declaring he had come to play for all the people (Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World*, 35).

<sup>821</sup> Albeit in a substantially reduced form, the Jazz Ambassadors Program survived in post-Cold War Washington’s public diplomacy as the ECA’s American Music Program Abroad, including blues, bluegrass, gospel, country, and hip hop styles (Harm Langenkamp, “Global Harmony in Silk Road Diplomacy,” in *Music and Diplomacy from the Early Modern Era to the Present*, ed. Rebekah Ahrendt, Mark Ferraguto, and Damien Mahiet (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 94.

<sup>822</sup> Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World*, 31–32.

<sup>823</sup> Lisa E. Davenport, *Jazz Diplomacy: Promoting America in the Cold War Era* (Univ. Press of Mississippi, 2010), 85.

Hungarian, Romanian, Bulgarian and Albanian jazz fans because they accommodated hundreds of American jazz concerts.

Dizzy Gillespie with his Orchestra played in Belgrade in 1956, whilst his Quartet performed in late May 1961, and then in 1971 (and 1981 and 1990). The Glenn Miller Orchestra appeared at the Belgrade Kolarac Hall in April 1957, whereas the Great Satchmo performed in 1959. Ella Fitzgerald sang in 1961 for the first time and then returned in 1971. Duke Ellington played at the Trade Union Hall (Dom sindikata) in 1970.<sup>824</sup> Lionel Hampton came twice, in 1971 and 1979, while Casey Anderson was in Yugoslavia in November 1970. The Modern Jazz Quartet played in the Trade Union Hall both in 1960 and in 1989. The Oscar Peterson Trio with Ray Brown and Ed Thipgen played in Belgrade in 1961 and 1973, and Ljubljana in 1964. The great Miles Davis participated at the Newport Belgrade Jazz Festival in 1971 and 1973, and then in 1986; and many more. Nevertheless, according to the CU, USIA and State Department archival records, the majority of these jazz players came to Yugoslavia through private arrangements, mostly with the *Jugoslovenska koncertna Agencija* (Yugoslav Concert Agency).<sup>825</sup>

From 1954 to 1971 the CU sponsored only four jazz performances in Yugoslavia, one rock concert (Blood, Sweat and Tears in 1971), and the folk blues guitarist Casey Anderson in November 1970.<sup>826</sup> The first two sponsored jazz bands were the Dizzy

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<sup>824</sup> Duke Ellington was scheduled to perform under CU sponsorship in 1963, but Kennedy's sudden tragic death cancelled the already arranged concerts (Airgram 307 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State (CU), July 24, 1970, Box 6, Records Relating to Selected USIA Programs 1953-1999, USIA Bureau of Programs, RG 306, NACP).

<sup>825</sup> A highly interesting and useful blog on Yugoslav concerts from the early 1950s to late 1990s is "Yugoslav Concerts" posted by a group of music fans, ranging from classical, to jazz, rock, punk, metal. It collects and posts online newspaper extracts, photographs, reproduction of cover records, concert tickets, and more (<https://jugosvirke.wordpress.com/>).

<sup>826</sup> In the CU objectives, Blood, Sweat and Tears, a nine-man rock-jazz band, would identify the U.S. administration with youth, "here and abroad"; "They bridge the generation gap [and] have just won three Grammy Awards," conveyed the Bureau. Except Yugoslavia, Blood, Sweat and Tears performed in Romania and Poland. An independent film crew accompanied the group and produced a TV documentary, and a prestige picture book was planned to come out about the tour. According to the *New York Times*, the rock group brought "more than 5000 Yugoslav music fans at a downtown stadium to their feet in roaring approval." ("Blood, Sweat & Tears Wins Ovation in Yugoslav Concert," *The New York Times*, June 19, 1970; John Richardson Jr. to Martin J. Billenbrand, April 23, 1970, Folder 1, Box 26, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL). For Casey Anderson sponsorship, see Mark B. Lewis to John Richardson Jr. (CU), Feb. 17, 1971, Folder 12, Box 21, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

Gillespie Orchestra and the Glenn Miller Orchestra in 1956 and 1957.<sup>827</sup> The third was the Woody Herman's concert in Belgrade in 1966.<sup>828</sup> Whilst, at the end of the 1960s, the CU sent the University of Illinois Jazz Band, a 25-man band, including vocalist Don Smith and led by John Garvey, to an eight-week tour in Eastern and Western Europe. The band passed through Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, Novi Sad, Niš and Skopje between October 17 and 30. The American Embassy was satisfied, "the Band's presence provided [...] a unique opportunity for direct cooperation with the League of Belgrade University Students," they emphasized "the vitality, the imagination and talent of young American musicians" and advanced "the program objectives of the Embassy's cultural program." The newspapers testified, "they proved [to] deserve their reputation as the best university band in the U.S." and "the entire Zagreb-Radio Television Orchestra should have gone to hear the nineteen-year old trumpeter."<sup>829</sup> As far as the Duke Ellington concerts in Belgrade are concerned, the CU, the Embassy, the Belgrade Bank of Commerce and the Radio-TV Belgrade jointly sponsored them.<sup>830</sup>

In 1959, USIS field officers stated that USIS was not supporting individual American musicians to come to Yugoslavia, rather their assistance consisted in helping *Jugokonzert* to bring U.S. musicians, as they affirm to have done in the case of the 1959 Louis Armstrong concert.<sup>831</sup> Indeed, in its December 1962 issue, *Pregled* reported that the Americans Jimmy Prat Trio, Herb Geller Quartet, and John Lewis had participated in the Yugoslav Jazz Bled Festival, but without any reference to U.S. official sponsorship.<sup>832</sup>

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<sup>827</sup> Cultural Presentation Program – Area and Country Breakdown, July 1954-Sept. 1966, Folder 11, Box 49, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL; Telegram 694 from Department of State to Belgrade, Feb. 25, 1957, 511.683/2-1857, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>828</sup> Educational and Cultural Profile of Yugoslavia, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

<sup>829</sup> Ralph T. Backlund, CU/CP, to dr. Edward D. Re, Sept. 26, 1968, Folder 8, Box 21, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL; Thomas D. Huff, CU/CP, to Jacob Canter, Feb. 27, 1969, Folder 9, Box 21, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

<sup>830</sup> Airgram 307 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State (CU), July 24, 1970, Box 6, Records Relating to Selected USIA Programs 1953-1999, USIA Bureau of Programs, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>831</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP: 30.

<sup>832</sup> "Kulturna razmena," *Pregled*, Dec. 1962, 38.

Some years later, an exception occurred and in 1966 USIS Yugoslavia financed the American participation at the Seventh Jazz Bled Festival (June 2 to 5), by providing a modest dollar honorarium and a round trip to jazz trumpeter Art Farmer, as well as facilitative services to VOA's conductor Willis Conover. The latter proved to be, according to Acting PAO Hugh B. Sutherland, a great success at the Festival. "Willis Conover added his knowledge of jazz to the unofficial program [...] he spent night and day interviewing, being interviewed, listening and talking with Yugoslav and foreign jazz fans." Additionally, he discussed arrangements for stronger and facilitated cooperation and performances of American jazzmen in Yugoslavia.<sup>833</sup>

Nevertheless, in the general context of the Bureau's Presentation Program, it appears that USIS played a minor part and the greatest American jazz masters continued coming mostly through private arrangements. Moreover, some officially sponsored jazz concerts – Duke's for instance – resulted from a joint effort between formal and informal state actors. It is highly probable that the extraordinary jazz popularity made needless and redundant any official sponsorship. The data above shows that American jazz was a cultural Cold War weapon in the broad sense, having the connotation of improvisation and freedom, but the State Department mostly prioritized classical arrangements. This latter policy was due to two key factors: the ANTA propensity towards classical music and art; and the high-level free circulation of jazz groups, LP, radio stations, orchestras, in Yugoslavia as a consequence of the general cultural liberalization tendency from the 1950s on.

The jazz performances made thousands of young people in Belgrade, Zagreb, Dubrovnik and Ljubljana delirious. Ella Fitzgerald "filled Belgrade's largest music hall [...] with a delirium of enthusiasm [and] [...] there were prolonged, angry shouts when the announcer said the concert was finished"<sup>834</sup>. Whilst for *Vjesnik*, Ellington's concert at the Dubrovnik festival "was a sensation," with "excellent trumpeters, splendid soloists [...] who played with their whole body [...] showing at the same time a great concentration and deep emotional involvement."<sup>835</sup>

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<sup>833</sup> Message 86 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, June 27, 1966, CUL 16 US, Box 351, Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>834</sup> "Ella Fitzgerald and Peterson Trio Receive Ovation," *New York Times*, Feb. 21, 1961.

<sup>835</sup> A. Tomašek, "Od baroka do džez," *Vjesnik*, July 17, 1970, 6.

A letter of Paul B. Lichtman, a young law graduate from Columbia University, written on October 28 1963, to President Kennedy, after his extensive trip through Yugoslavia, is a witness to the popularity of jazz:

My contact was limited to persons in their twenties, my age and I stand as a witness to only their hearts. Their love for Americans is most enthusiastic. [...] numerous persons rushed over to me and questioned me about America and about the President. Some of their questions led me to believe that it was thought that I was a weekly household guest at the White House. [...] Our music is on the lips of every young Yugoslavian [...]. The most asked question is when is Louis Armstrong, or Ella, or Benny Goodman coming. How often I was asked if I had ever seen Ray Charles and all wanted to know about him. I was astonished to find out music so widespread.<sup>836</sup>

But while the jazz concerts were a result of mainly unofficial cultural arrangements, there was undeniably a special Cold War weapon that made jazz a widespread loved musical style: the Yugoslav broadcasts of the *Voice of America*, to which will be dedicated the last section of this chapter.

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<sup>836</sup> Paul B. Lichtman to John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, Oct. 28, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP.



**Figure 5-3:** Belgrade, July 14, 1970. Duke Ellington giving his autograph to Ivanka Pavlović, singer, after the concert at the Trade Union Hall (Dom sindikata). Behind him standing from the left: Miroslava Janković, Cultural Advisor USIS Belgrade, Vojislav Simić, conductor of Belgrade RTV Jazz Orchestra, and Petar Vujić, Secretary of the Association of Jazz Musicians of Serbia (Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD). Source: Photograph of Duke Ellington Concert in Yugoslavia, July 14, 1970, Box 6, Records Relating to Selected USIA Programs 1953-1999, USIA Bureau of Programs, RG 306, NACP.

### 5.2.2 Some Final Points

By covering transportation expenses and production, the State Department typically sustained only those tours incapable of being supported by private arrangements and the financial assistance was, as a rule, designed to underwrite deficits, “not to subsidize tours completely.” By deficits, the CU officers considered those box-office receipts inadequate to meet the costs.<sup>837</sup> Additionally, low priced or free tickets were seen as a handicap, because “they would disable the public” to buy tickets for private arrangements and appreciate them so well. Subsequently, each diplomatic post established the tickets “on the going rate” because “events requiring a token payment, however modest, gain prestige and are attributed greater merit, artistically and otherwise, than are completely free performances.”<sup>838</sup>

Despite the fact that Yugoslav authorities despised the USIS person-to-person direct activities in the field, their attitude towards the presentation program seems motivated by opposite assumptions. In 1951, USIS received several requests from the Yugoslav Council for Science and Culture, soliciting to promote, in conjunction with the field post, “visits to Yugoslavia by American conductors and/or musicians.” “The British Council has been fairly active here in this field,” the USIS report continued, “and it would be considered most desirable if a first-class American conductor or musician could visit this area.” Moreover, the Yugoslav Council proposed to guarantee the artist’s fee. To which Margaret Glassford, USIS information officer, added that, since previous concerts fell through because of the Council’s inability to finance them, “some sort of subsidy [from the State Department] would have to be provided [...] inasmuch as the Yugoslav government cannot guarantee in dollars the fees usually sought by top-ranking artists.” Glassford took as an example the British Council praxis that paid both the travel and stay expenses, whilst the Yugoslav Council guaranteed the artist’s fee in dinars (previously converted into sterling by the British authorities in the field). “This arrangement has apparently proved most satisfactory [...] and has as well served to acquaint the Yugoslavs with British cultural activities in a manner which

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<sup>837</sup> Joseph N. Acinapura, “The Cultural Presentations Program of the United States,” 22–23.

<sup>838</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

USIC has not to date been able to match.”<sup>839</sup> A similar request was again forwarded by the director of *Jugokonzert*, Veljko Bijedić, who sent an informal request to the Embassy on March 31, 1952 pleading for assistance to obtain top rank American artists for performances because of “enormous public demand.”<sup>840</sup>

At this point, it is impossible to sustain that Yugoslav cultural authorities permitted U.S. concerts, whether of classical music, jazz or rock, with the intention to show how liberal their regime was, as Vučetić suggested<sup>841</sup>. These interests seem authentic and we found them reproduced many times throughout the 1950s. In 1952, the Federal Council for Science and Education (Savet za nauku i kulturu FNRJ) contacted Albert L. Donnelly, the director of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, at the time sponsoring the Boston Symphony Orchestra in Western Europe, to provide a concert in Yugoslavia. Donnelly promised to include Yugoslavia in the 1953 Boston Symphony tour in the Middle-East, and additionally proposed a closer cooperation of Yugoslavia with ANTA, which was enthusiastically accepted.<sup>842</sup> Moreover, in 1953 the same Council eagerly accepted the proposal of pianist Gary Graffman to visit Yugoslavia during his European tour, for which he received the promise to be paid for the travel expenses from Paris.<sup>843</sup>

During his appointment as Yugoslav ambassador in the United States (1962-1967), Veljko Mićunović strongly advised Janez Vipotnik, president of the Federal Commission of Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, to invite a higher number of U.S. prestigious cultural managers – like Sol Hurock, musical impresario, and Kurt Weinholt, president of Columbia Artists Management, – to Yugoslav festivals in Dubrovnik, Split, Opatija, Ohrid, Zagreb, and Ljubljana, so they could arrange the performances of Yugoslav artists in the United States.<sup>844</sup> Indeed, such reciprocity of the

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<sup>839</sup> Despatch 521 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Jan. 13, 1951, 511.68/1-1351, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. USIC was another, more rare, designation for USIS, abbreviating the United States Information Center.

<sup>840</sup> Despatch 936 from Belgrade to the Department of State, April 2, 1952, 511.68/4-252, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>841</sup> Radina Vučetić, “Trubom kroz Gvozdenu zavesu: prodor đeza u socijalističku Jugoslaviju.”

<sup>842</sup> Razgovor sa predstavnikom Bostonskog simfonija, May 9, 1952, 237, Box 7, Poverljive veze sa SAD i Kanadom, Savet za nauku i kulturu Vlade FNRJ, RG 317, AJ. There is no archival and newspaper evidence that Yugoslavia was included in the 1953 Middle-East tour of the Boston orchestra.

<sup>843</sup> Lujo Goranin, Yugoslav Books NY, to Yugoslav Concert Agency, Belgrade, April 24, 1952, 204, Box 7, Poverljive veze sa SAD i Kanadom, Savet za nauku i kulturu Vlade FNRJ, RG 317, AJ.

<sup>844</sup> Neke primedbe druga Mićunovića o radu KKV, gostovanju umetnika i ansambala u SAD i programu razmene, enclosed in Zabeleške o razgovoru između Budisavljević Bogdanke, v.d. samostalnog savetnika

presentational programs sometimes functioned, but never on an equal basis. In 1969, the Zagreb Philharmonic played at the Music Festival in Philadelphia during a 45-day tour managed by Herbert Barret from the Herbert Barret Management, who arranged the 1970 tour on the West Coast, then cancelled because of the lack of financial support from the Commission for the Advancement of Cultural Activities (Komisija za unaprijeđenje kulturnih djelatnosti SRH).<sup>845</sup>

But, if the classic and jazz concerts, ballet and theatre groups, were not regarded as a potential political risks by the Yugoslav cultural leaders, thus interested in reciprocal cooperation, the same could not be said for the Yugoslav broadcasts of the VOA, which raised political anxieties and uproar similar to those of the USIS direct activities in the field.<sup>846</sup>

### 5.3 The Voice of America Speaks...

*To hear news from America makes me feel somehow warm.*  
Anonymous respondent of VOA survey in 1952<sup>847</sup>

*The Voice of America is a symbol of freedom that can give people hope, and we who enjoy freedom must not let them down.*  
USIA Report of 1972<sup>848</sup>

*I believe that the Voice of America – and Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe – made an enormous difference. [...] The libraries in Yugoslavia helped the cause but very frankly, to the people who went to the library were people who already were in the American corner. They were able to*

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u Komisiji i Raymonda Bensonu, atašea za informacije Američke ambasade, May 19, 1964, 213/64, Box 237, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ.

<sup>845</sup> Suradnja Zagrebačke filharmonije sa umjetnicima i ansamblima SAD, September 30, 1971, File SAD, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS-a SRH, RG 1410, HDA. Another example of famous Yugoslav presentation in the United States was LADO, the National Folk Dance Ensemble of Croatia on several tours in the 1970s.

<sup>846</sup> Although not discussed in this chapter, the CPP in Yugoslavia included the Sports Presentation Program which sent to Yugoslavia the African American athlete Malvin Whitfield (1954), the Olympic hammer-throw champion Harold Connolly (1957), the coach of the Boston Celtics Arnold “Red” Auerbach (1959), the Harlem Globetrotters (1963), and in 1966 the NBA Pro Basketball Team, the AAU All-Star Swimming Team, and the Vesper Boat Club Rowing Team. In 1968 the U.S. National Basketball Team ended its European tour in Yugoslavia. For a lucid scholarly insight on these issues, look into Thomas L. Damion, *Globetrotting: African American Athletes and Cold War Politics* (Urbana; Chicago; Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 2012).

<sup>847</sup> Voice of America Listening in Yugoslavia, October 1952, YO5201, Box 121, Country Projects Files 1951-1964, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP: 70.

<sup>848</sup> Washington Report – The Voice of America, May 5, 1972, enclosed in J. Glenn Beall, Jr. to James N. Sites, May 24, 1972, Box 27, USIA Director's Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP.

*strengthen their beliefs, strengthen their arguments in conversations by what they read and what they saw in the libraries. But the Voice of America and the other broadcasting organizations – they had a mass appeal.*

Walter Roberts, Public Affairs Officers in Belgrade<sup>849</sup>

During a two-hour press interview with Duke Ellington, held in Dubrovnik on July 15, 1970, Nikita Petrak from Radio-TV Zagreb asked the jazz master whether he knew Willis Conover. When Ellington responded that he knew him personally, Petrak commented: “Willis Conover is fondly considered to be the principal tutor and friend of a whole generation of Yugoslav jazz buffs.” In his perfect American English imbued with Conover’s deep-toned accent, he kept saying that “thousands of Yugoslav youths learned and kept abreast of the best in popular music,” as Conover was their “inspiration and teacher of English.”<sup>850</sup> Indeed, the *Voice* and its Music USA program raised an entire generation of jazz musicians whose production resulted in one of the most vanguard and innovative in whole Europe.

Together with Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL),<sup>851</sup> the Voice of America spoke up for the U.S. government during the Cold War years, engaged in the battle for hearts and minds. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcasted uncensored news and commentaries to people living in the communist nations, utilized “World War refugees from the USSR and Eastern Europe to communicate anticommunist messages to their homelands,”<sup>852</sup> and were involved in CIA’s psychological warfare covert activities against the Soviet Union and its satellites. These Munich-based stations drew a large audience despite the Soviet efforts to jam the broadcasts and ban citizens from listening to them. The first was founded in 1949 and the second in 1951, and both received funds from the CIA until 1972 and were

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<sup>849</sup> Mark Taplin, “Global Publicks: Walter Roberts: The Impact of U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy - ‘The Most Effective Way of Influencing...Was the Voice of America,’” accessed February 22, 2016, <http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-roberts-impact-of-us-cold-war.html>.

<sup>850</sup> Airgram 307 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State (CU), July 24, 1970, Box 6, Records Relating to Selected USIA Programs 1953-1999, USIA Bureau of Programs, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>851</sup> RFE and RL were fused in 1975 and renamed Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL).

<sup>852</sup> A. Johnson, *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond* (Washington, DC: Stanford University Press, 2010), 7.

subjected to CIA-State Department's policy directives (then, as the system evolved, broadcast policy was determined by negotiation).<sup>853</sup>

As far as RFE and RL relations with VOA are concerned, "I always had the feeling that the Voice of America was not happy with them, that they felt that they were encroaching on their territory and that they were saying things that might even be at cross purposes from what the VOA said," testifies Walter Roberts, USIA veteran. And he continues, "[I would describe] relations between the Voice of America and RFE/RL, [...] as cool, and maybe even cold."<sup>854</sup>

Radio Free Europe was never broadcast in Yugoslavia.<sup>855</sup> Moreover, contrariwise to what happened in the Soviet Union and its satellites, VOA jamming was forbidden in Yugoslavia, which made this radio the greatest mass communication channel of the U.S. foreign policy worldviews and cultural mediations. Commonly, Yugoslavs avoided committing themselves publicly and admitting VOA listening, but did it in private conversations; as an unnamed Party Secretary from Montenegro confessed to USIS PAO Joseph Kolarek in 1959, "of course [he] listened to the *Voice of America*."<sup>856</sup>

Radio Industry Nikola Tesla produced the first radio set in Yugoslavia in 1947. In 1955, one radio set cost the equivalent of 1,000 cinema tickets and a radio gramophone 1,300 tickets. They were luxury items. Some of the radio sets were imported, since from

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<sup>853</sup> For an overview of the RFE and RL role in the Crusade for Freedom with the support of private allies as the American Heritage Foundation, see Richard H. Cummings, *Radio Free Europe's "Crusade for Freedom": Rallying Americans Behind Cold War Broadcasting, 1950-1960* (North Carolina: McFarland, 2010), 5–28. For an overview of the perils the RFE and RL staff faced, the infiltrations of KGB agents, look into Richard H. Cummings, *Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe, 1950-1989* (North Carolina: McFarland, 2009). Bright insights from both radio veterans and scholars are collected in A. Ross Johnson and R. Eugene Prata, *Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: A Collection of Studies and Documents* (Central European University Press, 2010), while an insider perspective can be found in George R. Urban, *Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War Within the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

<sup>854</sup> Taplin, Mark. "Walter Roberts: Relations With State, CIA - 'Most of the People in the Department...Were Happy to Get Rid of the Information Program.'" *Global Publicks*, February 1, 2015. <http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-roberts-relations-with-state-cia.html>.

<sup>855</sup> After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and USSR, RFE/RL gradually dropped its broadcasts in these areas (beginning in 1993 in Hungary, and ending in Romania in 2008). Nonetheless, with the eruption of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, RFE/RL began broadcasting in Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian to the Yugoslav successor states in early 1994, in Albanian to Kosovo in 1999 and in Macedonian and Albanian to Macedonia in 2001 (RFE/RL History - Archives, "Then And Now: Free Media In Unfree Societies," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, accessed January 31, 2016, <http://www.rferl.org/info/history/133.html>).

<sup>856</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP: 19.

1951 to 1959 Yugoslav electrical industries produced 1,075,105 radios on 1.3 million registered sets. An often-encountered obstruction for a major spread of the Yugoslav radio network was the poor electricity network, the bad technical quality of national sets, and the lack of highly skilled workers and spare parts.<sup>857</sup> High radio taxes (the so-called radio license or registration) increased the list of obstacles that handicapped VOA listening.<sup>858</sup>

From the end of World War II, the number of receivers increased dramatically: in 1951, there were 310,148 registered radios in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia.<sup>859</sup> Relying on the USIA Office Research data, in March 1957 Yugoslavia had 711,000 licensed radio sets to a population of 17,799,000 (or some 4 percent).<sup>860</sup> According to *Komunist* (October 6, 1960) in 1959 this figure reached 1.3 million radio licenses, which corresponded to one radio set every third family.<sup>861</sup> A BBC-VOA joint survey of 1966 (assigned to Fedor Rocco of the Institute of Market Research, *Zavod za tržišna istraživanja Jugoslavije*, in Zagreb) revealed that in 1966 87 percent of Yugoslavs had at least one radio or transistor, whilst in larger cities that number increased to 91 percent. Nonetheless, differences among republics persisted and Serbia with 89 percent, Croatia 91, and Slovenia 96, were above the national average. The other less developed

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<sup>857</sup> Janjetović, *Od "Internacionale" do komercijale*, 74–77.

<sup>858</sup> The rise of radio tax fees of November 1, 1951, applying only to sets capable of picking up foreign broadcasts, entailed up to \$60. Because of high electricity expenses and power limitation (in Vojvodina and Dalmatia), listeners reported to have abandoned VOA listening or to have passed to battery set radios. A mother explained: "we had to give up our radio even if it gave us the greatest pleasure in our home... [but] taxes are so high that we do not know how we are going to pay them." (Voice of America Listening in Yugoslavia, October 1952, YO5201, Box 121, Country Projects Files 1951-1964, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP); The Yugoslav Transistor Contest Draw Large Response, March 8, 1962, RN-5-62, Box 4, Research Notes 1958-1962, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP).

<sup>859</sup> Voice of America Listening in Yugoslavia, October 1952, YO5201, Box 121, Country Projects Files 1951-1964, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP. The data for other republics is not available in this report.

<sup>860</sup> Worldwide Distribution of Radio Receivers Sets, Dec. 31, 1957, P-105-57, Box 4, Research Reports 1956-1959, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>861</sup> This opinion poll was jointly conducted by the Yugoslav Council of Culture and Education, the Central Council of Yugoslav Trade Unions (Centralno Veće sindikata Jugoslavije), and Belgrade RTV (Radio Listening – a Popular Pastime in Yugoslavia, Nov. 9, 1960, RN-43-60, Box 4, Research Notes 1958-1962, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP).

republics remained on lower percentages: Bosnia and Herzegovina on 79, Vojvodina on 83, and Macedonia on 84 percent.<sup>862</sup>

Along with cinema-going, radio listening was the most favored pastime in Yugoslavia, revealed a 1960 Yugoslav opinion poll. Light music, such as romantic Italian and French songs, South American folk and mostly jazz were more popular than serious and classical music. In addition, radio seemed more popular within rural populations, since “in towns, where a great variety of entertainment media is available, radio listening is probably second or even third on the list.”<sup>863</sup>

The first broadcast of the *Voice of America* was transmitted in the middle of World War II, in February 1942, followed in July by President F.D. Roosevelt’s executive order that provided \$5.4 million for the construction of transmitters. “While the desire to advance the Allied cause united all propagandists,<sup>864</sup> ideological disputes emerged between New Deal liberals and their opponents,” argues Walter Hixon.<sup>865</sup> Indeed, critics of it being a propaganda forum for the liberal domestic agenda and the President’s personal ambitions, continued to allege the VOA transmissions in the decades to follow. Another VOA permanent weak point concerned its employee’s competence. “Forced to compete with a thriving domestic radio industry, VOA employed writers, technicians, and broadcasters who were often inferior to those working at a higher salary for commercial stations.”<sup>866</sup> After the first hard-hitting anti-communist trends in broadcasts, followed by Senator McCarthy’s investigations in February 1953 (whose hearings produced no evidence of communist subversion of the VOA), the official policy altered. Aware of its precious role in the Cold War, the Jackson Committee recommended that the network should place its emphasis on “objective, factual news” and political “commentary explanations,” and reinforce its popularity with “satire and humor [...]

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<sup>862</sup> VOA Listening in Urban Yugoslavia, Nov. 1967, E-7-67, YO6601, Box 41, Africa, Eastern Europe and Multi-Areas, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>863</sup> Radio Listening – a Popular Pastime in Yugoslavia, Nov. 9, 1960, RN-43-60, Box 4, Research Notes 1958-1962, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>864</sup> In the original context not used with pejorative connotation, propaganda and propagandists indicated those who, involved in spreading ‘information’ in the psychological warfare arena, served the country for the right cause.

<sup>865</sup> Hixon, *Parting the Curtain*, 29–30.

<sup>866</sup> *Ibid*, 31.

music and entertainment”<sup>867</sup> by which the VOA succeeded in becoming an effective source of cultural infiltration.

Operationally, the International Broadcasting Division (IBS) was responsible for the over-all plans and operations of the VOA radio program. In 1950, some 32 percent of all radio outputs were dedicated to the news, 57 percent to news analysis, commentaries, features, documentaries, forums and discussion; while the music programs featuring orchestras, performers, and artists retained 11 percent of all the programs. Additionally, the IBS provided thousands of radio transcripts sent abroad to USIS officers, meant to be used for the national radio stations.<sup>868</sup> In 1950, the *Voice* operated “on a 24-hours schedule with a total of 70 daily programs in 25 languages” and had a “potential listening audience of 295 million people.”<sup>869</sup> A 1972 report underlined how the *Voice* broadcasted 780 hours per week in 35 languages, whilst by way of contrast, the Soviet Union broadcasted more than 1,900 hours per week in 84 languages, and communist China and the United Arab Republic both transmitted more than 1,300 hours in 38 languages.<sup>870</sup>

VOA’s estimated audience in 1966, based on sample surveys and transistor radio contests, suggested that there were some 42 million adults weekly following the *Voice*, roughly distributed in communist Europe (17 million), in Latin America (7 million), in the Far East (6 million), in Near East and South Asia (5.5 million), and in Africa (2.2 million). Such an audience distribution proves its anti-communist Cold War assignment. Another advantage of the VOA was its audience feature: most of its listeners were predominantly males, aged 20 to 35 years, employed in higher tenures, while 25 to 35 percent were represented by students.<sup>871</sup>

Formally, the VOA broadcasts were

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<sup>867</sup> Report to the President by the President’s Committee on International Information Activities, June 30, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. II, part 2, doc. 368, 1847; Memorandum for the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay), Oct. 1, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. II, part 2, doc. 372, 1890.

<sup>868</sup> Department of State Publication 3927, Aug. 1950, File 511.00/9-2250, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>869</sup> Jack K. McFall to Senator Edwin C. Johnson, Aug. 22, 1950, 511.00/8-950, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>870</sup> Washington Report – The Voice of America, May 5, 1972, enclosed in J. Glenn Beall, Jr. to James N. Sites, May 24, 1972, Box 27, USIA Director’s Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>871</sup> Voice of America Audience Estimate, Dec. 1966, E-1-66, Box 1, Estimates and Evaluations 1966-1978, USIA Office of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP.

dedicated to presenting a fair picture of life in the United States and the Western world. They provide the listeners with a better basis for judging and interpreting the national and international events going on around them. Thus, the Voice of America might be described as being an expression of our belief that the United States has the right and the duty to speak out to the world, and to speak the truth as we see it so that all may hear. Unlike the Voice of America, these broadcasts [from communist China, Soviet Union and UAR] are loaded with distortions and propaganda. It would be a crime of omission to let them go unanswered. One of the oldest lessons of history is that a government which rules by repression or terror may rule the land, but it does not rule the minds of the people.<sup>872</sup>

By the end of March 1943, the *Voice* started its transmissions on Yugoslav territory and became a precious source of information for Nazi-fascist occupied territories, along with the BBC.<sup>873</sup> In the years to come, and much less secretly, Yugoslavs continued listening to the VOA in their homes or at the homes of friends and relatives, but not at work, school or in public places (such behavior, as we shall observe, was politically undesirable).

### 5.3.1 Listening in the 1950s

Similar to the RFE and the RL in their destination countries, the *Voice* gained enormous popularity among Yugoslavs of all strata and ages, an impact which the USIA Research Offices accurately surveyed and analyzed since the early 1950s.<sup>874</sup> How many listeners were there? Who were they and why did they listen? How did they listen and what did the broadcasts mean to them? Did they make a difference?

In the early 1950s, the evaluation of listeners' reactions was retrieved both through regular panels in Belgrade or through reader surveys distributed with the *SAD* periodical.<sup>875</sup> At the end of the decade, relations between USIS Belgrade and the VOA became close, with the post usually sending weekly guidance telegrams to the IBS/Yugoslav desk, to inform them about the subjects of greatest interest in the

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<sup>872</sup> Washington Report – The Voice of America, May 5, 1972, enclosed J. Glenn Beall, Jr. to James N. Sites, May 24, 1972, Box 27, USIA Director's Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>873</sup> Rade Ranković, "Jubilej Glasa Amerike," *Glas Amerike*, accessed January 29, 2016, <http://www.glasamerike.net/content/voa-serbian-anniversary/1632143.html>.

<sup>874</sup> Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive study on the VOA audience impact beside the USIA official surveys. On the ultimate impact of Western radios and Radio Liberty in the Soviet Union, and on how their influence has inspired or reinforced free tendencies at work in the USSR, see R. Eugene Prata, *Discovering the Hidden Listener: An Empirical Assessment of Radio Liberty and Western Broadcasting to the USSR during the Cold War* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 2007).

<sup>875</sup> Despatch 487 from Belgrade to Department of State, Dec. 29, 1952, 511.68/12-2952, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

Yugoslav press, and a monthly monitoring report from Belgrade. In this way, the *Voice* became more responsive, gave valuable publicity to the cultural presentation program and to the U.S. participation at the Yugoslav fairs, advertised *Pregled* issues, and so forth.<sup>876</sup>

Until the middle 1960s, Yugoslav high-ranking communists opposed to the opinion polls stating that, since “the Party was close to the masses,” it inevitably knew what people’s opinion was. In 1966 these trends changed along with general liberalization in society that flared after the approval of the pro-market Economic Reform (July 24, 1965) and, especially, after the Forth Plenum of the CK SKJ when Aleksandar Ranković was expelled and the secret services reorganized (of the post-Ranković period, Savka Dabčević-Kučar wrote in her memoirs, “As if one could breathe more freely”).<sup>877</sup> Indeed, in 1966, for the first time, the Yugoslav Institute for Market Research and Councils of Education and Culture got involved in audience surveys commissioned by the U.S. agencies.<sup>878</sup>

USIS Belgrade conducted the first-known USIA/VOA survey in Yugoslavia in February 1952 by sending mail questionnaires to some thousands of VOA listeners. The names and addresses of the potential respondents were taken from lists of VOA program schedules recipients, at the time printed in five major Yugoslav languages. All six republics were represented, with emphasis on representatives from small towns and villages. Five-hundred samples were accompanied by prepaid postage envelopes of which 496 were returned.<sup>879</sup> The questionnaires were sent to individual listeners, but the respondents collected answers from friends or their fellow citizens.

The final 60-page long report, authored by the Bureau of Applied Social Research of the Columbia University, New York, showed that 57 percent of all the listeners came from urban areas, while, on the gender divide, it included predominantly males from the middle urban class (mainly bank managers, government officials, students, writers,

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<sup>876</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP: 19.

<sup>877</sup> Dabčević-Kučar, *’71. - hrvatski snovi i stvarnost*, 84; Klasić, *Jugoslavija i svijet 1968.*, 23–27.

<sup>878</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, 67049, Jan. 13, 1967, YO6601, Box 41, Africa, Eastern Europe and Multi-Areas, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>879</sup> The only underrepresentation in the answers was from Bosnia and Herzegovina, since this republic had a lower literacy rate, was less receptive for Western European and U.S. cultural influence and had less foreign radio broadcasts.

teachers, engineers, and judges). Finally, the VOA listeners in Yugoslavia proved to include a high proportion of young people: 29 percent was under 20, 18 percent comprehended those between 20 and 30 years old, whilst the over 30s represented only 10 percent of the sample. Moreover, every interviewed person under 20 was a student, which suggested that there was “some association between being in school and listening to the VOA.” Such a young age of the listeners, proves *Voice’s* crucial impact in shaping Yugoslav political opinions towards pro-Western preferences.

The most astonishing data related to the frequency of listening: 66 percent of all listeners reported listening every day, while business, white collars and government officials listened more than any other category. Women claimed to listen more than men, which was related to their being at home more afternoons. The VOA schedule for Yugoslavia in the early 1950s comprehended News, Sports, Language Lessons, Science, Life in the USA, Press Reviews, Commentaries, Agricultural News, Sport, Classical Music, Popular Music and Youth Programs. Apart from their interests in popular music and youth programs, young Yugoslav were ardent listeners of News, Sports, Language Lessons, and Science.<sup>880</sup> In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the programs were expanded and came to offer, for the Serbo-Croatian desk, around 13 different shows emitted from 8.30 to 10.00 pm (compared to a 1966 survey, VOA evening broadcasts were moved to later, as evidence of the change in working and living habits of the Yugoslav population). They included: News, Commentaries, Reports, Sport, People, Culture, Panorama, Events, America, the Press, Youth, Science, Economy, the Sunday Review, Religion, and Women’s World. The Slovenian broadcasts were emitted from 5.00 to 7.00 am every day and offered News, Commentaries and Life in the United States and, on Sunday, Religious Music.<sup>881</sup>

The main revelation of the 1952 VOA survey were the political commentaries the listeners freely left on the questionnaires. The final report listed six anti-Tito and anti-communist commentaries and 20-odd favorable political references to the United States, in addition to anti-Soviet remarks. These commentaries certainly evince the level of

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<sup>880</sup> Voice of America Listening in Yugoslavia, October 1952, YO5201, Box 121, Country Projects Files 1951-1964, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP: x–xv.

<sup>881</sup> Voice of America Broadcast Schedule, May-Aug. 1970, YO7101, Box 45, Africa, Eastern Europe and Multi-Areas, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP.

political coercion in vogue. They represent a vent of tragic personal accounts, as well as a sign of protest and courage since the respondents were probably aware of postal control from communist authorities. “I listen to VOA programs every day; I don’t listen to enemies,” was a commentary; whilst a farmer underlined “I do not work anywhere now. I am not a Communist so they will not let me work in my job as a grain merchant. Long live mother America who is delivering and freeing the whole world from communist Russia. Long live Truman and American democracy.” A former high school teacher narrated, “Since May 1945 I was a professor of the First High School in Belgrade. I was dismissed for being an ‘Anglophile’ – at that time it was a big sin. For six years I have lived here in my village with my father and have a rather hard primitive life.” Another letter accused Tito and Moša Pijade of being “liars, swindlers... a robber band” accusing them of tortures by UDBA.<sup>882</sup>

Commentaries of young listeners had a more entertaining reasoning, “VOA is my great recreation for through its emissions I get to know the whole world and the life of different people,” while a mother stated “I wish to listen to medical advice because we have ten children, we are poor and this advice would be very useful to us.” Conclusively, the survey draws attention to the fact that Yugoslav listeners wanted more news on Yugoslavia and its culture, as well as to hear the U.S. opinion on it, in a way which would close the “circuit of communication between themselves and ‘The Voice.’”<sup>883</sup>

### **5.3.2 Listening in the 1960s Between Political Disapproval and American Jazz**

Surveys conducted in the 1960s present analogous audience attitudes, thus more complex in their outcomes. A report based on an interview of 146 Yugoslav refugees collected in West Germany between May 1960 and January 1961, demonstrates the diverse listening habits of Western broadcasts: 70 percent of the interviewees declared that they listen to foreign Western radio stations and 69 percent declared to be regular VOA listeners. Sergije Visich of the Yugoslav desk stated that 64 percent of the listeners in Serbo-Croatian and in Slovenian tuned in to the *Voice* (the corresponding

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<sup>882</sup> Ibid, 69–70.

<sup>883</sup> Ibid, 59.

figure for Czechoslovakia was 59 percent and 62 for Poland). Conrad Mejac, VOA staff from the same desk, reported having interviewed 100 Slovenians in 1960, of whom 71 listened to the *Voice* regularly. The comparative figure for the BBC was 14 percent of weekly listeners. What mostly surprised the USIA Office was the definition by Yugoslav interviewers of VOA's approach to Communism, defined by 33 percent of them to be "too soft." The corresponding figure for Poland and Czechoslovakia was 27 and 16, from which the report, quite rightly, concluded that the "greater impatience towards moderation in Yugoslavia and Poland [...] may also reflect the greater measure of freedom Yugoslavs and Poles have become accustomed to."<sup>884</sup>

Nevertheless, it was the Transistor Contest that best framed the Yugoslav listening habits and audience composition. The contest consisted in announcing that everyone could win a transistor radio by sending to VOA a card or letter giving their name, address, and certain personal information such as age, sex, occupation, in order to deliberately obtain an indication of the geographical distribution and composition of the audience. The Transistor Contest in September 1961 yielded 18,767 entries, an "unexpectedly heavy response" that "exceeded the total of any previous transistor contests."<sup>885</sup> Of the total entries, three quarters came from Croatia (which represents only 25 percent of the Yugoslav population, while only 15 percent came from Serbia that represents 41 percent of the population). This discrepancy might be due to two main reasons: greater availability of radio sets and electricity power network in Croatia and traditional Croatian pro-Western attitudes and cultural linkages. Compared to the 1952 USIA survey, this time the sample comprised a higher percentage of females (46) and a higher percentage of workers, which in fact testifies to the increase in women's participation in society and superior purchasing power for the working class.<sup>886</sup> That the participation to the contest was surrounded by political intimidations, is suggested by the fact that on November 15 1962, Radio Belgrade described contest participants as

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<sup>884</sup> Yugoslav Reactions to Western Broadcasting, July 5, 1961, RN-15-61, Box 4, Research Notes 1958-1962, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>885</sup> Additionally, USIS Belgrade reported "some evidence that bags containing contest mails were burned in Yugoslavia thus reducing the apparent number of entries" (The Yugoslav Transistor Contest Draw Large Response, March 8, 1962, RN-5-62, Box 4, Research Notes 1958-1962, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP).

<sup>886</sup> The Yugoslav Transistor Contest Draw Large Response, March 8, 1962, RN-5-62, Box 4, Research Notes 1958-1962, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP.

“impulsive,” “ignorant” and “traders in their pride,” with particular harsh words for “those who – at least because of their formal qualifications – should in practice be strongly opposed.” This last was a thinly disguised allusion to party members and government officials, as we shall witness later on. The broadcast ended with a veiled threat against “the individuals concerned” and resulted in withdrawal of entries from VOA headquarters requested “directly or through American relatives.”<sup>887</sup>

The VOA’s major strength in acting as a cultural soft power persuader reposed on a very high adult weekly audience (2.2 million listeners on 2.8 million radio sets in 1966)<sup>888</sup> and its appeal to an urban population which represented the base for all Yugoslav pro-reform movements. According to another 1966 audience poll by the Zagreb’s Institute of Market Research, 22 percent of Yugoslav urban population listened to VOA, half of them on a regular basis. Moreover, VOA urban audiences corresponded to USIA target groups in Yugoslavia. The survey gave additional information on Yugoslav VOA broadcasts: the broadcasts in Serbo-Croatian lasted one hour each evening and in Slovenian one half hour each morning for a total of 10.5 hours weekly.<sup>889</sup> As a politically important revenue, the survey emphasized how the Yugoslav “listeners turned to stations such as the VOA mainly to supplement and check on the news supplied by their own media, whose credibility they often suspected.” Crucially, they made a relevant point about Slovenian broadcasts that, while being more costly than the Serbo-Croatian ones, were successful above the average. Slovenians constituted 8.5 percent of the entire Yugoslav population, but they made up 5 percent of the VOA audience, which was essential since “the leadership of Slovenia, in the current economic and political direction of the nation, is important to U.S. interest.”<sup>890</sup>

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<sup>887</sup> The Yugoslav Transistor Contest, March 30, 1962, RN-30-62, Box 8, Research Reports 1966-1990, USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>888</sup> Voice of America Audience Estimate, Dec. 1966, E-1-66, Box 1, Estimates and Evaluations 1966-1978, USIA Office of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>889</sup> The 1966 survey of the Zagreb Institute for Market Research was the first in a communist country that permitted both the export of reliable data on some foreign radio listening habits of its citizens and the participation in the study design by a Western quasi-governmental organization. The sample embraced occupational groups – scientists, engineers, doctors, lawyers, creative intellectuals and others – which approximate USIA’s professionals target audience. Government employees, mainly white collar workers, constituted another large component of the sample (VOA Listening in Urban Yugoslavia, Nov. 1967, E-7-67, Box 1, Estimates and Evaluations 1966-1978, USIA Office of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP (hereafter VOA Listening in Urban Yugoslavia, Nov. 1967), i–iii).

<sup>890</sup> VOA Listening in Urban Yugoslavia, Nov. 1967, 4.

The USIA surveys on the Yugoslav *Voice* marked the undeniable contribution that *Music USA* had in popularizing American jazz in Yugoslavia. This legendary world-known show, half dance and half jazz, conducted by Willis Conover, producer and broadcaster, started on January 6, 1955, and lasted for 40 years. With his recognizable deep-toned voice, Conover was a jazz promoter and a jazz star for audiences in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and worldwide. When George Wein traveled the states of the Warsaw Pact, as the producer of the Newport Jazz Festival, he reported that he was astonished that “Eastern Europe’s entire concept of jazz comes from Willis Conover,” while visitors traveling to Poland in the 1960s remained surprised that “Conover’s likeness was displayed as often and with as much affection as pictures of John F. Kennedy.”<sup>891</sup>

In 1966, the USIA initiated a worldwide survey on the VOA by questionnaires distributed through local USIS posts, except for Yugoslavia where they were sent directly from Washington, probably for reasons of security. While the percentage of returns in the Yugoslav case remained very low, this worldwide poll indicated that Yugoslav respondents were the youngest among all the others (with an average age of 25). The Yugoslav students’ response proved particularly high and constituted 60 percent of all respondents. The outcomes showed that the largest proportion of respondents in all areas listened to *Music USA* 4 to 6 times a week and were generally interested in the whole program. However, the jazz portion remained the first preference in Yugoslavia and Europe. In the Yugoslav case, *Music USA* proved a universal hit: young audiences, mostly students, dedicated many (above average) listening hours to jazz music. Indeed, 13 percent of them followed *Music USA* 7 days per week, 52 percent from 4 to 6 days per week, 33 percent from 1 to 2 days a week, but for a total of one or one and a half hours.<sup>892</sup> In other words, the Yugoslav youth deliberately chose to be subjected to U.S. more than to Yugoslav propaganda, and did it for entertainment purposes, thus enjoying music and feeling unconventional. However, was this behavior politically detrimental in the long run for a dictatorial communist regime?

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<sup>891</sup> Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War* (University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 211. Conover was poorly known in the United States as the VOA did not broadcast domestically except on shortwave.

<sup>892</sup> Mail Survey of Listeners to MUSIC USA, April 1961, MB-6, Box 1, Country Projects Files 1951-1964, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP.

### 5.3.3 Communist Political Anxieties

In 1950, the Central Committee's Commission for Foreign Relations (Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze) recognized that anti-Yugoslav tones were disappearing from VOA's broadcasts, while continuously reporting on "anti-clerical abuse of priests in Czechoslovakia, abuse of youth and scientists in the USSR," and so forth. The Commission admitted that there was no anti-Yugoslav propaganda, except for some articles as the one containing AFL's condemnation of "Tito's despotic regime which destroyed the rights of democratic forces and workers."<sup>893</sup>

The Yugoslav authority's inquiries of 1966 revealed that socialist countries broadcast more on standard issues of life: lower prices, higher purchasing power, workers social rights and welfare state, whilst the "capitalist radio stations" prioritized "themes of social superstructure," namely the advantage of the multi-party system and political liberties such as freedom of thought and speech.<sup>894</sup>

Both the *Voice* and other foreign radio stations, mainly the BBC and the RAI, but also Radio Moscow, used contests to gain audience information on program preferences, broadcast ratings and effectiveness feedback. While they were not jammed, as in the Soviet Union, UDBA despised and scrutinized the mails that listeners sent in response to contests. Foreign broadcasts were considered dangerous but were not officially prohibited.<sup>895</sup>

When in 1961, the Municipal Committee of Belgrade wrote to the SKJ to underline that foreign radio stations were spreading enemy propaganda and had to be immediately eradicated, they were referring to necessary counterpropaganda actions.<sup>896</sup> What mostly preoccupied Yugoslav communist leaders at the local level was the participation of the SKJ members in the VOA Transistor Contests which, indeed, was punished by

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<sup>893</sup> Zabeleška o emisijama Radio New Yorka (Glas Amerike) na srpskohrvatskom jeziku, Nov.-Dec. 1950, 5/IX/109/VI-1-82, Box 5, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze CK SKJ 1945-1990, CK SKJ, RG 507, AJ.

<sup>894</sup> Informacija o problemima vezanim za inostranu propagandu u našoj zemlji, April 15, 1966, 16/2-1966, Box 256, Komisija za politički i idejno-vaspitni rad 1966, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 7.

<sup>895</sup> Propaganda kapitalističkih zemalja u Jugoslaviji, 1953, 724/1953, Box 44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 24-26.

<sup>896</sup> Opštinski komitet SKS Gradskom Komitetu SKS, Dec. 26, 1961, 236, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

expulsion or verbal admonishment.<sup>897</sup> In 1961 200 citizens of the Krnjača municipality (today part of Belgrade city) applied to the VOA contest, among them four “communists,”<sup>898</sup> three blue collar workers and one policeman. Called by the report “holders [and] participants of foreign propaganda,” the four SKJ members were excommunicated and expelled from the Party.<sup>899</sup> The Party’s Ideological Committee from Belgrade’s city region put it in this way,

Towards the SKJ members who participated [in the contests] strict measures have been taken, they were criticized, some of them were punished, and a smaller number were excommunicated. These measures are totally justified, because communists must bear in mind that these countries [...] will access materials which they will extensively use in their political and propaganda activities.<sup>900</sup>

The VOA represented “highly problematic and dangerous propaganda,”<sup>901</sup> but in internal discussions its impact was sometimes underestimated maybe even intentionally, since “only old pre-war politicians and few former royal traders listen today to the *Voice of America*.”<sup>902</sup> While listening to the VOA was not prohibited, it was politically undesirable and dangerous (the same went for the BBC, Radio Paris, and the RAI). The fact that SKJ members were punished or expelled from the Party lines because of participating in the contests, usually meant to lose one’s job, social privileges such as the state-provided flats or apartments (which were given to the majority of employees, regardless of Party membership, by a “waiting list” criteria), leisure time benefits, subsidized vacations, possibility of employment for family members, and so forth. The VOA example proves, once again, how Yugoslav authorities practiced invisible boundaries of coercion that had repercussions when they were trespassed.

A refugees’ opinion survey of 1962 enhances these views, since, for these Yugoslav emigrants to listen to the *Voice* and to other Western broadcasts, signified

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<sup>897</sup> Informacija o preduzetim merama u vezi neprijateljske propagande na teritoriju opštine Zvezdara, Jan. 15, 1962, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

<sup>898</sup> “Communist” means members of the SKJ.

<sup>899</sup> Informacija OK Krnjača, June, 1961, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

<sup>900</sup> Informacija o delatnosti strane propagande, May 3, 1962, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

<sup>901</sup> Opštinski komitet SKS Zemun Gradskom komitetu SKS, Jan. 22, 1962, 01-115/i, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

<sup>902</sup> Opštinski komitet SKS Sopot, Feb. 12, 1962, 232, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB.

breaking implicit rules, having access to unofficial news, and expressing informal dissent and nonconformity. These emigrants, of predominately Croatian and Slovenian nationalities, from urban areas and middle-high and highly educated, preferred to rely mostly on the VOA (46 percent), Radio Vatican (14 percent), Radio Paris (13 percent), the BBC and the RAI (11 percent).<sup>903</sup>

Memories of former VOA listeners collected by Vučetić on several personal Serbian and Croatian blogs and newspapers, confirm that listening to the *Voice* was regarded with concern, and as a secret and conspiratorial activity.<sup>904</sup> The same pattern of behavior is observed in the relations of communist authorities towards USIS posts in Belgrade and Zagreb where boundaries of freedom and margins of coercion fluctuated. As a result there were no established criteria for what was totally forbidden, tolerated or implicitly not recommended. The shades of grey of politically undesirable behavior were discussed among Party fractions in the negotiated spaces of the political arena where decisions were made. The Praxis question is just one example.

The analysis of U.S. public diplomacy in Yugoslavia helps to highlight and uncover these unstable boundaries that created a discrepancy between the low perception of Tito's dictatorship and the mechanism of political violence and coercion actually executed. Certainly, the political anxieties that surrounded the listening to foreign broadcasts, and the *Voice* in particular, frames the complexity of Yugoslav leader's polyarchy, its internal fractures and differentiation of policy priorities (a differentiation that almost naturally originates from such a huge bureaucratic state apparatus as was the Federation).

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<sup>903</sup> Radio Listening: Attitudes of Refugees, July-Aug. 1962, Box 121, Country Projects Files 1951-1964, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>904</sup> Popular Croatian talk show conductor, remembers "that my grandpa and father secretly listened to the *Voice of America* and the political news of the famous reporter Grga Zlatoper." "Many times I could not hear the Italian songs till the end because father asked for the *Voice of America*. He always wanted that station, for me boring news. He would find the *Voice* and you'd hear: 'Here is Washington, Voice of America, Grga Zlatoper speaks [Ovde Washington, Glas Amerike, govori Grga Zlatoper!]" recalled Milorad Bibić, journalist of *Slobodna Dalmacija*. (Orhidea Gaura, "Vojo Šiljak: Prva zvijezda talk-showa u Hrvatskoj," *Nacional*, September 22, 2009, <http://arhiva.nacional.hr/clanak/print/67442>; Vučetić, "Amerikanizacija u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi," 158–160.

### 5.3.4 And the RAI, BBC, and Radio Moscow?

Different comparative studies in the early 1950s emphasized Yugoslav preference for VOA over the BBC, the RAI (Rome), Radio Paris and Radio Moscow.<sup>905</sup> One of these comparison studies, conducted in 1953 by the Institute of Communication Research (University of Illinois) revealed that the “VOA is neither so carefully neutral as BBC nor so blatantly propagandistic as Radio Moscow. While its news is more general than Moscow, VOA is careful to include news that will interpret U.S. policy, which is apparently its main function.” And continued,

Moscow world is a black and a white one. It seldom says anything good about the U.S. or bad about the USSR. VOA, on the other hand, seldom says anything bad about the U.S. or good about the USSR, with the possible exception of an occasional wistful hope that the Soviet Union’s leadership is not all bad. [...] But BBC’s world is grey. [Moscow’s political strategy] is to divide the U.S. from its chief allies. To this end, Moscow devotes special treatment to France and Britain. It sympathizes with French predicaments in Indochina, opposes EDC and deplors American pressures on France. VOA strategy revolves around mutual security as the hope of the world. It portrays the U.S. as peaceful, defensively strong, and desirous of protecting human rights. [However, it] does not employ the detail and bright colors that Moscow uses in describing the chief cold war protagonists.

The stations differed in their basic approaches; the VOA and the BBC news “tend to be direct and simple, [...] VOA scripts appear to be on about the level of American commercial radio news; Radio Moscow is slightly more difficult level and the BBC [...] apparently thinks its audience is a highly-educated leader group.”<sup>906</sup>

In 1961, a survey by Radio Zagreb’s Audience Department also confirmed the VOA’s larger audience as compared to the BBC (the figures presented 33 percent for VOA and 9 for the BBC).<sup>907</sup> Among 14 foreign broadcasts – the VOA, the BBC, the RAI, ORTF (Paris), Deutsche Welle (Cologne), Deutschland funk (Cologne), Radio Moscow, Vatican, Madrid, Ankara, Bucharest, Sofia, Tirana and Peking, – revealed a 1966 survey, the VOA was by far the most widely listened to foreign station, “it attracted about three times as many listeners as its nearest competitor Radio Moscow, although Moscow beams twice the number of weekly hours – 21 compared to 10.5

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<sup>905</sup> Voice of America Listening in Yugoslavia, October 1952, YO5201, Box 121, Country Projects Files 1951-1964, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>906</sup> IRI Intelligence Memorandum, Oct. 25, 1954, IM-1-54, Box 1, Intelligence Bulletins, Memorandums and Summaries 1954-1956, USIA Office of Research and Intelligence, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>907</sup> Yugoslav Reactions to Western Broadcasting, July 5, 1961, RN-15-61, Box 4, Research Notes 1958-1962, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP.

[VOA] hours to Yugoslavia.” Moreover, the BBC broadcast 11 hours per week to Yugoslavia but captured only about one-seventh the VOA audience.<sup>908</sup>

As for the BBC, the majority of VOA listeners were aged 18 to 24, while, proportionally, Radio Moscow was followed by the age group 35 to 54. The surveys uncovered the usual daily rhythm of Yugoslav people: they preferred morning radio listening between 6 and 6.30, tuned in again for lunch between 12 and 12.30, and finally returned after work around 3 pm with the listening peak around 7 to 8 pm. Quite predictably, the appearance of the TV from the middle 1960s decreased radio listening, but without diminishing its appeal for a large number of listeners.<sup>909</sup>

The *Voice* transmitted by short and medium wave from Thessaloniki, while the other foreign broadcasts, the BBC included, ran on short wave. Since most Yugoslavs tuned in on medium wave, this partly explains VOA’s dominant overall position among the foreign broadcasters.<sup>910</sup>

While there is much scholarly literature on the RFE/RL,<sup>911</sup> scholarly investigations on the VOA impact need to be expanded.<sup>912</sup> The micro perspective on the Yugoslav *Voice of America* shows the much needed recognition of this public diplomacy channel that, not only transmitted hot political messages, but throughout its audience surveys, transistor contests, and mail responses to listeners,<sup>913</sup> effectively acted as, what Nicholas

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<sup>908</sup> VOA Listening in Urban Yugoslavia, Nov. 1967, E-7-67, Box 1, Estimates and Evaluations 1966-1978, USIA Office of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP: 1; Survey of Listening in Yugoslavia, Dec. 1966, YO6601, Box 41, Africa, Eastern Europe and Multi-Areas, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>909</sup> Survey of Listening in Yugoslavia, Dec. 1966, YO6601, Box 41, Africa, Eastern Europe and Multi-Areas, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>910</sup> VOA Listening in Urban Yugoslavia, Nov. 1967.

<sup>911</sup> Apart from the studies already quoted, other important scholars have explored the covert dimensions, clandestine offshoots and fifth column’s role of RFE/RL, their reliance on the CIA-CCF network, and their advocacy for liberal democracy and free market economy; for this see A. Johnson, *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond* (Washington, DC: Stanford University Press, 2010); Sig Mickelson, *America’s Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (New York, NY: Praeger, 1983); Arch Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (Lexington, Ky.; London: University Press of Kentucky, 2003); Nicholas J. Schlosser, *Cold War on the Airwaves: The Radio Propaganda War against East Germany* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2015).

<sup>912</sup> Alan L. Heil Jr., *Voice of America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003) provides a respectable perspective from one of its longest serving employees. An insightful focus on VOA’s domestic propaganda problems is to be found in David F. Krugler, *The Voice of America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles, 1945-1953* (University of Missouri Press, 2000).

<sup>913</sup> The Development of a System for Answering and Analyzing Voice of America Audience Mail, Aug. 17, 1966, S-8-66, Box 22, Special Reports 1953-1997, USIA Office of Research, RG 306, NACP.

Cull defined, the “listening” function of the USIA, thus collecting public opinion data and reactions from abroad.<sup>914</sup> The Yugoslav political anxieties and cautions regarding VOA popularity and reception by the Yugoslav mass public, point to the visible and invisible coercion boundaries which characterized the Yugoslav socialist experiment, whilst the listening attitudes show a rather successful public diplomacy story, maybe less because of the VOA’s extraordinary talents, and more because of a Yugoslav urban, young, and basically communist-disaffected population. VOA broadcasts were effective in propagating American classical and jazz music, artists, and trends, “breaking-news” and educational lectures, but also U.S. foreign policy views, ideas, ideologies, the possible external impact of which will be discussed in the last part of this study.

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<sup>914</sup> Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, xiii–xix.

## 6 THE U.S. CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NEW/OLD LEADERSHIP

*There are few countries in the world with which the U.S. has such close cultural relations or where scholars, political and economic leaders through the exchange program have been exposed to the United States. Yugoslavia has shown great courage and determination in meeting its difficulties and applied imagination and adaptability to its problems. United States backing such as the exchange program provides is essential to encouraging Yugoslavia to move ahead toward the creation of a «compromise between Western democratic traditions and proletarian dictatorships which lies at the root of Yugoslav Post-War developments.*

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Report, April 1967<sup>915</sup>

*Intellectual and cultural cooperation depends, essentially, on the establishment and development of ties between American and Yugoslav universities, academies and other institutions; if such are to be effective in advancing mutual understanding and in benefiting both nations, they must rest on the strength and vigor of those institutions in interpreting and helping to meet the needs of their own societies. The long-range program, however, should be seen primarily as an investment in people.*

Report of the Binational Advisory Commission, December 2, 1966<sup>916</sup>

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<sup>915</sup> CU program planning and budgeting system – FY69 Program Recommendations for Yugoslavia and Turkey, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

From 1956 to 1965, Yugoslavia established cultural exchange programs with many Eastern and Western European countries such as USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway. Among these nations, there were also Middle East and African countries such as Syria, Lebanon and Kenya.<sup>917</sup> The arrangements passed through the Federal Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (Savezna komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom), while the Republican sub-commissions (Komisije za kulturne veze s inozemstvom) were responsible for the programs for the Republican, local, needs. The Federal Commission coordinated the initiatives, published the competitions,<sup>918</sup> promoted ad hoc commissions for candidates' screening (or delegated it to the republican commissions), and collected local and republican requests with the cooperation of the secretariats of culture. Usually, the candidates eligible for the exchanges were post-doc students, assistants, lecturers, and researchers with reliable "political and moral" qualities. As a notable point, the Commission always promoted collective calls for all these countries. Nevertheless, these collective calls, as the one of 1963 that comprehended 22 countries,<sup>919</sup> did not include the United States.<sup>920</sup>

The Yugoslav government treated the cultural exchange and cooperation with the United States on a privileged and separated platform. Even if Yugoslavia did not have a special and unidirectional convention with the United States as with other countries (but plenty of official and unofficial programs), this cultural exchange program had the

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<sup>916</sup> Report of the Binational Advisory Commission for Long Term Planning of Educational, Scientific-Technical, and Cultural Cooperation between the SFRY and the USA, Dec. 2, 1966, Folder 17, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL: 1, 10. The underlined text is original.

<sup>917</sup> See entire Box 64, Razmjena naučnih radnika, Savjet za kulturu i nauku NRH 1956-1961, RG 1599, HDA.

<sup>918</sup> The competitions were published in the Yugoslav main newspapers: *Borba* and *Politika* for Serbia, *Vjesnik* for Croatia, *Delo* for Slovenia, *Nova Makedonija* for Macedonia, and *Oslobodjenje* for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

<sup>919</sup> Among them Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, DDR, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rumania, USSR, Switzerland, Sweden and among the Middle East and Asian countries, India, Iraq, Sudan, Tunis, and UAR (Poziv na sastanak, Jan. 15, 1964, 3845/1-1963, Box 22, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA).

<sup>920</sup> Ibid. See also: Box 22-23, Vize za inozemstvo, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA; Box 227, Republički sekretarijat za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu 1965-1979, RG 1415, HDA.

largest extension and a high political priority.<sup>921</sup> In 1967, the first country accommodating a major number of Yugoslav students was East Germany with 222 of them, followed by the United States with 194 of them.<sup>922</sup> The U.S. budgetary allocations for educational and cultural exchange in Yugoslavia indicate a galloping increase of the U.S. cultural “investments” in Yugoslavia in the period 1949-1975: from \$10,260,595 in 1949, to 29,288,021 in 1959, with a peak of 56,763,844 in 1966, followed by a partial decrease in the period 1967-1970,<sup>923</sup> and then a return to the rising trends in the early 1970s.<sup>924</sup>

Not only were the CU and the State Department in Washington concerned with cultural and educational exchange in Yugoslavia: the USIS publications in Belgrade and Zagreb were highly involved in explaining to Yugoslav audiences the core issues of the U.S. educational and university system. Special subject lists at the libraries were dedicated to American education and universities,<sup>925</sup> while pamphlets like *Goals of Education* described the American higher education system as one permitting a wide range of freedom: “a student of liberal arts can choose agriculture, or a liberal art student [can practice] industry management.”<sup>926</sup> Even the *Pregled* periodical did not fail to underline that the U.S. universities such as Harvard “gave [...] not only full freedom in our academic life, but also complete liberty in choosing what courses shall be attained.”<sup>927</sup>

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<sup>921</sup> Materijal i neke sugestije u vezi programiranja saradnje sa SAD u prosvetno-naučnoj i kulturnoj oblasti, Nov. 15, 1966, Box 237, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ.

<sup>922</sup> The Educational and Cultural Profile of Yugoslavia, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

<sup>923</sup> By the end of the 1960s, there was a serious “reversal of fortune for the Bureau,” when the U.S. economy started to face a major trade deficit and spiraling costs of the Vietnam War and the social welfare programs. In order to contain costs, Congress approved a 31 percent budget cut for CU, reducing it drastically to \$31.5 million in the fiscal year 1969 (Giles Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire: The US State Department’s Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France and Britain 1950-1970* (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang S.A, 2008), 87–88).

<sup>924</sup> Budgetary Allocations for Educational and Cultural Exchange 1939-1975, Folder 1, Box 46, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

<sup>925</sup> List of Reference Materials enclosed in Airgram 81 from the Department of State to All American Diplomatic and Consular Posts, July 13, 1962, 511.00/7-1362, Box 1046, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>926</sup> Airgram 682 from the Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Oct. 7, 1950, 511.00/10-750, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>927</sup> *Pregled*, June 1961, 38. On the innovation and exclusivity of American higher education, see also the special issues of November 1961 and June 1967.

This chapter, focused on the cultural exchange programs between Yugoslavia and the United States, will particularly discuss privileged cooperation paths as they occurred through the Leader's, the Fulbright, and the state-private network exchange programs. This kind of cooperation with Yugoslavia spanned from the middle 1950s and onwards, but their major expansion was realized in the first five years of the 1960s. These programs, as we shall see, were reserved a special treatment by the Yugoslav leaders because they were not directly connected with propaganda and had an immediate visible benefit for the grantees and institutions involved. In addition, wide attention shall be given to the political background of these programs, the level of government involvement in channeling soft power networks, and Cold War policies that shaped such cultural linkages. The chapter also underpins an inquiry into the personal grantees' experiences and life paths that lay beyond cultural cooperation agreements and policy practices.

## 6.1 The Leader's Exchange Program and the Yugoslav Middle Ranked Leadership

As Scott-Smith emphasized, the "United States has a unique ability to project and manage empires" and the Leader's Exchange Program occupies a "special place within this imperial endeavor."<sup>928</sup> The U.S. exchange programs represent in fact a category apart in the endeavor of U.S. public diplomacy activities. If the USIS soft power in the field was focused on a massive distribution of propaganda material and activities, the exchange programs were mostly effectively pursuing an individual approach revolving "around personal experience and insight."<sup>929</sup> In the words of Joseph E. Slater, Deputy Assistant Secretary, the educational and cultural activities were set "as a major instrument of foreign policy, to be joined with political and economic activities in sustaining and directing the position of the United States in world affairs."<sup>930</sup> In the Cultural Cold War context, Slater regarded education "in terms of the conflict of ideas" and, as far as the communist countries were concerned, "so long as we have faith in the

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<sup>928</sup> Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire*, 21.

<sup>929</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>930</sup> Source Material on International Education and Cultural Activities for the 1960s, July 15, 1961, Folder 2, Box 46, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

power and the viability of our own culture, we must be prepared to encourage cultural penetration in both directions.”<sup>931</sup>

The State Department Leader’s Exchange Program (LEP) in Yugoslavia can be considered as the most subversive action of the U.S. government towards the Yugoslav communist regime in the history of U.S.-Yugoslav foreign relations. While all the other cultural exchange programs were subject to some form of Yugoslav control, the LEP allowed only the U.S. administration to select grantees independently, and was specifically established so “that top governmental officials, as well as leaders and specialists in all categories, can be selected by the U.S. Government rather than by the Yugoslavs.”<sup>932</sup> The Yugoslav party ranks considered the LEP as a subversive program as well. Their main concern was the personal contact through which the invitation was delivered, without asking any permission of competent Yugoslav authorities, and sometimes without even informing them. Often, Yugoslav personalities solicited the Americans to first confer on them higher party ranks and organizations before inviting them to the LEP. When, on February 11, 1964, the U.S. General Consul in Zagreb, Samuel H. Lee, visited the Consular Department of the Executive Council of Croatian Parliament in order to invite its Secretary, Stjepan Iveković, on a 2-month LEP, he received a nervous response from the Parliament President, Ivan Krajačić, that invitations were to be made through federal or republican institutions, and never personally.<sup>933</sup>

### **6.1.1 The Ideological and Policy Background**

Inspired by Truman’s Campaign of Truth ethos to promote a “full and fair picture” of the United States in the world, Washington inaugurated the LEP in 1949-50. The program began as a series of trips of three months or more around the U.S., with the aim of including destinations chosen by the grantee, and ensuring a multi-varied experience

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<sup>931</sup> Ibid.

<sup>932</sup> Despatch 73 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 6, 1959, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands (hereafter RSC). The archival sources contained in Box 2 are originally located in the MC 468, Special Collection, University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville, Arkansas.

<sup>933</sup> Bilješka, Feb. 11, 1964, 04-Pov. K. 54/1-1964, Box 29, Republički protokol, IVS SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA.

mixed with professional interests and environmental and social diversity. The itineraries, flexible and varied, comprised meetings with “professional counterparts interspersed with tourist visits and small-town hospitality.” The LEP relied on the belief that “anyone undertaking such a facilitated journey across the country, in constant contact with the American people, could only come away favorably influenced.”<sup>934</sup> The LEP was renamed in 1965 the International Visitor Program, then the International Visitor Leadership Program in 2004, but its principles have largely remained the same. Until today, it is considered to be

the U.S. Department of State’s premier professional exchange program. Through short-term visits to the United States, current and emerging foreign leaders in a variety of fields experience this country firsthand and cultivate lasting relationships with their American counterparts. Professional meetings reflect the participants’ professional interests and support the foreign policy goals of the United States.<sup>935</sup>

According to the CU principal action recommendations for the 1960s, the five major goals of the U.S. cultural activities abroad were very much leader-oriented. Their recommendations included: to expose “present and potential leaders [...] to the ideology and techniques of free societies,” “to aid free world countries in meeting their needs for technically and professionally trained personnel, [...] [and] in expanding and improving their basic educational systems” and in developing “a high level of cultural and scientific achievements within each country and interchange between countries.”<sup>936</sup> Moreover, the 1961 CU study strongly praised that

we should give more emphasis than we have in the past to those who are uncommitted or even anti-American in their present orientation as compared to those who are already basically well-disposed towards the United States. [...] We should include in this group not only elected officials but party officials, local committee chairman, and similar present and potential party leaders [...] and ensure that the sons of local “elite” leaders are given specific exposure to modern concepts of free society. [...] We should develop comprehensive projects for exposing the owners, editors and staff of all elements of the press, radio and television in other countries to free society, concepts and techniques.<sup>937</sup>

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<sup>934</sup> Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire*, 78, 21.

<sup>935</sup> “About IVLP,” Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, <http://eca.state.gov/ivlp>. See also Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, *The International Visitor Leadership Program 75th Anniversary*, accessed September 12, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SOqGE-Hbf3g>.

<sup>936</sup> Summary of Principal Action Recommendations, July 13, 1961, Folder 2, Box 46, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

<sup>937</sup> *Ibid.*

The emphasis on uncommitted and anti-American Yugoslav leaders emerges similarly in the “Key Elements of Population” report that suggests which leaders should be mostly involved in LEP in Yugoslavia. The first group comprised the political and governmental officials of each Yugoslav republic. The Yugoslav regime was modeled on the federation and each republic had its own Parliament, executive council, administrative agencies, and a judiciary. The new constitution of April 1963 provided for a president and vice president of the republic and a Federal Assembly. Even if there was a single party control in Yugoslavia, the CU policymakers deemed that

there is considerable parliamentary democracy which we should encourage and stimulate [in] the present system of rotating key officials every two years, [...] between those of the federal and republic levels [...] [that] enables us to reach a greater segment of the population [...] during the period of transition to a more liberal form of government in Yugoslavia.<sup>938</sup>

Such a position indicates to what extent the CU as an agency of the U.S. government considered the Yugoslav regime as going through a transitional period towards a more liberal form of government. Besides the influence on political leaders, the U.S. agency considered to be highly effective the U.S. exchange programs on the Yugoslav academic community. The third priority of the CU were the communication and media leaders, evaluated as middle to highly effective: while the “Yugoslav media presents a constantly changing picture [...] [and] though this area is heavily controlled by the Press Law, [...] there is evidence of a break-through” estimated the U.S. policy creators.

The Yugoslav professionals, highly qualified, urbane and with ready insight into the work of their western colleagues, were considered the best strata of population through which “western practice of free communication and association without political implications” would be easily introduced. Actually, the Bureau estimated the impact on this target group to be the most effective. The so-called group of creative and intellectual leaders (artists, poets, dramatist, musicians, and actors, with the exception of writers who were under greater political pressure) were regarded as a basic secondary

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<sup>938</sup> The Key Elements of Population, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL (hereafter Key Elements of Population, April 27, 1967).

group whose artistic talents could develop without committing themselves to the official party line.<sup>939</sup>

For the remaining three groups of population, the managers, agricultural workers and youth, the U.S. public diplomacy activities were judged to be of less effectiveness. Considered as part of the political elite, the first two groups had no special treatment by the CU. The U.S. position towards the Yugoslav youth in this 1967 target plan deserves some attention. On the one hand, the Yugoslav university youth was included in the academic element of the population. The U.S. policymakers considered the Yugoslav students to be politically oriented toward the “ideology of Marx and Lenin,” even though many “Yugoslav leaders would probably admit they had not fully succeeded in their efforts to indoctrinate them.” Even if 85 percent of the students were members of the Yugoslav Student Federation (very close to the official party lines), they were still “vocal on many subjects [...] including the university administration, and had on occasion[s] taken a position which runs contrary to the «party line»” reported the Bureau.<sup>940</sup>

In fact, as we shall see in the next chapter, the *Praxis* dissident movement and the students’ demonstrations in 1968 never took a radical position against the government, although they requested challenging reforms for the regime. For these reasons, and because of the strong opposition of Yugoslav students to the Vietnam War and their consequent anti-Americanism, the CU program estimated a less effective impact on students. Nevertheless, much feedback from grantees evidenced that “bringing students [...] to the United States has an immediate impact [...] on the forming of human relations, and clear evidence that certain relaxations have taken place in Yugoslavia to permit their students to come to the United States with an open and receptive mind.”<sup>941</sup>

## 6.2 The LEP Inceptions in Yugoslavia: from 1958 to 1965

In the late 1950s, the majority of leaders under the LEP came from Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. The LEP in Yugoslavia started between June and

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<sup>939</sup> Key Elements of Population, April 27, 1967.

<sup>940</sup> Key Elements of Population, April 27, 1967.

<sup>941</sup> Ibid.

July 1958, before it officially commenced in the Soviet Union and Poland.<sup>942</sup> The exclusivity of Yugoslavia will in fact be proved once more, and in a more evident form, during the signing of the Fulbright program in Yugoslavia. The financial coverage of the LEP was to the responsibility of the Department of State. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav government provided the daily allowances, as their leaders were guests in foreign countries,<sup>943</sup> and sometimes even covered the travel expenses to the United States.<sup>944</sup>

The first years of the LEP in Yugoslavia were characterized by different categories of leaders involved. In 1958 for instance, the LEP included legislators, government officers and media representatives, as well as very high-caliber members of groups and delegations. In 1960, the focus moved upon the leaders of Cabinet ranks and heads of Secretariats of the Federal Executive Council. The number of grants accepted increased from 5 grantees in 1958, to 16 in 1959 and 28 in 1960.<sup>945</sup> After the Yugoslav government decided on a policy of decentralization in culture,<sup>946</sup> the USIS policymakers turned towards republican leaders, mainly those in high positions in the Councils of Culture and Education and in the communist hierarchy, “in fact the men who decide what USIS shall and shall not be allowed to do in Yugoslavia.” As a 1959 Inspection Report underlined, many of those leaders had often a poor knowledge of English, still, for reasons of jealousy of inferior more prepared officials, the top ranking officers were invited.<sup>947</sup>

From 1959 to 1965, more than 100 Yugoslav leaders stayed in the United States under the LEP. It is difficult to obtain a comprehensive number since this data has been

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<sup>942</sup> Study Annual Programs Division, July 1 – June 30, 1958, Folder 14, Box 26, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

<sup>943</sup> Koča Popović, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to Federal Executive Council, Jan. 18, 1960, 9327, Box 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ.

<sup>944</sup> Rešenje o putovanju Krste Crvenkovskog u Sjedinjene Američke Države, March 26, 1960, Box 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ.

<sup>945</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP: 35. These numbers do not coincide with the Tables 2 and 3 listed below: this is possible because of the lack of documentation, but also because sometimes the LEP and the Foreign Specialist Program (part of the State Department scholarships) were united in one list.

<sup>946</sup> The policy of cultural decentralization was introduced after the 1963 Constitution. In 1965, many of the federal competences in matters of culture and education, as well as financial funds for these sectors, were passed to the republican jurisdiction.

<sup>947</sup> Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 35.

collected from several and dispersed sources, and probably the estimates are lower than the actual numbers.<sup>948</sup> According to Latinka Perović, secretary of the League of Communists of Serbia (Savez Komunističke Srbije or SKS) from 1968 to 1972, a LEP grantee in 1969 and victim of the “Downfall of Serbian liberals” in 1972 (to which group she belonged), “all the Central Committee secretaries stayed in the U.S. under this program.”<sup>949</sup> It would not be exaggerating to state that the majority of the Yugoslav middle and middle-high to high-level leaders (excluding the top Central Committee members) went on the LEP. The next seven tables contain the list of Yugoslav leaders granted a LEP experience from 1959 to 1965.

N	Year	Name	Surname	Position
1	1959	Vlajko	Begović	Director, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade
2	1959	Krsto	Crvenkovski	Secretary for Education and Culture, Federal Executive Council (SIV)
3	1959	Leon	Geršković	Secretary for Legislation and Organization, Federal Executive Council (SIV)
4	1959	Anton	Kacijan	First Secretary, State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (DSIP)
5	1959	Moma	Marković	Secretary for Labor, Federal Executive Council (SIV)
6	1959	Bogdan	Osolnik	Secretary for Information, Federal Executive Council (SIV)
7	1959	Spasoje	Velimirović	Assistant Secretary for Labor, Federal Executive Council (SIV)
8	1959	Vladimir	Vujović	Secretary, Federal Industrial Chamber

Table 6-1: Yugoslav LEP Grantees in 1959

N	Year	Name	Surname	Position
1	1960	Drago	Baum	Head, Federal Commission for Nuclear Energy
2	1960	Zdenko	Dizdar	Chief of the HOT Laboratory, Institute of Nuclear Sciences “Boris Kidrič”
3	1960	Slavko	Komar	Federal Secretary for Agriculture and Forestry
4	1960	Anton	Moljk	Member, Federal Commission for Nuclear Energy
5	1960	Slobodan	Nakićenović	Undersecretary of State; Secretary of the Federal Commission for Nuclear Energy
6	1960	Salom	Šuica	State Counsellor and Head of the Federal Commission for Nuclear Energy
7	1960	Stana	Tomašević	Assistant Secretary for Labor, Federal Executive Council (SIV)

<sup>948</sup> The data was collected from Box 1074, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP; Box 610 and 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ; Box 142 and Box 320, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL; and the periodical *Pregled* from 1959-1969.

<sup>949</sup> Interview with Latinka Perović, Belgrade, June 19, 2010 quoted in Radina Vučetić, “Amerikanizacija u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi '60-ih” (PhD. dissertation, University of Belgrade, 2011), 168.

Table 6-2: Yugoslav LEP Grantees in 1960

N	Year	Name	Surname	Position
1	1961	Džemal	Bijedić	Member, Federal Assembly
2	1961	Sreten	Bjeličić	Assistant Secretary for Social Affairs and Public Utilities, Federal Executive Council (SIV)
3	1961	Zvonko	Damjanović	Head, Department of Biological Sciences, Federal Council for Scientific Work
4	1961	Većeslav	Holjevac	Mayor of Zagreb
5	1961	Djurica	Joškić	President, Executive Council of Vojvodina
6	1961	Herbert	Kraus	Secretary for Health, Federal Executive Council (SIV)
7	1961	Jovan	Marinović	Director, TANJUG (Yugoslav Press Agency)
8	1961	Milentije	Popović	Member, Federal Executive Council (SIV)
9	1961	Vojislav	Rakić	Assistant Secretary for General Economic Affairs, Federal Executive Council (SIV)
10	1961	Franjo	Raknić	Director, Scientific Work Fund
11	1961	Branko	Raković	Head, Department of Mathematical and Technical Sciences, Federal Council for Scientific Work
12	1961	Lidija	Šentjerc	Secretary for Social Affairs and Public Utilities, Federal Executive Council (SIV)
13	1961	Mira	Trajlović	Dramaturg, Theatre Director, Founder of Atelje 212 Theatre

Table 6-3: Yugoslav LEP Grantees in 1961

N	Year	Name	Surname	Position
1	1962	Gavro	Altman	Editor, <i>Komunist</i> (SKJ)
2	1962	Filip	Bajković	President, Executive Council of People's Assembly, NR Montenegro
3	1962	Milutin	Baltić	Member, Executive Council of Parliament, NR Croatia
4	1962	Anka	Beruš	Member, Executive Council of Parliament, NR Croatia
5	1962	Pero	Djetelić	Assistant Secretary for Education and Culture, Federal Executive Council (SIV)
6	1962	Bogo/Božidar	Gorjan	Secretary for Information, Executive Council, NR Slovenia
8	1962	Rodoljub	Jeumović	Assistant Secretary for Education and Culture, Federal Executive Council (SIV)
9	1962	Batrić	Jovanović	Director, Civil Aviation Authority
10	1962	Osman	Karabegović	President, Executive Council of People's Assembly, NR BIH
11	1962	Boris	Kocijančiča	President, Association for Health, NR Slovenia
12	1962	Zdenko	Kristl	Journal Reporter, Foreign Desk of <i>Vjesnik</i> (Zagreb)
13	1962	Zvonimir	Krst	Editor and European Desk Reporter, <i>Vjesnik</i> (Zagreb)
14	1962	Vlado	Majhn	Secretary for Urbanism, Housing and Communal affairs, Executive Council, NR Slovenia
15	1962	Miodrag	Mihajlović	Third The Secretary of State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (DSIP)
16	1962	Helij	Modić	NR Slovenia

17	1962	Milijan	Neoričić	Mayor of Belgrade (1961-1964)
18	1962	Ante	Novak	Director, Yugoslav Federal Statistical Institute
19	1962	Toše	Popovski	Editor, <i>Nova Makedonija</i> (Skopje)
20	1962	Nikola	Sekulić	Vice President, Parliament, NR Croatia
21	1962	Ivan	Šinkovec	Editor, <i>Delo</i> (Ljubljana)
22	1962	Josip	Torbarina	Dean of English Department, Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb
23	1962	Aleksandar	Trumić	Dean, University of Sarajevo
24	1962	Stanka	Veselinov	President, Council for Culture, NR Serbia
25	1962	Aleksandar	Vuco	Yugoslav Surrealistic Writer
26	1962	Petar	Zdravkovski	Member, Executive Council, NR Macedonia
27	1962	Veljko	Zeković	Secretary, Executive Council, NR Macedonia
28	1962	Živko	Žižić	Member, Federal Executive Council (SIV)

Table 6-4: Yugoslav LEP Grantees in 1962

N	Year	Name	Surname	Position
1	1963	Nikola	Balog	Undersecretary of State, Federal Secretariat for Legislation and Organization
2	1963	Rodoljub	Jemuović	Deputy Secretary for Education and Culture, Federal Executive Council (SIV)
3	1963	Boro	Miljkovski	Secretary for Information SR Macedonia
4	1963	Aleksandar	Nikolić	Coach, Yugoslav National Basketball Team
5	1963	Branko	Nilević	Secretary for Health, Social Policy and Public Utilities, SR Montenegro
6	1963	Miha	Potočnik	Judge, Constitutional Court, SR Slovenia
7	1963	Mihajlo	Švabić	Vice President, Executive Council, SR Serbia
8	1963	Anton	Vratuša	Undersecretary of State, Federal Executive Council (SIV)
9	1963	Drago	Vučinić	Secretary, Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries

Table 6-5: Yugoslav LEP Grantees in 1963

After the first years, the LEP in Yugoslavia grew immensely in 1961 and 1962, without immediately reflecting the galloping political crises that emerged after the First Non-Aligned Conference and the retreat of the MFN clause. The crisis of grantee numbers is evident in 1963 when from 26 leaders in the previous year, only 9 leaders were sent abroad.

N	Year	Name	Surname	Position
1	1964	Rista	Aćimović	General Manager, Yugoslav Bank for Foreign Trade
2	1964	Predrag	Anastazijević	Director, Federal Nuclear Energy Commission
3	1964	Uroš	Andrejevski	Assistant Secretary of Labor, SR Macedonia
4	1964	Josip	Brnčić	President, Supreme Court of Croatia
5	1964	Krešimir	Car	Vice President, Committee for Tourism, SR Croatia

## Waging Public Diplomacy

6	1964	Firdus	Djinić	Director, Institute of Public Opinion Research, Belgrade
7	1964	Stana	Djurić Klajn	Head, Musicological Institute, Serbian Academy of Sciences
8	1964	Humo	Enver	Director, Department of Foreign Relations, Belgrade
9	1964	Neda	Erceg	President, Commission for Cultural and Artistic Programs, Radio Yugoslavia
10	1964	Antonije	Isaković	General Director, <i>Prosveta</i> , Publishing House, Belgrade
11	1964	Ljudevit	Jonke	Dean, Philosophical Faculty, University of Zagreb
12	1964	Batric	Jovanović	Director, Yugoslav Directorate of Civil Aeronautics, Belgrade
13	1964	Ljubica	Jurela	Director, <i>Gradjevinska knjiga</i> , Publishing House, Belgrade
14	1964	Verica	Jurić Olenković	Undersecretary for Information, SR Croatia
15	1964	Boris	Kocijančić	President, Committee for General and Administrative Questions, Executive Council, SR Slovenia
16	1964	Erik	Kos	Writer of the contemporary social science
17	1964	Marko	Kozmar	Member, Editorial staff, <i>Komunist</i> (SKJ)
18	1964	Milka	Kufrin	President, Federal Committee for Tourism
19	1964	Marijan	Matković	President, Association of Yugoslav Play writers, Zagreb
20	1964	Milorad	Miletić	Department of Foreign Scholarships, Secretariat for Education, Federal Executive Council (SIV)
21	1964	Milorad	Mladjenović	Research Director, Boris Kidrič Institute of Nuclear Sciences, Vinča
22	1964	Božidar	Novak	Director, <i>Vjesnik</i> , Zagreb
23	1964	Boško	Novaković	Professor, Philosophy Faculty, Novi Sad
24	1964	Svetozar	Pepovski	Assistant Secretary of Labor, Federal Executive Council (SIV)
25	1964	Puniša	Perović	Representative in the Federal Assembly; Director and Chief Editor, <i>Naša Stvarnost</i> (SKJ)
26	1964	Zorka	Peršić	General Director, <i>Mladinska knjiga</i> , Publishing House, Ljubljana
27	1964	Miha	Potočnik	Member, Constitutional Court, SR Slovenia, and Secretary Slovenian Parliament
28	1964	Djuža	Radović	Dean, Academy of Theatre Art, Radio, Film and Television, Belgrade
29	1964	Vjenceslav	Richter	Director, Institute of Industrial Design, Zagreb
30	1964	Milorad	Ristić	Director, Boris Kidrič Institute of Nuclear Sciences, Vinča
31	1964	Matko	Rojnić	Director, National University Library, Zagreb
32	1964	Ladislav	Rupnik	Chief, Division of Financial and Economic Matters, SR Slovenia
33	1964	Kosta	Spaić	Rector, Academy of Dramatic Arts, Zagreb
34	1964	Velizar	Škerović	Vice President, Executive Council, SR Montenegro
35	1964	Albert	Štruna	Rector, University of Ljubljana
36	1964	Branko	Zutić	Director, <i>Školska knjiga</i> , Publishing House, Zagreb

Table 6-6: Yugoslav LEP Grantees in 1964

N	Year	Name	Surname	Position
1	1965	Nisim	Albahari	Secretary, Organ of Political Council, Assembly of SR BIH
2	1965	Dušan	Avramov	Director, Federal Food Administration
3	1965	Miroslav	Belović	Manager and Play Director, Yugoslav Drama Theatre
4	1965	Jovan	Cekić	Director, Institute of Health, SR Serbia

5	1965	Osman	Djikić	Secretary, Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries
6	1965	Nikola	Djuverović	Federal Secretary for Foreign Trade
7	1965	Kiro	Hadži-Vasilev	Director, College of Political Science, Belgrade
8	1965	Zdenko	Has	Federal Labor Inspector
9	1965	Jože	Ingolič	Federal Secretary for Agriculture
10	1965	Mira	Janković	Head, English Department, Philosophy Faculty, Zadar
11	1965	Batric	Jovanović	Director, General Director, Directorate for Civil Aviation
12	1965	Slavko	Macarol	Rector, University of Zagreb,
13	1965	Miloš	Macura	Director, Federal Bureau of Statistics
14	1965	Vukašin	Mićunović	Director, <i>Tanjug</i> , Yugoslavia News Agency
15	1965	Milan	Milosavljević	Secretary of TV Program Committee, Radio and TV Belgrade
16	1965	Dušan	Mitević	President, Serbian People's Youth
17	1965	Lazar	Mojsov	Director, <i>Borba</i> (Belgrade)
18	1965	Janez	Nedog	President, District Chamber of Commerce, Ljubljana
19	1965	Aleksandar	Petković	Secretary, Commission for International Relations, SSRNJ
20	1965	Pero	Pirker	President of the Zagreb City Assembly
21	1965	Zoran	Polić	Federal Secretary, Budget and Administration Organization
22	1965	Danilo	Purić	Director, <i>Politika</i> (Belgrade)
23	1965	Ivko	Pustišek	Secretary General of RTV Yugoslavia
24	1965	Enver	Redžić	Director, Institute for the Study of the History of Labor Movement, BIH
25	1965	Laslo	Rehak	Secretary, Socialist League of Serbia
26	1965	Sonja	Romac	Counselor, Educational and Cultural Council, Federal Assembly
27	1965	Franc	Tretjak	Director, Chamber of Commerce Rates, SR Slovenia
28	1965	Milan	Uzelac	Secretary of Education, SR BIH
29	1965	Branka i Mladen	Veselinov	Actor and Actress
30	1965	Janez	Vipotnik	Federal Secretary for Education and Culture
31	1965	Josip	Zmajić	Director, Institute for International Technical Cooperation

**Table 6-7: Yugoslav LEP Grantees in 1965.** Source: The data of Table 6-1 to 6-7 was collected from Box 1074, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP; Box 610 and 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ; Box 142 and Box 320, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL; and the periodical *Pregled* from 1959-1969.

The years 1964 and 1965 represent the largest leap in the LEP history from 1958, when the average number maintained was 33 grantees per year. What is more surprising, is not only the large number of leaders involved, but their high ranking positions in the Federal Executive Council, the DSIP, and media, radio and TV broadcasting services. Compared with other cultural exchange programs, particularly the Fulbright and the state-private network, the LEP, even if smaller in numbers,

seemed highly effective. The returnees, all of them holding very important positions in the government, were judged as

more approachable than heretofore, and have a clearer understanding of and more sympathy for the American mentality and U.S. policies. They have become our most important contacts and enable us to expand and develop our over-all program more intelligently to the best interests of both countries. [...] Leaders such as we are sending are in a position to influence the practices of institutions both in the economic and political spheres: familiarity with U.S. methods and philosophy lead to emulation, as we have witnessed from those who have been in the United States. In addition, these grants immensely contribute to their friendliness and approachability upon their return.<sup>950</sup>

After the Yugoslav government prohibited the dissemination of “hard core” information through USIS, the LEP assumed the leading assignment of reaching Yugoslav representatives beyond official channels. “We believe that our efforts in this area [the LEP] have been useful in encouraging Yugoslav officials to adopt more positive attitudes towards the program in general and the present negotiations in particular.”<sup>951</sup>

The LEP in Yugoslavia passed the hardest test in the first years of the 1960s, during the downfall of U.S.-Yugoslav foreign relations in the triennium 1961-1963. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crises (October 16 to 28, 1962), that generated a worsening of the bi-national relations, the DSIP Office for the USA prohibited the travel of Petar Zdravkovski, member of the Executive Council of Macedonia, under the LEP. Moreover, the Yugoslav Foreign Office judged that “it would be useful for a while that our distinguished political people would desist from making the visits in a situation of unresolved issues between the two countries, as well as for the general political climate in the US.”<sup>952</sup> In these delicate circumstances, the DSIP criticized the lack of reciprocity of the LEP and, again, the direct and individual calls to future grantees. They insisted, but poorly obtained, that they should go through the DSIP<sup>953</sup>, who “would

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<sup>950</sup> Despatch 73 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 6, 1959, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC.

<sup>951</sup> Despatch 212 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Oct. 17, 1960, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC.

<sup>952</sup> Marko Nikezić, Undersecretary of State, to Veljko Zeković, Secretary of the Federal Executive Council, Oct. 26, 1962, 435748, Box 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ.

<sup>953</sup> Ibid.

determine the political opportunity and realization time of these exchanges.”<sup>954</sup> Interestingly, for some unknown reason, Petar Zdravkovski, still departed at the end of 1962.

### 6.3 The LEP/IVP after the Fulbright in Yugoslavia

When, in 1965, the Leader’s Exchange Program was renamed the International Visitor Program, it came to combine the earlier Foreign Leader Program and Foreign Specialist Program.<sup>955</sup> From this very year onwards, the LEP suffered severe budget cuts of some 53 percent when, according to the U.S. field officers, the government of Yugoslavia was becoming “less suspicious of and with less desire to control the program.” The American Embassy in Belgrade regarded the cuts as a “considerable blunting of a primary instrument for advancing U.S. policy goals in Yugoslavia [that] [...] could also have an adverse effect in other, more subjective, relationships between the Embassy and the GOY.”<sup>956</sup> According to Embassy sources, it seemed that Yugoslav leaders had become more attached to the program as before. A 1967 Embassy memo strongly affirmed this point of view:

While the tensions caused by the Vietnam War cloud the picture and limit to a great extent any public espousal of the U.S. by returning grantees, it is apparent that the visits of Yugoslav intellectual leaders to the United States are effectual. There is no letup in the number of such leaders, who are interested in taking advantage of [...] visiting the United States. Good evidence of this occurred when a rumor reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the International Visitors Program was to be sharply cut back, prompting the then third ranking official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Srdjan Prica) to personally telephone the Ambassador and express the strong concern of the Yugoslav government.<sup>957</sup>

The U.S. Embassy officials felt very convinced that the LEP had “without a doubt affected the course [of] moderate tendencies in political and economic reforms” in Yugoslavia. “A second, direct, effect of these visits, continued the memo, is that [...]

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<sup>954</sup> Cabinet of the Secretary of SIV to Edvard Kardelj, Mijalko Todorović, and Žagar Istok, Nov. 22, 1962, 337, Box 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ.

<sup>955</sup> Summary of Educational Exchange between Yugoslavia and the United States, Dec. 2, 1966, Folder 17, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. Although, the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade continued to use both of the designations until the end of the 1960s.

<sup>956</sup> Airgram 252 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Sept. 28, 1965, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC.

<sup>957</sup> Airgram 359 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 24, 1967, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC (hereafter Airgram 359 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 24, 1967).

thanks to these individuals the Embassy has been able to arrange various cultural programs, often on relatively short notice.” And concluded that the Yugoslav LEP would be able to “directly influence Yugoslav policies and, when their number is large enough to assure mutual support, the real effects of that exposure to American life and ideals, will be more readily seen.”<sup>958</sup>

The conviction of the U.S. policymakers in Belgrade corresponds to some extent to the data we have shown in this section. In fact, Yugoslav leaders of all strata, many of them crucial for the Yugoslav reformation movements in the years to come, went on a LEP in the United States. Certainly, the exposure to what they saw in the U.S. and the correlation of what they did in Yugoslavia in the aftermath is hard to prove, but influence cannot be denied.<sup>959</sup> Nevertheless, the short-term impact was regularly reported from Belgrade to Washington. The Yugoslav role as a “decompression chamber” for visitors from other East European countries returning from the West (quote from a Yugoslav LEP grantee to an Embassy Officer on October 10, 1967) seemed to function in the Yugoslav 1960s historical context.<sup>960</sup> The LEP in Yugoslavia symptomatically points to the U.S. Cold War strategy towards this “Coca-Cola” communist regime: changing its internal leadership and exploiting its non-aligned example to other Eastern European countries. The LEP was a unilateral program that presumed large margins of maneuvers for the U.S. administration. Shorter than most of the other exchange programs, it was meant to provide a “hard-core,” dense, and life-changing experience of the United States, it prioritized middle and middle-high Yugoslav leaders and opinion molders, that would, hopefully, change the Yugoslav society in the decades to come.

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<sup>958</sup> Airgram 359 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 24, 1967.

<sup>959</sup> Giles Scott-Smith put it in this way: “That they have an impact on their participants, be it positive or negative, is unquestionable. However, what the impact is in the longer-term remains difficult to pin down, since the exchange experience becomes one of many variables that need to be taken into account when assessing political trends. As exchanges revolve around personal experience and insight, and therefore anecdotal and oral history, they tend to fall outside of orthodox fact-finding analysis and therefore their contribution to the practice of international affairs has tended to be overlooked” (Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire*, 26).

<sup>960</sup> Airgram 359 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 24, 1967.

## 6.4 The Fulbright Program Comes to Yugoslavia (1964-1970)

*In the cultural offensive, the dollar program run by the Embassy is aimed at point targets, at the leaders and others in whom an American experience will have an immediate and favorable effect on our policies. The Fulbright program is aimed at area targets where an American experience will have a long term, slowly maturing effect on potentially influential groups: teachers, intellectual, students and certain specialists.<sup>961</sup>*

*The activity of the Fulbright Commission and the Fulbright program in Yugoslavia were indeed, I would say, a Western drilling of holes in a socialist "Swiss cheese."*

Rade Petrović, former Executive Secretary of the Fulbright Commission for Yugoslavia<sup>962</sup>

In December 1958, the Board of Foreign Scholarships (BFS), a presidentially appointed 12-member committee to select the Fulbright grantees, "unanimously concurred in the initiation [of the] Fulbright Agreement with Yugoslavia."<sup>963</sup> The decision came after almost one year of consultations between the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade which raised the Department's major concern about the probability of the Yugoslav government wishing "to control the selection of all grantees and might attempt cross-the board choices of CP members."<sup>964</sup> At the time when the U.S. government began the negotiations with Yugoslavia, the Fulbright program had already extended to 38 countries in Western Europe, Middle East, the Near and Far East, Australia, and Latin America, although without involving any communist country.<sup>965</sup> Since its inception, this exchange program inspired and originated "the

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<sup>961</sup> Harry B. Wyman, IES, to Scott Lyon, EE/P, Sept. 6, 1957, 511.683/9-657, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP. Today known as the Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board, it gathers U.S. specialists, mostly academic scholars, writers, lawyers and communication specialists. It works in cooperation with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, the bi-national Fulbright Commissions and Foundations, and the Public Affairs Sections of U.S. embassies abroad, to administer the Program.

<sup>962</sup> Telephone Interview with Rade Petrović, Aug. 28, 2014.

<sup>963</sup> Telegram 2647 from the Department of State to American Embassy Belgrade, Dec. 5, 1958, 511.683/11-2058, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>964</sup> Despatch 415 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Feb. 24, 1958, 511.683/2-2458, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>965</sup> By 1958, these countries were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg, Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, UAR, and the UK (Fact Sheet on the International Educational Exchange Program, April 1966, Folder 11, Box 103, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

biggest, most significant movement of scholars across the face of the earth since the fall of Constantinople in 1453” affirmed Ronald B. McCallum, Senator Fulbright’s Oxford tutor, in 1976.<sup>966</sup>

James William Fulbright, the father of the homonymous exchange program, was born in Missouri in 1905 from where his parents soon moved to Arkansas, to the Ozark Mountain town of Fayetteville. He grew up in a prosperous and respected family (his father was a successful local businessman), attending the town’s public school and the University of Arkansas in Fayetteville. According to Harry P. Jeffrey “he was a solid B student, campus leader, and star football halfback,”<sup>967</sup> as well as the president of the student body and a member of the student senate. Encouraged by a university professor, he applied for the Rhodes Scholarship at the age of 20. At that time, the Rhodes Scholarship was the first international exchange program founded in 1903. Financed by the British colonial statesman and businessmen Cecil John Rhodes, its aim was to foster a worldwide commonwealth based on mutual understanding and future leaders’ proficiencies, albeit narrowly focused on Anglo-Saxon countries and white male-oriented. The scholarship provided students from the British Commonwealth, the United States and Germany to study at the University of Oxford. William Fulbright’s experience at Oxford, lasting from 1925 to 1929, and his holiday and ostensible study trips to continental Europe, had a radical impact on his intellectual formation and leadership skills. As his biographer Randall Woods pointed out, the spirit of the Rhodes scholars at Oxford, their interactions with their British host students and professors, served as an indelible and long-lasting model for William Fulbright in his later quest for internationalism, mutual understanding, and the fostering of strong bonds across cultures and national boundaries through a fellowship based on international learning.<sup>968</sup>

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<sup>966</sup> Eric Sevareid, CBS commentary, 18 May 1976 quoted in Haynes B. Johnson and Bernard M. Gwertzman, *Fulbright: The Dissenter* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968), 108.

<sup>967</sup> Harry P. Jeffrey, “Legislative Origins of the Fulbright Program,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 491, no. The Fulbright Experience and Academic Exchanges (May 1987), 37.

<sup>968</sup> Randall B. Woods, *Fulbright: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 9, 35–36. Beside the eminent Woods’s biography, other relevant Fulbright portraits can be found in: Eugene Brown, *J. William Fulbright: Advice and Dissent* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1985); Tristram Coffin, *Senator Fulbright: A Portrait of a Public Philosopher* (Dutton, 1966); Haynes B. Johnson and Bernard M. Gwertzman, *Fulbright: The Dissenter* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968). For enquiries on senator Fulbright and his positioning in the arena of the Cold War international affairs see Lee R. Powell,

In September 1945, only one year after he captured his Senate seat, William Fulbright introduced an amendment to the Surplus Property Act of 1944 that would proceed from the sales of U.S. surplus property overseas to fund an educational exchange program. Two months later Fulbright abandoned his first proposal in favor of a second, broader bill that made more explicit his ideas of international education. This final bill established a non-partisan Board of Foreign Scholarship to administer the project. On the first of August 1946, President Truman signed the Fulbright bill into law, officially known as the Smith-Mundt Act, and the Fulbright scholarship program came into being.<sup>969</sup>

The final legislative on the Fulbright academic exchange came with the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, known also as the Fulbright-Hays Act (because it was introduced in the House of Representatives by Wayne Hays of Ohio), that consolidated the previous laws and broadened the categories of leaders and specialists that included “other influential or distinguished persons.” Apart from adding new authority to assist foreign groups and individuals to participate in nonprofit cultural, artistic and athletic activities in the U.S., the new legislative enlarged the support for the American studies abroad and facilitated the establishment of bi-national commissions and new agreements.<sup>970</sup> President John Kennedy signed the Fulbright-Hays act on June 25, 1962, with the Executive order 11034.<sup>971</sup>

Scholars usually interpreted the Fulbright program background as the corollary of William Fulbright’s internationalist Wilsonianism, aimed at fostering the mutual understanding of nations, “to help rid the world of the twin evils of parochialism and nationalism,” to combat xenophobia that “breeds intolerance and aggression,” and,

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*J. William Fulbright and America’s Lost Crusade: Fulbright, the Cold War and the Vietnam War* (Rose Publishing Company, 1984) and *J. William Fulbright and His Time: A Political Biography* (Guild Bindery Press, 1996) and Randall B. Woods, *J. William Fulbright, Vietnam, and the Search for a Cold War Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

<sup>969</sup> Randall B. Woods, “Fulbright Internationalism,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 491, no. The Fulbright Experience and Academic Exchanges (May 1987): 25–26.

<sup>970</sup> The New Authority provided by the Fulbright-Hays Act enclosed in Instruction 4352 from the Department of State to All American Diplomatic Posts, Nov. 21, 1961, 511.003/11-2161, Box 1050, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>971</sup> Airgram 2792 from the Department of State to All American Diplomatic Posts, Sept. 13, 1962, 511.003/9-1362, Box 1050, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

finally, to educate future leaders in liberal internationalist *Weltanschauungs*.<sup>972</sup> Recent studies have, however, underpinned that the Fulbright program flourished thanks to the surplus of the wartime economy (military articles that would otherwise have been lost) and was as much as rationalist as ideologist, as Sam Lebovic attested. Indeed, the ideology of liberal universalism that resulted from the U.S. global hegemony as well as from the defeat of fascism, when put into practice, presumed national asymmetries and showed an ideology of nationalist globalism. Unquestionably, the latter was an American cultural practice that subsisted prior to the Cold War, but, when put into practice with the Fulbright exchange program, it “helped lay the groundwork for Cold War cultural propaganda [and] [...] make the American Century.”<sup>973</sup>

#### 6.4.1 The “Case” of Senator Fulbright in Yugoslavia<sup>974</sup>

*Important as the Yugoslav experiment in itself, the major importance of Yugoslavia from the viewpoint of American interest is in its role as a bridge between East and West. As a model and a magnet for less audacious Communist regimes, Yugoslavia contributed to the advancement of American interests by encouraging the trend toward both national independence and internal liberalization in Eastern Europe.*

Senator Fulbright, Report to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (date n.a.)<sup>975</sup>

Why did the U.S. representatives in Belgrade consider the late 1950s as the most propitious moment for initiating negotiations over the Fulbright program even if they realized that the Yugoslavs were particularly “sensitive to increased Western cultural and informational activities?”<sup>976</sup> Several indicators seem to be decisive: the positive

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<sup>972</sup> Woods, “Fulbright Internationalism,” 23.

<sup>973</sup> Sam Lebovic, “From War Junk to Educational Exchange: The World War II Origins of the Fulbright Program and the Foundations of American Cultural Globalism, 1945–1950,” *Diplomatic History* 37, no. 2 (2013): 280–312. For this revisionist view see also Justin Hart, *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U. S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 6.

<sup>974</sup> For a short review from the Yugoslav perspective of the Fulbright program, see Radina Vučetić, “Amerikanizacija u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi ’60-ih,” 170–177.

<sup>975</sup> Country Analysis Chart enclosed in CU program planning and budgeting system – FY69 Program Recommendations for Yugoslavia and Turkey, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

<sup>976</sup> Telegram 532 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, Nov. 6, 1958, 511.683/11-2058, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP.

effect of the 1958 U.S. – Soviet agreement on the exchange program;<sup>977</sup> the Yugoslav preference for interstate arrangements on cultural exchanges rather than informal settlements; and the positive reception of the Ford foundation after five years of fruitless negotiations.<sup>978</sup>

As a real precedent for a communist country, Congress voted the inclusion of Yugoslavia in the Fulbright program in 1959.<sup>979</sup> Informal talks commenced when Krsto Crvenkovski, the Secretary for Education and Culture of the Federal Executive Council, met the State Department officials in Washington D.C. where he stayed under the Leader's Exchange Program in 1959.<sup>980</sup> Soon after, the two governments exchanged a memorandum giving formal shape to the negotiations.<sup>981</sup> The talks brought to the table three unsettled difficulties: the impossibility of converting Yugoslav dinars for the needs of international travel and stay abroad; an acceptable system of candidates' selection; and the nationality of the Executive Director and Secretary. The first impediment was quickly resolved. Both sides agreed that the "excess" currencies owned by the U.S. government in Yugoslavia through P.L. 480<sup>982</sup> and based on the Agreement of the Surplus Agricultural Supplies between the two countries, would be used to cover the travel expenses for the Yugoslav grantees (with the rest supplied by the American

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<sup>977</sup> The accord, signed on January 17, 1958, was entitled "Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchanges in the Cultural, Technical, and Educational Fields." It included exchanges in science and technology, agriculture, medicine and public health, radio and television, motion pictures, exhibitions, publications, government, youth, athletics, scholarly research, culture, and tourism. As an executive agreement rather than a treaty, it did not require ratification by the U.S. Senate, which helped to avoid a prolonged and bitter debate in a forum which had only recently witnessed the challenges of McCarthyism (Yale Richmond, *U.S.-Soviet Cultural Exchanges, 1958-1986: Who Wins?* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 133–137 and *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004).

<sup>978</sup> Telegram 532 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, Nov. 6, 1958, 511.683/11-2058, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>979</sup> DSIP to SIV, June 11, 1959, 91842, Box 640, Međunarodni odnosi 1953-1970, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ.

<sup>980</sup> Telegram 038335 from the Department of State to American Embassy Belgrade, June 7, 1960, 511.68/6-760, Box 1074, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>981</sup> Pro Memoria sent from U.S. Government to the Government of Yugoslavia, July 7, 1960, 511.683/6-2660, Box 1074, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP; Telegram 038335 from the Department of State to American Embassy Belgrade, June 7, 1960, 511.68/6-760, Box 1074, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP; DSIP to SIV, Dec. 19, 1963, 91430/3, Box 640, Međunarodni odnosi 1953-1970, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ.

<sup>982</sup> The Need for a Policy Decision re the Conversion of "Excess" Currencies, Feb. 27, 1961, Folder 3, Box 46, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. The P.L. 480 Sales Agreements with Yugoslavia were signed for the first time in 1955, and then renewed by amendments every next year (Agreements Signed from Beginning of Program, March 31, 1961, Folder 3, Box 46, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL).

host institutions and the State Department) and the full grants for the American grantees in Yugoslavia.<sup>983</sup> The Agreement of Surplus Agricultural Commodities allowed a favorable currency exchange rate at \$ 1 for 475 Yugoslav dinars,<sup>984</sup> while the official currency exchange rate was around 700 dinars per dollar (at least until 1966 when devaluation augmented the exchange rate up to 1200 per dollar).<sup>985</sup>

The second sore point created more apprehension on both sides. The Yugoslav authorities, profoundly concerned with the candidate selection processes, strongly lobbied and obtained the possibility of pre-selection. The struggle over procedures continued for the whole of 1962 and 1963.<sup>986</sup> What actually was accorded is that, after the Bi-national Commission finished the first round of interviews, the list was to be delivered to the Yugoslav Commission for Cooperation with the American and Other Foundations, a 22-member committee appointed by the Federal Secretary of Education and Culture whose members were distinguished academics and specialists from all the six republics. This so-called Ford Commission or Academic Committee, created in 1958 in order to guide the selection process for the homonymous foundation, selected the Fulbright candidates that most fitted the republican university needs. The final list was, therefore, returned to the Bi-national Commission in charge of forwarding it to the BFS in Washington.<sup>987</sup> On the third sensitive point, the American side ceded unfavorably and, in the final negotiations, it was accorded that the chair of the Commission would be

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<sup>983</sup> Zabeleška o Fulbrajtom programu, Aug. 21, 1967, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ.

<sup>984</sup> Savezni sekretarijat za financije, Sept. 27, 1963, 08-2830/1, Box 240, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ.

<sup>985</sup> Godišnji izvještaj Jugoslovensko-američke komisije za Fulbrajto program od januara 1965. do oktobra 1966., May 12, 1967, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ.

<sup>986</sup> Many reports and memos testimony these lobby negotiations: Airgram 13 from the Department of State to American Embassy Belgrade, July 16, 1962, 511.003/7-1662, Box 1050, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP; Telegram 09151 from the Department of State to American Embassy Belgrade, March 19, 1963, EDX 4/48-4460, Box 3254, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF) 1963, RG 59, NACP; Godišnji izvještaj Jugoslovensko-američke komisije za Fulbrajto program, May 12, 1967, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ: 8; Elaborati o međunarodnim vezama, May 1968, Box 34, Sednice Saveznog saveta 1968, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ: 72.

<sup>987</sup> Zabeleška o sprovođenju i produženju ugovora o Fulbrajtom programu, 1968, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ; Saradnja SFRJ-SAD u oblasti obrazovanje (Fulbrajto program), Nov. 1970, 021/1, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ: 20-21.

of American nationality, while the Executive Director and the Executive Secretary would be of Yugoslav nationality.<sup>988</sup>

The Fulbright Agreement, envisioned “to promote further mutual understanding between the peoples of the U.S. of America and the SFR of Yugoslavia by a wider exchange of knowledge and professional talents through educational activities,” was signed in Belgrade on November 6, 1964. It established a Bi-national Commission composed of eight members, four of Yugoslav and four of American nationality.<sup>989</sup> The celebration of the event and the political treatment of it confirmed how both parties considered the cultural reciprocal cooperation a matter of privileged policy. Yugoslavia was the first socialist country that signed a Fulbright agreement<sup>990</sup> and the only country, by 1964, visited by Senator Fulbright for the very purpose of attending the signing and the celebration of the event. Moreover, the Senator departed on November 5, only two days after the Election Day and on Johnson’s presidential victory.<sup>991</sup> Fulbright’s stay in Yugoslavia was treated as a political event of the highest level. The Senator met the highest ranked party politicians, many of them progressive reformers with pro-Western attitudes such as Koča Popović, Marko Nikezić, Edvard Kardelj, and Janez Vipotnik.<sup>992</sup> His meeting with Josip Broz Tito at Brdo Kranj (Slovenia) ended in “good humor” and Broz’s appreciation of Fulbright’s pro-Yugoslav campaigns in the U.S. Senate and the Foreign Relations Committee.<sup>993</sup>

According to the memos of President Tito’s Cabinet, William Fulbright rewarded Yugoslavia with a visit when the U.S. administration considered the bilateral foreign

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<sup>988</sup> Branislav Grbić, chief of the Federal Secretary of Finance, to Paul Wheeler, PAO, 1963, Box 240, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ and Janez Vipotnik, Federal Secretary for Education and Culture, to C. Burke Elbrick, American Ambassador, Nov. 9, 1964, Box 1, Komisija za prosvetnu razmenu između SFRJ i SAD, RG 472, AJ.

<sup>989</sup> Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, Nov. 9, 1964, Box 1, Komisija za prosvetnu razmenu između SFRJ i SAD, RG 472, AJ.

<sup>990</sup> In other communist countries, the Fulbright program started much later: in 1973/74 in the Soviet Union and in 1977 in Hungary.

<sup>991</sup> Koča Popović, The Secretary of State, to the General Secretary of the President, Oct. 22, 1964, 441257, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT.

<sup>992</sup> See reports to Josip Broz Tito from Oct. 24 and Nov. 3, 1964, in Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT.

<sup>993</sup> Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika SFRJ Josipa Broza Tita sa predsednikom Spoljnopolitičkog komiteta Senata SAD, James William Fulbrightom, Nov. 14, 1964, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT.

relations to be in a “deadlock.”<sup>994</sup> Both sides perceived the negative trends and circumstances since early 1960. Tito’s anti-Western statements at the First Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade in September 1961, the Berlin crises after the start of the erection of the Wall in 1961 and the Cuban missile crises in 1962, as well as the Congress abolition of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) treaty for Yugoslavia in 1962, contributed to the inclination towards U.S.-Yugoslav foreign relations.<sup>995</sup> The Cabinet of the President acknowledged that Senator Fulbright’s lobbying as the President of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee substantially influenced the 1963 restoration of the MFN treaty for Yugoslavia. The restoration had several positive revenues for the re-approval of the Agricultural Surplus Agreement, for the return of American citizens’ confiscated property after World War II and for the liberalization of Yugoslav exports in the United States.<sup>996</sup>

While Yugoslavia opposed the U.S. foreign policy strategies in Latin America, Congo, and Cyprus, Yugoslav leaders highly appreciated Senator Fulbright’s efforts to canalize the U.S. geopolitical strategies towards détente. Moreover, the Yugoslav reports emphasized his flexible position on Cuba, Panama, and China, his fight for atomic distension and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and his belief in international education exchanges as a contribution to a more peaceful and truly internationalist world order.<sup>997</sup> As he acknowledged several times in informal talks to Koča Popović, the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Vladimir Popović, president of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and International Relations of the Federal Executive Council, he truly believed that Yugoslavia and its non-aligned policy

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<sup>994</sup> Informacija povodom prijema senatora Fulbrighta, Nov. 14, 1964, 611/8, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT; Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslavensko-američki odnosi 1961. – 1971.* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2012), 174–176.

<sup>995</sup> Bogetić, *Jugoslavensko-američki odnosi 1961. – 1971.*, 30–98.

<sup>996</sup> Informacija povodom prijema senatora Fulbrighta, Nov. 14, 1964, 611/8, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT; Bogetić, *Jugoslavensko-američki odnosi 1961. – 1971.*, 174–177.

<sup>997</sup> Informacija povodom prijema senatora Fulbrighta, Nov. 14, 1964, 611/8, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT.

was an example of “pragmatic adjustment,” “an experiment of worldwide impact” and a “bridge between the capitalist and socialist world.”<sup>998</sup>

While he disagreed with Marshall Tito on German rearmament and the “Berlin question,” they actually concurred in criticizing the U.S. strategy towards Cuba and the necessity of a “peaceful coexistence” rapprochement with the Soviet Union.<sup>999</sup> Fulbright also ironically remarked how the United States, while pursuing a domestic battle against socialism, were in fact implementing many socialist state programs, of which the Fulbright scholarships were just an example.<sup>1000</sup> Proud of the first agreement signed with a communist country, he heavily underscored the fact that the exchanges of intellectuals and leaders would end up being more powerful than diplomatic foreign policy actions in creating ties and good relationships, which eventually ensued to be true for the Yugoslav case. He repeated to Josip Broz Tito what had been the core of his philosophy and ideology: that knowledge would tear apart barriers between nations and relieve the excesses of nationalism and that “Yugoslavia [was] in a position of enlightening other nations to [...] overcome the ideologies that divide them.”<sup>1001</sup>

Fulbright’s 1964 mission to Yugoslavia was at least two fold. As a U.S. senator, his political mission was to repair misunderstandings and low points of the previous U.S.-Yugoslav bilateral relations. As a politician and intellectual, deeply convinced of his liberal internationalist globalism, he came there to affirm his support for the independent Yugoslav path as a solution to the world’s ideological and warlike contrasts. Additionally, his visit illustrated how foreign policy and public diplomacy were serving one another’s purposes and how they were intrinsically reflecting one another.

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<sup>998</sup> Zabilješka o razgovorima dr. Vladimira Popovića, predsjednika Odbora za spoljne poslove i međunarodne odnose SIV i James William Fulbrighta, Nov. 7, 1964, 611/5, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT.

<sup>999</sup> Zabeleška o izlaganju Predsednika SFRJ Josipa Broza Tita u razgovoru sa predsednikom Spoljnopolitičkog komiteta Senata SAD, James William Fulbrightom, Nov. 14, 1964, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT; Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika SFRJ Josipa Broza Tita sa predsednikom Spoljnopolitičkog komiteta Senata SAD, James William Fulbrightom, Nov. 14, 1964, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT.

<sup>1000</sup> Zabeleška iz neformalnih razgovora druga V. Popovića i sa Senatorom W.J. Fulbrightom, Nov. 11, 1964, 611/3, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJ.

<sup>1001</sup> Izjava senator J.W. Fulbrighta povodom potpisivanja sporazuma o razmeni u oblasti obrazovanje između Jugoslavije i SAD, Nov. 9, 1964, Box 1, Komisija za prosvetnu razmenu između SFRJ i SAD, RG 472, AJ.

## 6.4.2 The Fulbright Program Changed My Life...: The First Five Years (1965-1970)

Soon after Senator Fulbright departed, the Yugoslav-American Bi-national Commission proceeded by opening the first competitions in December. The first year of the Fulbright program in Yugoslavia, 1965/1966, provided 12 complete grants for Yugoslav and American post-graduate students, researchers, teaching assistants, lecturers and professors, 12 additional travel grants for scholarships to U.S. universities and 5 grants for American post-doctorate researchers provided by the Yugoslav Federal Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.<sup>1002</sup> In the following years, the interest of applicants and the number of grants increased rapidly: from 88 applications in 1964 to 215 in 1970.<sup>1003</sup> The number of grantees confirms these trends: in 1967, the Commission provided 38 Yugoslav and 16 American grants,<sup>1004</sup> while in 1970 the numbers rose to 55 Yugoslavs and 17 Americans. Finally, the first five years of the Fulbright program resulted in 254 grants to Yugoslav and 112 to American professors, scholars, and researchers.<sup>1005</sup> As John Lampe pointed out, the Fulbright program in Yugoslavia was the second largest program in Europe, after West Germany.<sup>1006</sup>

During the first five years, the majority of the Yugoslav grantees (77 percent of them) came from the major and prestigious Yugoslav universities: Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana.<sup>1007</sup> Speaking in geographical and strategical terms, these three cities represented the core points of the U.S. public diplomacy activities in Yugoslavia, equally if referring to the USIS libraries, the Cultural Presentation Program or the Trade

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<sup>1002</sup> Informacija o Fulbrightovom programu, June 16, 1965, 1203, Box 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ.

<sup>1003</sup> Yugoslav-American Commission Meeting, Jan. 21, 1965, Box 2, Komisija za prosvetnu razmenu između SFRJ i SAD, RG 472, AJ and 42<sup>nd</sup> Meeting, June 11, 1970, Box 2, Komisija za prosvetnu razmenu između SFRJ i SAD, RG 472, AJ.

<sup>1004</sup> Godišnji izvještaj Jugoslovensko-američke komisije za Fulbrajtove programe od januara 1965. do oktobra 1966., May 12, 1967, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ: 8.

<sup>1005</sup> Izvještaj o realizaciji programa razmene u oblasti prosvete između SFRJ i SAD, 1970, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ.

<sup>1006</sup> John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 292–293.

<sup>1007</sup> Saradnja SFRJ-SAD u oblasti obrazovanja (Fulbrajtove programe), Nov. 1970, 021/1, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ: 17.

Fairs exhibition program. Concerning gender divisions, the 1965-1970 years indicate an unexpected female presence of 22.5 percent in a period when the Yugoslav academia was male-oriented at around 90 percent. Moreover, the data shows an unexpected high degree of senior scholars, mostly researchers, academicians, lecturers at around 53 percent of the total.<sup>1008</sup> These last figures reveal the Yugoslav predominance in the Binational Commission and the lobby effect of the Academic Committee. Indeed, while the Fulbright program was essentially inclined towards young post-graduate students, as those most predisposed to impact and influence, the Yugoslav part of the Commission pressed and obtained favorite senior scholars for local university needs.

The annual plans of the Fulbright Commission for Yugoslavia comprehended several major projects: the Yugoslav studies in the Yugoslavia States; the American studies in Yugoslavia; the natural, technical and technological sciences; the social sciences and education; financial aid to seminars in Yugoslavia; and the art and human sciences.<sup>1009</sup> The Commission also served other exchange programs either by selecting, by interviewing their candidates, or by financially supporting them. Some of these exchange programs included the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare program with the Yugoslav universities, the Portland State University program with the University of Zagreb, the Skopje University and Chicago State College program and the Split Seminar of the local Law Faculty, covered financially by the USIA.<sup>1010</sup>

The major battle internal to the commission was the decision as to which projects would be privileged. The Yugoslav authorities strongly lobbied and ensured the prevalence of the natural, technical and technological sciences grants for their university needs, against the U.S. pressures and requests for more human and social sciences projects and grantees.<sup>1011</sup> The Yugoslav position was justified by the fact that, as the

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<sup>1008</sup> These data was obtained by intersecting archival sources from Box 2, 124, 145, RG 472, AJ; Box 240, RG 318, AJ and Box 61, RG 319, AJ.

<sup>1009</sup> Saradnja SFRJ-SAD u oblasti obrazovanje (Fulbrajtovo program), Nov. 1970, 021/1, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ: 15.

<sup>1010</sup> 43rd Commission Meeting, Sept. 14, 1970, Box 2, Komisija za prosvetnu razmenu između SFRJ i SAD, RG 472, AJ.

<sup>1011</sup> Prilog 1: Informacija o sprovođenju zadataka iz programa razmene u oblasti prosvete između SFR Jugoslavije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, June 2, 1969 enclosed in Predlog za učešće u finansiranju programa razmene u oblasti prosvete između SFRJ i SAD (Fulbright programa), June 11, 1969, 01.1092, Box 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ.

deputy director of the Bi-national Commission Petar Bošković stated in 1967, the Ford Foundation scholarships were already covering the human and social sciences studies.<sup>1012</sup> For the Yugoslav academic community, the United States became the Mecca for ambitious Yugoslavs, especially in the social, theoretical and applied sciences. The Yugoslav scientists who were trained in the United States brought back home not only a stimulating research experience, but also remarkable academic contacts. Their experience in the United States meant a very rapid and undisturbed professional progression.<sup>1013</sup>

Ranko Bugarski, a professor of English and General Linguistics at the University of Belgrade, retired in 2000, described in this manner his Fulbright experience: “I remember this as one of the greatest and most cherished experiences of my academic and private life. It opened up new and lifelong vistas, although I was not a beginner then.<sup>1014</sup> I have many happy memories. I think the Fulbright program was a precious endowment to mankind.”<sup>1015</sup> Taib Šarić, another Fulbright grantee, nowadays an academician and agronomy professor at the University of Sarajevo, recalls that, even if he felt American people had poor interest in other countries, their political systems and way of life, “I thank the Americans for this kind of intellectual help.”<sup>1016</sup> The expression of gratefulness for the Fulbright experience is recurrent in many alumni testimonies. Petar Grgić, a grantee from the University of Zagreb in 1965/1966, sent a letter to the Bi-national Commission in 1967 stressing how the program was worthy not only from the professional but also “from international and human relationship viewpoint.” “All Americans that I met – he continued – were very pleasant and fine people, all of them [trying] to help, and if one needs anything, they will happily help you. They will never

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<sup>1012</sup> Izvještaj o boravku u SAD druga Petra Boškovića enclosed in Ante Rukavina to Vukašin Mićunović, Jan. 10, 1968, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ.

<sup>1013</sup> Airgram 413 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1969, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC: 1-4. This was particularly remarked to me by Rade Petrović, former member of the Bi-national Commission, in his Telephone Interview on Aug. 25, 2015.

<sup>1014</sup> He was already abroad in 1962/1963 at the University College London and in 1966/1967 at the Columbia University, as a Ford Foundation Visiting Scholar.

<sup>1015</sup> E-mail Interview to Ranko Bugarski, Aug. 27, 2015.

<sup>1016</sup> E-mail Interview to Taib Šarić, Aug. 25, 2015.

let one feel left alone in a foreign country, and therefore one should know how to appreciate this.”<sup>1017</sup>

Many other personal stories, like the one of Marijan Bošković, a 1966/1967 Fulbright grantee from the Zagreb Institute of Food Research and Technologies (Institut za istraživanje i tehnologiju hrane) who obtained his MSc. in Food Science and Technology at the MIT in 1968,<sup>1018</sup> became international adventures as well as resulting in high-ranked careers. The story of Marijan Bošković is symptomatic: he married an American woman working for the Boston University Medical School and then returned to Zagreb where he enrolled for a PhD. in Biotechnologies. He also served in the Zagreb City Assembly from 1969 to 1972 as a Councilor of Cultural and Educational Affairs. Out of curiosity, he translated into Croatian the Apollo 13 space-ground communications during three live broadcasts by Zagreb RTV in 1970 and interviewed the astronauts when they visited Yugoslavia. Hired by Coca Cola’s European headquarters in Rome in 1972, he stayed in Italy until 1974 when he moved to the United States, which turned out to be his final destination in life. It was there that Marijan had an extraordinary career at General Foods (today Kraft Foods), progressing from Research Scientist to Research Specialist to Research Principal and exploring new scientific discoveries over antioxidants. His international career reflected on his family too, so that his two children actually spoke Croatian, Italian, and English.<sup>1019</sup> His example, as that of many others, symbolizes effectively what was the consequence of the Fulbright program in many micro-histories: internationalized families, careers and worldviews. By the end of the 1960s, the Fulbright program in Yugoslavia was still facing some recurrent problems: the low convertibility of the dinars for purchasing

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<sup>1017</sup> Airgram 359 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 24, 1967, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC. This kind of appreciation can be found in many studies collecting Fulbright Alumni feedback, as for example: Richard T. Arndt and David Lee Rubin, eds., *The Fulbright Difference: 1948-1992*, Studies on Cultural Diplomacy and the Fulbright Experience (New Brunswick ; London: Transaction Publishers, 1993) and Arthur Power and Russell R. Dynes, eds., *The Fulbright Experience: 1946-1986. Encounters and Transformations*. (New Brunswick, N.J. (U.S.A.): Transaction Publishers, 1987).

<sup>1018</sup> Twenty Years of the Commission for Educational Exchange between the USA and Yugoslavia, Belgrade 1984, Box 10, Series III, J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board Records, MC 1279, UAL: 58.

<sup>1019</sup> Paula Gordon, “Dr. Marijan Ante Bošković - In Memoriam,” *Translation Journal* 12, no. 4 (October 2008), <http://translationjournal.net/journal/46boskovic.htm>.

international tickets and undersized amount of the grants.<sup>1020</sup> Beside financial problems, the lack of housing facilities in Yugoslavia and lower standards of living, of which the American wives complained frequently to the Embassy, introduced the unwritten rule of favoring American grantees without young families or small children.<sup>1021</sup>

### 6.4.3 Yugoslav versus U.S. Soft Power

The 1969 saw the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the Fulbright scholarships program in Yugoslavia. With an exchange of letters on December 19, 1968, the U.S. Ambassador Charles B. Elbrick and the President of the Federal Council on Education and Culture, Vukašin Mićunović, extended the program for another four years.<sup>1022</sup> Under the pressure of John Richardson Jr., the Assistant The Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (the head of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs), the Yugoslav government agreed to participate in cost sharing the program in the months that followed. The official announcement was made in September during Richardson's visit to Belgrade. The Yugoslav side – it was accorded – would contribute with 20 percent of the annual budget, and in fact in 1970 the Yugoslav government (and after 1971 the Yugoslav republics) participated with 375,000 new dinars and 525,000 the year after.<sup>1023</sup> “This decision – stated the Department's memo – [is] the first of its kind with a communist country.”<sup>1024</sup>

Nevertheless, did the Yugoslav side consent to cost sharing the program only because it had a high consideration of its benefits? It might be possible; however, it is highly plausible that the Yugoslav acquiescence was partly due to a limited political

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<sup>1020</sup> Godišnji izvještaj Jugoslovensko-američke komisije za Fulbrajtove programe od januara 1965. do oktobra 1966., May 12, 1967, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ: 13.

<sup>1021</sup> Ibid, 19.

<sup>1022</sup> C. Burke Elbrick to Vukašin Mićunović, Dec. 19, 1968, Box 1, Komisija za prosvetnu razmenu između SFRJ i SAD, RG 472, AJ and Vukašin Mićunović to C. Burke Elbrick, American Ambassador, Dec. 19, 1968, Box 1, Komisija za prosvetnu razmenu između SFRJ i SAD, RG 472, AJ.

<sup>1023</sup> John Richardson Jr. to the Department of State, Oct. 3, 1969, Folder 5, Box 21, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, UAL; Yugoslav-American Commission for Educational Exchange to Federal Council on Education and Culture, Jan. 11, 1971, 4/021-2, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ. During Yugoslav financial history, to prevent state bankruptcy the Yugoslav national bank habitually substituted the old devaluated currency by a new one called simply the “new dinar.”

<sup>1024</sup> John Richardson Jr. to the Department of State, Oct. 3, 1969, Folder 5, Box 21, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, UAL.

crisis generated by the fire in the Fulbright offices in Belgrade of some months earlier before the accord was deliberated. Indeed, in the night between July 21 and 22 1969, a group of unknown persons broke into the head office of the Bi-national Commission, set fire to, and vandalized the office. The incident caused damage to the facility and a partial loss of the files. The Yugoslav government expressed embarrassment and treated the case with high concern. They engaged the State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Koča Popović, the Director of Division for the USA and Canada, Cvijeto Job, then Krsto Crvenkovski as the Secretary for Education and Culture of the SIV to assure the maximum effort in their investigations.

The Yugoslav members of the Commission appeared to agree that the arson was politically motivated. In the Embassy's perspective the accident was procured by the anti-American Stalinist hard-liners who could not accept the American "success of Apollo 11," the "obvious sympathy of the Yugoslav population for the United States," "the well growing ties between the two countries"<sup>1025</sup> and Vice President Humphrey's visit to Yugoslavia occurring in those days.<sup>1026</sup> In fact, an Embassy counselor reported that on July 21 there were some verbal incidents made by some young people at the USIS library in Belgrade during the television broadcasting of the Moon landing of Apollo 11.<sup>1027</sup>

The Yugoslav authorities were concerned about the possible political repercussions of the 1969 fire incident because they saw the Fulbright program from a pragmatic and utilitarian perspective, as a need for their scientific and technological advancement. On the one hand, they considered the State Department's annual appropriations to the Bi-national Commission a "weapon of political pressure."<sup>1028</sup> On the other, even if conscious that the "Americans have some good reasons for pursuing the program," they stated that "with better organization and coordination [...], the advantage of the other

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<sup>1025</sup> Airgram 413 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1969, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC: 1-4.

<sup>1026</sup> Federal Council on Education and Culture to Gagović, secretary of SIV, July 22, 1969, 34/69, Box 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ.

<sup>1027</sup> Razgovor načelnika III Uprave DSIPa R. Radovića a g. I. Tobinom, savetnikom u Ambasadi SAD, July 22, 1969, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ.

<sup>1028</sup> Produženje sporazuma o Fulbrajtovom programu, Nov. 21, 1967, Box 1, Komisija za prosvetnu razmenu između SFRJ i SAD, RG 472, AJ.

side [could] be easily minimized.”<sup>1029</sup> Certainly, their position strongly contradicted with their attitude towards the U.S. cultural mission in Yugoslavia of which the Fulbright program was an implementation. The Ideological commissions of the CC, the Socialist League of the Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ) and the City committees never stopped considering the U.S. cultural penetration in Yugoslavia with great concern: as highly dangerous, these activities had to be limited, since they could not be stopped.<sup>1030</sup> The Yugoslav contradictory practices of a “hard line” towards the USIS activities in the field and a “soft line” towards the cultural exchange program reveal more than a differentiation of interests among the Yugoslav party ranks. The positive views on the cultural cooperation and exchange programs expressed by many middle ranked Yugoslav leaders indicate to what extent the Yugoslav Communist League was a fractioned party leadership that diverged on economic reform and national priorities as well as on their position towards the West and the United States.<sup>1031</sup>

The Yugoslav government and its agencies strongly favored the Fulbright program as a resource of internationalizing high academic education, developing long-term research projects, contributing to American, science, social, Slavic and human studies, and assisting technological advancement, such as rationalization in industrial production.<sup>1032</sup> They were also extremely satisfied with the candidates’ screening procedures that, in their opinion, left them space for maneuvering for their own interests.<sup>1033</sup>

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<sup>1029</sup> Zabeleška o sprovođenju i produženju ugovora o Fulbrajtvom programu, 1968, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ.

<sup>1030</sup> For an extended analysis of Yugoslav policies towards American propaganda, see chapter 1 and 2.

<sup>1031</sup> For Rusinow, the Yugoslav leadership was a “polycentric polyarchy involving a network of elites to which access was usually open to all except a few minorities excluded by geographical, cultural or self or externally-imposed ethnic or ideological isolation.” In his opinion, they were represented by an “impressive number of autonomously organized and institutionally legalized forces, representing divergent interests and values, most if not all social strata, and most politicized Yugoslavs who had not opted out because of basic ideological dissent, participated in making effective public choices at all political levels from commune to Federation” (Dennison I. Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 346). On this issue, see also Dragutin Lalović, ed., *Hrvatsko i jugoslavensko “proljeće” 1962-1972* (Zagreb, 2015), 7–17, and Cvijeto Job remarks on Yugoslav leadership in Tvrtko Jakovina, “Razgovor s Cvijetom Jobom, dugogodišnjim diplomatom i veleposlanikom FNRJ/SFRJ,” *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* XXXV, no. 3 (2003): 1031–48.

<sup>1032</sup> Saradnja SFRJ-SAD u oblasti obrazovanje (Fulbrajtvov program), Nov. 1970, 021/1, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ: 23.

<sup>1033</sup> *Ibid.*, 20–21.

For the U.S. policymakers, the Fulbright program in Yugoslavia was, with no doubt, a plain success: the Yugoslav Fulbright alumni and the U.S. Fulbright specialists were “now to be found in all of the Yugoslav Republics, in every Yugoslav city, in every Yugoslav university and at most of the university faculties.” In their view, by participating in the program, the Yugoslav leadership showed themselves to be “prepared to gamble that the desired technical advances can be made without a total dislocation of socialist ideology.”<sup>1034</sup> In the opinion of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, there were three major positive collateral effects of the cultural exchange programs with Yugoslavia. The first immediate benefit was the increase of personal contacts and mutual trust; the other two effects, the moderate policy reforms and liberalization practices introduced in Yugoslavia in the 1960s and the benefits for the foreign policy bilateral relations, were contemplated as long-term consequences. The grants for visits and study in the United States were “avidly sought by Yugoslavs” and their immediate effect was that leaders and academics became “more cooperative [because of] the courtesy and honor extended to them.” In this direction, it became noticeable that exchange travel to the United States “has not only lost the stigma of «courting capitalism» which tended to discourage some Yugoslavs from seeking and accepting invitations in past years,” but conversely, such invitations became a respected status symbol among the Yugoslav elites.<sup>1035</sup>

Regarding the second collateral effect, the U.S. diplomatic representatives were profoundly convinced that the Yugoslav moderate tendencies in political and economic reforms were in fact a reflection to “some extent of this [Western] influence.” Although the political character of the environment to which these Yugoslavs returned created impediments for the free discussion of certain ideas or inclinations, in private talks with the Embassy officers (and “presumably with trusted friends”), there was no question but that these visits served in a major way to advance the U.S. interests in Yugoslavia. As the U.S. alumni “advance[d] in positions in the Party, executive government or academia,” specified a 1967 Embassy memo, “the influence of American thought and

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<sup>1034</sup> Airgram 366 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Oct. 8, 1970, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC.

<sup>1035</sup> Airgram 969 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 15, 1968, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC.

ideals has penetrated Yugoslavia, moderated traditional communist-socialist values and, in forms acceptable to that dogma, penetrated other countries with governments of similar persuasions.”<sup>1036</sup> The U.S. representatives deemed that many Yugoslav innovations among economists, cultural leaders and opinion molders stemmed from the personal experiences of Yugoslav grantees in United States and from the exposure of Yugoslavs to American grantees who visited Yugoslavia. Lastly, the cultural exchange programs had a positive general effect on the treatment of the negative inclinations in mutual foreign relations: the effect was particularly visible during the Vietnam conflict,<sup>1037</sup> which underpinned a series of antiwar sentiment in Yugoslav political speeches, popular culture and street demonstrations.<sup>1038</sup>

The analysis of the Fulbright program in Yugoslavia brings to our attention several innovative conclusions. Both sides considered the program a tremendous success and both agreed that it had created not just another new exchange program, but instead a mechanism of exchanges on a new organizational basis (the Bi-national Commission).<sup>1039</sup> After the program became operational, the Yugoslav government and party members almost totally abandoned a negative anti-American rhetoric on the cultural exchanges and took a pragmatic position.<sup>1040</sup> Such a policy demonstrates that the Yugoslav experiment was possible and shows by which modalities it was realized. The Yugoslav “oxymoron” became the Yugoslav experiment in itself, a product of the Cold War binaries that originated the Yugoslav “third-way,” its non-aligned position. The contradictory position on U.S. propaganda was only a collateral effect of such

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<sup>1036</sup> Airgram 359 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 24, 1967, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC.

<sup>1037</sup> Airgram 969 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 15, 1968, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC; Airgram 366 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Oct. 8, 1970, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC.

<sup>1038</sup> Radina Vučetić, “Yugoslavia, Vietnam War and Antiwar Activism,” *Tokovi Istorije*, no. 2 (2013): 165–82; Radina Vučetić, “Violence against the Antiwar Demonstrations of 1965–1968 in Yugoslavia: Political Balancing between East and West,” *European History Quarterly* 45, no. 2 (April 1, 2015): 255–74, doi:10.1177/0265691414568283; James Mark et al., “‘We Are with You, Vietnam’: Transnational Solidarities in Socialist Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 50, no. 3 (July 1, 2015): 439–64, doi:10.1177/0022009414558728.

<sup>1039</sup> Informacija povodom prijema senatora Fulbrighta, Nov. 14, 1964, 611/8, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT.

<sup>1040</sup> Informacija o poseti dr. Charlesa Franklina, May 18, 1966 enclosed in Poseta Charlesa Franklina – Materijali, May 11, 1966, 416844, Box 237, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ.

policies. Searching for this new identity characterized the history of Yugoslavia and became its “nation branding” transnational practice.<sup>1041</sup>

For the Washington Democratic administration generally, and Senator Fulbright particularly, the Yugoslav Fulbright program was a matter of Cold War strategy. To Washington’s right wing anti-communist hard liners, Senator Fulbright proposed an alternative, in which he believed with profound personal commitment. Johnson’s opponent in the election race, Senator Barry Goldwater, a convinced anti-communist, was defeated in the 1964 elections. The agreement with Yugoslavia of November 1964 symbolically pointed to peaceful negotiation as the solution of the Cold War binaries.<sup>1042</sup> The Fulbright’s visit to Belgrade seems to hide much of this intention and the Yugoslav Cabinet reports sustain this interpretation. Finally, the Fulbright program, as part of the U.S. public diplomacy agenda that operated in Yugoslavia, exerted its soft power on the Yugoslav leadership (and leaderships), opinion molders and public. How the two major U.S. state programs, the Leader’s Exchange Program and the Fulbright program, intersected the so-called state-private network in the binaries between public and cultural diplomacy, will be addressed in the conclusive part of this chapter.

## 6.5 The Role of the State-Private Networks in the Public Diplomacy Agenda

*The private exchanges contributed significantly to CU objectives [since they] strengthen ties between institutions, and reach key intellectual government officials who play an important role in development and progress in Yugoslavia. Private exchanges have the added impetus of indicating to the Yugoslavs the amount of American voluntary interest in their country.*<sup>1043</sup>

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<sup>1041</sup> Melissa Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation: The Global Business of National Identity* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

<sup>1042</sup> Randall B. Woods, *LBJ: Architect of American Ambition* (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2007); Randall B. Woods, *J. William Fulbright, Vietnam, and the Search for a Cold War Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

<sup>1043</sup> Report on Relations of Private Exchange to CU Objectives, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

According to the “Summary of educational exchange between Yugoslavia and the United States,”<sup>1044</sup> there were 13 state-based programs and some 37 to 40 private and semiprivate cultural exchange programs undertaken in Yugoslavia by the U.S. government, private foundations and associations. Sometimes, even the state-based programs involved private actors too, as we observed in the case of the Fulbright program when the U.S. universities provided allocations for the Yugoslav grantees.

Recent historiographical work has exposed the irreplaceable role of the state-private network in the Cultural Cold War in which the U.S. cultural strategy elaborated a “system of ‘gray’ propaganda disseminated by witting the ‘private’ allies of the State.”<sup>1045</sup> Many new bright historiographical accounts have framed the role of the private “players” and intelligentsia as autonomous subjects but also their interference with the State power network as in the case of the European Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF).<sup>1046</sup> The intention of many private organizations dealing with the European nations and societies was to enhance “person-to-person familiarization of Americans and Europeans of all strata of society”<sup>1047</sup> and to prevent the spreading of communism. The private involvement seemed natural in a society with a strong philanthropic and individualistic tradition and many were convinced that the “victory in the battle for men’s minds demands the cooperation of individual American citizens, of business groups, and of all our many private organizations.”<sup>1048</sup>

The network of private and semi-private actors managing the cultural cooperation and the exchange programs in Yugoslavia was extensive and differed by methods, personalities and universities, involvement and time range. It is not the intention of this

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<sup>1044</sup> Summary of Educational Exchange between Yugoslavia and the United States, Dec. 2, 1966, Folder 17, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL (Summary of Educational Exchange between Yugoslavia and the United States, Dec. 2, 1966).

<sup>1045</sup> Scott W. Lucas, “Beyond Freedom, beyond Control, beyond the Cold War: Approaches to American Culture and the State-Private Network,” *Intelligence and National Security* 18, no. 2 (2003): 66. See also Helen Lavelle and Hugh Wilford, eds., *The US Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War: The State-Private Network* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2006).

<sup>1046</sup> Hans Krabbendam and Giles Scott-Smith, eds., *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-60* (London: Routledge, 2004), 1–11; Luc van Dongen, Stéphanie Roulin, and Giles Scott-Smith, eds., *Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities, and Networks* (Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

<sup>1047</sup> Report on the Program Planning Conference, Feb. 4, 1954, Box 3, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>1048</sup> Theodore C. Streitbert, USIA director, to Arthur H. Sulzberger, president of the NTY, Jan. 4, 1956, Box 13, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP.

study to give a comprehensive account of it, since it would necessitate a different methodological approach, but rather to evidence its range from a quantitative and qualitative perspective, and its interconnection with the public diplomacy dimension and power, namely the U.S. governments, and ultimately the interconnections of foreign relations and philanthropy in the Cold War context.

Among those defined as “state programs,” the Fulbright and the Leader’s Exchange Program were the leading ones, nevertheless coexisting in collaboration with the Yugoslav Commission for Cultural Relations Grants that provided the U.S. scholars fellowships for specialization in various fields, while the Fulbright Commission arranged for the travel grants. Another state program was the Inter-Agency Foreign Journalist Program, a platform sponsored and financed jointly by the White House, the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the USIA and which offered 30-day tours of the United States. On the other hand, the Inter-Country Lecture Program, financed from the general operating expenses of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, the Inter-Foundation Lecture Program, operating under the Fulbright, as well as the American Specialist Program, were all bringing lecturers to Yugoslavia for short periods. Similarly, the American Professor Program sponsored directly by the State Department, arranged for U.S. professors to lecture for a semester or on a yearly basis at a Yugoslav university.

The Textbook Translation Program, based on a P.L. 480 agreement for translating and publishing American authors’ works into Yugoslav languages, supplied scientific and bestseller literature free of charge to universities, libraries, schools, and scientific institutions (for instance the 1966 agreement included the translation, printing and distribution of up to 250 new works over a five-year period). The other two book programs were the Library of Congress and the Yugoslav Institute of Bibliography Agreement and the Information Media Guarantee Program. The first one, established in 1960, provided an exchange of bibliographic information and materials, which were therefore made more easily available in both countries. The latter one was a very early

one, agreed already in 1952, and permitted American books, periodicals, newspapers and authors' rights to be imported and paid in dinars.<sup>1049</sup>

Besides these state-based programs directly pertaining to the cultural and academic sphere, Yugoslavia was assisted by several aid programs, which consisted in technical, technological and scientific support of its internal development. The foremost was the International Technical Cooperation Program, otherwise known as the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) or International Cooperation Administration (ICA). Under these programs, initiated in the early 1950s, Yugoslav engineers and other experts were trained in the United States, while American and European specialists were sent to Yugoslav production facilities, construction sites or energy production centrals, where they provided consultancy and technical assistance. On similar grounds and methods the Agency for International Development (AID), the Counter-Part funds program, the CARE program, the AID program with Pittsburgh University, the Foreign Operations Administration and the Kentucky University exchange program on agriculture, forestry and technologies operated.<sup>1050</sup> In a similar way, the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), financed again by the P.L. 480 funds, supplied a number of medical and public health research projects, administered jointly by U.S. and Yugoslav institutions, generally involving research carried out in Yugoslav institutes with facilitative assistance given by the U.S. personnel and institutions. According to the CU statistics, the program of the U.S. Department of

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<sup>1049</sup> Summary of Educational Exchange between Yugoslavia and the United States, Dec. 2, 1966. For the initiation of the book and translation program in Yugoslavia in the 1950s, see Chapter 2, Book Translations, IMG and the P.L. 480 Programs.

<sup>1050</sup> This area of study remains today a highly neglected one in historiography. To date, only John R. Lampe, Russell O. Prickett, and Ljubiša S. Adamović, *Yugoslav-American Economic Relations Since World War II* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990) have partially dealt with these issues. The number and extension of the U.S. technical assistance to Yugoslavia during the first two decades of the Cold War, seems extremely variegated and far-reaching. The *Pregled* review reports for instance that between 1952 and 1961, 768 Yugoslavs went to the United States where they specialized in agricultural technologies through the TCA program, while in the same period 34 specialists offered their expertise and knowledge to Yugoslav industrial facilities ("Jugoslavija – SAD," *Pregled* Nov. 1962, 63). Reports of American engineers and technical consultants on industrial production organization, hydroelectric centrals, hybrid corn production, nut crops, nursery program, fish culture, mining, road construction, highway, and transportation, can be found in Boxes 2705 and 2706, Central Decimal Files 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP and in Boxes 238 and 240, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ.

Agriculture ensured approximately 20 projects, including research on peppers, cereals, fruits, trees, plant pests and parasites.<sup>1051</sup>

The widest and all-encompassing private program in Yugoslavia was certainly the one of the Ford Foundation. The Ford representative, Wallace Nielsen, visited Yugoslavia in 1958 and initiated negotiations with the Yugoslav government. According to his commentary to the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, he found “overwhelming interest among high-ranking Yugoslavs to his suggestion that the foundation might set up a program here.”<sup>1052</sup> The setup of the Ford program occurred in 1959 and enabled the Yugoslav students to study in the United States or provided research grants for senior scholars focused mostly on education, business economics, social and human studies, art, journalism, television, urbanism and linguistics.<sup>1053</sup> From 1959 to 1968, the Ford Foundation gave grants to 188 Yugoslavs to specialize in the United States for six to ten months periods.<sup>1054</sup> Following the Skopje earthquake of 1963, the Foundation invited ten engineers, architects, and planners to the United States and financed visits to American and European universities by the representatives of the University of Skopje who were planning the redevelopment of the destroyed city.<sup>1055</sup>

Many famous Yugoslav politicians, intellectuals, artists and scientists completed a Ford experience in the United States during the 1960s. Among them were Miladin Životić, Gajo Petrović, Mihailo Marković and Veljko Korać, part of the group of philosophers and supporters of an anti-dogmatic Marxism, dissenters with the official political party Marxist dogma, founders of the Korčula Summer School and editors of the *Praxis* review that lasted from 1964 to 1974.<sup>1056</sup> Others, such as the famous Serbian vanguard artist, Olja Ivanjicki, and Miodrag Protić, the founder of the Museum of Contemporary Art in Belgrade, represented the most renowned Yugoslav art personalities. Finally, one of the famous Ford grantees was Savka Dabčević-Kučar, a

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<sup>1051</sup> Summary of Educational Exchange between Yugoslavia and the United States, Dec. 2, 1966.

<sup>1052</sup> Despatch 415 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Feb. 24, 1958, 511.683/2-2458, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>1053</sup> Summary of Educational Exchange between Yugoslavia and the United States, Dec. 2, 1966.

<sup>1054</sup> Radina Vučetić, “Amerikanizacija u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi '60-ih,” 167.

<sup>1055</sup> Private Sector Forum, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

<sup>1056</sup> On the interconnections of the Praxis school of reformation Marxism and the U.S. public diplomacy agenda, see Chapter 7.

Croatian party leader, president of the CC of the League of Communists of Croatia, president of the Republican government from 1967 and a dissident during the 1971 Croatian Spring.<sup>1057</sup>

The personal accounts of Protić and Dabčević-Kučar have a special meaning in the aftermath of their return to Yugoslavia. In fact, Protić wrote to the Ford representatives in Yugoslavia stating, “America changed my personality and in some way completed it.”<sup>1058</sup> He stayed in the United States in 1963 where he visited the New York museums and engaged in a lifelong friendship with Alfred Barr, the founder and first director of the Museum of Modern Art. After his return, he implemented what he learned on the other side of the Atlantic: he projected the Yugoslav Museum of Contemporary Art on the New York example, both externally in the majestic vanguard cubic architecture, and internally in the thematic and non-chronological artworks sequence. Symbolically, the Museum opened on October 20, 1965, on the Yugoslav Liberation Day, in the presence of Aleksandar Ranković, the head of the Yugoslav secret services that was to be dismissed in 1966.<sup>1059</sup> It was the Yugoslav oxymoron palpable in real life and historical events.

The story of Dabčević-Kučar is not symptomatic only for the 1971 outcome.<sup>1060</sup> Savka Dabčević went on a Ford grantee as professor of economics and was one of the first women who obtained a PhD. in Economics in Yugoslavia. Her dissertation theme on “J. M. Keynes: the Theorists of State Capitalism” was certainly an unconventional one. In 1960/1961, she stayed in the United States and France on a Ford grant. In the aftermath of her return, she authored and co-authored many books on capitalist economy and the Yugoslav integration into the market economy, such as “Decentral and socialist planning: Yugoslavia” as a chapter of “Planning Economic Development” (1963) and “The Political Economy of Capitalism” (*Politička ekonomija kapitalizma*) (1967). Moreover, during the 1960s she contributed to the “White Book” (*Bijela knjiga*), a first study in economic reform, jointly with Većeslav Holjevac, Zagreb’s mayor and another Croatian dissident in the 1971 Spring, and other leading Croatian

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<sup>1057</sup> Vučetić, “Amerikanizacija u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi.” 167.

<sup>1058</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1059</sup> Radina Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam. Amerikanizacija jugoslavenske popularne kulture šezdesetih godina XX veka* (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2012), 234–237.

<sup>1060</sup> For more details on the Croatian Spring, see Chapter 7.

pro-market economists.<sup>1061</sup> Whether she was chosen by the Ford Commission for her innovative points of view on economic matters or for her high position in the Croatian republican government, it is undisputable that her permanence in the United States shaped her views on Western capitalism and her interests in market-led reforms.

Besides the Ford Foundation, the other private programs running in Yugoslavia were related either to university cooperation or to cultural or philanthropic associations. The list is long, although the most relevant were certainly the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship,<sup>1062</sup> the Cornell University Regional Planning Project,<sup>1063</sup> the University of Indiana Project,<sup>1064</sup> the Oak Ridge Associated Universities,<sup>1065</sup> the Regional Council for International Education Project,<sup>1066</sup> the University of Minnesota Project,<sup>1067</sup> the Harvard University Milman Parry Collection Project,<sup>1068</sup> the Experiment in International

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<sup>1061</sup> Savka Dabčević-Kučar, '71. – *hrvatski snovi i stvarnost*, vol. 1, (Zagreb: Interpublic, 1997), 254 – 283.

<sup>1062</sup> This program provided Yugoslav leaders, of outstanding leadership achievements, six to eight months of professional consultations, seminars, field trips, and on-the-job assignments in all parts of the United States (John Richardson Jr. to the Department of State, Sept. 12, 1969, Folder 10, Box 21, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL). In 1959 and in 1960, it enabled a member of the National Assembly of Slovenia and a member of the Executive Council of NR Serbia, respectively, to visit and conduct research in the United States. If not otherwise specified, the reference for notes 1062 to 1085 are indicated in note 1086.

<sup>1063</sup> Beginning in 1965, the Cornell University and the Urban Institute of Slovenia engaged in a program, co-financed by the State Department and the Ford Foundation, for developing urban and regional planning. The project consisted of four parts: yearly summer workshops in Ljubljana, yearly training of Yugoslav professionals at U.S. universities, a joint research project in Ljubljana, which included three American specialists, and the establishment of regional planning research centers in Yugoslavia and the United States.

<sup>1064</sup> Financed by the Department of State, this three-year program began in the fall of 1965 between the University of Indiana and the Ljubljana Faculty of Economics where it established a graduate business administration program. It also included a mutual exchange of professors. This program developed on an earlier established annual seminar, held both in Yugoslavia and alternatively in the United States, dealing with political and social issues such as regionalism, nationalism and federalism.

<sup>1065</sup> The project, active from 1965 and financed partly by the State Department, included a yearly "International Conference on the Development of Science and Technology and their Impact on Society" held at Herceg Novi (BIH), and sponsored jointly by the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies and the Federal Council for the Coordination of Scientific Activities.

<sup>1066</sup> The Regional Council for International Education at Pittsburgh and the Yugoslav Institute for Educational Research sponsored a summer seminar in Yugoslavia on the "Educational Trends in Yugoslavia and America," which was financially sustained by the State Department, and covered 12 American professors' travel grants to Yugoslavia.

<sup>1067</sup> The project, sponsored partly by the Department of State, developed studies on immigrations from Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, which included considerable microfilming of important Yugoslav documents and newspapers. The project went into effect on June 1, 1966.

<sup>1068</sup> Co-financed by the Department of State, the project engaged in adding new materials to the Milman Parry Collection of South Slavic oral traditional texts at Harvard University. It included the microfilming of epic texts and songs with a tape recorder during the summers of 1963 and 1964.

Living,<sup>1069</sup> the Great Lakes College Association (GLCA), the Ljubljana University Project,<sup>1070</sup> the Portland State College and University of Zagreb Agreement,<sup>1071</sup> and the Salzburg Seminar for American Studies.<sup>1072</sup>

A large group of private and semiprivate programs in Yugoslavia was related to the social sciences. Carried out by the Ford Foundation and jointly administrated by the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, the Foreign Area Fellowship permitted American doctoral and post-doctoral candidates to conduct “research interests of imaginative and highly competent social scientists and the frontiers of their fields.”<sup>1073</sup> Many other programs covered the social sciences area of study: the Council for International Programs for Youth Leaders and Social Workers,<sup>1074</sup> the University of Pennsylvania Program in cooperation with the Yugoslav Institute of Social Sciences,<sup>1075</sup> the Western Michigan University and the University of

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<sup>1069</sup> Founded in 1932 and to some extent financed by the U.S. government, the Experiment in International Living was a private, non-profit organization engaged in educational exchange, designed to develop “mutual respect among the peoples of the world.” In 1965 and 1966, 22 Americans and 5 Yugoslavs were exchanged each year.

<sup>1070</sup> A yearly seminar held in Ljubljana beginning with 1965 that examined selected aspects of the political and social structure of Yugoslavia and the United States. It was sponsored jointly by the University of Ljubljana, the Great Lakes College Association and the Department of State, and it included American professors, lecturers and students.

<sup>1071</sup> Under this agreement, a group of 25 students were provided with grants to enroll in the University of Zagreb to study Serbo-Croatian, Yugoslav history and literature, and a two-year course in Serbo-Croatian at Portland College.

<sup>1072</sup> As an independent private organization founded in 1947, it was financed for the most part by foundations and individuals from the U.S. and Europe. American professors conducted the series of yearly seminars, which continue until today, in order to present “a comprehensive and objective picture of the contemporary United States to Europeans.” The first invitation for Yugoslav candidates was released in 1958, when the major topics of discussion spanned from the “American Law and Legal Institutions,” “American Literature and Criticism,” to “Race and Minorities” (Predlog kandidata za učestvovanje na Salešburskom seminaru, March 1, 1958, 0602-113, Box 93, Savjet za kulturu i nauku NRH 1956-1961, RG 1599, HDA).

<sup>1073</sup> Summary of Educational Exchange between Yugoslavia and the United States, Dec. 2, 1966.

<sup>1074</sup> It provided foreign youth leaders, social workers and specialist teachers with a one-month training in social work methods in the United States (Katie Louchheim to the Undersecretary, Jan. 10, 1969, Folder 9, Box 21, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL).

<sup>1075</sup> Co-sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the State Department jointly, this international project carried out both in Poland and India, was conducting a research project “to identify and measure social values influencing local political responsibility” in a perspective of cross cultural comparison and political integration.

Zagreb Educational Research Project,<sup>1076</sup> and the Michigan University and the Ljubljana University Institute for Sociology and Philosophy.

The California State College Project, the Iowa Wesleyan Project, the Louisiana State University and Belgrade University Seminars Program, the Yugoslav Institute of School and Pedagogical Research Project, the American Association of College for Teachers in Education, were on their side financed by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Several other programs were particularly targeting the younger population: the New York Herald Tribune Youth Forum Project (NYHT),<sup>1077</sup> the Youth for Understanding Teenage Exchange Program,<sup>1078</sup> the Multi-Area Educational Travel Project<sup>1079</sup> and the Interlochen Michigan Music Camp.<sup>1080</sup> Other minor cultural programs for cooperation were the Indiana and Ljubljana University Agricultural Seminars, the Samuel Rubin Foundation Agreement, the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Zagreb Electrochemical Project, the Hemingway Fund,<sup>1081</sup> the Baloković Fund,<sup>1082</sup> the Annual Slavic Seminar in Zagreb and Zadar, the International Dubrovnik Seminar,<sup>1083</sup> and the collaboration of Michigan University and the Biological Institute of Ljubljana University.

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<sup>1076</sup> The Institute of Social Research of the University of Zagreb negotiated with Western Michigan University a mutual research in the field of education, which began in 1965 with seminars covering social, political and cultural Yugoslav problems.

<sup>1077</sup> This yearly project brought foreign students to the U.S. and sent American students abroad for home stays, school visits, seminars and public discussions. There was one Yugoslav student participating every year. After the demise of the NYHT, the project passed to be under the World Journal Tribune.

<sup>1078</sup> Operating within the state of Michigan, this reciprocal project brought foreign teenage students to live in American homes while attending American high schools.

<sup>1079</sup> Sponsored by the U.S. National Student Association and the Department of State, to provide opportunities for students and youth leaders from abroad to see the many different aspects of the U.S. It included conferences, travels and home stays. One Yugoslav youth leader participated each year.

<sup>1080</sup> One of the very few projects without federal assistance, it consisted in yearly meetings promoting the cause of music in education. In 1966, one Yugoslav representative participated after screening of the Federal Secretariat for Education and Culture.

<sup>1081</sup> On June 20, 1966, Mary Welsh Hemingway donated 5455 new dinars to the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts, in order to establish a fund to assist young gifted students dedicated to creative writing.

<sup>1082</sup> Joyce Borden Baloković, wife of the later Croatian violinist and political activist, established the fund at the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts for young Yugoslav post-graduates wishing to study at Harvard University.

<sup>1083</sup> Also known as the Summer School of Hope College, it was initiated by Michael Petrovich in 1972, an assistant professor of history and director of the Balkan Area Studies of the Hope College, Michigan (Hope College Summer School, 1972, 51/1856, Box 150, Republički sekretarijat za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu 1965-1979, RG 1415, HDA).

A special project of academic collaboration between the U.S. National Academy of Science (NAS) and the Council of Yugoslav Academies was created on June 1 1966, with a Memorandum of Understanding that provided exchange visits to scholars in the field of natural science, especially mathematics.<sup>1084</sup> Another two programs were specifically related to journalists and theater actors: the National Association of Broadcasters and Foreign Radio Television Journalist Project; and the Kansas University Theater Exchange Program. The first one was a 30-day program in the United States designed to familiarize foreign broadcasters with the American radio and television system with particular emphasis on the news gathering and dissemination process.<sup>1085</sup> The latter had the characteristics of both the Cultural Presentation Program and of an exchange program, financed by the State Department, and that comprised of a student theater and demonstration team that from summer 1963 had yearly appeared at Yugoslav institutions giving presentations on the style and history of American theater. Under this program, several Yugoslav students visited the University of Kansas to examine the theater program there.<sup>1086</sup> In addition, the MECEA funds assisted in carrying out many private exchange programs, like those under the auspices of the American College of Cardiology, the Council on Student Travel, the Experiment in International Living, the Harvard International Seminar, the International Marketing Institute, the U.S. National Student Association and the Youth for International Understanding.<sup>1087</sup> Under the MECEA umbrella, some 433 exchanges, of whom 344 were Americans and 89 Yugoslavs, were carried out from 1961 to 1966.<sup>1088</sup>

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<sup>1084</sup> The NAS as a private organization of scientists and engineers and the National Science Foundation jointly financed the program.

<sup>1085</sup> The program, while officially sponsored by the National Association of Broadcasters, was in fact hardly promoted and co-financed by State Department funds.

<sup>1086</sup> This list of private and semi-private actors in Yugoslavia has been created by the intersection of several archival resources: Izveštaj Dvonalacionalne savetodavne komisije za dugoročno planiranje obrazovne, naučno-tehničke i kulturne saradnje između Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, Dec. 2, 1966, Box 237, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ; Summary of Educational Exchange between Yugoslavia and the United States, Dec. 2, 1966, Folder 17, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL; and Private Sector Forum, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

<sup>1087</sup> MECEA is the acronym for Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Activities that ensured regular annual appropriations by the State Department under the authority of the Public Law 87-256 approved on September 21, 1961 (*Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on*

As we could observe from the extensive list below, the first half of the 1960s were characterized by mounting trends of American private programs involved in Yugoslavia. Many of them were focused on enabling Americans to conduct research in Yugoslavia in anthropology, linguistics, community development, and industrialization. They assisted Yugoslav universities in establishing centers for urban planning, graduate MBA programs, university chairs in American Literature and continuing workshops in American Studies. Others organized conferences on macroeconomics, legal and economic aspects of federalism and educational trends.

The analysis of the role of the state-private cultural network in Yugoslavia conveys three central conclusions. Firstly, the majority of the programs took an intensifying path in the biennium 1965-1966, because of the mediation of the Fulbright Commission, with the Yugoslav government and institutions, in canalizing those networks. As happened in the case of the Fulbright program, most of the exchange networks were again concentrated on the three major university capitals: Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana. Secondly, the State Department partially financed almost all of these projects and programs together with private funding. What is more, some of them, such as the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies, commenced as an independent initiative of the Harvard University Council, but ended up under the informal control of the U.S. Army stationed in Austria, “which amounted to, more or less, ideological conformity.”<sup>1089</sup> Thirdly, we can conclude, by deduction, that these programs involved most of the Yugoslav scientific and academic leaders, and many young professionals and party ranks; even if we cannot measure quantitatively their impact in detail, still their broadness and involvement point to their success.

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*Appropriations, United States Senate, 95th Congress, First Session* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 420.

<sup>1088</sup> Private Sector Forum, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

<sup>1089</sup> Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War* (University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 165. See also Richard Purcell, *Race, Ralph Ellison and American Cold War Intellectual Culture* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 75–80.

### 6.5.1 The GLCA Exchange and Danica Purg's Account: Some Grey Sides of an Exchange Story

The State Department also contributed to the project of the Great Lakes College Association and Ljubljana University. Beginning in 1965, the project organized seminars on political and social issues in both countries, and study trips to the United States for individually selected students.<sup>1090</sup> In 1968, Danica Purg, a Slovenian student enrolled in the fourth year of the High School of Political Science in Ljubljana, was residing in the United States on her GLCA grant. In April 1968, she met the Yugoslav Vice Consul in San Francisco, and then sent several complaints and letters to Cvijeto Job, who at that time was the Cultural Affairs Officer at the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington D.C. In her long reports, she vigorously complained of the treatment she was given during her stay at the Kalamazoo College in Michigan<sup>1091</sup>. She animatedly criticized their group escort, Mike Petrovich, who, according to Purg, was a CIA agent and a “Chetnik.”<sup>1092</sup> The questions she and her fellows from Ljubljana were posed at the VOA headquarters in Washington D.C. (during a radio interview), Purg considered “provocative and unpleasant.” When her group visited the State Department from April 4 to 8, 1968, “one of the officials stated that, when President Tito dies, there will arouse national conflicts in Yugoslavia [...] to which Boris Bergant [one of her fellows] responded «I’m sorry but I won’t answer these questions because you are provocative».” During her extensive travels throughout the American continent (San Francisco, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Kalamazoo, Canada, and New York), Purg reported to have felt surrounded by CIA agents.<sup>1093</sup> “My feelings here are more a protest

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<sup>1090</sup> In September 1965, for example, an 18-day seminar was held in Ljubljana with the participation of 5 American professors, 10 Yugoslav lecturers, and 17 American and 16 Yugoslav students (Guy E. Coriden, CU/EUR, to John Richardson Jr., CU, Jan. 27, 1970, Folder 12, Box 21, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL).

<sup>1091</sup> The Kalamazoo College in the homonymous city was part of the Great Lakes College Association on which grantee Purg was staying in the United States.

<sup>1092</sup> Originally, Chetnik indicated a Serbian nationalist belonging to a group that fought against the Turks before World War I and engaged in guerrilla warfare during both World Wars. In the post-War Yugoslav context, the Chetnik group (Četnici in Serbo-Croatian) comprised a World War II non-homogenous and anti-Axis movement led by Draža Mihailović, who pursued a policy of “Great Serbia” and the restoration of the monarchy. After the War, Chetniks was the common name for a political enemy for the Yugoslav communist regime, for which accusation the outcome was always capital execution.

<sup>1093</sup> Zabeleška o razgovoru Bogomira Liovića, vicekonzula Generalnog konzulata SFRJ u San Franciscu sa Danicom Purg, July 5, 1968, 26/68, Box 43, Republički protokol, Izvršno Vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA.

than a paranoid sickness. A protest because for the first time in my life I feel what it is like when the «big power» dominates [...]. [At the State Department] our whole discussion was about Yugoslav nationalism. My fellows and I were very angry,” reported Purg to Cvijeto Job. And she continued:

When we had a meeting at the Hope College, we were disappointed from the very start. They showed two movies about Yugoslavia. [...] The first one was about the natural beauties of our country (made by Pan American).<sup>1094</sup> The other one was a ten-year-old documentary [...] with a lot of biased statements such as that the state controls people who practice any religion, [...] that it is a dream to have an electric kitchen-range [...] and a fridge in Yugoslavia. [...] The next day we had another discussion and were attacked again.”<sup>1095</sup>

Cvijeto Job, a pro-Western oriented Yugoslav diplomat with a large experience in the DSIP and the United States, and who brought the issue to Guy Coriden (at the time Deputy Director of the Soviet and East European Division at CU), responded very cautiously to Purg’s accusations. “Of course, without understating [...] we don’t have to exaggerate and create a frightening, unusual [...] hypertrophied show that everyone with whom they [the Yugoslavs] get in contact [...] are CIA and FBI agents and immigrants with hostile intentions,” but then, he concluded, “it is hard to evaluate the «provocative» questions [...]. It happens sometimes that our citizens, coming from another environment, with different habits and traditions, consider as provocative what is here [...] pretty normal.”<sup>1096</sup>

Revising ones memory after more than half a century and by a final viewpoint, can never be an accurate perspective. Nevertheless, the recalled memories of Danica Purg, today founder and president of the IEDC-Bled School of Management, Slovenia, and of CEEMAN,<sup>1097</sup> can be of precious help in reframing her experience in the 1968 United States. Purg’s experience is valuable because it represents an exception rather than a rule, albeit its suggestiveness rests in revealing the weak points of intercultural communication, the perception of and interaction with the Other, and the translation of

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<sup>1094</sup> The popular Pan American documentary film on Yugoslavia was *Wings to Yugoslavia - a Rare Kodachrome Film for Pan Am Airways*, 16 mm (U.S.: Kodachrome, 1964), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5B6eBAuhvEY>.

<sup>1095</sup> Danica Purg to Cvijeto Job, Cultural Adviser at Yugoslav Embassy in Washington DC, May 25, 1968, Box 43, Republički protokol, Izvršno Vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA.

<sup>1096</sup> Povodom zabeleške Generalnog konzulata SFRJ u San Franciscu od 28. maja 1968., Aug. 5, 1968, 09/592, Box 43, Republički protokol, Izvršno Vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA.

<sup>1097</sup> CEEMAN is an association of 219 management development institutions from 54 countries, established for the very aim of enhancing managerial business and other practices in Central and Eastern Europe (<http://www.iedc.si/about-iedc/faculty/danica-purg>).

political identification into ordinary life. Here are the extracts from Danica Purg's account of her American experience in 1968, as she remembers them today:

I like to remember my stay in USA with other colleagues from Slovenia. I like to think of the fact that I essentially improved my English, I met some great people there, and I learned a lot. I heard about the scholarship at the Faculty of Political Sciences, where I studied. [...] With 200 USD that we got as pocket money and a travel check for the same amount, I succeeded, after my studies, to travel extensively by plane throughout the USA. I have seen San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Jackson, Dallas, New Orleans, Boston, Chicago and Detroit, as well as Washington (the last one together with the entire group). I mention this particular stay in the USA very often in my interviews and articles, because it was an unbelievable opportunity I got from the USA government. [...] Since I was very proactive, I had many great U.S. friends, and wherever I went, I had a "friend of a friend" where I could spend some days free of charge.

Now that you remind me, I am thinking also of the other part of the story: I was shocked by the violence in the USA from the beginning to the end of my stay: When our group arrived [...], we had to stay for four days in a hotel in Washington because of the murder of Martin Luther King. This was for me very sad, because I studied political science, [...] and I realized what a loss the death of Martin Luther King was. During my stay, I had another bad experience: a young black person threw a bottle at my head, while I was walking in the park.

Travelling through the USA, I met (sat together in the plane) with some soldiers returning from Vietnam war. This was another thing that shocked me. Some of them had a nervous breakdown and travelled home to rest, the others told me with great hatred for communism that they were in Vietnam fighting against communism. I was offended to hear that and sorry to see what the Vietnam war did to American soldiers. Thus, another frustration.

At the end of my stay in the USA, Mr. Robert Kennedy was killed. I was active in the group of young people – students from Kalamazoo College, preparing his visit to the town for the election campaign, going around the private houses to convince people to vote for him, and finally even giving him a present from Yugoslavia. [...] All these sad events provoked in me some doubts about the American democracy, and being an open person, I showed my disappointment and emotions.

Another incident happened when our group was invited to the State Department and there we had a long session on Yugoslavia. I still remember the questions "what will happen after Tito dies," which were for me somehow brutal. We lived in a pretty "romantic" environment, we liked president Tito, we didn't feel oppressed by the regime and though that these were not questions for "guests." [...] My expectations were different visiting USA the first time, and the disappointment was a consequence of that. Visiting USA later again, I liked it much more. I started to see other things, like high-class management education, great professors at Harvard Business School, great artworks, etc. [...] and later on I visited many universities and management schools. I developed a great cooperation with Darden Business School at Virginia University, Harvard Business School, MIT Sloan School of Management, Boston University, Babson College, Claremont University ...

[Was I] a member of the Communist Party [?], Yes, I was a member, but I was accepted in the "party" because I was an exemplary good student, and not out of fanatical, ideological reasons. I believed in justice, in equal opportunities for the development of people. The fact that I got such a scholarship to the USA was also reflecting that. [...] Today, I treasure only good memories of my first trip to the USA. I like to remember nice friends, great professors, the great trips I made throughout the USA [...]. And I don't think it was necessary to forward my complaint to the

USA authorities. I was young, full of ideals about the world and I needed somebody who could understand and comfort me by talking about that.<sup>1098</sup>

This controversial memory and experience emphatically evaluates two fundamental points: the extensive contributions of these exchange programs to individual successful career paths and the specific intercultural and cross-cultural communication relations that opened up not only mutual understanding, but misinterpretations, confusions and misapprehensions.

Apart from these exceptional stories in cultural exchanges, discussions and meetings on cultural cooperation at the highest levels continued intensively in the second half of the 1960s. From November 21 through December 2, 1966, a special, ad hoc, Bi-national Advisory Commission between Yugoslavia and the United States met in Belgrade to discuss past cooperation and establish new goals.<sup>1099</sup> The Yugoslav group included some outstanding representatives of the educational and cultural scene.<sup>1100</sup> Charles Frankel, the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, remarked in the aftermath of the visit, “the results are encouraging [...]. The Yugoslavs were well prepared [...] and [...] reached ready agreement for major priority fields for exchange for the next five to ten years.”<sup>1101</sup> The Commission concluded that “these activities [educational, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation] had been both successful and useful and had played an important part in the relations of the two

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<sup>1098</sup> E-mail Interview with Danica Purg, June 6, 2014.

<sup>1099</sup> Not to be confused with the Fulbright’s Bi-national Commission.

<sup>1100</sup> The six Yugoslav members were Dragutin Franković, professor and director of the Yugoslav Institute for Educational Research; Tošo Tišma, professor and rector of the Novi Sad University; Slavko Makarol, professor and pro-rector of Zagreb University; Dušan Breznik from the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade; Živorad Teofilović, adviser at the office of the President of the Federal Council for Coordination of Scientific Activities; and Miloš Rajačić, head of the department for Western Countries in the Federal Institute for International Technical Assistance. The four American members of this Advisory Commission were Paul R. Hanna, professor and director of the Stanford International Development Educational Center (Stanford University); Merle Curti, professor of History at the Wisconsin University; Frederick D. Rossini, professor and Dean of College of Science at the University of Notre Dame and John C. Campbell, senior research fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations and author of the internationally notable study *Tito’s Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967) (Airgram A-374 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Dec. 13, 1966, Box 17, Folder 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL).

<sup>1101</sup> Charles Frankel to Katzenbach, Dec. 23, 1966, Folder 5, Box 21, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

nations.”<sup>1102</sup> Both sides agreed to continue cooperation in the areas of mutual interest. Firstly, in the cultural fields such as geography, archeology, history, cultural heritage, languages, literature, art, political and social institutions, and education, including libraries and museums. Secondly, in the area of economic development, management and technical training, as well as in the natural sciences and technology. Lastly, in topics such as medicine and public health, education, social problems such as urbanization, industrialization, and pollution, as well as law and political institutions, which were placed among the priority issues. The Commission approved the expansion of existing forms of cooperation in the state-private network. Consequently, the exchange of individuals (undergraduate and graduate students, lecturers, researchers, teachers, artists, musicians and professionals), the cooperation by institutions and research centers, the exchange of printed materials such as books, journals, and documents but also media devices such as microfilms and tapes, and formal symposia, conferences and congresses, would continue to distinguish the next decade of cultural cooperation.<sup>1103</sup>

## 6.6 A *Win-Win* Position or a Cold War Experiment?

*[The unique position of] Yugoslavia as a funnel for infusing new ideas and concepts into the socialist world warrants special consideration.*<sup>1104</sup>

*[The] Yugoslav leadership is avidly absorbing Western management ideas and technology as it develops its own socialist self-management system increasingly according to market principles.*<sup>1105</sup>

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<sup>1102</sup> Report of the Bi-national Advisory Commission for long term planning of educational, scientific-technical, and cultural cooperation between the SFRY and the USA, Dec. 2, 1966, Folder 17, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL (hereafter Report of the Bi-national Advisory Commission, Dec. 2, 1966): i-ii.

<sup>1103</sup> Report of the Bi-national Advisory Commission, Dec. 2, 1966.

<sup>1104</sup> Airgram 413 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1969, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC: 1-4.

<sup>1105</sup> Airgram 366 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Oct. 8, 1970, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC.

Radina Vučetić suggests that the Yugoslav – U.S. attitudes and policies on and towards cultural issues, propaganda, exchanges and cooperation, was a win-win where everyone got what they wanted and were therefore satisfied with the outcomes.<sup>1106</sup> Nonetheless, the insights into how both the leaderships considered and consequently treated the cultural cooperation generally, shows us many shades of grey. The Yugoslav side struggled for its prevalence in the Bi-national Commission (which profoundly irritated the U.S. officials at the early stages of negotiations), maximized the utilization of American expertise, but remained extremely dissatisfied and contrary to the U.S. cultural propaganda in the field. As we observed, the U.S. Embassy and the USIS post in Belgrade provided the U.S. private agencies and networks with a follow-up and mediation with the Yugoslav authorities. The Embassy also utilized its personal contacts to facilitate the negotiations. After the establishment of the Bi-national Commission, the mediation process became easier and the Embassy reports proudly emphasized these increasing trends in the second half of the 1960s: stronger cooperation between universities from both sides of the Atlantic, new linkages in educational disciplines, face-to-face student contacts and especially long-term friendships. “The intellectual curiosity and disarming friendliness of the American students [are] positive factors in building better relationships among Americans and Yugoslavs”<sup>1107</sup> commented a 1966 Embassy report. Such an element of mutual friendliness was symbolically expressed by Hoyt C. Franchere, Dean of the Department of Arts and Letters from Portland State College, to Vida Marković, Head of the English Department at the University of Zagreb, when stating “Vida, the hillsides out here are just like those in Oregon and your people are just like Americans to me,” to which she replied: “Hoyt, why shouldn’t it be like that all over the world?”<sup>1108</sup> Still, more than just creating friendships, the exchange programs were involved in a nation building process in which the U.S. grantees were “expected to maintain a high image of technical and scientific superiority, but at the same time raise the image of personal, moral, humanistic values

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<sup>1106</sup> Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam*.

<sup>1107</sup> Airgram 119 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1966, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC.

<sup>1108</sup> Hoyt C. Franchere to Cvijeto Job, July 2, 1970, 09 552, Box 43, Republički protokol, Izvršno Vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA.

in the United States, which years of propaganda in this part of the world have helped distort.”<sup>1109</sup>

The analysis of the Leader’s Exchange Program, the Fulbright Program and the state-private network in Yugoslavia has illuminated many paths by which soft power public diplomacy policies have been implemented. Joint efforts by the State Department, the USIA and the CU, were intended to exert political and cultural influences on Yugoslav leaders, academics, and specialists. They opened up career advancements and channeled Western cultural and political ideas. Moreover, the U.S. strategy contemplated and used the Yugoslav special “bridge” position as a lever into other Eastern European socialist countries, which looked to Yugoslavia as a mirage of freedom and welfare.<sup>1110</sup>

The main difference between the Leader’s Exchange and the Fulbright program was that, while the first was a unilateral one with all the vital decisions relying on the Embassy and the State Department, the Fulbright program was “a more truly bi-national project.” Moreover, while the first was concerned with short term academic and leader exchanges, the Fulbright program was more appealing for academics interested in long-term stays abroad.<sup>1111</sup> Furthermore, while the Leader’s program relied completely on the U.S. budget support, the Fulbright program involved U.S. private institutions, foremost universities, and had to be planned an academic year in advance.<sup>1112</sup>

As for the Fulbright program, it represented a breaking point in the cultural exchange cooperation between Yugoslavia and the United States, and was the most appreciated exchange program by the Yugoslav highest leaders and party ranks. The sign of the Fulbright agreement in Yugoslavia was an unprecedented event in the history of the program: Yugoslavia was the first communist country involved, it was the

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<sup>1109</sup> Airgram 969 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 15, 1968, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC.

<sup>1110</sup> Airgram 969 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 15, 1968, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC: 14; Airgram 413 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1969, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC: 1–4.

<sup>1111</sup> This was in fact a practical outcome of the program targets: while the academics could take a year off visiting professorships or research at some American universities, the Yugoslav leaders could not leave their political responsibilities for a long period.

<sup>1112</sup> Instruction A-110 from the Department of State to American Embassy Belgrade, Feb. 3, 1958, 511.683/2-358, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP.

first communist country whose government financed the program (from 1969), and it was the only country where Senator Fulbright came to presence the celebration of the agreement. For the Yugoslav government the benefits of the exchange programs seemed to be unquestionable. The Yugoslav scientists, who were trained in the United States, had considerably advanced Yugoslav technological development, affirmed the Embassy from Belgrade in 1969. “A concrete indication of the [Yugoslav] Government’s attitude is the fact that, at considerable cost and with little internal struggle, it is contributing eight scholarships for Americans to study in Yugoslavia.”<sup>1113</sup> Many memos of the Federal Secretariat for Education and Culture confirm this policy direction as this one of 1969:

We give a special attention to these relations because of :a) the obvious necessity of using the results of American science and technology for our development, especially in the context of reforms; b) the stability of these relations that are not directly subject to political oscillations [...]; c) the maintenance and exchange of scientific, educational and cultural relations with the American intellectual and influential elites (especially at the American universities), which is mostly liberal and has a positive attitude towards us and our relations with the United States, strengthens and safeguards our valuable political position in the public and political life of the United States.<sup>1114</sup>

This Yugoslav position was expressed following Ambassador William Leonhart’s visit to the City Council of Zagreb and the Croatian republican institutions in November 1969. The talks underlined how the political relations between the two countries were “in full equality and mutual respect” and how, after the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia had been further affirmed as an “independent [...] factor of stability in Europe, in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.” The discussion also confirmed the increase of good mutual relations following the Johnson’s administration, while the Yugoslav government highly appreciated the halt of bombing of North Vietnam and the SALT talks in Paris on anti-proliferation policies. “The active equal relations with the United States represent our very interest. They also confirm the necessity and possibility of an execution of our concept of peaceful and active

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<sup>1113</sup> Airgram 413 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1969, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC: 1-4.

<sup>1114</sup> Program posjete ambasadora SAD Williama Leonharta i supruge, Nov. 26, 1969, Box 43, Republički protokol, Izvršno Vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA.

coexistence with countries of other social orders, equal in strength.”<sup>1115</sup> The fact that the Yugoslav government pursued the cultural exchange programs with the United States to affirm its presence and lobby for its interests among the American liberal intellectual elites seems an element of great novelty. At the time, the Yugoslav Ambassador in the U.S. (1962-1967), Veljko Mićunović, similarly asserted:

the development of our country, especially in the aspects of economic reform, the reform of the education system [...] and the full openness of our country, requires [...] the use of the highly developed science, technology and culture of the United States. The improvement of our political relations, which conditions and allows the liberalization of contacts and travels, gives it a real foundation.<sup>1116</sup>

As Mićunović underlined to Rusk, the cultural exchange programs between the two countries were favoring the bilateral relation processes because they were not subject to political fluctuations. Moreover, they acted as a corrective of political inclinations and crises moments. In addition, for these needs, the Yugoslav government insisted in expanding the exchange programs for technological modernization of the national human resources.<sup>1117</sup> Undoubtedly, the impact of the exchange programs on the economic life of Yugoslavia and, more specifically, on the development of the U.S. – Yugoslav trade was beneficial. As the U.S. Embassy reported, the 1968 LEP visit to the United States of the director of the Novi Sad International Agricultural Fair was responsible for new initiatives, for increased American commercial participation and substantial volume of sales.<sup>1118</sup>

Looking at the 1960 Yugoslav Press Law, which, by reducing the USIS margins of liberty, urged the realization of the Fulbright agreement as well as the increase of the LEP, it can be argued that the realization of the cultural exchanges in the 1960s between Yugoslavia and the United States, actually realized the goals they were created for. These apparently non-political collaborations substantially improved bi-national relations and contributed to overcoming misunderstandings and diverging foreign relations strategies.

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<sup>1115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1116</sup> Materijal i neke sugestije u vezi programiranja saradnje sa SAD u prosvetno-naučnoj i kulturnoj oblasti, Nov. 15, 1966, Box 237, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ.

<sup>1117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1118</sup> Airgram 413 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1969, Box 2, Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC: 1-4.

Aided by the Paris peace talks, the U.S. decision to halt bombing and the effect in Yugoslavia of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, earlier criticisms of United States foreign policy have all but withered away. The [...] visit of President Nixon to Asia and Romania has been favorably received. Additionally, the recent U.S. space successes have galvanized pro-American sentiments in this country and provided a favorable climate for increased cooperation.<sup>1119</sup>

Why did the U.S. policymakers accept the Yugoslav predominance in the Bi-national Commission policy decisions? Why did they invest large amounts of capital in so many different exchange programs with an extended private involvement? The hermeneutical key relies on the presumption that the U.S. administrations had a political calculation based on an investment-return advantage over the expenses undertaken in Yugoslavia. Since the early 1960s, they perceived that the Yugoslav leaders were changing attitudes and policies, while not giving up on the U.S. field propaganda. They recognized positive feedback from the Leader's, the Fulbright and the Ford Foundation programs. They increased personal contacts and counted the results.

As an intense decade for Yugoslavia's internal reformation, the 1960s involved torrid political debates of Party leadership over three critical issues: the decentralization and federalization process and the consequent splitting of political power;<sup>1120</sup> the economic reform towards a market-led socialism; and the degree of democratic expression permitted to heterodox Marxist political and cultural elites. The U.S. diplomats and public diplomacy officials in Belgrade and Zagreb observed these events with immense interest and interpreted many of them as being inspired by the U.S. "soft power" diplomacy, its private agents and networks, as we shall observe in the last chapter of this study.

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<sup>1119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1120</sup> This debate profoundly concerned the Croatian communist leaders over the question of national autonomy as well as over the independent status of the Croatian language among Yugoslav languages (Dragutin Lalović, ed., *Hrvatsko i jugoslavensko "proljeće" 1962-1972* (Zagreb, 2015)).

# 7 MEASURING THE IMPACT: THE U.S. SOFT POWER AND THE YUGOSLAV COLD WAR ADJUSTMENT

*Perhaps [the] best [way to] describe the situation in Yugoslavia is by a story that I told a USIA director when he asked me: “How is it to work in Belgrade?” And my answer was, at the time, if you travel from Sofia to Rome, Belgrade looks like Rome. But if you travel from Rome to Sofia, Belgrade looks like Sofia. [...] At the time I came [in 1960], I had the distinct feeling that while of course I worked in a Communist country, in many respects our USIS program in Yugoslavia was more like a USIS program in Austria than in Budapest.*

Walter Roberts, USIS PAO in Belgrade (1960-1966)<sup>1121</sup>

Joseph Nye argues that, “in behavioral terms soft power is attractive power,” while in terms of resources, “soft-power resources are the assets that produce such attraction.” So, if the attractiveness of a soft-power resource can be measured “through polls or focus groups,” how can we evaluate if “that attraction in turn produces desired policy

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<sup>1121</sup> Mark Taplin, “Global Publicks: Walter Roberts: U.S. Public Diplomacy in Yugoslavia -- ‘We Had Quite a Program There,’” accessed February 22, 2016, <http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-roberts-us-public-diplomacy-in.html>.

outcomes”? Nye’s answer is that results have to be judged case by case. Certainly, admits Nye, there is a persistent gap, both for hard and soft power, “between power measured as resources and power judged as the outcome of behavior.”<sup>1122</sup> Finally, similarly as with hard power, soft power attraction “often has a diffuse effect, creating a general influence rather than producing an easily observable specific action.”<sup>1123</sup>

Put in simpler terms, the impact of soft-power practices and resources is not easy to measure. Sometimes because its diffusion is spread and involving way too many actors; other times because attractiveness may be both the cause and consequence of certain behavioral outcomes; or, simply because, while culture could be “a tool of diplomacy,” possibly “instrumentalized to achieve a state’s goals in foreign policy,”<sup>1124</sup> the reverse could happen, namely culture to exploit diplomacy networks for its own affirmation.

Yet, both the transmitters (the State Department and its Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the USIA and its USIS in the field, and their private encounters), the receivers (the Yugoslav elites, intellectuals, and students) and the observers and receivers (the Yugoslav Central Government, its Foreign Office, and other massive organizations) of the U.S. public diplomacy in Yugoslavia, recognized quantitative and qualitative criteria by which they evaluated, positively or negatively, the impact of American cultural policies and practices, thus contextualizing them in current Yugoslav

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<sup>1122</sup> Joseph S. Jr. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics*, 2nd ed. (Public Affairs, 2009), 23. This means that “public polls can measure the existence and trends in potential [...] resources, but they are only a first approximation for behavioral change in terms of outcomes. Where opinion is strong and consistent over time, it can have an effect, but its impact in comparison to other variables can only be determined by careful process tracing of the sort that historians do.” (Joseph S. Jr. Nye, “Responding to My Critics and Concluding Thoughts,” in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox (Routledge, 2010), 218).

<sup>1123</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, 34. This definitional flexibility of soft power – as being rather an ‘analytical concept’ or “ideograph for non-coercive influence,” and not a theory – has opened up critics by sceptics such as Niall Ferguson and Janice Bially-Mattern, since the lack of specification on the concept has produced re-articulations and re-interpretations of its meaning (Niall Ferguson, “Think Again Power,” *Foreign Policy*, February 2003; Janice Bially Mattern, “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33, no. 3 (June 2005): 583–612, doi:10.1177/ 03058298050330031601). In Hayden’s perspective, “soft power should be understood in terms of how certain resources and capacities are seen by international actors as both *available* to them and likely to be *effective* in persuasion or some form of influence” (Craig Hayden, *The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2011), 36). For the scholarly debate on soft power in public diplomacy, see Introduction.

<sup>1124</sup> Volker Depkat, “Cultural Approaches to International Relations: A Challenge?,” in *Culture and International History*, ed. Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2004), 177.

political and social developments of the 1950s and 1960s. Besides the contemporary reports, surveys, analysis, and the oral and written interviews, some of USIA's core ideas – on participatory democracy, individual responsibility and creativity, the regime's critiques, and the multiparty system – entered the Yugoslav public sphere in the 1960s, through opposite, unlinked channels and personalities. This conclusive chapter aims to analyze the impact of U.S. cultural policies from two points of view: the contemporary observers and social science surveys; and the dissident, dissonant, and pro-reform voices of the Yugoslav public sphere in the 1960s.

### **7.1.1 The Party Measures Impact...**

Attractiveness for a numerous audience, eagerness of the reception of messages, and inclusion of participants from all over Yugoslavia, are common to both the USIS libraries and its field activities: the presentations of the *American way of life* at the Zagreb and Belgrade trade fairs; the American performers on Yugoslav stages; the *Voice of America* broadcasts; and the cultural involvement of Yugoslavs in the exchange programs with the United States.

70 percent of all foreign propaganda in Yugoslavia, reported the SSRNJ Commission for Political and Ideological-Educational Work in 1966, was of U.S. origin, while the rest, in decreasing order, of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France. The foreign centers, by being stocked with newspapers and magazines, located in “bourgeois” and fancy districts, attracted, by their high appeal, “many hundreds of daily visitors.”<sup>1125</sup> Depicted by “bloc and Cold War” representations, the U.S. propaganda, while being affected by anti-communist notes, was generally avoiding any hostile and direct criticism of Yugoslavia. Ideologically, continued the report, the U.S. messages were trying to prove that Yugoslavia, because of the U.S. economic aid and its subsequent rapprochement with the “free world,” was abandoning Marxist ideology, applying principles of free enterprise market economy, and raising its living

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<sup>1125</sup> Informacija o problemima vezanim za inostranu propagandnu u našoj zemlji, April 15, 1966, 16/2-1966, Box 256, Komisija za politički i idejno-vaspitni rad 1966, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 5.

standard and individual liberties.<sup>1126</sup> From what we saw in the previous chapters, the SSRNJ evaluation was completely correct.

*Pregled*, the U.S. major circulating periodical, reported the Secretariat of Information in 1969, “ha[d] perfect illustrations,” and “besides being a technically high-level magazine, it [was] interesting and meaningful. It included topics from various fields of science, culture, art, etc., and did so in order to arouse the interest of an intellectual audience.” *Pregled* topics, continued the report, were chosen from among those currently under discussion in the Yugoslav public opinion, such as the pension system, education, and the welfare state. They were “presented in such a manner, that readers could get the impression that these issues had long before been resolved in the United States, thanks to its ‘free society’ and the ‘American way of life.’” Not to mention that *Pregled* was printed on glossy and shiny paper by the “most modern American printing shop abroad; only the American Embassy in Beirut possessed a more modern one.”<sup>1127</sup> Indeed, the impact of appealing illustrations and glossy paper cannot be underestimated. As Slavenka Drakulić put it, “Once you’ve seen it, it immediately sets not only new standards, but a visible boundary.” On the example of *Vogue*, she emphasized,

For us, the pictures in a [U.S.] magazine were much more important: we studied their every detail with the interest of those who had no other source of information about the outside world. We tried to decode them, to read their message. And because we were inexperienced enough to read them literally, the message that we absorbed was that the other world was a paradise. Our reading was wrong and naïve, nevertheless, it stayed in the back of our minds as a powerful force, an inner motivation, a dormant desire for change, an opportunity to awaken.<sup>1128</sup>

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<sup>1126</sup> Whilst, on the other hand, French propaganda was, by methods and vocabulary, less intrusive and political; objective, flexible, and diverse was the British one, mainly propagating the British way of life, culture, art, science and the English language. As for the USSR, it transmitted Soviet foreign policy views, and its economic, scientific, and technological conceptions and achievements (Informacija o problemima vezanim za inostranu propagandnu u našoj zemlji, April 15, 1966, 16/2-1966, Box 256, Komisija za politički i idejno-vaspitni rad 1966, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 4).

<sup>1127</sup> Informacija o inostranoj pisanoj informativnoj-propagandnoj delatnosti prema Jugoslaviji, June 17, 1969, 01-624, Box 565, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ. In 1966, the Institute of Public Opinion Research of Belgrade engaged 16 social scientists and 102 trained interviewers, in order to analyze the impact of the publications of foreign embassies. The result was that they had little influence, except *Pregled* that was largely mentioned by the respondents (Memorandum of Conversation, 67049, Jan. 13, 1967, YO6601, Box 41, Africa, Eastern Europe and Multi-Areas, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP).

<sup>1128</sup> Slavenka Drakulić, *How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed* (New York; London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991), 27–28.

That images and messages were a powerful means of propaganda was clear as daylight to Yugoslav policymakers. Somehow, and not unexpectedly, discussions over foreign propaganda and counteracting plans, appeared on their agendas when bilateral relations with the United States were in recession (as between 1961 and 1964), or when an internal manifestation of dissidence, such as the student 1968 demonstrations in June, suggested possible western and anti-socialist influences. In fact, in mid-1968, the Presidency of the Party commissioned Mate Oreč and Vojislav Mićović, scholars from the Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, to carry out research on foreign propaganda, which resulted in a 70-page monograph published in 1970.<sup>1129</sup> Discussed before the Fifth plenary session of the Presidency of the SKJ, in September 1968, it condemned “hostile, illegal propaganda,” that attacked “our country, values and societal traditions.” It recognized the strategy of “psychological warfare” towards Yugoslavia, whose main protagonists and organizers were “the USIA, the CIA, and NATO’s Atlantic Institute, then various emigrational organizations of ‘ustasha’, ‘chetniks’, and ‘volksdeutchers.’”<sup>1130</sup> The discussions on U.S. and Soviet propaganda went on and, after the Fifth plenary session in 1969, it deliberated that such propaganda was an “imposition of ideological and political concepts and interests of either one or the other Bloc;” and that, by being “anti-communist and anti-socialist,” contrary to the principles of Yugoslav self-management, interfering with its internal affairs, and linked to foreign secret services, it necessitated of an organized opposition as “a sort of self-protection of our self-management socialist society.”<sup>1131</sup>

Several key points were, therefore, emphasized, namely that foreign propaganda: a) intensified in moments of international and internal conflicts, such as the Six-Days Israel-Arab war of 1967, the *Prague Spring* of 1968, and the student and Kosovar nationalist protests in 1968;<sup>1132</sup> b) was oriented towards “long term goals,” and all social

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<sup>1129</sup> Mate Oreč and Vojislav Mićović, *Kako deluje inostrana propaganda* (Beograd: Komunist, 1970).

<sup>1130</sup> Mate Oreč and Vojislav Mićović, Inostrana propaganda u Jugoslaviji – Materijal za razmatranje na petoj sjednici Komisije, Sept. 1968, 15-143/10-69, Box 2, XXVI-K.2/1-5, Komisija PSKJ za političku propagandu i informativnu delatnost 1965-1978, CK SKJ, RG 507, AJ: 31-32 (hereafter Oreč and Mićović, Inostrana propaganda u Jugoslaviji, Sept. 1968).

<sup>1131</sup> Inostrana propaganda prema Jugoslaviji, organiziranje našeg društva u vezi s tim i zadaci SKJ, Dec. 1969, Box 2, XXVI-K.2/1-57, Komisija PSKJ za političku propagandu i informativnu delatnost 1965-1978, CK SKJ, RG 507, AJ: 3 (hereafter Inostrana propaganda prema Jugoslaviji, Dec. 1969).

<sup>1132</sup> Kosovo nationalists demonstrated against the Yugoslav government on November 29, 1968.

groups, with predominant interest in the humanist intelligentsia, the youth and students; c) was successfully exploiting its connections with Yugoslav cultural, scientific and educational institutions, and mass communication channels, hence dangerously “yugoslavizing” its propaganda;<sup>1133</sup> d) exploited the Yugoslav social and political problems (unemployment, foreign debt and investments, etc.) to glorify the political assets of its country of origin;<sup>1134</sup> and e) gained “larger political influence” through broad, indirect and supposing “neutral” cultural contacts, than through its “secret agents.”<sup>1135</sup> Interestingly, the Oreč-Mićović study recommended three counteractions, of which only one gave considerations to the activities of foreign cultural centers. Firstly, to develop Yugoslav information and propaganda efforts worldwide; secondly, to extend the propaganda activity of the SKJ and other mass organizations towards Yugoslav people; and, only as a last measure, to limit the administrative and diplomatic actions of the foreign propaganda centers.<sup>1136</sup>

But were not these Party propositions conflicting with the Yugoslav open-border and non-aligned policy? “The openness of our community to the outside world and our willingness to enter into free trade with all countries and, above all, the free circulation of people, ideas and experience – is an expression of the strength of our free self-governing society,” stated the Ninth resolution of the 1969 SKJ Congress. Although, such openness held the risk “of various non-Socialist and ideologically reactionary attitudes, and covert or openly hostile activities.”<sup>1137</sup> Certainly, a discrepancy existed between the treatment of foreign propaganda arriving through the cultural exchanges and those of the cultural centers, as suggests a comparison between documents coming from different agencies. For instance, the Yugoslav Foreign Office positively declared, in 1967, that the U.S. universities highly appreciated the Yugoslav grantees, although “our people cannot avoid the exchange of political opinions so frequent in the American

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<sup>1133</sup> Inostrana propaganda prema Jugoslaviji, Dec. 1969, 4–5, 7.

<sup>1134</sup> The U.S. propaganda, correctly reported the Yugoslav policymakers, was critical towards socialism by suggesting that the “the lack of complete freedom and individual liberties as in the West, were the weak points of the Yugoslav social system.” (Inostrana propaganda prema Jugoslaviji, Dec. 1969, 8–10).

<sup>1135</sup> Stenografske beleške Pete sednice Komisije Predsedništva SKJ za političku propagandu i informativnu delatnost, Oct. 23, 1969, 15-143/10, Box 2, XXVI-K.2/1-5, Komisija PSKJ za političku propagandu i informativnu delatnost 1965-1978, CK SKJ, RG 507, AJ: 4/2 SJ.

<sup>1136</sup> Oreč and Mićović, Inostrana propaganda u Jugoslaviji, Sept. 1968, 42.

<sup>1137</sup> Mate Oreč and Vojislav Mićović, Inostrana propaganda u Jugoslaviji, Sept. 1968, 2–3.

university circles.”<sup>1138</sup> Dragutin Franković, director of the Yugoslav Institute for the Study of School and Educational Issues, affirmed, “The open-policy of Yugoslavia towards all the countries of the world was not only a far-reaching and wise gesture, but has already had long-term results in all areas of economic and social life. [...] Science, culture, and education, should not remain on the sidelines in this entirely progressive process.”<sup>1139</sup> Moreover, in 1970, the Federal Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries released an extensive report stating that cultural cooperation with the United States was on high-grounds, with more than 50 professors and students on a Fulbright, Rubin and Eisenhower foundations’ grant, and more than 400 Yugoslavs staying abroad under some exchange program. The fact that the “Americans acted coordinately to include their political and ideological goals [...] in order to influence the education of our future leaders and educational system as whole,” even though their system of cultural exchanges seemed decentralized and private, did not bother the SKKV officials too much.<sup>1140</sup>

The balancing of propaganda and openness was of foremost importance in the Yugoslav regime. Yugoslav exceptionalism and international prestige was built upon the porosity of its borders.<sup>1141</sup> That different representatives of the Yugoslav establishment (from the top Presidency of the SKJ, the massive SSRNJ, to the Federal and Republican Commissions of Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries), expressed diverse positions over foreign propaganda was, what Zimmerman called, “a more conciliatory and consensual strategy” evolving in Yugoslav regime-society relations. Resulting from a “genuine devolution of power and authority” of the central party

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<sup>1138</sup> Informacija o naučnoj i kulturno-prosvetnoj saradnje Jugoslavija-SAD, Dec. 14, 1967, 5, Box 61, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu (1960-1971), RG 319, AJ.

<sup>1139</sup> Elaborat o međunarodnim vezama nekih kulturnih i prosvetnih organizacija i institucija, May 1968, US 4 BJ, Box 34, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu (1960-1971), RG 319, AJ: 6.

<sup>1140</sup> Pripremanje razgovora o kulturnoj suradnji sa SAD, 1970, file SAD (unregulated files), Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS-a SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

<sup>1141</sup> By regional socialist standards,” argued Valerie Bunce, Yugoslavia was “unusually decentralized, unusually liberalized, and unusually situated with respect to East-West economic and political-military rivalries.” (*Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State* (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 53. For references on Yugoslav exceptionalism, look into Armina Galijaš, Rory Archer, and Florian Bieber, *Debating the End of Yugoslavia* (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2014); Hannes Grandits, *Yugoslavia’s Sunny Side: A History of Tourism in Socialism*, ed. Karin Taylor (Budapest ; New York: Central European University Press, 2010); and, particularly, the excellent volume of Vesna Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia: A Transnational History* (London; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) where she exposed as “hollowness” the exceptionalist approach to Yugoslav history.

leadership towards an authentically federal system, the SKJ invested “formal state institutions with functions associated with such institutions in the Western institutional system,”<sup>1142</sup> hence permitting parallel, even conflicting, stances over propaganda. However, such devolution of central Party power would not pass the test of dissidence, and repeatedly reacted when its legitimacy was somehow questioned.

### 7.1.2 The USIA Measures Impact...

“The soft power of a country rests heavily on three basic resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority).”<sup>1143</sup> More crucially, “power depends on context,” but, more than hard power, soft power depends “upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers.”<sup>1144</sup> Thus, to what extent was the USIA attractiveness recognized among Yugoslav “willing interpreters and receivers”?

As the USIA research correctly emphasized, Yugoslavia was a different case from other Eastern European Communist countries. Here communism was imposed by an internal and not an external force. This gave Tito a large political legitimation and provided his regime with a highly effective weapon in combating internal subversion and neutralizing overt opposition. The Marshall’s legitimacy depended on several factors: the regime’s identification with a successful war against the German and Italian occupation; Tito’s defiance of Soviet efforts to dominate Yugoslavia that made him a sort of national hero, “even in the eyes of anti-Communists;” the general feeling of Yugoslavia’s international prestige, though much greater than the actual power and resources of the country; the abandonment of collectivism; some sort of religious toleration; and the popularity of some Yugoslav economic features such as the workers’ councils, industrial decentralization, and the expansion of free educational facilities. Nevertheless, “it could hardly be said that the Yugoslav people are enthusiastic about their government,” commented the USIA. The motives for such an attitude were

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<sup>1142</sup> Zimmerman defined this devolution of Yugoslavia a departure from the Leninist state-society model (William Zimmerman, *Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia*, 2nd ed., Princeton Legacy Library (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 44.

<sup>1143</sup> Joseph S. Jr. Nye, *The Future of Power*, Reprint ed. (Public Affairs, 2011), 123.

<sup>1144</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, 34.

threefold: a traditional distrust against the government inherited from the Turkish domination, the Serbo-Croat national controversy always “in the air,” and “dire poverty and discontent,” especially of young people and the higher educated.<sup>1145</sup> That dissatisfaction was common among Yugoslav youth is suggested by a 1961 Zagreb poll of thousands of Yugoslav university students, which reported that a large percentage of students had serious doubts about the validity of Marxist ideology. While 44 percent considered the Yugoslav system the best contemporary form of democracy, one third replied that Yugoslavia, did not have a genuine democracy like the Western one.<sup>1146</sup>

A 1962 poll of 395 Yugoslav refugees, conducted by the Italian Institute for Public Opinion of Milan at the San Sabba reception camp near Trieste,<sup>1147</sup> and whose U.S. origin was purposely obscured, corroborated the widespread economic dissatisfaction in Yugoslavia, particularly among the working class. Spiraling prices, housing scarcity, and excessive taxes peaked among the refugees’ reasons for discontent. Besides economic grievance, they accused the regime of restricted personal freedom and privileged treatment for Party members.<sup>1148</sup> Interestingly, while citing the denial of fundamental personal freedom as one of the regime’s most harmful acts, few respondents were able to name specific losses. They described an atmosphere (“the individual has no freedom”) rather than catalogued the acts of repression.<sup>1149</sup> This

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<sup>1145</sup> Public Opinion in the Satellites and Yugoslavia, Feb. 10, 1961, RN-6-61, Box 4, Research Notes 1958-1962, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP. On the lack of an organized, anti-communist opposition in Yugoslavia, see Katarina Spehnyak and Tihomir Cipek, “Disidenti, opozicija i otpor - Hrvatska i Jugoslavija,” *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 39, no. 2 (2007): 255–97.

<sup>1146</sup> A Review of USIA Research, April 1963, R-34-63 (P), Box 13, Research Reports 1966-1990, USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, RG 306, NACP: 7–8.

<sup>1147</sup> The San Sabba facility welcomed the Italian exiles from Yugoslavia, but also refugees of Slovenian, Croat and Serbian nationality. The interviews in question were conducted in Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian.

<sup>1148</sup> Refugee Views on Life in Yugoslavia, April 30, 1963, R-27-63, Box 13, Research Reports 1966-1990, USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, RG 306, NACP (hereafter Refugee Views on Life in Yugoslavia, April 30, 1963). The survey report took into account some sampling anti-communist bias, but considered the Yugoslav escapees quite representative, since most left the country for economic rather than ideological or political reasons (1–2). Among the sample, the proportion of males, young persons, Croats and Slovenes was much higher than in the Yugoslav population as a whole, and consisted in urban manual workers, professionals, students and white-collar workers. They were more educated than the Yugoslav average (3).

<sup>1149</sup> The few who did express specific grievances focused on the workers’ impotence to appeal against arbitrary rules and decisions, curbs on communication with foreign countries, and the presence of political prisoners (Refugee Views on Life in Yugoslavia, April 30, 1963, 13).

parameter is noteworthy in order to understand the often invisible, unpredictable boundaries of coercion in Yugoslav society.

More importantly, they cited VOA as their main informational source on conditions in the United States and other Western countries. Certainly, as explained in the previous chapters, the Yugoslavs were better informed than other citizens under communist rule about the outside world, the Western broadcasts were not jammed, and the USIS reading rooms in Belgrade and Zagreb were almost unique in their extension. In the opinion of the USIA analysts, the fact that Yugoslavia had a “relatively heavy flux of Western tourists and the feedback from the increasing number of Yugoslav workers employed in West European countries,” made many Yugoslavs “acutely aware of their deprivations.”<sup>1150</sup> The majority of the poll respondents felt that Yugoslavia was undemocratic, and ranked the leading Western nations as democratic, first and foremost the United States and Italy.<sup>1151</sup> Among the respondents, their images depended on elements that they considered absent in Yugoslavia.<sup>1152</sup>

Aware of their crucial place in Yugoslav society and the Communist Party, the U.S. public diplomacy agents were mostly interested in gaining influence on the Yugoslav intelligentsia. The program purpose of the State Department’s LEP/IVP was to provide government leaders and head academics “with exposure to American life and institutions,” to “increase Yugoslav knowledge and appreciation of U.S. tradition and accomplishments,” and “to demonstrate that the U.S. policies coincide with the best interests of Yugoslavia.” As by-products, the exchange programs “would foster mutual understanding between key persons of both countries, [...] strengthen Yugoslav ties with the West and demonstrate U.S. continued interest in cooperating with Yugoslavia.” The exchanges of communication and mass media leaders would enable “Yugoslavs to observe the U.S. democratic system of dissemination news and information” and “bring mutual understanding through free and open communication.” The student exchanges would introduce “Yugoslav student leaders to the democratic process of student life,”

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<sup>1150</sup> Refugee Views on Life in Yugoslavia, April 30, 1963, 13–14. “Contact between the Yugoslav people and the much more prosperous countries of Western Europe is so frequent that it would be difficult for them not to be aware of the contrast. Inferences can be drawn with more confidence about the relative importance of different sources of discontent,” emphasized the report (20–21).

<sup>1151</sup> The mentioning of Italy was a courtesy reaction towards the asylum country, asserted the USIA analysis.

<sup>1152</sup> Refugee Views on Life in Yugoslavia, April 30, 1963, 16–18.

while Yugoslav educators would convey “not only a greater appreciation of American education, but also an insight into its broad philosophy and atmosphere.” As for the Cultural Presentation Program, its final aim was, given the “ready and enthusiastic audience in the Yugoslav community,” to enable “us [the Americans] to assure Yugoslavs of our continued interest in maintaining contact with its people through non-political activities.”<sup>1153</sup>

Scholars of public diplomacy and soft power agree that the more an exchange and cultural program functions as though its intent is nonpolitical the more it can achieve a political effect. When ideas travel through public diplomacy channels (i.e. the exchange programs), they can be directed to targets with specific political goals (i.e. the leaders). By bringing up Gramsci’s idea of the hegemony, or “intellectual-moral leadership,” as “the entire social stratum which exercises an organizational function in the [...] field of production, or in that of culture, or in that of political administration,” Scott-Smith claims that a hegemony group can project a set of norms and embrace the leaders of other nations.<sup>1154</sup> In line with his research outcomes, he underlines that the IVP, for example, worked very well in Europe and Latin America, while it was less effective in Asia where status, hierarchy, and tradition were resistant to outside intervention.<sup>1155</sup> Moreover, he argues that:

Individuals from sectors where results are judged in terms of policy decisions or political leadership are entirely dependent on the structure of political power and the freedom they have to apply their views within the political culture of their home country. [...] The judgment of success or failure with an exchange program therefore has to be clarified as to whether it leads to simply a more favorable image of the United States abroad or whether it leads to an expanding group of participants who see their interests (and their nation’s interests) as being in alignment with those of the United States (with identifiable policy outcomes being the result).<sup>1156</sup>

In observing the political framework of Yugoslav leaders, we should bear in mind this second assumption, and how it is applicable to these young, expanding groups of

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<sup>1153</sup> Program Plan for Yugoslavia, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL.

<sup>1154</sup> Giles Scott-Smith, “Mapping the Undefinable: Some Thoughts on the Relevance of Exchange Programs within the International Relations Theory,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (March 2008), 184.

<sup>1155</sup> Giles Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire: The US State Department’s Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France and Britain 1950-1970* (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang S.A, 2008).

<sup>1156</sup> Scott-Smith, “Mapping the Undefinable,” 189.

Yugoslav leaders whose pro-reform stances would enhance the Yugoslav institutional, political and human linkages with the United States or some of the U.S. values.

The Yugoslav intelligentsia consisted, according to a 1965 USIA study, of some 620,000 individuals, mostly high school and college graduates, like doctors, lawyers, engineers, school teachers, university professors, artists, writers, journalists, and students; but also managers, higher governmental bureaucrats, military and police officers; and leaders of political and social organizations. With more than two-thirds being under the age of 40, the intelligentsia was predominantly urban in character and middle-class in origin (only one-third of its membership was of working class or peasant origin).<sup>1157</sup> With higher incomes and fringe social benefits, the Yugoslav intellectuals and leaders were a highly privileged group, economically and socially. They were the backbone of the SKJ, the future leaders who would take over the “Communist Old Guard” leadership. Although the majority of them were hard-boiled, dogmatic and orthodox Marxists, a sizable number harbored un-Marxist and even anti-Marxist ideas, many of them with liberal and national tendencies, and pro-Western in outlook.<sup>1158</sup> “Some of them,” stated the study, were:

increasingly demanding a more liberal handling of domestic problems and an ending of Party control over the country’s economic, social and cultural life. Artists and writers are demanding more literary and artistic freedom of expression. There are also increasing tendencies toward self-identification with Western culture and toward what is called “chauvinistic local nationalism.”<sup>1159</sup>

Indeed, in October 1964, Party leader, Marijan Cvetković, said that many intellectuals, “start from the position of liberalistic pseudo-democracy and favor the idea of a multiparty system.”<sup>1160</sup> At the VIII Congress of the Party (Dec. 1964) Vice President Alexandar Ranković spoke harshly of “various demagogues who, with increasing insolence, raise their voices advocating various petty bourgeois liberal

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<sup>1157</sup> The USIA report emphasized other very interesting parameters on Yugoslav intelligentsia: men constituted the majority of it, but women were playing an increasingly important part in the professions previously dominated by men (especially among elementary and high school teachers, librarians and economics). Female representation was lowest, however, among university professors, artists, and journalists (The Yugoslav Intelligentsia: An Appraisal, June, 1965, R-67-65, Box 25, Research Reports 1966-1990, USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, RG 306, NACP: 7 (hereafter The Yugoslav Intelligentsia: An Appraisal, June, 1965)).

<sup>1158</sup> The Yugoslav Intelligentsia: An Appraisal, June, 1965.

<sup>1159</sup> The Yugoslav Intelligentsia: An Appraisal, June, 1965, 15.

<sup>1160</sup> “Vodeću ulogu SK ostvariti svakodnevnom aktivnošću,” *Vjesnik*, Oct. 14, 1964, 1, 3.

concepts of democracy.”<sup>1161</sup> Veljko Vlahović addressed the “anti-socialist [...] bacilli of Western political ideas.”<sup>1162</sup>

The infatuation of a sizable segment of Yugoslavia’s literary and artistic circles with Western culture was not only a source of considerable concern to the ruling elites but also effective proof that many intellectuals were Western-oriented. As far back as June 19, 1960, *Borba* complained that Yugoslav publishers had ceased to deal critically with Western literature and that they approach “everything European with almost religious awe.”<sup>1163</sup> In his 1962 New Year’s Eve message, Tito himself complained that much in present-day Yugoslav art and literature “is alien and incompatible with socialist ethics.” Many Yugoslav writers and artists, he stated, had succumbed to Western literary trends and supported abstract art.<sup>1164</sup> As we shall see in the next pages, intellectual circles differed in their reactions. Some of them meekly accepted the indictment and openly repented; others interpreted them as merely a passing phase in Yugoslav official cultural policy and decided to lie low for a while. A few, however, dared to defend their positions. The literary magazine *Telegram*, the one that in 1967 would publish the “Declaration on the Status and Name of the Croatian Standard Language,” compared the official Yugoslav criticism of abstract art to Nazi Germany’s campaigns against modern artists. “The same artists,” the magazine reported, “who had been castigated by Hitler for their alleged decadence are now eagerly sought by art lovers.”<sup>1165</sup>

For the USIA policymakers, however, the Yugoslav intelligentsia was seen as a fast growing group destined to become a leading, perhaps dominant, force in Yugoslav society. The fact that the Yugoslav intellectuals, unlike their counterparts in other Eastern European countries, had managed to preserve their predominantly urban, middle

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<sup>1161</sup> “Referat Sekretara CK SKJ druga Aleksandra Rankovića,” *Vjesnik*, Dec. 14, 1964, 2.

<sup>1162</sup> “Referat člana Izvršnog komiteta CK SKJ druga Veljka Vlahovića,” *Vjesnik*, Dec. 14, 1964, 8.

<sup>1163</sup> Dragan Nedjeljković, “Izdavači i kritika,” *Borba*, June 19, 1960, 10.

<sup>1164</sup> *Vjesnik*, January 1, 1963; The Yugoslav Intelligentsia: An Appraisal, June, 1965, 16. The anti-western campaign against distortions of socialist reality and “alien” influence in Yugoslav arts, press and literature gained momentum after Tito’s return from Moscow in December 1962. Speaking at a working factory on December 29, he declared, “various things have infiltrated from abroad and have thus troubled and obscured the purity of the spirit of socialism” (“Tito: Moramo ukloniti sve što smeta našem pravilnom razvoju,” *Vjesnik*, Dec. 30, 1962, 1–2; Chronology of Cultural Policy in Yugoslavia, enclosed in Alexandar G. Park, IRS/S, to Cody, IAE, March 27, 1963, M-32-63, Box 1, Research Memoranda 1963-1999, USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, RG 306, NACP).

<sup>1165</sup> “Degerirana umjetnost jača od nacizma,” *Telegram*, January 25, 1963, 12.

class, and privileged character, and a higher political influence than that of workers and peasants, fostered the U.S. aspiration that they could “prove to be a potent force for erosion of the Communist status quo in Yugoslavia and its eventual replacement by a new orthodoxy, one marked by pro-Western sentiments and the ‘bourgeois nationalist deviations.’”<sup>1166</sup> Whether or in which forms this prediction became a reality, we shall see in the final section of this chapter.

## 7.2 The ‘Yugoslav 1960s’ and the U.S. Public Diplomacy Networks

*Take two or three dry wafers of the five-year plan and be sure that all agriculture has been completely squeezed out of them; smear them with the stuffing of industry which is prepared in the following way: pass through a masher the unlimited amount of cheap workers and at least the same amount of slightly more expensive administrators; add one gram of expensive leadership to this; dilute to 50 percent liquid using economic criminality. Afterwards mix this with a reliable foreign currency expert of no morals; then roll it flat with the dependable director with no school education. Take care that the mass remains flexible and manageable, adding fresh slogans all the time. Shape the cake as self-management and put it into the oven. In order to prevent over-cooking – dampen it with the juice of American aid. Since the baked cake does not have a special appearance, you will have to glaze it with the economic reform. The icing is prepared from crushed standard of living, chopped culture and peeled education. If the icing cracks, touch it up with new measures or pretend you don’t notice it. Decorate the cake with flowers of economic experts and models of cars, villas and cabins. Serve and eat in the darkness. Remark: If you want it to taste better, drink the juice of the glorious past with it and in case of bad digestion take some pills of Marxism which will attack your heart. Vomiting is forbidden.*

“Economic Cake à la Yugoslavia,” *Paradoks*, satirical monthly youth magazine, banned in summer 1966, Zagreb<sup>1167</sup>

Historian Dušan Bilandžić described the years following the approval of the 1963 Constitution as the “offensive of reform forces.”<sup>1168</sup> Adopted on April 7 1963, the new Constitution renamed the state as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and defined the self-management governing structures. The Preamble mentioned the

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<sup>1166</sup> The Yugoslav Intelligentsia: An Appraisal, June, 1965, 18.

<sup>1167</sup> Quoted in Airgram 13 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, July 19, 1966, PPB 10-2 YUGO, Box 433, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>1168</sup> Dušan Bilandžić, *Hrvatska moderna povijest* (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 1999), 451; John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 276–298.

sovereign rights of the working people and the nationalities making up the Federation, exercised through both federal and republican institutions, and protected by a newly established Constitutional Court. This “complicated formula denied sovereignty to the republics as territorial entities, whilst opening the door to a degree of polycentrism in the governance of the federation, by allowing them to enter into agreements on specified social and economic questions without federal interference.” Slovenian Party leader Edvard Kardelj, the regime’s major ideologist and author of the Constitution, declared that the working class was to be incorporated into the state, “by bringing ‘working people’ into the assembly system, and introducing new rules on the rotation of offices.”<sup>1169</sup> Kardelj replaced Ranković at the Vice Presidency – the relations between the two leaders were already strained for years – hence increasing Ranković’s isolation among the establishment. Kardelj favored a decentralization stance, and an economic reform that would withdraw central planning in favor of a free-market competition, endorsed by Vladimir Bakarić, president of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, and the Zagreb’s “economic school.”<sup>1170</sup>

The international situation was delicate as well, with the USSR sliding towards the neo-Stalinism of the Brezhnev era, and Tito not wishing to offend Moscow, for reasons of both strategy and ideological conviction. While often reluctant on the reforms, Tito finally decided to take the gamble and the Eighth Congress of the SKJ, in December 1964, endorsed the principles of market socialism (though accompanied by contradictory statements about the role of the Party in controlling inequalities and heavy warnings against ideological and nationalist deviations). So, as Benson emphasized, while Tito held talks with the Soviet leadership in Moscow in June 1965, the Federal Assembly in Belgrade brought in the first of a series of economic reform measures, at the “the very moment at which the Kosygin plans for economic reform in the USSR

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<sup>1169</sup> L. Benson, *Yugoslavia: A Concise History*, 2nd ed. (Hound mills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 108. In line with the New Constitution, in the spring of 1963 the Republics, provinces and municipalities approved their constitutions and status and held elections for all levels of government, even though the executive committee of the CK SKJ ratified the name proposals on the electoral lists (Bilandžić, *Hrvatska moderna povijest*, 452).

<sup>1170</sup> Bilandžić, *Hrvatska moderna povijest*, 452–453.

were in the process of being shelved, and the Soviet leadership had to be reassured that Yugoslavia was not straying into the capitalist camp.”<sup>1171</sup>

The 1965 economic reform, that Rusinow defined by the oxymoron “laissez faire socialism,” and that was promulgated and signed on July 24 1965, increased the role of the market in the industrial sector, reduced the scope of secondary redistribution by the State, simplified and rationalized foreign trade, and increased its impact on the domestic market. A drastic revision was applied to the existing price ratios that were left free to increase in accordance with supply and demand. The tax reductions were to be made possible by the virtual elimination of the State’s role in investment, of subsidies and rebates for exports, of support of weak industries whose unrealistically low prices made them unprofitable, and by a reduction in indirect income, such as subsidized holidays, travel, and housing.<sup>1172</sup> To simplify and liberalize foreign trade, the dinar was devaluated, while the International Monetary Fund supported the changes with \$80 million in drawing rights, and in August 1966 Yugoslavia finally achieved full membership in the GATT.<sup>1173</sup>

The economic reform found its most firm opponents in the old guard pro-centralist communists, many of whom saw the decentralization as a sign of the country’s path to disintegration, a country they had fought for. The fall of Ranković at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee (July 1, 1966), the “Brioni Plenum,” and the following reorganization of the secret services, weakened the centralistic power, without diminishing it. In some cases, the centralization trend at the federal level transferred to the republics, sometimes even intensifying the intra-national grievances.<sup>1174</sup>

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<sup>1171</sup> L. Benson, *Yugoslavia: A Concise History*, 108–110; Dušan Bilandžić, *Hrvatska moderna povijest* (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 1999), 451–452.

<sup>1172</sup> The tax reform reduced the State’s share in the net income of the country’s enterprises from 49 to 29 per cent; turnover tax was reduced to a sales tax on final consumption; taxes on gross personal incomes and social insurance contributions were reduced, the former from 17.5 to 10.5 percent. (Dennison I. Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 176–177; John R. Lampe, Russell O. Prickett, and Ljubiša S. Adamović, *Yugoslav-American Economic Relations Since World War II* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 72–103.

<sup>1173</sup> Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, 178–179. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a multilateral agreement, established in 1947, that regulated international trade by a substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers. Today, GATT is an act under the World Trade Organization (WTO).

<sup>1174</sup> As Dejan Jović has argued, “the new Yugoslavia aimed at a radical decentralization of the state [that] was not only [...] a result of pressures by those who pointed to the continued existence of the ‘national question.’” It was “an inevitable task if socialism was to succeed in replacing the state with a ‘self-

The new Constitution lay the groundwork for the decentralization of the cultural institution as well, especially from 1965 onwards, in line with the new economic reform. In February 1966, the SKKV transmitted the responsibility for cultural exchanges to the Republican Secretariats for Education, Culture and Physical Culture.<sup>1175</sup> In May, the Commission discussed the gradual passage of financial duties to the republics, an act that would leave major room for maneuver to museums, galleries, municipalities, associations and artists, but engrave their financial sustainability. The function as an intra-national link and coordinator rested on the SKKV.<sup>1176</sup> Decentralization of cultural institutions gave wings to further Yugoslav experimentations in pop, op art, and abstract art, expressionism, situationalism, conceptualism, feminism, and modernism. The regime, while approving the vision of Tito as “pop art icon,”<sup>1177</sup> ambiguously related to the dominant role of modernism in Yugoslav art, often referred to, in the words of Croatian party leader Miko Tripalo, as “the remaining element of the old capitalist system,” an “outside influence,” and “decadent bourgeois culture.”<sup>1178</sup>

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governing society,” because “decentralization and de-etatization was a *conditio sine qua non* for democracy.” In the Yugoslav political narrative, “democracy did not mean ‘liberal democracy’ but direct, or semi-direct, economic and political democracy via a complex system of *delegates* and *delegations*. Its focus was not on political power but on the distribution of goods and services produced by the ‘working people.’” In fact, as Jović further explains, “From the discourse of liberal democracy, such an equation of decentralization with democratization does not make much sense [since] the *demos* cannot be created through decentralization, but only through centralization, via, for example, the construction of a nationwide ‘electorate.’” (Dejan Jović, “Communist Yugoslavia and Its ‘Others,’” in *Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe*, by John Lampe and Mark Mazower, Hors Collection (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2013), 277–302, <http://books.openedition.org/ceup/2438>).

<sup>1175</sup> Republičkom sekretarijatu za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu, March 16, 1966, 06-10, Box 226, Republički sekretarijat za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu, RG 1415, HDA.

<sup>1176</sup> Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, July 27, 1966, 06-23, Box 226, Republički sekretarijat za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu, RG 1415, HDA; O likovnoj saradnji sa inostranstvom, July 19, 1966, 652-6, Box 226, Republički sekretarijat za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu, RG 1415, HDA; Sredstva za strane nastavnike i lektore, Dec. 12, 1966, 01-638-1/1966, Box 226, Republički sekretarijat za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu, RG 1415, HDA.

<sup>1177</sup> Radina Vučetić, “Između avangarde i cenzure. Tito i umetnost šezdesetih,” in *Tito - viđenja i tumačenja* (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije - Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2011), 684–706. For a broad perspective on how artists in Europe and America shaped avant-garde visions of the Civil Rights movement, the Vietnam War, and the counterculture, see Thomas Crow, *The Rise of the Sixties: American and European Art in the Era of Dissent* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005).

<sup>1178</sup> Despatch 111 from the American Consulate Sarajevo to the Department of State, April 25, 1961, 868.46/4-2561, Box 2708, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP.

### 7.2.1 Mihajlo Mihajlov, *Perspektive*, *Praxis* and the U.S. Public Diplomacy Network

The economic reform, however, had some disappointing outcomes: the prices increased by 35 percent and the managerial establishment resisted in implementing the reform guidelines. Many enterprises could not properly handle the new maneuver spaces, and protest voices were aroused over unemployment rates and “growing inequalities” among the workers. For the first time, by the mid-1960s onwards, as suggests Hrvoje Klasić, the critics of Party politics, its bureaucratic elements, and self-management itself, came not only from the inside political elites, but also from the cultural intelligentsia (as the *Praxis* group was) and ordinary citizens.<sup>1179</sup> The Yugoslav liberalization processes in the 1960s included a balance between decentralization, harsh, from time to time, criticism of Western influences, the imprisonment of Mihajlo Mihajlov, the ban of *Perspektive* and the toleration of the *Praxis* philosophical movement (at least until 1973/1974).

Neither the U.S. State Department nor the USIA agents openly supported any Yugoslav dissidence movement (which would lead to a harsh foreign relations crisis), but they certainly highly approved their pro-reform stances and contemplated them as a proof of Yugoslav internal liberalization (and democratization from below). The “dissidence” protagonists were not primarily inspired by U.S. and Western liberal democratic ideologies and values, at least not directly. Nonetheless, they were strongly involved in the cultural exchange programs with the United States, were in good relations with the U.S. representatives in Yugoslavia, and their public polemic, based on Marxist assumptions, was in debate with Western philosophical, ideological values. Crucially, as Radina Vučetić suggests, these anti-SKJ movements gained huge press attention in the United States and were used as political pressure from Washington – as

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<sup>1179</sup> Hrvoje Klasić, *Jugoslavija i svijet 1968*. (Zagreb: Ljevak, 2012), 28–29. Increase of prices led to a series of strikes all over the country between 1966 and 1968. One of these was the teachers’ strike, started in Titovo Užice in late 1966, when the strikers demanded “more pay and more say in the administration of education” (Airgram 418 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Dec. 30, 1966, EDU 9 YUGO, Box 382, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP).

in the case of Mihajlo Mihajlov (and earlier that of Milovan Djilas in the 1950s) – to criticize the lack of individual freedom in Yugoslavia.<sup>1180</sup>

The “Mihajlov case” exploded in early 1965 and was a real case of purposely planned anti-SKJ dissidence. Mihajlo Mihajlov (1934-2010), born into a family of Russian emigrants, was a professor of Russian literature at the University of Zagreb campus in the Croatian coastal town of Zadar, in the early 1960s. In 1964 he went on a cultural exchange trip to the Soviet Union, where, thanks to the “thaw that accompanied Khrushchev’s destalinization campaigns, he collected an astonishing outpouring of literature, novels, stories, memoirs and songs about the camps by survivors and others.” In its first two issues of 1965, Belgrade’s literary magazine *Delo* published two of his articles entitled *The Moscow Summer 1964* (*Leto moskovsko 1964*), in which he reported on his journey and argued that the first concentration camps were not the Nazi’s but the Soviet’s in 1921.<sup>1181</sup> Its appearance angered Soviet diplomats in Belgrade. The issues containing the articles were withdrawn. Accused by Tito with Djilasism and “reactionary thought,” Mihajlov was expelled from Zadar University soon after.<sup>1182</sup> On March 26 1965, he was brought to court by the Zadar Public Persecutor.<sup>1183</sup> The March issue of *Delo* brought an apology for the Mihajlov articles (the Board disassociated itself from “politically untrue and ill-intentioned interpretations with which Mihajlov’s travelogue was partly burdened”).<sup>1184</sup> Mihajlov ended up in jail for a year. When released in summer 1966, he tried, together with a group of intellectuals from Zadar, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Belgrade and Novi Sad (among them Danijel Ivin, Francis Zenko, Marijan Batinić, Leonid Sheikh, Mary Čudina, Davor Aras, Jovan Barović, and Predrag Ristić), to start the first legal opposition journal in

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<sup>1180</sup> Radina Vučetić, “Amerikanizacija u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi ’60-ih” (PhD. dissertation, University of Belgrade, 2011), 109–118.

<sup>1181</sup> Mihajlo Mihajlov, “Now It Can Be Told -- By the Russians; Now It Can Be Told,” *The New York Times*, March 14, 1965.

<sup>1182</sup> Telegram 1593 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, March 8, 1965, PPV 12, Box 434, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>1183</sup> He was tried under Article 175 of the Criminal Code for “damaging the reputation of a foreign state,” and under Article 125 of the Press Law, which prohibited “written material in contravention of an already-announced ban” to be distributed, which is what Mihajlov did when he sent the copies of the articles to Giovanni Volpe, an Italian right-wing editor (Telegram 1608 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, March 29, 1965, PPV 12 – PPV 1-2, Box 434, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP).

<sup>1184</sup> Telegram 1593 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, March 8, 1965, PPV 12, Box 434, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP; Srđan Cvetković, *Portreti disidenata* (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2007), 239–312.

Yugoslavia, *The New Thought*, intended to deal with a critical reexamination of the lawful conduct of the ruling elites. He failed, and some participants were arrested, but only Mihajlov was brought to trial and sentenced to prison.<sup>1185</sup> As an Embassy report emphasized in August 1965, Mihajlov was Western-oriented, connected and invited to U.S. universities such as the Columbia and the University of California at Berkeley, and strongly in conflict with the SKJ and its elites.<sup>1186</sup> When he was finally released in 1975 and permitted to leave Yugoslavia, he resided in the United States and, until 1985, taught Russian literature and philosophy at Yale, Ohio State University and the University of Virginia, as well as in Western Europe. Moreover, he worked as an analyst at the Radio Free Europe before returning to Serbia in 2001, after the removal of President Slobodan Milošević.<sup>1187</sup>

The case of the *Perspektive* and *Praxis* journals were somehow different, since they involved a larger network of intellectuals, the first active in Slovenia, and the second in Croatia. *Perspektive* was a cultural review from Ljubljana, founded in 1960 by Taras Kermauner, a Slovenian literary historian, philosopher, essayist, playwright and translator, and published by the Slovenian National Publisher in 170 pages. When, in 1964, the magazine began to criticize the Party deviations and demanded more open discussions, Vida Tomšič, the President of the League of Communists of Slovenia and former President of the Slovenian Assembly, defined it as “a call for a return to a multi-party system” and an attack on “the principle of democratic centralism in the League of Communists.”<sup>1188</sup> The editorial board was dismissed, but the new one, selected in April 1964, unwilling to cease with criticisms of the regime, forced the journal to shut down in May. Soon, *Perspektive* became a cause célèbre because of a satirical poem which

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<sup>1185</sup> Mihajlov was imprisoned in 1967 to 1970, then for shorter periods in 1970, 1972-1973 and 1975-1978. In 1978, he was awarded the annual award from the International League for Human Rights. On these issues, see Richard Eder Special To The New York Times, “Mihajlov Is Given New 4 -Year Term By Belgrade Court; Belgrade Court Gives Mihajlov New Prison Term of 4 Years,” *The New York Times*, April 20, 1967; Mihajlo Mihajlov, “Punished for Publishing Abroad,” *The New York Times*, February 12, 1971; “Yugoslav Writer Given Jail Term; Mihajlov Gets 30 Days for Publishing in The Times,” *The New York Times*, February 10, 1972; Mihajlo Mihajlov, “Rights Come First,” *The New York Times*, April 8, 1978.

<sup>1186</sup> Airgram 177 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 24, 1965, POL 29 YUGO – EDU 9-3 YUGO, Box 382, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>1187</sup> “Mihajlo Mihajlov, 76; Writer and Dissident in Yugoslavia,” *The New York Times*, March 8, 2010.

<sup>1188</sup> Airgram 139 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, April 7, 1964, INFO 12 YUGO, Box 417, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP.

defined Yugoslav Communism as “socialism à la Louis XIV,” and its Party as “proprietors of soul torments.”<sup>1189</sup> Three weeks after *Perspektive* was suppressed, the new editor-in-chief Tomaž Salamun and regular contributor Jože Pučnik were arrested for “fomenting hostile propaganda.”<sup>1190</sup> On June 9, ten former editors and contributors of *Perspektive* (among them Petar Božič, Taras Kermauner, Vital Klabus, Lojze Kovačič, Primož Kozak, Mirjan Rozanc, Domenk Smole, Rudi Seligo, Dane Zajc), signed a declaration asking for reduction in coercion over culture, less bureaucratic monopoly, more democratization of the cultural field, and restoration of *Perspektive*. Another 87 Slovenian poets, writers, essayists, critics, and scientists joined the list. However, the action passed “in silence and contempt,” and the ban was not retreated.<sup>1191</sup> While the U.S. representatives at the U.S. Consulate Zagreb acted as mere representatives of the *Perspektive* events, they, nevertheless, observed them as a sign of change and a request for liberal critiques of Yugoslav society.

Among all the Yugoslav dissidence journals, *Praxis* holds a special place, both for its transnational character, its international impact and prestige, and its long term consequences in the Yugoslav intellectual circles and public narratives. Founded by a group of Zagreb’s philosophers (subsequently extended to Belgrade) in 1964, the main editors were Gajo Petrović and Rudi Supek, while members of the editorial board included Branko Bošnjak, Danko Grlić, Milan Kangrga, Ivan Kuvačić, Danilo Pejović, and Predrag Vranicki.<sup>1192</sup> *Praxis* had two editions, the Yugoslav (1964-1974) and the foreign one (*Praxis International*, 1965-1973). Both versions were suppressed in the

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<sup>1189</sup> Airgram 166 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, May 20, 1964, PPV 12 YUGO – PPV 1-2 YUGO, Box 444, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>1190</sup> The two were arrested on May 22, 1964 (*Ljubljanski Dnevnik*, June 2, 1964). Quite significantly, Pučnik was one of the most outspoken Slovenian critics of dictatorship and lack of civil liberties in Yugoslavia. Imprisoned for a total of seven years, and later forced into exile, he returned to Slovenia in the late 1980s, when he became the leader of the Democratic Opposition of Slovenia, a platform of parties that defeated the communists in the first free elections in 1990, introduced a democratic system and market economy to Slovenia.

<sup>1191</sup> Airgram 177 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, June 23, 1964, PPV 12 YUGO – PPV 1-2 YUGO, Box 444, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP; *Delo*, May 18, 1964, 3; *Delo*, May 20, 1964, 6.

<sup>1192</sup> The Editorial Adviser Board consisted of, among others, Kostas Axelos, Zygmunt Baumann, Ernst Bloch, Umberto Cerroni, Mladen Čaldarović, Vladimir Filipović, Erich Fromm, Lucien Goldman, André Gorz, Jürgen Habermas, Agnes Heller, Leszek Kolakowski, Veljko Korać, Karel Kosik, Henri Lefebvre, George Lukasz, Serge Mallet, Herbert Marcuse, Mihailo Marković, Zagorka Pešić-Golubović, Veljko Rus, Svetozar Stojanović, Abdulah Šarčević, Miladin Životić, and Ljubo Tadić.

wave of expulsions followed by the Croatian Spring (1971) and the Downfall of Serbian liberals (1972).

*Praxis* advocated a type of philosophy aimed at the affirmation of an “authentic” Marxist theory and praxis, and its humanistic and dialectical aspects, resolved to fight Stalinism and bureaucracy.<sup>1193</sup> In its first phase, the emphasis was on general philosophical matters; however, from the mid-1960s, social and political questions arose, together with ontological and anthropological inquiries.<sup>1194</sup> The *Praxis* philosophers remained sufficiently opened-minded to experience other ways of thinking, in particular Western ones. As Mihailo Marković asserted, *Praxis* was a “remarkable, courageous, creative magazine” that enriched the “philosophical anthropology with ideas about the essence of man and his activities, the nature of alienation and re-alienation, the universal human emancipation,” and contributed to debates on “political philosophy, the theory of revolution, democracy, nation and ethnic relations.”<sup>1195</sup> From the point of U.S. public diplomacy outcomes, the *Praxis* journal, but more than anything the Korčula Summer School, represent a case of relevant impact. Miladin Životić, Gajo Petrović, Mihailo Marković and Veljko Korać, were all Ford grantees in the 1960s and spent time at the U.S. universities. The vivid philosophical and political debates with the American, mainly leftist, university elite and students, certainly had an intellectual impact on these philosophers.

The Korčula Summer School, which prepared the launch of the journal, was first organized in 1963 (though not on the island of Korčula but in Dubrovnik). Soon it became a modern Agora between philosophers and intellectuals along the Cold War

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<sup>1193</sup> The group of Zagreb’s and Belgrade’s philosophers broke with the Stalinist tradition at the philosophical Bled Conference in 1960 (Mihailo Marković, “Neobjavljeni intervju: Praxis - Kritičko mišljenje i delanje,” *Filozofija i društvo*, no. 1 (2010): 3); Predrag Vranicki, *Historija Marksizma*, vol. 2, 2 vols. (Zagreb: Cekade, 1987), 368–410.

<sup>1194</sup> Gajo Petrović, “Čemu Praxis,” *Praxis*, no. 10–11 (1971); Borislav Mikulić and Mislav Žitko, eds., *Aspekti Praxisa. Refleksije uz 50. obljetnicu* (Zagreb: Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 2015). As Petrović wrote in 1967, “philosophy is still necessary as a living thought that penetrates the fundamental issues of the contemporary world; [that] becomes a human revolutionary work [...] The primary task of Yugoslav Marxists is, therefore, to make a serious study of Yugoslav Socialism as it is through this study that Yugoslav Marxists will contribute not only to Socialism at home, but also to international Socialism” (Gajo Petrović, “Na početku novog godišta,” *Praxis*, no. 1–2 (April 1967), 5.

<sup>1195</sup> Marković, “Neobjavljeni intervju,” 4; Mikulić and Žitko, *Aspekti Praxisa*, 32, 39.

divide.<sup>1196</sup> That for the State Department it could be a place of soft power interference, is proven by the fact that the participation of Marxist philosophers from the United States, such as Herbert Marcuse, Howard L. Parsons, and A. W. Levy, at the second Summer School of July 1964, was sponsored by a State/CU grant.<sup>1197</sup> Indeed, the Korčula School, financed by the Croatian Republican funds, gathered both the Yugoslav “liberal Marxists” and Western non-Marxist philosophers. Held in quite a rudimentary environment (for the 1965 session the Consulate reported the lack of water and electricity for a few days, a quite disorganized schedule, no newspaper coverage, and no Soviet and Czechoslovak presence), the School proved a fantastic network-building community. “The primary interest from the viewpoint of non-Marxists present at the Korčula Summer School,” emphasized the Consulate’s report, “was the desirability of such contacts between Marxist and non-Marxist philosophers,” as was the presence of father Giuseppe Wetter, a Jesuit from the Vatican. Allan Gouldner, a Ford research fellow from Washington University, St. Louis, came to Korčula to explore possibilities, which were immediately denied, for the Ford Foundation’s financial support.<sup>1198</sup>

Accused by the Croatian Party leaders and *Vjesnik* of establishing “a philosophical elite and to set themselves up as the arbiters of Yugoslav destiny,”<sup>1199</sup> the criticism of the *Praxis* writers exceeded, in the words of the Consulate’s reports, “the customary bounds of self-criticism in communist countries.” For the *Praxists* themselves, that was a “loyal opposition [...] within the Marxist-Leninist framework.”<sup>1200</sup> And even within this framework, *Praxis* entered into debate with Western, and U.S. values and ideologies, as never an intellectual group did before in Yugoslavia. Basically, *Praxis* authors engaged in the “necessity of scrupulous criticism of everything existing.”<sup>1201</sup>

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<sup>1196</sup> Milan Kangrga, *Šverceri vlastitog života: Refleksije o hrvatskoj političkoj kulturi i duhovnosti* (Beograd: Res publica, 2001), 215–234.

<sup>1197</sup> Airgram 144 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, March 4, 1965, PPV 12 YUGO – POL 12 YUGO, Box 444, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP. Thanks to his experience in Korčula, in 1966, Parsons published *Humanistic Philosophy in Contemporary Poland and Yugoslavia*, American Institute for Marxist Studies, No. 5 (AIMS, 1966).

<sup>1198</sup> Airgram 43 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, Aug. 31, 1965, PPB 7 YUGO, Box 433, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP: 1-7.

<sup>1199</sup> Airgram 262 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, June 7, 1966, PPB 7 YUGO – PPB 9 YUGO, Box 433, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>1200</sup> Airgram 43 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, July 25, 1965, PPB 9 YUGO – POL 15 YUGO, Box 433, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP: 4.

<sup>1201</sup> Milan Kangrga, “O metodi i domašaju jedne kritike,” *Praxis*, no. 2 (1964), 239–306.

They underlined that socialist societies gave too little attention to civil rights and failed to achieve the degree of democracy and freedom attained by more liberal bourgeois states. For them, the right to strike was to be regarded as a symbol of strength rather than as a symbol of weakness. While for the *Praxis* philosophers the future of socialist societies lay in the withering away of the party, and not the establishment of a multi-party system, they nevertheless considered worthy of discussion the advantages of the multi-party system and the choice between parties. In the second issue of 1964, they underlined that the democratic institutions in Yugoslavia could not ensure real democracy without people's participation and their exercise of dissent.<sup>1202</sup>

Besides their transatlantic connections with U.S. intellectuals such as Marcuse and Parsons, the *Praxis* philosophers entertained personal relationships with the U.S. representatives in Zagreb. From the Consulate's reports we get to know, for instance, that in May 1966, Gajo Petrović and Danilo Pejović announced to the officers that they would spend some weeks in Moscow with "more liberal Soviet philosophers who are not given as free a rein as their counterparts in Yugoslavia,"<sup>1203</sup> while on July 19, 1966, Mihailo Marković, dined with an Embassy officer (name not reported) where he discussed the future of *Praxis*.

Certainly, the *Praxis* group represented the most avant-garde and radical Marxist criticism against the Yugoslav Communist Party during the 1960s and 1970s. But in spite of its radicality, argues Rei Shigeno, the group never became a political opposition to the Party, because they hesitated in establishing their criticism on political grounds. While claiming the necessity of abolishing the Party, because it was a monopolizing decision-making power and the alienation of universal human being (which they called praxis), they did not predict any universality that could be incarnated in some particular political body.<sup>1204</sup> Or, as Renata Salecl put it:

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<sup>1202</sup> See Howard Parsons, "Sloboda i demokracija" (189–202), Slobodan Stojanović, "Sloboda i demokracija u socijalizmu," (203–213), Danilo Pejović, "Socijalizam i inteligencija," (214–227), in *Praxis*, no. 2 (1964). Nonetheless, *Praxis* philosophers were critical both towards the evils of capitalism, as consumer and mass culture materialism (Miladin Životić, "Socijalizam i masovna kultura," *Praxis* no. 2 (1964), 258–268.

<sup>1203</sup> Airgram 241 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, May 17, 1966, PPB 7 YUGO-USSR – PPB 9 YUGO, Box 433, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP.

<sup>1204</sup> For Shigeno, the *Praxis* political strategy was largely a consequence of their particular interpretation of Marx's philosophy (Rei Shigeno, "On the Conception of Politics of the Praxis Group--Exposing the Limits of Its Universalism," *European Studies* 1 (2001): 81–98.

According to the Praxis philosophers, the predominant 'etatistic bureaucratic' conditions in Yugoslav society prevented the emergence of the 'proper self-management socialism.' They called for a programme to abolish the gulf between the ideal and the real and to put into effect the concept of self-management. In other words, the opposition criticized the establishment, in the name of a purified version of the establishment's own ideology.<sup>1205</sup>

## 7.2.2 'Network is Power' or the Power of Networks

*Aleksandar Nenadović: Apart from these arms negotiations, what was your impression of the American civilization?*

*Koča Popović: It was sobering, I felt as it was a dynamic, modern society with powerful technology and a highly democratic culture.*

Koča Popović on his first visit of the United States in spring 1951<sup>1206</sup>

The Yugoslav attitudes towards foreign propaganda, U.S. public diplomacy actors, and the dissident voices within the regime's intelligentsia, show us to what extent Tito's regime was a delicate balancing act, and Titoism less a philosophy of politics than a response to changing circumstances and pressures as they arose. It was a "synthesis of communism and Yugoslav nationalism," a calculation between ideology, expediency, self-interest and maintaining peaceful relations within centralistic and federalization forces, and externally with the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>1207</sup> The generation revolt of the 1960s left its mark in Yugoslavia as elsewhere. The regime repressed the students' disorders in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana in 1968<sup>1208</sup> and violently quelled the social and political fermentation in Croatia which became known as the Croatian Spring (1970/1971).<sup>1209</sup>

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<sup>1205</sup> Renata Salecl, *The Spoils of Freedom: Psychoanalysis and Feminism After the Fall of Socialism* (London ; New York: Routledge, 1994), 60.

<sup>1206</sup> Aleksandar Nenadović and Koča Popović, *Razgovori s Kočom* (Globus, 1989), 117.

<sup>1207</sup> Vesna Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*, 227.

<sup>1208</sup> While transnational in its inspirations, Yugoslavia's student movements in 1968 were not uniform. The student movement in Zagreb was led by national, more than social demands. At the same time, Serbian leadership discretely criticized their students' leftist radicalism (Predrag J. Marković, "Studentski pokret u Jugoslaviji 60-tih godina 20. veka: između nacionalizma i internacionalizma, između reformizma i dogmatizma," in *Dijalog povjesničara/ istoričara 7*, ed. Hans-Georg Fleck and Igor Graovac (Zagreb, 2003), 393–412.

<sup>1209</sup> The background to the Croatian Spring was the 1967 Declaration on the Status and Name of the Croatian Standard Language that, signed by Croat communists, intellectuals, writers and politicians, called for the recognition of Croatian as a separate language. Both the Novi Sad agreement of 1954, which denied the existence of the language, and the publication in 1967 of the first volumes of a national dictionary that ignored the specificity of Croatian variants, roused the indignation on the political

In October 1972, a political leadership of Serbia, and some of its representatives in the Federation, entered into conflict with Josip Broz Tito and were removed from political life. Formally they resigned, practically they were dismissed. It was the downfall of the Serbian liberals. The informal leader of the group was Marko Nikezić, President of the Central Committee of Serbia, and among his supporters there were younger politicians such as Latinka Perović, Mirko Čanadanović, Orhan Nevzati; and also older and experienced communist leaders such as Koča Popović, Milentije Popović, Mijalko Todorović, Mirko Tepavac, Pal Šoti, and many more. Their formal newsletter was *Ekonomska politika* (Economic Policy), a weekly magazine founded in 1952, considered to be a forum on Western-type economic solutions. Some of their critics suggested that, under economic analysis, they were smuggling political liberalism. The fall of the liberals in Serbia marked the definitive end of the reformist, pro-capitalist alternatives in Yugoslavia. Soon, an entire generation of pro-western liberal politicians were replaced: Slovenian Stane Kavčič, Croatian Savka Dabčević and Miko Tripalo; Macedonian Slavko Miloslavevski and Krsto Crvenkovski.<sup>1210</sup> Many members of this non-homogenous group, had been somehow involved in the U.S. soft power network in Yugoslavia. Koča Popović, long serving Foreign Affairs secretary (1953-1965), was meritorious, from the strong Yugoslav-U.S. partnership in the Eisenhower era; Marko Nikezić, secretary of Foreign Affairs from 1965 to 1968, served in Washington as ambassador between 1958 and 1962 and played a crucial role during the Fulbright talks; Krste Crvenkovski, on a Leader's Exchange in 1959, proved an

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spectrum. The Croatian Spring, while recalling the 1967 Declaration, was a call for social and democratic reform. Its most prominent protagonists were Savka Dabčević-Kučar, Miko Tripalo, Pero Pirker, Ivan Šibl, Dragutin Haramija, intellectuals such as Vlado Gotovac, Marko Veselica, students Dražen Budiša and Ivan Zvonimir Čičak. The repression of December 1971 led to the purging of the Croatian communist leadership, expulsions from the party and arrests. The harassment of the movement continued through to the late 1970s and early 1980s. Some of the "springers" (proljećari), including the future President of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, were prominent in the democratic movement in the late 1980s and the 1990s (Vesna Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*, 230–233; Miko Tripalo, *Hrvatsko proljeće*, 2nd ed. (Zagreb: Globus, 1990); Savka Dabčević-Kučar, *'71. - hrvatski snovi i stvarnost*, vol. 1, 2 (Zagreb: Interpublic, 1997)).

<sup>1210</sup> Also dismissed were a number of editors-in-chief: Aleksandar Nenadović from *Politika*, Frane Barbieri from *NIN*, Mirko Stamenković from *Novosti*, Ljubomir Veljković from *Ekonomska politika*, Draljub Era Ilić, director of RTV Belgrade, Slobodan Glumac from *Borba* (Mijat Lakićević, *Ispred vremena* (Beograd: Fond za otvoreno društvo, Srbija, 2011).

excellent linkage for the U.S. establishment in the Fulbright talks as well.<sup>1211</sup> For Popović, the downfall of the liberals was a “showdown of the legitimate representatives of the democratic orientation in the League of Communists in Serbia and Yugoslavia.”<sup>1212</sup> Latinka Perović, Secretary of the Serbian League of Communists before her retreat in the 1972 liberal wave, asserts that Yugoslav communist elites struggled between two political paradigms. The first was the dominant centralistic one embodied in personalities like Dobrica Ćosić; the second, represented in leaders such as Marko Nikezić, Koča Popović, Milovan Djilas, was a progressive alternative of the “unwanted” elites, which endorsed the autonomously led market economy and political federalism and liberalization as its reform package. The latter elites ultimately failed in making these instances a dominant pattern, but their legacy remained as a foundation stone in the tradition of Serbian liberal democracy.<sup>1213</sup>

### 7.2.3 Instead of a Conclusion

Network is power, argues social scientist Marcel Castells, and indeed the U.S. public diplomacy networks proved to be a strong catalyzer for attracting the Yugoslav elites towards the United States, its messages and values.<sup>1214</sup> For Mihajlo Mihajlov (and Milovan Djilas before him), the U.S. press was a reference point, a sort of loudspeaker, an international launcher of his agenda. The *Praxis* movement, on the other hand, relied on U.S. university connections to internationalize their philosophical discussions and entered into debate with Western values implied in democratic traditions. The involvement of the Yugoslav leaders in the U.S. exchange program, while impossible to reduce to simplistic causes, proved to be an inspiration and powerful network of ideas. As many analyses from the Yugoslav side emphasized, the Yugoslav grantees in the

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<sup>1211</sup> Ranko Petković, *Subjektivna istorija jugoslovenske diplomatije: 1943-1991* (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 1995); Tvrтко Jakovina, *Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici (1948-1963)* (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 2003), 59–60.

<sup>1212</sup> Nenadović and Popović, *Razgovori s Kočom*, 190.

<sup>1213</sup> Latinka Perović, *Dominantna i neželjena elita. Beleške o intelektualnoj i političkoj eliti u Srbiji (XX-XXI)* (Beograd: Dan Graf, 2015); Latinka Perović, *Zatvaranje kruga: ishod političkog rascepa u SKJ 1971./1972.* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1991); *Snaga lične odgovornosti, Svedočanstva 32* (Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2008); Olivera Milosavljević, *Činjenice i tumačenja. Dva razgovora sa Latinkom Perović, Svedočanstva 37* (Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2010).

<sup>1214</sup> Manuel Castells, ed., *The Network Society: A Cross-Cultural Perspective*, 2nd ed. (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Pub, 2005).

United States were selected within the most liberal, pro-Western framework of the students. “The American reality is skillfully presented and impresses our people. They are often fascinated with what they see and underestimate our achievements.”<sup>1215</sup> Nevertheless, as Scott-Smith pointed out, the exchange programs, whatever their political intent, “can never be said to be a decisive factor in terms of political effect,” because “too many other variables are involved to make such a claim.”<sup>1216</sup>

The Yugoslav elites were very much involved in the U.S. public diplomacy networks through the channels we examined in the previous chapters: federal legislators, administrators, mass organization leaders (of the SKJ, SSRNJ, SSJ, etc.), economic administrators, mass communicators (directors, chief editors of newspapers, RTV, and publishing houses; leading journalists and commentators from the above institutions), and, finally, the Yugoslav intellectuals (university professors, editors of intellectual journals, leading literary writers, theatrical and film directors and writers artists).<sup>1217</sup> Certainly, it is not possible to claim that the U.S. soft power directly inspired the Yugoslav dissidence movements of the 1960s, such as the Mihajlov case, *Praxis* or the 1972 Downfall. It is, notwithstanding, evident that these foreign channels of U.S. “benevolent” propaganda projected values, messages, ideas and lessons, which acted as external sources of attraction.

Crucially, these channels of public and cultural diplomacy evinced, as did the dissidence movements in other contexts, the limits and the balancing of the Titoist regime between acts of coercion and benevolent tolerance. Finally, they pointed to unresolved dilemmas of the regime’s internal elaboration on how political reforms

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<sup>1215</sup> Oreč and Mićović, *Inostrana propaganda u Jugoslaviji*, 28; Zapisnik sa sednice Komisije za ideološka pitanja, Sept. 11, 1965, Box 209, Zapisnici i materijali ideološke komisije GK SKS Beograd 1965-1967, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB: 7.

<sup>1216</sup> Indeed, “Examining the political effect of exchanges falls into a gap between quantitative analysis (statistical assessments and hard data) and qualitative analysis (personal judgment)” (Scott-Smith, “Mapping the Undefinable,” 191).

<sup>1217</sup> Yugoslav Opinion Leader Study, 1968-1969, YO6801, Box 41, Africa, Eastern Europe and Multi-Areas, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP. In 1966, for example, a group of Yugoslav journalists vividly discussed at the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade the fact that the Yugoslav press was not free in the Western sense. They underlined how, even if they were “all young and communists,” their generation appeared critical of the “current condition of the Yugoslav press and impatient for change” (Airgram 935 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, May 31, 1966, PPB 9 YUGO, Box 433, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP).

would stick to the Yugoslav way to socialism and its proper “democratic,” self-management society. Or, as Hrvoje Klasić suggests,

The lack of understanding and willingness of the establishment to implement substantial and comprehensive changes were the biggest obstacle to the development of Yugoslavia. Without respecting and encouraging pluralism, with a growing gap between theory and practice, the reform, of which much was expected, only intensified the already present antagonisms. As a result, all attempts of political, social and economic decentralization, directed at the development and modernization of the country, deepened its disintegration.<sup>1218</sup>

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<sup>1218</sup> Klasić, *Jugoslavija i svijet 1968.*, 450.

## 8 CONCLUSIONS

*I never wanted an independent Bosnia. I wanted Yugoslavia. That is my country.*

Emir Kosturica, Serbian/Bosnian film director

*Political power may change hands overnight, economic and social life may soon follow, but people's personalities, shaped by the communist regime they lived under, are slower to change. Their characters have so deeply incorporated a particular set of values, a way of thinking and of perceiving the world, that exorcising this way of being takes an unforeseeable length of time. [...] Democracy is not like an unexpected gift that comes out without effort. It must be fought for. And that is what makes it so difficult.*

Slavenka Drakulić, Croatian feminist activist and writer<sup>1219</sup>

*I never quite understood why the Yugoslavs allowed us to do that.*

Walter Roberts<sup>1220</sup>

In the name of a country's right to pursue in its path to socialism, Tito harshly condemned the Soviet's invasion of Czechoslovakia of August 1968. As 20 years before, the Yugoslav "No" to the Soviets and the threat of the Brezhnev doctrine of restricted sovereignty, made the Yugoslav Foreign Office discuss once more a possible Soviet military invasion on Yugoslavia. Ambassador Elbrick in Belgrade assured the

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<sup>1219</sup> Slavenka Drakulić, *How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed* (New York; London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991), xvii.

<sup>1220</sup> Mark Taplin, "Global Publicks: Walter Roberts: U.S. Public Diplomacy in Yugoslavia -- 'We Had Quite a Program There,'" accessed February 22, 2016, <http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-roberts-us-public-diplomacy-in.html>.

U.S. backing in such a case.<sup>1221</sup> The Yugoslav advocacy of Prague's Spring helped to bring 'back on track' the Yugoslav-U.S. bilateral relations, which had been in a downturn after the Six-Day War of June 1967 fought between Israel and the neighboring states of Egypt (at the time the United Arab Republic), Jordan, and Syria.<sup>1222</sup> The U.S. 1968 endorsement of Tito's regime made "all doors open for those American enterprises" willing to establish their affiliates in Yugoslavia.<sup>1223</sup> In the spirit of this cooperation, in May 1969, the Yugoslav Secretariat for Foreign Trade sent its first economic delegation to the United States to meet the Federal Reserve and the EXIM bank,<sup>1224</sup> whilst a U.S. economic delegation visited Yugoslavia in November of the same year.<sup>1225</sup>

Not surprisingly, these excellent economic investment relations returned in high-level meetings on cultural cooperation between the two countries. In September 1969, Frank Shakespeare, the new USIA director established by the Nixon administration, visited Yugoslavia and reassured the Federal Assembly that the new administration would continue fighting Congress for the continuation of the cultural program with Yugoslavia.<sup>1226</sup> During his brief visit, Shakespeare intensely lobbied for the opening of the American Libraries in Ljubljana, Skopje and Sarajevo,<sup>1227</sup> an issue that, only seven years before, Bogdan Osolnik, Secretary of Information, discarded as "absolutely out of the question."<sup>1228</sup> The visits of John Richardson, the new Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural and Educational Affairs, and Guy Coriden, the director of the Office of

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<sup>1221</sup> Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslavensko-američki odnosi 1961.-1971.* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2012), 258–267.

<sup>1222</sup> Dragan Bogetić and Aleksandar Životić, *Jugoslavija i Arapsko-Izraelski Rat 1967.* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2010).

<sup>1223</sup> Bilješka o razgovoru Milan Kovačević – Steven E. Steiner, June 12, 1969, 04-332/1-1969, Box 43, Republički protokol, Izvrsno Vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA.

<sup>1224</sup> Izvještaj o poseti privredne delegacije SFRJ Kanadi i SAD-u, May 1969, 1964, Box 43, Republički protokol, Izvrsno Vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA.

<sup>1225</sup> Delegacija privrednika iz Sjedinjenih Američkih Država – posjet Zagrebu, Oct. 27, 1969, XXV-10/773-1969, Box 43, Sjeverna i Južna Amerika 1967-1969, Savjet IVS-a za odnose s inozemstvom, RG 1409, HDA.

<sup>1226</sup> Zabeleška o prijemu g. Frenka Šekspira, direktora USIA, kod druga Marka Bulca, člana SIV-a, Sept. 10, 1969, 432742, Box 61, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu (1960-1971), RG 319, AJ.

<sup>1227</sup> Frank Shakespeare to Edward J. Derwinski, House of Representatives, Jan. 9, 1970, Box 13, USIA Director's Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP.

<sup>1228</sup> Neka pitanja informativne-propagandne delatnosti SAD u FNRJ, Oct. 24, 1962, Box 240, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ: 36–37.

European Exchange Programs, to the Yugoslav DSIP in September 1969, strengthened *per se* the U.S. position in the negotiations.<sup>1229</sup>

Indeed, on June 5 1970, the Yugoslav and U.S. government signed the agreement for “the establishment of the United States Center in Ljubljana,”<sup>1230</sup> a final point of years-long negotiations. On May 11 1972, the two governments agreed on the opening of the American Center in Skopje,<sup>1231</sup> and, on July 18 1973, on the American Center in Sarajevo.<sup>1232</sup> From the U.S. perspective, it was a victory of two decades of public diplomacy in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav eagerness in entertaining durable and solid cultural relations with the United States, as suggests a 90-page “Report of the Yugoslav Delegation for the Talks on Cultural Cooperation with the United States” of November 1973,<sup>1233</sup> is indicative in many ways. It certainly stemmed from stable political relations of the early Nixon era and Yugoslav approval of the *détente* strategy.<sup>1234</sup> Yet, this outcome was, more than anything, a result of long-lasting, extensive and attractive public diplomacy efforts that Washington waged in Yugoslavia between 1950 and 1972.

The American endorsement of Tito’s regime, from 1950 on, involved a calculated risk both in political and economic terms. Its position was repeatedly subject to strong attack from both Congressional and public critics, particularly at times when the Yugoslav leadership took positions on vital international issues that appeared identical with or very close to those of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the U.S. administration, either Republican or Democratic, pursued in, what Foy D. Kohler as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs defined as, the long-term objectives of U.S. policy in Yugoslavia, namely

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<sup>1229</sup> Informacije i predlozi za posetu J. Richardsona, pomoćnika DS SAD za kulturu i prosvetu, Sept. 17, 1969, 432890, Box 61, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu (1960-1971), RG 319, AJ.

<sup>1230</sup> Sporazum između vlade SFRJ i vlade SAD o osnivanju američkog informativnog centra u Ljubljani, June 6, 1970, 133/2-01, Box 44, Savjet IVS za odnose s inozemstvom 1967-1973, RG 1409, HDA.

<sup>1231</sup> Sporazum između Vlade SFRJ i Vlade SAD o osnivanju informativnog centra SAD u Skopju, May 11, 1972, 09-424/1-1972, Box 45, Savjet IVS za odnose s inozemstvom 1967-1973, RG 1409, HDA.

<sup>1232</sup> Sporazum između Vlade SFRJ i SAD o osnivanju Informativnog centra SAD u Sarajevu, Sept. 13, 1973, 226/2-01, Box 46, Savjet IVS za odnose s inozemstvom 1967-1973, RG 1409, HDA.

<sup>1233</sup> Izvještaj jugoslavenske delegacije za vođenje razgovora o kulturnoj saradnji između SFR Jugoslavije i SAD, Nov. 1973, Folder SAD (unregulated), Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS-a SRH, RG 1410, HDA.

<sup>1234</sup> Osnovna pitanja i koncept razgovora o kulturnoj saradnji SRF Jugoslavije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, 1972, 9.624/72, Box 45, Savjet IVS za odnose s inozemstvom 1967-1973, RG 1409, HDA; Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi u vreme bipolarnog detanta 1972-1975* (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike - Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2015).

1. To assist Yugoslavia [...] build a firm secure base of national independence and to support the determination that Yugoslavia has shown to preserve and strengthen its independent status; 2. To exert an influence upon Yugoslavia's present and future leadership for the evolution of Yugoslav political, economic, and social institutions *along more democratically representative and humanistic lines with increasing ties to the West*; 3. To follow a course which would bring the U.S. maximum benefit from the significant role of Yugoslavia as an independent socialist state [...] which exerts a disturbing influence upon the political and ideological unity of the Soviet-dominated international Communist movement and tends to stimulate the Soviet-dominated Eastern European governments to seek greater freedom of action from Moscow in shaping their own institutions and policies.<sup>1235</sup>

We shall conclude where, in fact, we started, on soft power. In soft power interactions, Nye argues, we cannot “underestimate the importance of pull, rather than push.”<sup>1236</sup> Speaking in Lundestad's terms, Yugoslavia entered neither the “empire by invitation” nor the “empire by imposition.”<sup>1237</sup> The establishment of U.S. public diplomacy in Yugoslavia coincided with, and actually stemmed from, a profound transformation of the nature of the U.S. foreign relation strategy towards Yugoslavia. The USIA-USIS couple in Yugoslavia, with its wide network of appealing publications, such as the *Pregled* and the *Bilten*, and its crowded reading rooms, its cultural presentation programs of classic, jazz and rock artists, and its exhibitions on the *American way of life* at the Yugoslav International Fairs and USIS posts, proved to be a reference point for Yugoslav intellectuals, students, intelligentsia and the wider public. The *Voice of America* attracted the largest audience among all the foreign radio stations in Yugoslavia, and its Transistor Contests found keen listeners among workers, women, students, professionals, academics and even Communist Party members. Although these activities continued to act as disturbing factors for the Yugoslav ideologists, they were tolerated in the name of the Yugoslav openness to the world.

From the mid-1950s on, the U.S. public diplomacy soft power engaged in lobby operations and, by the mid-1960s, they achieved that more than fifty different U.S. cultural exchange programs were operating in Yugoslavia. Every year, hundreds of

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<sup>1235</sup> Letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Kennan), October 12, 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XVI, doc. 102, 213 (hereafter FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XVI, doc. 102, 213).

<sup>1236</sup> Joseph S. Jr. Nye, *The Future of Power*, Reprint ed. (Public Affairs, 2011), 121–122.

<sup>1237</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 284–86 and Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From Empire by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford University Press, 2005). Geir Lundestad, *The Rise and Decline of the American “Empire”: Power and Its Limits in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

Yugoslav leaders, academics and students visited the United States and stayed within its universities. The leaders, who went on an exchange program in the United States, returned with changed, more positive and enthusiastic, attitudes. While coming from diverse intellectual, national, and personal backgrounds, the Yugoslav communists who studied in the United States, such as Savka Dabčević-Kučar, Većeslav Holjevac, Latinka Perović, and Krsto Crvenkovski, or who had personally served there, such as Marko Nikezić, Koča Popović, and Cvijeto Job, endorsed pro-western, liberal market economy views and reforms. For the Yugoslav dissidents, as the *Praxis* philosophers, the United States embodied the liberal ‘Other’ with whom they eagerly communicated and trusted.

The U.S. cultural penetration contributed to shape the Yugoslav experiment. The mutual distrust between the two partners over the decades covered in this study, evinced from their ideological belonging to opposite factions that, ultimately, would be overcome by pragmatism, *realpolitik* and, to some extent, shared appreciation. Though for the founders of its way to socialism, Yugoslavia was a product of Marxist exceptionalism, for the U.S. policymakers, it was an experiment worth gambling with.

While domestically the USIA struggled in making its policy prerogatives a matter of executive strategy, in Yugoslavia the USIA’s public diplomacy efforts became a key feature for the attainment of Washington’s short, middle and long-term policy goals. In fact, the cultural exchange programs involving Yugoslav leaders proved capable of balancing bilateral relations between the two countries, and the exchanges became a framework of soft power practices in which both sides were involved. Senator Fulbright’s advocacy in Congress for the Yugoslav case and Yugoslav lobbying in the Fulbright Commission attest to how both actors, the Americans and Yugoslavs, were ready to gamble their own ideological stances for issues of *realpolitik* shrouded in “mutual understanding” and “active peaceful coexistence.”

Moreover, the Yugoslav’s balanced eagerness in accepting the U.S. public diplomacy agents and programs, as well as the unexpected retreat of concessions, allude to the Yugoslav search of its ‘Cold War’ identity as an opened, non-aligned, socialist country. The imposed, often arbitrary, limits to the public and cultural diplomacy display the regime’s invisible boundaries of coercion and the American keenness to surpass them. What is more, these margins of freedom partly illuminate the wide discrepancy between the perception and the reality of Tito’s dictatorship, that remains,

today, largely contested in the debates over Yugoslav memory, Tito-nostalgia and Yugo-nostalgia.<sup>1238</sup>

Finally, while the Library and Cultural Presentation Program provide easier measurable criteria for quantification and qualification of the American impact in Yugoslavia, the personal paths and experiences in the private lives of Yugoslav leaders are harder, but not impossible, to track and evaluate. While we have traced the impact, only further historical investigations can explore the breadth of the U.S.-Yugoslav personal leadership networks that, ultimately, led to power or took it away, as in the case of the Serbian Liberals' Downfall in 1972.

“Nothing in the Balkans,” wrote U.S. diplomat Walter Roberts, “is ever black or white – there are only shades of grey.”<sup>1239</sup> Studying these shades improves our understanding of the complex and tumultuous history of Yugoslavia, a history that evolved on the binaries of the Cold War, and eventually shaped its distinctiveness on the relations, cultural and political, with the United States and the Soviet Union. What is more, it is essential to understand that “Cold War” exceptions, as was the U.S. strategy towards Yugoslavia, were mostly viable through cultural interactions and interchanges. Finally, it proves it was a successful cultural strategy that was able to tie Yugoslavia, its leaders and institutions, “along more democratically representative and humanistic lines with increasing ties to the West,”<sup>1240</sup> and this might be the best lesson from the U.S. cultural engagement in Yugoslavia.

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<sup>1238</sup> See on these issues, Maria Todorova, Augusta Dimou, and Stefan Troebst, eds., *Remembering Communism: Private and Public Recollections of Lived Experiences in Southeast Europe* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2014); Maria Todorova and Zsuzsa Gille, *Post-Communist Nostalgia* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), and Breda Luthar and Maruša Pušnik, eds., *Remembering Utopia: The Culture of Everyday Life in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Washington, DC: New Academia Publishing, LLC, 2010).

<sup>1239</sup> Walter Roberts, *Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies 1941-1945*, (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 1987), Kindle edition, Foreword; see also, John B. Allcock, *Explaining Yugoslavia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

<sup>1240</sup> FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XVI, doc. 102, 213.

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  - Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom Izvršnog Vijeća Sabora SRH
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