Argumentation as a dimension of discourse: The case of news articles

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The aim of this paper is to explore the status of argumentative discourse. We argue that argumentation can contribute to instances of different discourse genres, regardless of whether it is functional to their purposes. By analyzing examples from the daily press in the light of an approach to discourse analysis inspired by pragmatics, we show that also texts that are not expected to be argumentative have underlying argumentative structures and that a text's being argumentative is a matter of degree: the understanding of underlying argumentative structures contributes to a varying extent to the understanding of what a text as a whole means and of its point in the speech situation. This role of argumentative structures in text understanding suggests considering argumentation as a cognitively-based dimension of discourse, connected to human rationality.

1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to explore the status of argumentative discourse. We shall argue that argumentation should be regarded not merely as a kind of discursive activity that characterizes one text type, but more generally as a cognitively-based dimension of discourse. We shall do so by exploring, with tools inspired by philosophical pragmatics (see Sbisà 2018), the ways and the extent to which the argumentative dimension of discourse interacts with the meaning of texts and with our understanding of them. Although our conclusion cannot claim full generality (since the explorations we shall expound in this paper are limited to sample cases drawn from the particular context of the daily press), we believe that our findings show to a significant extent how widespread argumentation is in discourse and lend support to our interpretation of why this is so.

At first sight, argumentation may appear to constitute a neatly delimited text type, to be instantiated by texts belonging to some discourse genres, but not others (see, e.g., Werlich 1983). So, one usually expects to find it in a scientific paper, in a court judgment or in an opinion article, but not in a recipe, a travel guide or a news article. While we quite agree that there is a privileged relationship between certain discourse genres and the argumentative text type, we do not think that the (more or less explicit) presence of argumentation, or even the dominance of the argumentative text type, can by themselves determine which genre a certain instance of discourse belongs to. As has recently been pointed out by scholars in the field of discourse analysis (see Amossy 2005: 90, Antemi & Santulli 2012: 97), argumentation does not appear solely in certain discourse genres, and it is a matter of degree how much of it there is in any given text, whatever discourse genre it may belong to.

It is in support of these claims that we shall present four sample analyses of texts from the daily press: an opinion article, where the argumentative text type is dominant (as is to be expected), and three news articles, in which argumentation is not expected to occur. In our analyses, we rely on Stephen Toulmin's model for the structure of arguments introduced for the first time in his book *The Uses of Argument* (1958), which has been highly influential in argumentation studies (for an overview of its applications, see van Eemeren et al. 2014: 233–243).[1] We search for instances of argumentative structures according to that model, in the framework of a view of text understanding inspired by philosophical pragmatics and using its conceptual tools, particularly presupposition and Gricean implicature.

1.1   From the argumentative text type to argumentative genres, and beyond

In text linguistics, argumentation is regarded as a text type along with others, such as description, exposition, narrative, and so on (see, e.g., de Beaugrande & Dressler 1981, Werlich 1983, Biber 1989, Hatim & Mason 1990). Although no concrete instance of a text perfectly fits one and only one text type, text types serve to identify the dominant structure of texts or their parts according to their cognitive functions or linguistic characteristics. So, according to Werlich (1983: 40), the cognitive function characteristic of argumentation is that of "judging in answer to a problem". In particular, argumentative texts present "[...] relations between concepts of phenomena, [...] in opposition to deviant or alternative propositions" (Werlich 1983: 40). Whether argumentation is conceived as aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004), or at contributing to the goal of different kinds of dialogue (such as

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[1] In the following, we shall be referring to the "updated edition" of Toulmin's *The Uses of Argument* published in 2003.

persuasion dialogue, inquiry dialogue, etc.; Walton 1998), or more simply at persuading the other(s) of the truth of a thesis (Johnson 2000), it has to be in explicit or implicit opposition to an alternative standpoint (which can also simply be presumed).

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 39) describe the prototypical format of an argumentative text from a speech-act theoretical perspective, as consisting of a certain number of "elementary" illocutionary acts (more specifically, assertive speech acts) that stand in a justifying (or refuting) relation to a previously expressed opinion (consisting of a statement acting as a claim or conclusion). According to them, these elementary illocutionary acts taken together determine the illocutionary force of the "illocutionary act complex" of arguing. The main difference between the illocutionary act complex of argumentation and the elementary illocutionary acts composing it is that the communicative function of the former does not operate at the sentence level, as does the communicative function of the latter, but at some higher textual level (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984: 34–35).

There is general agreement that argumentation as a text type is not constitutive of a discourse genre. Indeed, unlike text types, genres can be conceived of as socially recognized ways of using language for a certain purpose. The historical development of genres and their continuous transformation so as to adapt language to specific communicative purposes in specific situations have also been stressed (Miller 1984: 163–165). Thus, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984: 38) maintain that the "illocutionary act complex" of arguing does not constitute a specific genre, because, as a specific "language usage function", it is "primarily linked to specific intentions of language users and not to particular socio-cultural contexts", whereas genres refer to "the social organization of language use in certain language usage situations".

According to Werlich (1983: 106), argumentation can be found in two text forms or genres, *comment* and *scientific argumentation*, which differ as to the subjective or objective character of the dominant point of view. The *comment* genre has several variants, among them the *editorial*, the *leading article*, the *review*, and the *sermon*. Similarly, there are several variants of *scientific argumentation*, which belong mainly to academic writing. Because of their communicative purposes and social functions, these genres typically avail themselves of texts in which argumentative features are dominant. However, as argued more recently, argumentation can also be dominant in instances of other genres, such as the *judgment* (Bhatia 1987, 1993: 233–242, Santulli 2008), the *deliberation* (Bhatia 2004), and the *arbitration award* (Bhatia, Garzone & Degano [eds] 2012). One may refer to these genres as *argumentative genres*.

Although it is dominant in instances of argumentative genres, argumentation (like any other text type) cuts across genres (e.g., Werlich 1983: 39, Biber 1989: 129, Trosborg: 1997: 12). So, while in

certain cases it may extend to cover a text entirely, in other cases it characterizes only a part of a text, or an aspect of its function, while the text as a whole remains recognizable as belonging to a genre in which the dominant text type is not the argumentative one. For example, the main content of a letter might consist of an argument, or might amount either to the conclusion or to the premises of a not completely developed argument, but the letter is a letter nevertheless. And as such, a letter need not include arguments. An advertisement might amount to one or two premises plausibly leading to a conclusion, but it does not thereby cease to be an advertisement, whose aim to induce the audience to buy the advertised product is not necessarily achieved by means of an argument. In the same vein, Antelmi and Santulli (2012: 97) maintain that it is possible to avoid a neat distinction between *argumentative* and *non-argumentative* texts since "[…] there exist prototypical argumentative genres of discourse (deliberative, judicial etc) […], but there are also less evident forms of argumentation, which do not imply the adoption of explicit and/or stringent schemas".

We are inclined to think that in principle, any instance of any discourse genre may, to some extent at least, be argumentative, and favor the hypothesis that this is the case because, as Amossy (2005, 2009) has claimed, "argumentativity constitutes an inherent feature of discourse" (Amossy 2009: 254). In the next sections, we shall illustrate the tools we use to detect whether there is argumentation in a text.

1.2   A standard model of argument structures

As stated above (Section 1), in order to tell whether a text or some part of it possesses argumentative features, we rely upon Stephen Toulmin's model for the structure of arguments (Toulmin 2003: 87-100), assuming that to the extent to which argumentative structures in Toulmin's sense can be retrieved in a text, that text can be taken to comprise argumentation.

Toulmin advanced his model for the structure of arguments intending to provide an alternative to formal logic.[2] His purpose was to develop a model better suited than formal logic to deal with "real life" argumentation in ordinary language. At the core of this model lie the two concepts of "claim", (namely, the assumption whose merits are to be established) and "data", meaning the evidence, facts or information that are used to support the claim (Toulmin 2003: 90). The idea underlying this model is that whenever we make an assertion, thereby putting forward a claim, we may be challenged by our interlocutors, who may ask for the grounds on which the merits of the assertion depend. The first step in defence of our assertion is then to present our data, that is, the grounds we

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[2] While some argumentation theorists have claimed that Toulmin's model is too vague, ambiguous and sometimes even inconsistent (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Kruiger 1984), others, such as Freeman (2001, 2011) and Hitchcock (2017), have argued in favor of it.

have to support it. If the data presented are not enough to establish the merits of the claim, we may be required to articulate the data-claim relationship, which is normally left implicit. This relationship can be represented explicitly by the "warrant": warrants are "general, hypothetical statements, which can act as bridges, and authorize the sort of step to which our particular argument commits us" (Toulmin 2003: 91).[3] They can be expressed in the simple form "if *data*, then *claim*" or can be expanded as: "Data such as D entitle one to draw conclusions, or make claims, such as C" or as "[g]iven data D, one may take it that C" (Toulmin 2003: 91). The function of the warrant is to make explicit why the step from certain data to a certain claim is justified. However, warrants authorize this step to different degrees. As pointed out by Toulmin (2003: 92),

> [s]ome warrants authorise us to accept a claim unequivocally, given the appropriate data – these warrants entitle us in suitable cases to qualify our conclusion with the adverb 'necessarily'; others authorize us to make the step from data to conclusion either tentatively, or else subject to conditions, exceptions, or qualifications – in these cases other modal qualifiers, such as 'probably' and 'presumably', are in place.

This means that a claim can be weakened by means of a "qualifier", which indicates the strength of the data-claim relationship. Finally, there may be also "rebuttals" that put forward exceptions to the derivation of the claim from the data, suggesting "the circumstances in which the general authority of the warrant would have to be set aside" (Toulmin 2003: 94). Speaking of the general authority of the warrants, we should consider that while they are generally accepted as authoritative by our interlocutors, they are not necessarily self-validating. When the warrant's authority is not accepted straightaway, a backing is required, from which the warrant can obtain the authority. The backing consists of reasons for adopting the warrant: since backings are field-dependent, according to Toulmin (2003: 96) they amount to categorical statements based, for example, on statistics reports, taxonomic systems, or legal rules.

As we shall see in Section 2, reconstructing the argumentative structures underlying a text according to Toulmin's model is not at all easy, since it involves exploiting both explicit and implicit meaning, and sometimes also identifying what the author takes to be common ground. But that does not mean that this model cannot be applied to "real life" discourse. Pragmatic theories offer a wide range of concepts that can be turned into tools for discourse analysis, enabling the

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[3] Hitchcock (2017: 83–86) has pointed out that a warrant cannot be equated to an (implicit) premise: it can be better described as "an inference-licensing rule" since "[t]he claim is not presented as following from the warrant; rather it is presented as following from the grounds *in accordance with* the warrant" (Hitchcock 2017: 84).

analyst (among other things) to make implicit meaning explicit. In this way, the full reconstruction of the argumentative structures underlying a certain text can indeed be achieved.

1.3 Argumentation and reasoning

In this paper, we consider argumentation as a discursive activity (whether spoken or written). However, we are also inclined to admit that whenever it manifests itself, it amounts to an instance of reasoning. Indeed, much of our reasoning activity takes place in communicative contexts where we discuss what to believe and what to do.[4] It can then be reasoning aimed at attaining and consolidating knowledge, but also practical reasoning, aimed at justifying an ethical or political stance, making decisions, or assessing individual or collective actions or strategies. It can be sound reasoning – yielding a sound or (in the case of deduction) valid argument – or reasoning that is weak or flawed in some way.

In order to devise and expound an argument, we engage in a reasoning process: what we do is make connections between data and claims in such a way as to support a claim with certain data. In addition, we may have to provide reasons in support of the step from data to claim, that is, a warrant for the data-claim connection, and possibly also reasons for the warrant's acceptability. The basic dual structure, however, is made up of data plus claim, and corresponds to a minimum requirement for rationality, at least if one follows Grice's suggestion of conceiving of rationality as an agent's desire that her moves be supported by reasons, combined with a capacity to satisfy that desire at least to some extent (see Grice 1991: 82–83; it should be pointed out that "move" is used by Grice in this context in a very broad sense, applicable to both practical choices and cognitive acts such as adopting a belief).

While when dealing with rationality in ordinary contexts, it is often assumed that the point of being rational is finding the most convenient means to achieve some aim (be it practical or cognitive), the conception of rationality outlined by Grice (which we call "argumentative rationality" following Sbisà 2006, 2007a,) attains greater generality, since usefulness with respect to some end is just one of the ways in which we justify our acts and attitudes, not the only one. Argumentative rationality is taken by Grice to be grounded in a natural disposition that human beings possess to a varying degree, but which they value so much as to choose it as the essence of human personhood (see Grice 1991: 81–85). The former aspect of argumentative rationality (that is,

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[4] Mercier and Sperber (2011) have recently proposed the so-called "argumentative theory of reasoning", according to which reasoning has evolved not to help people get better at thinking on their own, but to provide arguments supporting their claims in order to convince their interlocutors, and to evaluate the arguments provided by their interlocutors, in communicative contexts.

its being a natural disposition of human beings) explains why in fact we so often make up data-claim connections of some sort; the latter facet, which is normative, accounts for why we should do this and do it well.

According to Grice's definition, we can thus call discourse *rational* when it displays some (warranted) data-claim relationship. The data-claim relationship, therefore, lies at the core not only of argumentation and therefore of the argumentative text type, but of the rationality of all our discursive productions. This way of contextualizing Toulmin's description of argumentative structures within Grice's philosophical conception of rationality promises to explain why argumentative structures can be found in so many speech activities and discourse genres, but, at the same time, no extrinsic framing of a discursive production can guarantee the presence and quality of argumentation.

2. The role of argumentative structures in text understanding

Our aim in this section is to explore when and how texts that can be considered as representative of everyday language use comprise argumentative structures, and what role these play in their overall significance. We maintain that articles from the daily press (both hard and online versions) are representative of everyday language use: in fact, the daily press addresses ordinary people, in principle anyone, and does so even when it happens to engage with topics belonging to some special domain, such as the law or the sciences. In the following parts of this section, then, we report on the analysis of some sample articles from the daily press.[5] It should be pointed out that in this paper, we are not searching for metrics that might put on record how widespread argumentation is in daily press articles or classifying daily press articles according to the role that argumentation plays in them. We are just focusing on whether or not there are argumentative structures underlying those texts and, if so, how these can be retrieved and understood and to what extent their understanding contributes to the overall understanding of the text.

We have chosen four articles: an opinion article, which can be expected to be argumentative,[6] and three news articles, in which the dominant text type should be expected to be the narrative one.[7]

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[5] The analysis of daily press articles is for us an ongoing task as a source of examples of various phenomena in language use, for both research and teaching aims. The example sources for this paper are listed in the *Appendix*.

[6] It falls quite clearly into the "comment" genre as defined by Werlich (1983: 107).

[7] Werlich (1983: 64) singles out a "news story" genre, which is a variant of the report text form, whose dominant text type is narrative. Even though none of our sample articles displays elaborated narrative features, they correspond to Werlich's description of the "news story" in that they present themselves as based on facts and enrich the facts with background information. Werlich distinguishes various types within the news story genre: "fact stories", which topicalize objects or phenomena in a situation, "action stories", which focus upon changes in time in a situation, "quote

2.1 A clear-cut case of argumentative text

Sometimes, the result of an exploration of a text's underlying argumentative structures is clear-cut: argumentation in support of a standpoint appears to constitute the main point of the text. Cases of this kind can easily be found in the daily press among opinion articles. This is not to say that all opinion articles are argumentative texts – they might limit themselves to expressing the author's opinion about some fact without providing reasons in support of it – but only that, given the standard aim of opinion articles, it is natural to find among them cases in which argumentation plays the central role.

As an example, we consider the opinion article "Una certa idea di povertà" ['A certain idea of poverty'] by the sociologist Chiara Saraceno, *la Repubblica*, 5 October 2018 (henceforth E1).[8] In this article, every word or phrase can be traced back to one part or other of an argumentative structure. The three main claims argued for are manifest enough and strategically placed in the text at salient stages, while the data in their support occupy most of the text.
We cite from the opening paragraph:

> (1) *Che siano 8 o 10 i miliardi che alla fine saranno destinati al reddito di cittadinanza, si tratta sempre di una cifra di gran lunga superiore a quanto nessun governo italiano abbia mai impegnato per il contrasto alla povertà. [...] sarebbe una buona notizia.*
> 'Whether it's 8 or 10 billion (euros) which will be allocated in the end to the citizens' income, we're still talking about a much bigger amount than any Italian government ever allocated for fighting poverty. […] it would be good news.'

(1) presents the reader with a claim that can be formulated as follows:

E1C1: It is a good thing that the Italian government is allocating to the citizens' income a much larger amount of money than any Italian government ever allocated for fighting poverty.

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stories", which topicalize speech events, and "interpretive news stories", which mix the three foci of emphasis of the fact story, the action story, and the quote story (Werlich 1983: 64–68). Article (2) might be considered as sharing some aspects of the "quote story", since it basically reports on the conclusions of some medical research, and of the "fact story", since the results of that medical research are dealt with as facts. Article (3) might be considered as an "interpretive news story", given the interplay of quotes and of reports of acts and events that it contains. Article (4) might be considered an "action story", since it highlights changes in time in the situation reported on.

[8] The parts of each identified argument are indicated as follows: number of the example (E*n*), letter for the argument component (C: claim; D: data; W: warrant; B: backing), number of the argument to which the component belongs within the example (in order of appearance from the beginning to the end of the example). Quotes from texts (accompanied by translations – as literal as possible) are numbered as usual on the basis of the order in which they appear in our paper.

E1C1 is supported by data: it is stated in the same paragraph that the amount of money expected to fund the citizens' income approximates what is needed to lift everybody living below the absolute poverty line to the absolute poverty line itself. The implicitly conveyed warrant is easily retrieved: whatever is done to combat poverty is a good thing. However, E1C1 is not a claim that the author actually endorses, as can be seen from her use in (1) of the conditional mood *sarebbe* [BE, third person present conditional mood; approximately: 'would be'] in place of the indicative mood *è* ['is']. Why the author refrains from endorsing a claim that she herself presents as supported by data, will be made clear below in the article: there are indeed data in the article which support the opposite claim of the author's E1C2, working at the same time as a rebuttal of E1C1. It would indeed be a good thing for the citizens' income to be introduced, were it not that the measure has a number of highly questionable and socially detrimental features.

The second and third claims, as we see below, are connected to one another:

E1C2: (a) It is not a good thing that the Italian government is introducing a citizens' income defined the way they are defining it; (b) in fact, the way in which they are defining it is a scandal.

E1C3: The citizens' income, defined in the way in which they are actually defining it, transforms poor people not into citizens, but into compulsive consumers under official supervision.

The content of E1C2 is implicit, in part at least. Nowhere is it said literally and explicitly in the article that the introduction of the regulations at issue 'is not a good thing', but since the assumption that E1C2 opposes E1C1 is useful to the text's cohesion, it is appropriate to elaborate on the text fragment that introduces E1C2 so as to grasp that claim in this form. The inference involved can be considered as a conversational implicature according to Relation.[9] Moreover, part (b) of E1C2 is not plainly asserted, but its assertion occurs against the background of a presupposition, which plays an important role in the organization of the text. At the beginning of the main body of the article (immediately after an introductory digression), we read:

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[9] Conversational implicatures are inferences prompted by the assumption that the speaker is being cooperative and, in standard cases, observing certain conversational maxims. The content inferred, which becomes part of what is communicated by the utterance, must be such as to make the speaker's contribution cooperative (see Grice 1975, Levinson 1983, Sbisà 2007b). In the case at issue, the maxim that is assumed to be observed is "Be relevant". According to Sbisà (2007b: 143–152), the maxim applies to the relation of text parts with respect to one another as well as to the relation of the text as a whole to the aims of the current linguistic exchange, and the relevance of text parts to one another includes textual cohesion.

(2)   *Lo scandalo, a mio parere, sta nel modo in cui Di Maio, Castelli e compagni stanno ridefinendo il cosiddetto reddito di cittadinanza.*
'The scandal, to my mind, lies in the way in which Di Maio, Castelli and company are redefining the so-called citizens' income.'

Here it is presupposed that there is a scandal about the income for citizens. This presupposition is not in itself informative, because approximately the same content (that is, that there is a scandal about the income for citizens) was already introduced as presupposed and therefore accommodated in the common ground by the previous use (some lines above) of the phrase

(3)   *Chi si scandalizza per l'entità dell'impegno di spesa […]*
'Those who find it a scandal that such a large amount of money is allocated […]'

(3) presupposes that someone is indeed scandalized by the large amount of money allocated to the aim of the citizens' income, and, therefore, that there is a scandal about the latter. These presuppositions are new to the readers at that point of the paper, and have to be accommodated in the common ground, which allows further on in the text for the use in (2) of the definite article *lo* ('the') and the associated anaphoric reference from (2) to the presupposition that there is a scandal about the income for citizens.[10]

Another informative presupposition is activated by (2), that is, that the members of the government are redefining the citizens' income (*nel modo in cui […] stanno ridefinendo […]* 'the way in which […] are redefining […]'). The fact that this content is introduced by presupposition frees the author from the burden of proving that they are actually doing so. The precise way in which the citizens' income is being redefined is, at any rate, clarified below by the data provided in support of claim E1C3, itself explicitly stated in the last sentence of the article:

(4)   *Così si trasformano i poveri non in cittadini, ma in consumatori forzati sotto tutela.*
'That way, the poor are transformed not into citizens, but into compulsive consumers under official supervision.'

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[10] As an anonymous referee has remarked, there is a further complication about the presupposition that there is a scandal about the citizens' income. The scandal that is introduced by the informative presupposition of (3) focuses on the amount of money allocated. The scandal that the article's author refers to in (2) has a quite different content. Certainly, the author plays with this ambiguity quite rhetorically. Nevertheless, considered literally, the underdetermined information that there is at least one scandal about the citizens' income is already present in the context in which the reader processes (2), as is confirmed by the naturalness of the use of the definite article.

Data in support of E1C3 (let us dub them E1D3) consist of a detailed description of the proposed regulations concerning the citizens' income, highlighting a number of aspects such as limitations in the use of the income assigned. E1C3 functions in its own turn as the data supporting E1C2, that is, as E1D2. The warrant on the basis of which E1C3 is supported by E1D3 is retrievable as the set of assumptions that make the descriptive statements composing E1D3 relevant to E1C3, while the warrant relative to the connection of E1D2 to E1C2 can be represented as the conditional statement

E1W2: If the citizens' income is redefined so as to transform poor people not into citizens, but into compulsive consumers under official supervision, its introduction is a scandal.

which, as often happens with warrants, is not present in the text's surface or retrievable from features of the text, apart from its role in providing E1D2 with relevance requirements. E1W2 finds some backing in the way in which the consequences of the regulations proposed for the citizens' income are described in the text fragment that functions also as data in support of E1C3 (for the relations between these argumentative structure components, see Figure 1).


Figure 1. The argumentative structure underlying the opinion article "Una certa idea di povertà" ['A certain idea of poverty'] (the argument components whose content is implicit at least in part are in grey boxes).

This article is certainly not understood if it is not understood that it argues for claim E1C2 by establishing claim E1C3. Also, the author's initial refusal to endorse E1C1 and some minor arguments against certain criticisms levelled at the citizens' income (which we have not examined here) contribute to clarifying the author's standpoint and reasons, so that understanding them is part of fully understanding the article.

    It should be noted that the reconstruction of argumentative structures according to Toulmin's model requires (as text understanding does anyway) the grasping of implicitly conveyed contents. Warrants are typically not explicitly asserted, but retrievable (mainly by particularized

conversational implicature) insofar as the reader is actually interested in finding out underlying argumentative structures. Backing for the warrants may be asserted or hinted at in the text, but often lies merely in the speech event's common ground.

As to the use to which this text can be put by its readers, it is clear that the more of its argumentative structures are understood, the more the text will contribute to enabling readers to (rationally) make up their own minds about the issue it deals with. By this, we do not mean that the readers will be more influenced by the author's standpoint, but that their awareness of the project's having pros and cons will increase.

2.2   Argumentation in news articles

Let us now turn to cases in which one would not expect argumentative structures to be present, such as news articles. News articles have the main function of reporting on states of affairs, events and actions. Reporting has nothing to do with arguing, so there is no reason to expect news articles to possess underlying argumentative structures. But the analysis of actual samples reveals that this may in fact be the case.

In our explorations of the Italian daily press, we have noticed at least three cases in which argumentation contributes to the overall significance of a news article:

1. When the content of the news comprises an argument or makes reference to an argument.

2. When the content of the news consists of or comprises reported speech and the speech reported makes and supports claims.

3. When the content of the news concerns actions or courses of action, which are undertaken by an agent on the basis of reasons.

In the following sections, we discuss a sample case for each of these categories.

2.2.1 News comprising arguments

The content of a news article may comprise an argument when the news consists of data that support a claim of interest (and possibly, of practical interest) to the reader. Examples can easily be found among articles reporting alleged discoveries about health matters.[11] These articles often convey an argument (which may be more or less complete and explicit) leading from medical research results to their practical implications. Moreover, in reporting research results they have to explain the research design, at least to the extent to which this is indispensable for readers to grasp

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[11] News from the world of economy or finance may display analogous features.

their significance. So argumentative structures turn out to be part of what the text conveys, and have to be understood to understand it properly.

Our sample text for this category is an article reporting on some statistical study on cancer and its correlation with possible causes: "Tumori, la ricerca shock: ne causa più la sfortuna che lo stile di vita" ['Tumors, the shocking study: more of them are caused by bad luck than by lifestyle'], from the online version of *la Repubblica*, 2 January 2015 (henceforth E2). As in E1, here too, several argumentative structures can be distinguished, but their components are somewhat less clearly expressed and less neatly organized. We shall focus on two main arguments, supporting claims that are connected to the content of the reported research. The claim supported by the former argument, E2C1, is explicitly expressed in the sentence

(5) *In molti casi ammalarsi di cancro è solo un fatto di sfortuna e non di stile di vita.*
'In many cases, falling ill with cancer is merely a matter of bad luck and not of lifestyle.'

It is presented as the conclusion of the research reported, and the data supporting it consist of the report on the research itself, comprising among other information:

E2D1: Two thirds of tumors are due to mutations depending on mere chance; one third is due to environmental factors or inherited predispositions.

The claim relative to the latter argument is implicit: it is suggested and supported by various statements in the article as well as by E2C1 itself.

E2C2: There is no point in changing one's lifestyle in order to avoid cancer.

E2C2 provides readers with a message in which they are most likely to have practical interest. Its status among the contents that the text conveys can perhaps be best defined as a conversational implicature according to Relation. In fact, inferring its content involves assuming that certain previously stated text contents such as that two thirds of tumors arise in the absence of risky behavior are of (practical) interest for the reader (which means that those contents satisfy the maxim "Be relevant" relative to the aims of the current linguistic exchange between author and readers),

and relying upon common ground material such as the assumption that it is everyone's desire not to fall ill with cancer.[12]

So far, it is clear enough that understanding E2 and making some use of it mobilizes readers' argumentative abilities, not only to retrieve implicit meaning, but also to reconstruct the argumentative structures supporting E2C1 and E2C2. But if, in the case of E2C1, one proceeds in argumentative structure reconstruction beyond the data to the warrant and its backing, one finds out that the implicit warrant

E2W1: If two thirds of tumors are due to mere chance, in many cases tumors are merely a matter of bad luck and not of lifestyle.

can only be taken as well backed if one assumes

E2B1: Two thirds of tumors amount to a number of cases of tumor higher than the remaining third and, at any rate, to a high number of cases.

the truth of which is highly doubtful. Indeed, in E2, we repeatedly find expressions such as *Due terzi dei tumori* ('two thirds of tumors'), *66% dei tumori* ('66% of tumors')], *31 differenti tumori* ('31 different tumors')], in which *tumori* ('tumors')] is used ambiguously, since it might refer either to cases of tumor or to kinds of tumor. While the research being reported is clearly an investigation of different kinds of tumor, E2B1 displays a conflation of the two readings and the fact that it expresses the backing of E2W1, on which E2C1 indirectly relies, shows that argumentative support to E2C1 is not sound. Indeed, many kinds of rare tumor may cause less cases of tumor than a few largely widespread types! But if claim E2C1 is not well supported, the same must hold for E2C2 (which relies upon E2C1 as its data). Again, the readers' argumentative abilities must be mobilized if they are to avoid being deceived into drawing unsupported conclusions.

Is the article deceptive, then? Not really. If we proceed in our consideration of the details of its underlying argumentative structures, we see that it contains what, following Toulmin, we could call a *qualifier*, expressing a limitation of both E2C1 and E2C2. *In molti casi* ('in many cases')] appears both in E2C1 (see (5) above) and in one of the statements that help to make the reader grasp E2C2:

(6)   *[…] in molti casi non è possibile prevenire i tumori.*

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[12] We would like to point out that while in the conversational implicature discussed in Section 2.1 (see footnote 9) the maxim of Relation "Be relevant" is applied to the relationship between parts of the text, in the current case it is applied to the relationship between the informative contribution of the author and what readers are interested in.

'[…] in many cases preventing tumors is not possible.'

so that both claims are presented as not completely general.[13] Moreover, there are at least two passages expressing rebuttals of claim E2C1. Let us quote one (aptly collocated at the end of the article):

(7) *Lo studio, che lascia fuori dall'analisi un terzo delle neoplasie conosciute per le quali le cause sono particolari predisposizioni genetiche e ambientali molto pericolose, è comunque un lavoro di tipo statistico e quindi andrà verificato con altre ricerche.*
'The study, which omits from the analysis one third of known tumors which are caused by specific genetic predisposition and environmental factors, is in any case a statistical study, and therefore needs to be confirmed by further research.'

(7) does not merely warn the reader that the research results presented are in need of further verification, but introduces (as not-at-issue content, in the relative clause) an important fact about the study itself, namely, that the sample of the kinds of cancer examined excludes the kinds of cancer already known not to be a matter of chance. The data (see E2D1 above) should then read as

E2D1*: Two thirds of those kinds of tumor that are not known not to be a matter of chance are due to mutations depending on mere chance […].

which gives to E2C1 and therefore E2C2 much weaker support (if any). So, only a careful, complete exploration of the argumentative structures underlying the article enables readers to understand which claims are actually supported by the information the article provides and which are not, with apparent repercussions for the practical uses that readers might want to make of them.

2.2.2 Speech events as news

News articles include reported speech when they report people's comments about the event which is the main topic of the article. But sometimes the event reported may itself be a speech event, consisting of some socially salient person saying certain things and performing, in so doing, a certain illocutionary act. Since reported speech typically expresses the standpoint of an agent, reasons for that standpoint are usually provided, either in the reported speech itself or in the article's comments on it. When there is more than one speech reported, expressing different standpoints,

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[13] "In many cases, *p*" implicates "Not in all cases, *p*". This is a generalized conversational implicature according to quantity, also known as scalar implicature (see Levinson 1983: 132–147).

confronting them makes the need for reasons in favor or against each standpoint even more pressing. Even if the news article remains a report as opposed to an argumentative text like E1, the understanding of argumentative structures helps the reader get a good grasp of the facts reported and their implications. As an example, we examine an article reporting the request made to scientific journals by the *US National Institute for Health* not to publish in detail the results of a scientific study they themselves had funded: "Creato il super-virus killer gli Usa censurano la ricerca" ['Having created the killer super-virus, the US censors research'], *la Repubblica*, 22 December 2011, henceforth E3.

In this article, the standpoints of different agents about different aspects of the request under discussion are expressed by various forms of reported speech: direct speech (*oratio recta*), indirect speech (*oratio obliqua*), and illocutionary reports (that is, reported speech introduced by an illocutionary verb). Each reported speech comprises a claim whose reasons are specified either in the same reported speech or at some traceable distance in the main body of the article. Some of the agents whose speech is reported are in favor of the decision to exclude from publication the details of the research that has created the super-virus, while another agent and the article's author (on behalf of part of the scientific community which, it is said, *si spacca* ('is divided')) are against that decision. Understanding the issue clearly requires that readers identify the following two claims

E3C1: It is fair to avoid publishing the details of the research that has produced the super-virus.

E3C2: It is not fair to exclude from publication the details of the research that has produced the super-virus.

as the two main claims that are confronted throughout the article.
E3C1 reflects the standpoint of the US government, to be inferred from their reported illocutionary act of imposing secrecy:

(8)   *E il governo degli Stati Uniti per la prima volta impone agli scienziati di nascondere i particolari della scoperta: […]*
         'And for the first time, the United States government is imposing secrecy on scientists about the details of the discovery […]'

The fact that E3C1 is controversial is explicitly stated:

(9)   *La decisione provoca un putiferio internazionale.*

'The decision has caused an international furore.'

The opposite claim, which we have formulated as E3C2, is not spelled out anywhere in the article, but is hinted at through implicature or presupposition, for example in

> (10) *Non la chiamerei censura*.
> 'I wouldn't call it censorship.'

which implicates that someone is calling the request under discussion *censorship*, but that the reported speaker disagrees with that charge (thus endorsing E3C2), and in

> (11) *[…] di ben altro dovremmo preoccuparci che di fermare gli scienziati*
> '[…] there's a lot of other things we should be worried about before we bother to stop the scientists.'

which presupposes that some people are bothering to stop the scientists and affirms that one should be worrying about other things.

Understanding the issue also requires of readers that they organize the information provided by the text around E3C1 and E3C2, forming two groups of opposite argumentative structures. Simplifying a bit, and connecting pertinent material from different sources at each step, for E3C1 we have:

E3D1: The super-virus is extremely dangerous. The details of its discovery, if published, can be used by terrorists.

E3W1: If publishing the details of the discovery of something extremely dangerous would enable terrorists to use it, it is responsible on the part of the scientific community to avoid publishing them.

E3B1: (a) There must be a way to make information circulate within the scientific community without informing everyone. (b) Principle E3W1 has already been applied since the 1930s for physics studies on atomic energy.

For E3C2, we have:

E3D2: (a) Keeping the details of a scientific research from being published amounts to stopping scientists. (b) Terrorists are unlikely to make use of the super-virus, because, once launched, it cannot be controlled.

E3W2: If keeping the details of a scientific research from being published amounts to stopping scientists and, moreover, the worries about the possible use of the super-virus by terrorists are unjustified, it is not fair to do so.

E3B1: (a) Stopping scientists is always wrong. (b) People do not use a weapon if they cannot control the damage it causes.

On the one hand, not all the informative material composing the argumentative structures outlined above is explicitly expressed in the text; part of it appears as presupposed content, and part consists of implicatures. On the other hand, not all the information provided in the article has a precise role in one or other of its underlying argumentative structures. For example, the information that the US government has imposed on Science and Nature the exclusion from publication of the details of the research (we mean here the information about the imposition itself) might play the role of data in favor of one or other of E3C1 and E3C2, depending on whether the readers' background beliefs comprise

E3B2: It is fair to rebel against imposed censorship, that is, against the imposition not to publish some information.

or

E3B1: A government can legitimately use its authority to stop publication of scientific results whose knowledge might be dangerous.

All this suggests that the relationship of the overall understanding of E3 to the retrieval of its underlying argumentative structures is looser than those that have been noticed in the cases of both E1 and E2.

2.2.3 News reporting actions

News articles often report actions, whether done or planned, including legal and institutional acts. The understanding of action reports involves the attribution of intentions to the agent and the awareness of the normative context in which the action occurs. It usually also involves an understanding of the agent's reasons for acting. In this case, the contents to be understood have obvious argumentative aspects, since the task of grasping and articulating the agent's reasons amounts to outlining an argument in support of her choice of doing what she did. So texts reporting actions, or plans for action, are to some extent argumentative. As an example of this kind of news article, we shall examine a rather trivial news item about Venice City Council's replacing the glass steps of a recently built bridge with stone steps ("Troppe cadute sul ponte Calatrava – Il comune elimina i gradini in vetro" ['Too many falls on the Calatrava bridge – the Council is getting rid of the glass steps'], *la Repubblica*, 12 October 2018, henceforth E4).[14] The article's topics are primarily the action that Venice City Council is about to take in order to improve on the bridge's safety, its costs, and the Council's motives. The article considers the pros and cons of taking that action and, beyond that, also the Council's past conduct as regards the bridge's construction and maintenance.

From the point of view of argumentative structures, the article can be read as reporting Venice City Council's reasoning about how best to improve on the safety of the Calatrava bridge, so that understanding it involves grasping how they justify the action they decided to take. It is among the aims of newspaper articles to enable readers to make up their minds about what is happening and, in this case, about the Council's planned action as regards the bridge as well as their overall conduct in this matter. Therefore, the argument attributed to Venice City Council in support of replacing the bridge's glass steps with stone ones becomes a contribution to the broader dispute about whether that is the correct action to be taken, and whether the Council has behaved correctly altogether. Two main claims can be identified, one of which is in favor of the Council's plan:

E4C1: It's a good idea to eliminate the glass steps of the Calatrava Bridge and replace them with stone steps.

while the other concerns the overall conduct of the Council as to the bridge:

E4C2: Venice City Council did not do well to build the Calatrava Bridge the way they did.

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[14] Calatrava Bridge, whose official name is Ponte della Costituzione ('the Constitution Bridge'), connects Piazzale Roma and Saint Lucia railway station, crossing Venice's Grand Canal. The bridge was opened in September 2008. *Calatrava* is the name of the architect who designed the bridge.

E4C1 is supported by various data, some of which are explicitly stated, while others are stated elliptically, and still others presupposed or implicated. They can be retrieved from quotes such as the following:

(12)   *[…] per mettere fine a scivolate e ruzzoloni sui gradini del Ponte di Calatrava*
'[…] to put a stop to slips and tumbles on the steps of the Calatrava Bridge.'

or

(13)   *Centinaia i risarcimenti chiesti al comune […] Alcuni particolarmente onerosi.*
'Hundreds of claims for damages received by the Council […] Some particularly big.'

If one wants to explore the argument in support of E4C1 further, it is not difficult to form an appropriate warrant, fully compatible with the article's contents

E4W1: When a public structure turns out to be dangerous both for its users and (because of maintenance expenses and claims for damages) for the institution on which it depends, it is a good idea for them to make changes to it.

and to identify the corresponding backing

E4B1: It is the council's job to protect the safety of pedestrians as well as to make wise use of public funds.

which is hinted at in the article when it reads:

(14)   *Questione di sopravvivenza: per i pedoni e per le casse del Comune.*
'A matter of survival: for pedestrians and for the City Council's coffers.'

As to E4C2, some of the data in its support, which can be summarized as follows:

E4D2: (a) The Calatrava Bridge's steps are slippery and break easily; crossing it involves making awkward adjustments to your footing; the wheelchair lift for the disabled broke down just a few days after it came into operation.

are provided by means of presuppositions, since the article introduces these details as motivations (expressed by nominal phrases) of the difficult relationship that Venetians have with the bridge; other data consist of the negative assessment of the bridge's project by an agent with authority:

E4D2: (b) The lawyer for the Court of Auditors said that the bridge was a project characterized by "macroscopica approssimazione e diffusa incapacità" ('evident superficiality and wholesale incompetence').

But E4C2, while being part of what the article offers for the reader's attention, is not endorsed by the author of the article, because the assessment of its truth depends in part (as the last sentence of the article explains) upon what must still be ascertained about the bridge's construction by the Appeal Court of Auditors in Rome.

2.3 What our analyses show

In all the cases from E1 to E4, we have seen how proper, helpful text understanding requires grasping the text's argumentative structures, both when the text is manifestly organized so as to present and support a standpoint, and when it is not. For example, without being clear about the argumentative structures underlying a text, receivers might be misled by its superficial features into drawing conclusions that the text itself does not really support. Or they might fail to make sense, not so much of the individual pieces of information provided by the text, but of their connections. Or they might be unable to assess the actions they are informed about. Just how central argumentative structures are with respect to a text's overall significance, however, is a matter of degree. In cases in which the text serves some goal which does not by itself require argumentation, not everything in the text needs to contribute to some argumentative structure; conversely, underlying argumentative structures that are offered to the recipient's attention may not necessarily constitute acts of arguing (for example, because no agent in the speech situation endorses the claim they support and actually argues for it).

It is also a matter of degree how much of the underlying argumentative structures comes to the surface in what the text explicitly says, and how apparent the connections are between their components. For example, we have found claims that are not explicitly expressed, but implicated, and data introduced by means of linguistically triggered presuppositions. Typically, warrants are not explicitly asserted, but are retrievable (often by means of conversational implicature) once the receiver takes it that some information can actually play the role of data with respect to a certain

claim, thereby supporting it. The backing for warrants may be asserted or hinted at in the text, but sometimes lies merely in the speech event's common ground.

Finally, it is also a matter of degree how many components of the argumentative structures which are relevant to a text's overall significance are part of what the speaker means by the text. These components may be expressed explicitly as speech act contents or conveyed implicitly as linguistically triggered presuppositions or implicatures: in either case they belong to the meaning which is communicated by the text, and are understood as speaker-meant. But it can happen that nothing corresponds to a step which is clearly required to complete an argument, either at the level of the text's explicit content or among its presuppositions and implicatures. That argumentative component cannot be counted as properly part of the text's communicated meaning, while it is very likely to be part of what the text's author takes to be the common ground of the participants in the communicative event to which the text belongs. If the need arises, participants and analysts must retrieve it directly from there, but without acquaintance with the speech situation or help from further informative sources, it might be impossible for them to do so.

Failure to grasp those argumentative components that are not part of the text's communicated meaning does not affect the understanding of the text itself (an exception might be certain cases of conversational implicature, the working out of which depends on the actual sharing of beliefs or pieces of knowledge not represented in the text). But such a failure may lead the receiver to miss (at least in part) the point that the text contributes to its whole speech situation.

3. Concluding remarks

Our explorations of argumentative structures in articles from the daily press confirm that argumentative discourse cannot be considered as a discourse genre, nor can it be limited to instances of those genres to the purposes of which argumentation is manifestly functional.

A text can be regarded as belonging to a certain discourse genre in light of the purpose or function it is designed to perform in a certain social situation. But a text being designed to argue for a standpoint, or actually being to some extent argumentative, does not in itself constitute such a purpose or function. Moreover, argumentation is hardly a typified activity. It is not a social practice or routine, to be executed by performing a fixed series of steps. Even if it has a recognizable structure, most texts that instantiate it do so fairly freely: argumentative structures might be completely developed or reduced to a minimum (the data-claim relationship), and their components might appear in the text's linguistic surface explicitly, or be retrievable as implicit meaning.

Sometimes, the social purpose or function of a text requires the presentation of arguments, but this occurs in the context of a variety of communicative or institutional situations and activities, which do not correspond to one genre. A scientific paper, a court judgment, and an opinion article all have to present arguments, and can hardly be said to be good instances of their genres if they do not. It is quite appealing, then, to consider the argumentative text type as instantiated in a variety of argumentative genres.

It should also be granted, however, that texts belonging to genres typically characterized by the use of argumentation do not necessarily stop belonging to those genres when they fail to present sound or fully developed arguments.[15] Conversely, there are texts that possess underlying argumentative structures irrespective of the social frame or the typified activity to which they belong. This is the case with the news articles from the daily press that we have examined.

A text may possess (or fail to possess) argumentative features in any social frame. Its argumentative features (if it has any) may be functional to the specific purpose it has in the social situation where it belongs, albeit one not typically requiring argumentation, or independent of it. Argumentation can therefore contribute to instances of different discourse genres, whenever understanding which reasons support a certain claim contributes to determining the point of a text or is in any other way of interest to the participants. Sometimes, the argumentative features of a text contribute to the purpose or function of the text itself or of its (non-argumentative) genre; in other cases, they provide specific solutions to content-related communicative needs. At least this is what happens with news articles in the daily press.

When a text has argumentative structure, it is natural to call it an argumentative text. However, it would be naïve to assume that argumentative texts in this sense form a distinct category (albeit orthogonal to discourse genres), such that a text is either argumentative or not. To delimit the category, one might resort to the illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions of the speaker, considering whether she intends to argue for a standpoint or has the goal of convincing an opponent. But the attribution of these intentions presupposes (rather than grounding) an understanding of the text that the speaker has produced. So, what takes priority in distinguishing between what is argumentative and what is not, is after all the analysis of the texts themselves. This is what we have attempted to do, examining sample articles from the daily press using an approach to discourse analysis inspired by pragmatics.

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[15] For example, a TV debate is such not because speakers participating in it actually "argue" for or against their standpoints (although we expect them to do so, at least to a certain extent, leaving aside whether they present sound arguments), but because of how the social frame in which their verbal interchange takes place is defined and of the goals around which that occasion of verbal interchange develops.

Our analyses show that the extent to which a text is argumentative is a matter of degree. While there are texts that are argumentative, so to speak, in their entirety, other texts too, unexpectedly enough, reveal underlying argumentative structures the understanding of which contributes to the understanding of what the text means as a whole, as well as of its point in the speech situation. The extent to which it is necessary to understand argumentative structures in order to make sense of the text may vary, just as what is missed by a receiver who fails to grasp them may vary too.

The role played by argumentative structures with respect to text understanding far beyond those texts that are manifestly argumentative makes it possible to speak of argumentation as a dimension of discourse. It is a dimension of discourse that manifests itself whenever there is an interest in connecting a claim raised in a text, or a claim or action reported by it, to some reason.

Text seems somewhat designed to satisfy such an interest even when it is not in focus. In this light, one might surmise that argumentation is a widespread cognitively based potential of any use of language, which manifests itself to different degrees and in different forms.

The degree to which a text can be taken to be argumentative is often correlated, to some extent at least, with the discourse genre to which it belongs. Among our sample cases, it is no coincidence that the type of text to whose understanding argumentative structures contribute most – without grasping them, one could hardly make any sense of the article – is an opinion article, where the author is expounding and justifying an opinion, while the argumentation structures we retrieved in news articles are less explicit, less central or, at any rate, not so overarching. This confirms once more that certain discourse genres are associated with expectations concerning the presence and role of argumentative structures, while others are not. But social frame, goal and the like are not enough to make a conversational contribution actually argumentative: it must really have a recognizable argumentative structure in order to be such. So, there is something in the degree to which a text is argumentative, which does not depend on matters such as socially defined frames and goals, but is related to the speaking individual's way of articulating her thought on that particular occasion.

In Section 1.3, we have hinted at the connection between argumentation and reasoning, recalling Grice's definition of rationality as an agent's desire that her moves be supported by reasons and her capacity to satisfy that desire. We can now say that the degree to which a text is argumentative has to do with the extent to which the speaker and her text satisfy the requirements for rationality that derive from Grice's definition. An agent who desires that her moves be supported by reasons looks for such reasons and, in the case of linguistic moves, builds up data-claim relationships, possibly also developing the other elements of an argumentative structure around them; the more she is interested in her moves being supported by reasons, the more she will elaborate upon the

argumentative dimension of her discourse. The complexity, explicitness and soundness of the resulting argument quite obviously depend also on the extent to which the agent is actually capable of reasoning well.

However, considering the normative facet of Grice's conception of rationality, namely, its role in human beings' self-definition as persons, it also becomes possible to take it that all human persons are rational (indeed they are such by definition). And if we are persons and are rational, our discursive productions should be expected to be rational too, and therefore to be by default argumentative, to some extent at least. This fits in well with what our analyses suggest and, in addition, makes it quite legitimate (as something actually owed to the speaker's quality of being a person) that in making sense of a text and possibly drawing practical implications from it, the underlying argumentative structures of that text should be taken into consideration, even when they are unexpected, inapparent, and fragmentary.

All this lends further plausibility to our proposal of considering argumentation as a dimension of discourse. The role of argumentation, we suggest, is similar to the role granted to narrativity by those semioticians who have claimed that there is a narrative dimension to every text (and not just the ones that are overtly narrative), which has to be investigated when we set out to account for a text's meaning (see, e.g., Greimas & Courtés 1979: 247–250).[16] In our opinion, argumentation too might fruitfully be considered not just as a particular discursive phenomenon, but as a dimension to be investigated in any and every text.

Author contributions

The authors collaborated in the research on which this paper relies, and discussed all parts of the paper. However, Sections 1 to 2.1 and Section 3 are authored by Paolo Labinaz, while Sections 2.2 to 2.3 are authored by Marina Sbisà.

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[16] Sbisà has considered the narrative structure called "narrative schema" as the cognitive format for understanding speech act sequences (Sbisà 1989: 147-173; 2002).

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Appendix

Acronym	Title of the newspaper article	Title of the newspaper	Date of the printed publication	Online version
E1	Una certa idea di povertà [A certain idea of poverty]	*la Repubblica*	October 5, 2018	https://rep.repubblica.it/pwa/commento/2018/10/04/news/reddito_di_cittadinanza_cosi_i_poveri_diventano_consumatori_sotto_tutela-208170117/?refresh_ce
E2	Tumori, la ricerca shock: ne causa più la sfortuna che lo stile di vita [Tumors, the shocking study: more of them are caused by bad luck than by lifestyle]	*la Repubblica*	January 2, 2015	https://www.repubblica.it/salute/ricerca/2015/01/02/news/tumori_ricerca_ne_causa_pi_la_sfortuna_che_lo_stile_di_vita-104167899/
E3	Creato il super-virus killer gli Usa censurano la ricerca [Having created the killer super-virus, the US censors research]	*la Repubblica*	December 22, 2011	https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2011/12/22/creato-il-super-virus-killer-gli-usa-censurano.html
E4	Troppe cadute sul ponte Calatrava: il comune elimina I gradini in vetro [Too many falls on the Calatrava bridge – the Council is getting rid of the glass steps]	*la Repubblica*	October 12, 2018	https://rep.repubblica.it/pwa/generale/2018/10/11/news/storie_italiane-208749118/