The evolution of policy-driven innovation networks at regional level: evidence from a stochastic actor oriented approach

The last twenty years have witnessed the diffusion of regional innovation policies that support networking among heterogeneous organisations (e.g.: firms and universities; small and large firms). The implicit assumption is that policies are needed to stimulate interactions that would not occur spontaneously, but whose presence would be desirable. Since it would not be possible, nor appropriate, to identify the specific partners with whom an organisation should collaborate, what policies can do is provide incentives in order to encourage collaboration among heterogeneous organisations, establish a general framework of rules and then leave the participants free to organise their innovative activity. However, the presence of general and flexible incentives does not ensure that undesirable behaviours (such as the formation of an oligarchic core of agents driving the funded projects, or the reiteration of established linkages) are not adopted anyway. Our study seeks to deepen the reflection on these points, introducing two main original elements with respect to the existing literature. First, we observe small scale regional policies targeting SMEs, instead that the large-scale EU programmes. Second, we adopt a dynamic approach, rather than a comparative static approach as usually adopted. Our empirical analysis explores how collaboration has evolved within a set of policies targeting innovation networks, which have been implemented by the regional government of Tuscany (Italy) in the programming period 2000-2006. By using a stochastic actor oriented approach, we investigate how their relationships have evolved according to several aspects: (i) reiteration of pre-existing linkages as opposed to experimentation of new relationships (stability or experience effect); (ii) collaboration with agents possessing complementary rather than similar knowledge and competencies or abilities (homophily effects); (iii) formation of a core of agents “controlling” the policy programmes (Matthew effect).