In this paper we study how policyholders and equityholders contribute to the formation of a life insurance company issuing participating contracts. The structure of these contracts is stylized and features a guaranteed rate of return and a terminal bonus, as in the pioneering model by Briys and de Varenne (1994, 1997). Policyholders aim at maximizing their preferences by choosing the leverage ratio and the guaranteed level, while being subject to regulatory constraints of fair valuation and solvency. We provide conditions under which non trivial contracts exist and analyze their properties.

On the optimal design of participating life insurance contracts

Bacinello Anna Rita;Corsato Chiara;Millossovich Pietro
2020

Abstract

In this paper we study how policyholders and equityholders contribute to the formation of a life insurance company issuing participating contracts. The structure of these contracts is stylized and features a guaranteed rate of return and a terminal bonus, as in the pioneering model by Briys and de Varenne (1994, 1997). Policyholders aim at maximizing their preferences by choosing the leverage ratio and the guaranteed level, while being subject to regulatory constraints of fair valuation and solvency. We provide conditions under which non trivial contracts exist and analyze their properties.
978-88-5511-121-8
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11368/2967948
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