On the optimal design of participating life insurance contracts

In this paper we study how policyholders and equityholders contribute to the formation of a life insurance company issuing participating contracts. The structure of these contracts is stylized and features a guaranteed rate of return and a terminal bonus, as in the pioneering model by Briys and de Varenne (1994, 1997). Policyholders aim at maximizing their preferences by choosing the leverage ratio and the guaranteed level, while being subject to regulatory constraints of fair valuation and solvency. We provide conditions under which non trivial contracts exist and analyze their properties.



Titolo: On the optimal design of participating life insurance contracts
Autori: 
BACINELLO, ANNA RITA
CORSATO, CHIARA
MILLOSSOVICH, PIETRO
Data di pubblicazione: 2020
Abstract: In this paper we study how policyholders and equityholders contribute to the formation of a life insurance company issuing participating contracts. The structure of these contracts is stylized and features a guaranteed rate of return and a terminal bonus, as in the pioneering model by Briys and de Varenne (1994, 1997). Policyholders aim at maximizing their preferences by choosing the leverage ratio and the guaranteed level, while being subject to regulatory constraints of fair valuation and solvency. We provide conditions under which non trivial contracts exist and analyze their properties.
Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/11368/2967948
ISBN: 978-88-5511-121-8
Appare nelle tipologie:

File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
 
 
 
©2014 University of Trieste dove siamo Privacy
Piazzale Europa,1 34127 Trieste, Italia - Tel. +39 040.558.7111 - P.IVA 00211830328 - C.F. 80013890324 - P.E.C.: ateneo@pec.units.it
 Copyright © 2021