Objects and space in an avian brain

Investigation of the cognitive abilities of non-human species raises philosophical questions and the data obtained from meticulous empirical endeavour with animals have implications for philosophical theories. One example concerns cognitive innateness. When Kant (1781) proposed that mental abilities could exist as a p r i o r i knowledge, psychology was just about to become an independent scientific discipline. Nowadays, cognitive neurosciences can address experimentally the question of whether organisms already have some cognitive concepts at birth, which allow organisms to live in and cope with a challenging environment, and the extent to which they are independent of specific experiences. One example of a primitive inborn concept is the differentiation between animate and inanimate objects (Gelman et al., 1983). The field of animal cognition has been productive in generating relevant data, because of the availability of both adequate models and different methods suitable for testing nonverbal creatures (human newborns and non-human individuals). Here, we will explore three core domains of cognition, physics, space and number, with particular reference to birds but also comparing them to preverbal human infants and other, non-avian, species. A special focus will be on the use of ‘God’s organism’ (Rose, 2000) i.e. the young of the domestic fowl, the domestic chick (Gallus gallus domesticus), which, because it is precocial, provides researchers with a set of uniquely co-occurring features, such as early exposure learning (associated with filial imprinting) combined with the possibility of accurate control on sensory experiences. Together these features make the domestic chick extremely suitable to an investigation of whether basic cognitive concepts are already present at birth or whether they need extensive experience to develop.