This chapter first investigates the main rationales and justifications of bicameralism. This chapter argues that all modern bicameral systems are based, in their roots, on two possible ultimate justifications: the separation of powers and the protection of minorities.6 These justifications are not mutually exclusive and may be combined in different ways and with different shades. Subsequently, this chapter explores the model of bicameralism adopted in the Italian Constitution of 1947. The analysis argues that the bicameral system of the Italian Republican Constitution is a formidable case study, as long as it is almost exclusively based on one single driver of bicameralism, namely the separation of powers. After having analyzed this model, this chapter explores the changing pattern of Italian bicameralism in light of the European integration process. This chapter argues that the gradual extension of EU legal constraints on Member States’ sovereignty shall be considered as a new mechanism of separation of powers. Finally, this analysis claims that the European integration process is a key factor in overcoming the main justification of Italian bicameralism. This impact has been mainly overlooked by the legal scholarship, even though it may shed new light on the recent and ill-fated proposals of reform of Italian bicameralism. In its conclusion, this chapter offers a set of remarks stemming from the very peculiar case study of Italian bicameralism that might be of some interest to students of other jurisdictions.

How Does the European Union Challenge Bicameralism? Lessons from the Italian Case

Pietro Faraguna
2019

Abstract

This chapter first investigates the main rationales and justifications of bicameralism. This chapter argues that all modern bicameral systems are based, in their roots, on two possible ultimate justifications: the separation of powers and the protection of minorities.6 These justifications are not mutually exclusive and may be combined in different ways and with different shades. Subsequently, this chapter explores the model of bicameralism adopted in the Italian Constitution of 1947. The analysis argues that the bicameral system of the Italian Republican Constitution is a formidable case study, as long as it is almost exclusively based on one single driver of bicameralism, namely the separation of powers. After having analyzed this model, this chapter explores the changing pattern of Italian bicameralism in light of the European integration process. This chapter argues that the gradual extension of EU legal constraints on Member States’ sovereignty shall be considered as a new mechanism of separation of powers. Finally, this analysis claims that the European integration process is a key factor in overcoming the main justification of Italian bicameralism. This impact has been mainly overlooked by the legal scholarship, even though it may shed new light on the recent and ill-fated proposals of reform of Italian bicameralism. In its conclusion, this chapter offers a set of remarks stemming from the very peculiar case study of Italian bicameralism that might be of some interest to students of other jurisdictions.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11368/2948393
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