This paper deals with Nenad Smokrović’s account of argumentation as a curiosity-driven, cooperative effort. More specifically, I focus on one of the two assumptions on which his account is based: that reasoning is argumentative in nature. Since Smokrović assumes Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory as the starting point for developing this account, I point out the difficulties in combining their conception of reasoning as a persuasive device with the picture of the argumentation process he provides. I then suggest that one can assume the argumentative nature of reasoning while dismissing their conception of reasoning. In particular, I propose an alternative way to elaborate the idea that reasoning is argumentative by highlighting its reason-giving function. I argue that this function appears to be better suited to the argumentation process described by Smokrović than the persuasive one suggested by the argumentative theory. As I will try to show, only if we consider reasoning in its basic form, that is as a reason- giving device, can we understand why two or more people driven by their curiosity can get together in a collaborative effort to safely establish whether a certain proposition is true, without manipulating each other.

Argumentation, Knowledge and Reasoning

Labinaz, Paolo
2022-01-01

Abstract

This paper deals with Nenad Smokrović’s account of argumentation as a curiosity-driven, cooperative effort. More specifically, I focus on one of the two assumptions on which his account is based: that reasoning is argumentative in nature. Since Smokrović assumes Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory as the starting point for developing this account, I point out the difficulties in combining their conception of reasoning as a persuasive device with the picture of the argumentation process he provides. I then suggest that one can assume the argumentative nature of reasoning while dismissing their conception of reasoning. In particular, I propose an alternative way to elaborate the idea that reasoning is argumentative by highlighting its reason-giving function. I argue that this function appears to be better suited to the argumentation process described by Smokrović than the persuasive one suggested by the argumentative theory. As I will try to show, only if we consider reasoning in its basic form, that is as a reason- giving device, can we understand why two or more people driven by their curiosity can get together in a collaborative effort to safely establish whether a certain proposition is true, without manipulating each other.
2022
978-953-361-064-1
978-953-361-065-8
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11368/3036578
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