Beyond Brentano: Stumpf and the Scientific Method of Philosophy

This essay deals with the origin and development of Stumpf’s views on philosophy and science. Stumpf is indebted to Brentano for a fundamental prin- ciple: the method of philosophy must be scientific. With that, however, Brentano was praising the attitude of the best philosophers of all times, who adapted their methodologies to the objects under investigation. Stumpf, on the other hand, meant the method of modern science. Since his years in Göttingen, he was famil- iar with modern scientific methodology, including its experimental aspects, and with mathematics. Although he always spoke of Brentano with respect and grati- tude, Stumpf was clearly aware of this difference, and of the contrast between Brentano’s mainly deductive way of thinking and his own. In addition to a look at the origin and development of Stumpf’s insights, this essay considers his ma- ture views on philosophy and science, as exemplified primarily in his essays on the classification of the sciences and on the rebirth of philosophy