Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Huber ([2005]) has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence. In this paper, we argue that under a properly defined Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence, Huber’s criticism fails. By contrast, our discussion will highlight what we take as some new and appealing features of Bayesian confirmation theory.

Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber (2005)

FESTA, Roberto;CRUPI, VINCENZO;
2008-01-01

Abstract

Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Huber ([2005]) has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence. In this paper, we argue that under a properly defined Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence, Huber’s criticism fails. By contrast, our discussion will highlight what we take as some new and appealing features of Bayesian confirmation theory.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
Pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11368/1898439
 Avviso

Registrazione in corso di verifica.
La registrazione di questo prodotto non è ancora stata validata in ArTS.

Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 3
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 2
social impact