In a recent book on The Evolution of Social Contract, Brian Skyrms shows how evolutionary game theory can be used to explain how the implicit social contract we live by might have evolved. In this paper, after describing the main lines of Skyrms’s approach, we will examine some problems arising from it, on the basis of a comparison with von Hayek’s evolutionary view. Finally, we will make some remarks on the possible relevance of the outcomes achieved by Skyrms for the studies on the ‘bounded rationality’.

Modelli evoluzionistici del contratto sociale

FESTA, Roberto
1999-01-01

Abstract

In a recent book on The Evolution of Social Contract, Brian Skyrms shows how evolutionary game theory can be used to explain how the implicit social contract we live by might have evolved. In this paper, after describing the main lines of Skyrms’s approach, we will examine some problems arising from it, on the basis of a comparison with von Hayek’s evolutionary view. Finally, we will make some remarks on the possible relevance of the outcomes achieved by Skyrms for the studies on the ‘bounded rationality’.
1999
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11368/1898464
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