Adverse selection, moral hazard and systemic risk are the main reasons for a missing market in agricultural insurance. If multiperil and index-linked insurance products have been introduced for reducing speculative and not preventive behaviors of farmers, it seems reasonable that the government intervention has to replace financial ad-hoc aids with public tools orientated towards a “risk-partnership” among State, insurer and farmer in order to guarantee, in the short and in the long run, lower reinsurance costs and, more in general, a financial stabilization in farming and in private insurance sector

Teoria economica, asimmetria d'informazione e rischio sistematico nel mercato assicurativo in agricoltura.

DARIS, ROBERTO;PRESTAMBURGO, SONIA
2005-01-01

Abstract

Adverse selection, moral hazard and systemic risk are the main reasons for a missing market in agricultural insurance. If multiperil and index-linked insurance products have been introduced for reducing speculative and not preventive behaviors of farmers, it seems reasonable that the government intervention has to replace financial ad-hoc aids with public tools orientated towards a “risk-partnership” among State, insurer and farmer in order to guarantee, in the short and in the long run, lower reinsurance costs and, more in general, a financial stabilization in farming and in private insurance sector
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11368/2504542
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