EXTENDED ABSTRACT: Through a close analysis of a single paragraph of J. Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, I examine his position on the issue of desert and show how it does not take into account the separateness of persons. As it is widely known, one of the charges that Rawls addresses to utilitarianism is the criticism that it does not take seriously the individuality of any person, because of the monistic principle of preference aggregation, which seems essential to the very idea of utilitarianism as social-political philosophy. I think that Rawlsian accusation against utilitarianism can be revolted against Rawls himself. Since the two Rawlsian principles of justice (liberty and difference) shape all social institutions and model a fair social cooperation, the benefit and burdens of cooperation must ultimately be judged also from a foundational perspective, that is from the perspective of perfect procedural justice. The perfect procedural justice, using Kantian terminology, is the transcendental condition of our critical judgment on any institution and on any action with social significance. It represents, in other words, the condition of possibility of institutions in accordance with the two principles. The call for fairness is nothing more than this: calling for corrections in accordance with the two principles. But which kind of call? Since equity has this corrective dimension, common sense thinks that this claim consists of and is based upon some qualities of the subject, in particular, some of his/her moral qualities, which have been violated. Some of these qualities can be grouped under the name of “moral desert”. Justice should represent, according to common sense, the realization of some desert, or at least should be sensitive to the recognition of individual desert. The goods should be distributed according to the Aristotelian principle of “to each his own”: this seems to be the appropriate conception, prima facie and intuitively, of the realization of justice in our imperfect world, as far as at least it can be in accordance with the circumstances, always inadequate, of an empirical life. Does Rawls mean that the application of the principle of giving “to each his own” is impossible? On the one hand, the answer seems to be positive, because the notion of distribution according to virtue fails to distinguish between moral desert and legitimate expectations. Indeed, we do not expect that a judicial decision or a general political decision is structured by the amount of virtue of the subject who the decision is addressed to. Such procedure would be appropriate, for example, in a caste system society, but not in a society worried to outline some general and/or initial conditions of opportunity (constrained by insurance terms of choice, for example). A distribution of justice according to virtue then would violate the conditions of fairness. The fact that liberal citizens, having done various things encouraged by the existing arrangements, have now certain rights, and just distributive shares honor these claims, recognizes what might be considered a social truism: if you are going to cooperate, then you are reasonably waiting for a symmetrical cooperative behavior from your partner. The fact is, indeed, that your personal acquisitions, your claims, a proper ascription of your own deserts make sense only within a scheme that is not your product. In a certain way, you, as a citizen of a society properly adequate with the concept of well-ordered society, are the product. The legitimate expectations that arise are designed on justice as fairness. But the acceptance of a particular social asset is less a voluntary act than the product of your insurance rationality, the most important part of the theory of justice. When you join a just social asset you recognize what is already in you, and this is precisely your being entitled to citizenship within a well-ordered society. But then is there any distinction between the possession of a valid entitlement for something and desert? I thinks it is not. The conclusion that should be drawn from this discussion is that the rawlsian critique of utilitarianism – not taking seriously into account the real separateness of person – should be fully ascribed to his theoretical construction too.

Separateness and Desert: a Rawlsian Problem

MARRONE, PIERPAOLO
2012-01-01

Abstract

EXTENDED ABSTRACT: Through a close analysis of a single paragraph of J. Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, I examine his position on the issue of desert and show how it does not take into account the separateness of persons. As it is widely known, one of the charges that Rawls addresses to utilitarianism is the criticism that it does not take seriously the individuality of any person, because of the monistic principle of preference aggregation, which seems essential to the very idea of utilitarianism as social-political philosophy. I think that Rawlsian accusation against utilitarianism can be revolted against Rawls himself. Since the two Rawlsian principles of justice (liberty and difference) shape all social institutions and model a fair social cooperation, the benefit and burdens of cooperation must ultimately be judged also from a foundational perspective, that is from the perspective of perfect procedural justice. The perfect procedural justice, using Kantian terminology, is the transcendental condition of our critical judgment on any institution and on any action with social significance. It represents, in other words, the condition of possibility of institutions in accordance with the two principles. The call for fairness is nothing more than this: calling for corrections in accordance with the two principles. But which kind of call? Since equity has this corrective dimension, common sense thinks that this claim consists of and is based upon some qualities of the subject, in particular, some of his/her moral qualities, which have been violated. Some of these qualities can be grouped under the name of “moral desert”. Justice should represent, according to common sense, the realization of some desert, or at least should be sensitive to the recognition of individual desert. The goods should be distributed according to the Aristotelian principle of “to each his own”: this seems to be the appropriate conception, prima facie and intuitively, of the realization of justice in our imperfect world, as far as at least it can be in accordance with the circumstances, always inadequate, of an empirical life. Does Rawls mean that the application of the principle of giving “to each his own” is impossible? On the one hand, the answer seems to be positive, because the notion of distribution according to virtue fails to distinguish between moral desert and legitimate expectations. Indeed, we do not expect that a judicial decision or a general political decision is structured by the amount of virtue of the subject who the decision is addressed to. Such procedure would be appropriate, for example, in a caste system society, but not in a society worried to outline some general and/or initial conditions of opportunity (constrained by insurance terms of choice, for example). A distribution of justice according to virtue then would violate the conditions of fairness. The fact that liberal citizens, having done various things encouraged by the existing arrangements, have now certain rights, and just distributive shares honor these claims, recognizes what might be considered a social truism: if you are going to cooperate, then you are reasonably waiting for a symmetrical cooperative behavior from your partner. The fact is, indeed, that your personal acquisitions, your claims, a proper ascription of your own deserts make sense only within a scheme that is not your product. In a certain way, you, as a citizen of a society properly adequate with the concept of well-ordered society, are the product. The legitimate expectations that arise are designed on justice as fairness. But the acceptance of a particular social asset is less a voluntary act than the product of your insurance rationality, the most important part of the theory of justice. When you join a just social asset you recognize what is already in you, and this is precisely your being entitled to citizenship within a well-ordered society. But then is there any distinction between the possession of a valid entitlement for something and desert? I thinks it is not. The conclusion that should be drawn from this discussion is that the rawlsian critique of utilitarianism – not taking seriously into account the real separateness of person – should be fully ascribed to his theoretical construction too.
2012
http://www.dirittoequestionipubbliche.org/page/2012_n12/stu_06-marrone.pdf
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