L'irredentismo e la scelta di guerra in Serbia, Bulgaria e Romania

The international literature on the “decision for war” which dragged the European Powers one by one into the great conflict of 1914-1918, is vast. For the most part the debate centres upon the varying degrees of responsibility to be borne by the leading protagonists of the conflict. The present contribution, however, focuses on the choice to go to war made by three supporting – but for different reasons not marginal – actors in the trial of strength between the two military alliances. In the case of Serbia we here analyse the circumstances which, having brought about the government’s indirect involvement in the crime at Sarajevo, limited its freedom of action in formulating a reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. In the case of Bulgaria, the irredentist motivation (which automatically inclined the country towards the Central Powers) was extremely strong, but in negotiating an increase in the promised “spoils of war” the government would wait for more than a year before finalising its choice. In the case of Romania, on the other hand, an equally strong irredentist motivation inclined the country towards the Entente; but again, before the decision could be taken, two years of negotiating the prize had to go by, all the while with an attentive eye on the changing fortunes of the war on its various fronts. What the three cases have in common is the achievement, in 1918, of politico-territorial results which would have been totally unforeseeable four, three, or even two years before.