This paper investigates the role of performance voting in solving the capital levy problem. In a presentative democracy, voters can use elections to protect their property by holding politicians accountable for the tax policies they implement. We characterize the set of tax policies that can be sustained by symmetric performance standards and show when this set contains the second-best (Ramsey) tax policy.
Capital taxation and electoral accountability
Magris F.
2006-01-01
Abstract
This paper investigates the role of performance voting in solving the capital levy problem. In a presentative democracy, voters can use elections to protect their property by holding politicians accountable for the tax policies they implement. We characterize the set of tax policies that can be sustained by symmetric performance standards and show when this set contains the second-best (Ramsey) tax policy.File in questo prodotto:
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