In this article, political economies have been linked to the decision-making processes of Latin American countries: before and after 1989. Conservative and liberal reforms (with a moderate or radical laissez faire) have usually been applied through neo-oligarchic decision-making processes (by the “technopols”). Social-democrat economic policies (with more emphasis on social policies) have often been implemented with neo-corporatism. When “soft” populism prevailed, partitocrazia was the typical political instrument of leftist governments, either if they governed or if they were at the opposition. Thus, they usually vetoed rightist presidents, who had been trying to introduce market reforms. The political consequence of “hard” populism has been authoritarianism, like in Venezuela with Chavez and Maduro. In “hybrid” economic policies, combining different models of political economies, there is not a stable decision-making process, and political conflict is usually strong.
Political economies and decision-making processes in Latin America
Fossati, Fabio
2021-01-01
Abstract
In this article, political economies have been linked to the decision-making processes of Latin American countries: before and after 1989. Conservative and liberal reforms (with a moderate or radical laissez faire) have usually been applied through neo-oligarchic decision-making processes (by the “technopols”). Social-democrat economic policies (with more emphasis on social policies) have often been implemented with neo-corporatism. When “soft” populism prevailed, partitocrazia was the typical political instrument of leftist governments, either if they governed or if they were at the opposition. Thus, they usually vetoed rightist presidents, who had been trying to introduce market reforms. The political consequence of “hard” populism has been authoritarianism, like in Venezuela with Chavez and Maduro. In “hybrid” economic policies, combining different models of political economies, there is not a stable decision-making process, and political conflict is usually strong.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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