Model-theoretic semantics is grounded on the assumption that meaning is reference. In such a framework, defining the meaning of a natural language expression corresponds to defining the object to which it refers, a practice sometimes referred to as ‘Natural Language Metaphysics’. Typical objects of reference used in semantic modeling are individual entities and possible worlds. A number of linguistic facts have been explained by introducing novel classes of entities in the model. Relevant examples are times and events. In this contribution, we aim at producing a case for introducing phenomenal experiences among the set of objects natural language expressions refer to. We show that the truth conditions of some natural language expressions are best described as denoting phenomenal experiences, rather than objects of the world.
A Case for Phenomenal Experience in Natural Language
Fiorin G
;
2015-01-01
Abstract
Model-theoretic semantics is grounded on the assumption that meaning is reference. In such a framework, defining the meaning of a natural language expression corresponds to defining the object to which it refers, a practice sometimes referred to as ‘Natural Language Metaphysics’. Typical objects of reference used in semantic modeling are individual entities and possible worlds. A number of linguistic facts have been explained by introducing novel classes of entities in the model. Relevant examples are times and events. In this contribution, we aim at producing a case for introducing phenomenal experiences among the set of objects natural language expressions refer to. We show that the truth conditions of some natural language expressions are best described as denoting phenomenal experiences, rather than objects of the world.Pubblicazioni consigliate
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