According to a standard formulation, alethic pluralism holds that there are many properties of truth. The position has been challenged to make sense of the traditional definition of logical validity, understood as a necessary truth preservation. The challenge consists of two problems: one, well known, posed by mixed inferences, and another, new, related to the unity of logical validity. In this paper, I argue that a pluralist semantics for compounded sentences, put forward by Douglas Edwards, can be used to overcome both difficulties.
VALIDITÀ LOGICA E PLURALISMO ALETICO: DUE PROBLEMI E UN’UNICA SOLUZIONE
STROLLO A
2022-01-01
Abstract
According to a standard formulation, alethic pluralism holds that there are many properties of truth. The position has been challenged to make sense of the traditional definition of logical validity, understood as a necessary truth preservation. The challenge consists of two problems: one, well known, posed by mixed inferences, and another, new, related to the unity of logical validity. In this paper, I argue that a pluralist semantics for compounded sentences, put forward by Douglas Edwards, can be used to overcome both difficulties.File in questo prodotto:
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