Belief, according to many philosophers, aims at truth. In this paper I discuss in what measure a pluralist conception of truth is compatible with this claim. In particular, I argue that if the idea is understood according to a teleological account, alethic pluralism can be adopted also in a strong form. I contend that while the teleological account of belief requires a generic concept of truth, it poses a few constraints on the property (or the properties) of truth. By contrast, at least a moderate version of alethic pluralism is commanded by a normativist interpretation of the aim.
THE FORCE OF ALETHIC PLURALISM: TRUTH PLURALISM AND THE AIM OF BELIEF
STROLLO A
2020-01-01
Abstract
Belief, according to many philosophers, aims at truth. In this paper I discuss in what measure a pluralist conception of truth is compatible with this claim. In particular, I argue that if the idea is understood according to a teleological account, alethic pluralism can be adopted also in a strong form. I contend that while the teleological account of belief requires a generic concept of truth, it poses a few constraints on the property (or the properties) of truth. By contrast, at least a moderate version of alethic pluralism is commanded by a normativist interpretation of the aim.File in questo prodotto:
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