The aim of this thesis is to show the relevance that Aquinas's theory of natural inclinations can play in the contemporary debate for the inquiry on human flourishing, which consists in the realisation of the proper end that human beings have as human beings. We will engage in dialogue with several authors, belonging to the analytic tradition (Elizabeth Anscombe, John Finnis, Ralph McInerny, Anthony Lisska) or, nevertheless, culturally close to it (Alasdair MacIntyre), who have reconsidered the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas in the contemporary debate in order to inquire what enables human flourishing. We will argue that the proper consideration of natural inclinations leads, on the one hand, to overcome the problems posed by Hume's law by identifying human nature as a normative criterion common to all human beings, and, on the other hand, to recognise the role of the first-person perspective in identifying what enables the human flourishing of each agent. Natural inclinations do not express agents' psychological preferences, but consist in the fact that human beings naturally tend towards the realisation of their nature as a good to be realised. In order to flourish, human beings are required to act in accordance with their natural inclinations, since natural inclinations are tendencies that human beings have towards a set of goods that are grounded in human nature. Revisiting a recent proposal put forward by Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum in the field of analytic metaphysics, we will argue that agents develop a virtuous conduct if and only if they act in accordance with their natural inclinations; in doing so, they flourish as human beings, that is, they actualise the powers they have by virtue of their nature. However, human beings are not strictly necessitated to act in accordance with their natural inclinations. Indeed, in order to flourish, agents should also recognise, by virtue of their rational capacities, that acting in accordance with their natural inclinations is a reason for acting for them and they should act in accordance with these reasons. Furthermore, we will argue that there is no single way to flourish for all human beings, because, although flourishing requires that human beings act in accordance with their nature, nevertheless, the way in which agents can flourish varies according to their individual characteristics and according to the circumstances and contexts in which they act, that is, according to the practices in which they participate in their lived experience. In the last part of this thesis, we will test the theoretical proposal developed in the previous parts through a critical analysis of Alasdair MacIntyre's thought.
Questa tesi si propone di mostrare la rilevanza che la teoria delle inclinazioni naturali di Tommaso d'Aquino può svolgere nel dibattito contemporaneo per l'indagine sul fiorire umano, che consiste nella realizzazione del fine proprio che gli esseri umani hanno in quanto esseri umani. Ci confronteremo con diversi autori, appartenenti alla tradizione analitica (Elizabeth Anscombe, John Finnis, Ralph McInerny, Anthony Lisska) o, comunque, culturalmente vicini a essa (Alasdair MacIntyre), che hanno riconsiderato la filosofia di Tommaso d'Aquino nel dibattito contemporaneo per indagare che cosa permetta il fiorire umano. Sosterremo che la considerazione adeguata delle inclinazioni naturali porta, da un lato, a superare i problemi posti dalla legge di Hume, individuando nella natura umana un criterio normativo comune a tutti gli esseri umani, e, dall'altro, a riconoscere il ruolo del punto di vista della prima persona nell'individuare che cosa consenta il fiorire umano di ciascun agente. Le inclinazioni naturali non esprimono preferenze psicologiche degli agenti, ma consistono nel fatto che gli esseri umani tendono naturalmente alla realizzazione della loro natura in quanto bene da realizzare. Per fiorire, gli esseri umani sono tenuti ad agire in accordo con le loro inclinazioni naturali, poiché le inclinazioni naturali sono tendenze che gli esseri umani hanno verso un insieme di beni che sono fondati nella natura umana. Rielaborando una recente proposta avanzata da Stephen Mumford e da Rani Lill Anjum nel campo della metafisica analitica, sosterremo che gli agenti sviluppano una condotta virtuosa se e solo se agiscono in accordo con le loro inclinazioni naturali; così facendo, fioriscono in quanto esseri umani, cioè attualizzano i poteri che hanno in virtù della loro natura. Tuttavia, gli esseri umani non sono strettamente necessitati ad agire in accordo con le loro inclinazioni naturali. Infatti, al fine di fiorire, gli agenti dovrebbero anche riconoscere, in virtù delle loro capacità razionali, che agire in accordo con le loro inclinazioni naturali è per loro una ragione per agire e dovrebbero agire in accordo con queste ragioni. Inoltre, sosterremo che non esiste un unico modo per fiorire per tutti gli esseri umani, perché, sebbene il fiorire richieda che gli esseri umani agiscano in accordo con la loro natura, tuttavia, il modo in cui gli agenti possono fiorire varia in base alle loro caratteristiche individuali e in base alle circostanze e ai contesti in cui agiscono, ossia in base alle pratiche a cui partecipano nella loro esperienza vissuta. Nell'ultima parte della tesi, metteremo alla prova la proposta teoretica sviluppata nelle parti precedenti attraverso un'analisi critica del pensiero di Alasdair MacIntyre.
Inclinazioni naturali: natura umana e prospettiva in prima persona tra tomismo e filosofia analitica / Codognato, Giulia. - (2024 May 14).
Inclinazioni naturali: natura umana e prospettiva in prima persona tra tomismo e filosofia analitica
CODOGNATO, GIULIA
2024-05-14
Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to show the relevance that Aquinas's theory of natural inclinations can play in the contemporary debate for the inquiry on human flourishing, which consists in the realisation of the proper end that human beings have as human beings. We will engage in dialogue with several authors, belonging to the analytic tradition (Elizabeth Anscombe, John Finnis, Ralph McInerny, Anthony Lisska) or, nevertheless, culturally close to it (Alasdair MacIntyre), who have reconsidered the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas in the contemporary debate in order to inquire what enables human flourishing. We will argue that the proper consideration of natural inclinations leads, on the one hand, to overcome the problems posed by Hume's law by identifying human nature as a normative criterion common to all human beings, and, on the other hand, to recognise the role of the first-person perspective in identifying what enables the human flourishing of each agent. Natural inclinations do not express agents' psychological preferences, but consist in the fact that human beings naturally tend towards the realisation of their nature as a good to be realised. In order to flourish, human beings are required to act in accordance with their natural inclinations, since natural inclinations are tendencies that human beings have towards a set of goods that are grounded in human nature. Revisiting a recent proposal put forward by Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum in the field of analytic metaphysics, we will argue that agents develop a virtuous conduct if and only if they act in accordance with their natural inclinations; in doing so, they flourish as human beings, that is, they actualise the powers they have by virtue of their nature. However, human beings are not strictly necessitated to act in accordance with their natural inclinations. Indeed, in order to flourish, agents should also recognise, by virtue of their rational capacities, that acting in accordance with their natural inclinations is a reason for acting for them and they should act in accordance with these reasons. Furthermore, we will argue that there is no single way to flourish for all human beings, because, although flourishing requires that human beings act in accordance with their nature, nevertheless, the way in which agents can flourish varies according to their individual characteristics and according to the circumstances and contexts in which they act, that is, according to the practices in which they participate in their lived experience. In the last part of this thesis, we will test the theoretical proposal developed in the previous parts through a critical analysis of Alasdair MacIntyre's thought.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
CODOGNATO Giulia_Tesi PhD_Inclinazioni naturali_Natura umana e prospettiva in prima persona tra tomismo e filosofia analitica.pdf
accesso aperto
Descrizione: CODOGNATO Giulia_Tesi PhD_Inclinazioni naturali_Natura umana e prospettiva in prima persona tra tomismo e filosofia analitica
Tipologia:
Tesi di dottorato
Dimensione
3.14 MB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
3.14 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
Pubblicazioni consigliate
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.