The paper deals with the received view, shared by many social scientists, of expected utility theory as a descriptive and prescriptive vision both of right action and of right procedure of thought. It states that in the classical formulation of the theory there are scarce hints for such a monistic interpretation, which does not pay justice to the pluralistic reality of the reason for action.
REASONS, ACTIONS, EXPECTED UTILITY, MOTIVATIONS
Pierpaolo Marrone
2024-01-01
Abstract
The paper deals with the received view, shared by many social scientists, of expected utility theory as a descriptive and prescriptive vision both of right action and of right procedure of thought. It states that in the classical formulation of the theory there are scarce hints for such a monistic interpretation, which does not pay justice to the pluralistic reality of the reason for action.File in questo prodotto:
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