The relationship between parliaments and governments during the Covid-19 pandemic has been closely examined by various disciplines, which have typically analysed data on the laws and procedures enforced to manage the emergency. This literature generally agrees that the government dominated the management of the pandemic, often at the expense of parliamentary prerogatives. However, such data may not be sufficiently detailed to fully grasp some nuances. Above all, they may provide limited information on the factors that influenced the balance of powers between the two institutions. This article focuses on the Italian case. It complements data on legislation with the findings of semi-structured interviews conducted with members of parliament and government, as well as high-ranking bureaucrats, to gain a more in-depth understanding of these processes. The data on legislation suggest that governmental dominance was strong at every stage of the emergency, although parliament slightly regained some prerogatives over time. This recovery began under Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, but it became more pronounced under Mario Draghi. The acquisition of knowledge about the pandemic was perceived by several interviewees as a factor that helped parliament regain some control, making it a possible outcome of a policy learning process. However, other factors also emerged as significant, such as the direct role of the prime ministers in strengthening the role of the executive and the difficulties of the technocratic members of the government in navigating parliamentary dynamics during Draghi’s tenure.
The government–parliament relationship in times of pandemic: the case of Italy
Gianluca Piccolino;Elisabetta De Giorgi
2025-01-01
Abstract
The relationship between parliaments and governments during the Covid-19 pandemic has been closely examined by various disciplines, which have typically analysed data on the laws and procedures enforced to manage the emergency. This literature generally agrees that the government dominated the management of the pandemic, often at the expense of parliamentary prerogatives. However, such data may not be sufficiently detailed to fully grasp some nuances. Above all, they may provide limited information on the factors that influenced the balance of powers between the two institutions. This article focuses on the Italian case. It complements data on legislation with the findings of semi-structured interviews conducted with members of parliament and government, as well as high-ranking bureaucrats, to gain a more in-depth understanding of these processes. The data on legislation suggest that governmental dominance was strong at every stage of the emergency, although parliament slightly regained some prerogatives over time. This recovery began under Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, but it became more pronounced under Mario Draghi. The acquisition of knowledge about the pandemic was perceived by several interviewees as a factor that helped parliament regain some control, making it a possible outcome of a policy learning process. However, other factors also emerged as significant, such as the direct role of the prime ministers in strengthening the role of the executive and the difficulties of the technocratic members of the government in navigating parliamentary dynamics during Draghi’s tenure.Pubblicazioni consigliate
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