The Red Sea crisis is often framed as a maritime security challenge centered on the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. This article argues that such a perspective obscures a deeper transformation: the emergence of an interconnected regional security arena linking the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, where terrestrial conflicts, maritime vulnerabilities, and external power competition have become increasingly inseparable. The analysis identifies three interrelated dynamics driving this transformation: the convergence of land and maritime security, the growing reliance on proxy governance rather than formal alliances, and the cross-border transmission of conflicts through overlapping political and security networks. Drawing on developments in Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia, including the contested al-Fashaqa borderland, the article demonstrates how local actors exploit external rivalries to enhance their bargaining power while simultaneously deepening regional fragmentation. It argues that power in the emerging Red Sea order is increasingly defined not simply by territorial control or freedom of navigation, but by the capacity to regulate access to strategic infrastructure, political networks, and connectivity. Understanding this evolving order therefore requires moving beyond conventional geographic and sectoral divisions to examine the Middle East and the Horn of Africa as a single, interconnected arena of competition and negotiated sovereignty.

Bab al-Mandeb Is Not the Story / Donelli, F.. - ELETTRONICO. - Vol. 9, no. 2:(2026), pp. 21-26. [10.5281/zenodo.23949857]

Bab al-Mandeb Is Not the Story

Federico Donelli
2026-01-01

Abstract

The Red Sea crisis is often framed as a maritime security challenge centered on the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. This article argues that such a perspective obscures a deeper transformation: the emergence of an interconnected regional security arena linking the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, where terrestrial conflicts, maritime vulnerabilities, and external power competition have become increasingly inseparable. The analysis identifies three interrelated dynamics driving this transformation: the convergence of land and maritime security, the growing reliance on proxy governance rather than formal alliances, and the cross-border transmission of conflicts through overlapping political and security networks. Drawing on developments in Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia, including the contested al-Fashaqa borderland, the article demonstrates how local actors exploit external rivalries to enhance their bargaining power while simultaneously deepening regional fragmentation. It argues that power in the emerging Red Sea order is increasingly defined not simply by territorial control or freedom of navigation, but by the capacity to regulate access to strategic infrastructure, political networks, and connectivity. Understanding this evolving order therefore requires moving beyond conventional geographic and sectoral divisions to examine the Middle East and the Horn of Africa as a single, interconnected arena of competition and negotiated sovereignty.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11368/3151698
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