When not ignored by scholars, Lotze’s logic is understood as an example of either psychologism or Platonism. As a matter of fact, despite his allowance for the topic of the origin of concepts, Lotze manages to avoid logical psychologism. At the same time, concepts cannot be said to have validity (Geltung) in the same way as propositions in themselves do: were this the case, one could actually ascribe Lotze a form of Platonism. Avoiding the crass dichotomy between realism and nominalism, Lotze works out a meticulous analysis of the relation between general concepts and our knowledge of reality, which is perfectly compliant with his teleological worldview

Platonismo o psicologismo? La filosofia della logica di Lotze

Riccardo Martinelli
2018-01-01

Abstract

When not ignored by scholars, Lotze’s logic is understood as an example of either psychologism or Platonism. As a matter of fact, despite his allowance for the topic of the origin of concepts, Lotze manages to avoid logical psychologism. At the same time, concepts cannot be said to have validity (Geltung) in the same way as propositions in themselves do: were this the case, one could actually ascribe Lotze a form of Platonism. Avoiding the crass dichotomy between realism and nominalism, Lotze works out a meticulous analysis of the relation between general concepts and our knowledge of reality, which is perfectly compliant with his teleological worldview
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11368/2922041
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