In this paper I examine some implications of Parfit’s non-metaphysical and cognitivist metaethics, especially his theory that the agents respond in non-causal manner to non-ontological properties, and the criticisms that are carried out from the evolutionary debunking argument. I conclude that a dispositionalist and realistic position in metaethics seems to fit better to our evolutionary history.
SUL COGNITIVISMO NON METAFISICO DI PARFIT
PIERPAOLO MARRONE
2019-01-01
Abstract
In this paper I examine some implications of Parfit’s non-metaphysical and cognitivist metaethics, especially his theory that the agents respond in non-causal manner to non-ontological properties, and the criticisms that are carried out from the evolutionary debunking argument. I conclude that a dispositionalist and realistic position in metaethics seems to fit better to our evolutionary history.File in questo prodotto:
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